
Class 
Book 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



THE 



ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



BY 

JUSTIN H. SMITH 

alithor of the troubadours at home, our struggle for the fourteenth colony, 

Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec, etc.; 

recently professor of modern history in dartmouth college 



NEW YORK 
THE BAKER AND TAYLOR CO. 
1911 






Copyright, 1911 
By Justin H. Smith 






Press of 

The New Era Printing Company 

Lancaster. Pa 



TO THE MEMORY OF 

DR. GEORGE PIERCE GARRISON 

AND TO 

ALL THOSE OTHER SCHOLARS WHOSE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE 
THROWN LIGHT UPON THE HISTORY OF TEXAS 

THIS VOLUME IS WITH GREAT RESPECT 

INSCRIBED 



PREFACE. 

The annexation of Texas, it can justly be said, was a very inter- 
esting, important, complicated and critical afifair. It involved issues 
and consequences of no little moment in our domestic politics. It 
gave us an area greater than England and France together, with a 
jx)rt that ranks very near the head of our list, and paved the way 
for the acquisition of San Francisco and our far Southwest. It 
led to our greatest and most brilliant foreign war. It extinguished 
a nation that might have become a strong and unfriendly rival and 
might have caused the disruption of the Union. It removed an 
excellent opportunity for certain leading European powers to inter- 
pose in the afifairs of this continent and in particular to embarrass 
the development of the United States. It presented a field of battle 
on which our diplomats and those of England, France, Mexico and 
Texas waged a long and intricate struggle with all their skill and 
with a full determination to succeed ; and it brought these five na- 
tions to the verge of war. Such an episode would appear to merit 
a detailed study, especially since very dififerent opinions regarding 
it still prevail ; and as the author, while gathering data for a history 
of our ^Mexican War, found many essential materials for a thorough 
treatment of the subject, he has felt under obligation to complete 
and present them. 

As the footnotes indicate, the monograph is based almost ex- 
clusively (with the exception of certain preliminary matters) on 
first-hand sources, though all previous works of any importance on 
the subject have been fully examined. Use has been made of sub- 
stantially all the diplomatic papers — American, British, French, 
Mexican and Texan — bearing upon the question, and also, as may 
be seen by the account of the Sources in the Appendix, a rather 
large amount of other valuable material both manuscript and printed, 
such as executive and legislative documents, letters, speeches, diaries 
and periodicals. All discoverable sources of information, indeed, 
have been examined. In this way a closer approach to complete- 
ness has been attainable, and at the same time it has been possible 
to avoid errors into which a writer depending upon a portion of the 
data would not infrequently fall without even suspecting danger. 



VI PREFACE. 

Secondly, by making a painstaking study of public opinion in the 
countries chiefly concerned it has been feasible to ascertain the 
causes which controlled or influenced oflicial action in certain impor- 
tant cases. Thirdly, attention has been paid to a number of sub- 
sidiary topics which throw a strong light upon the subject. Such 
are the British designs with reference to slavery in Texas and the 
United States, the political condition of northern Mexico at this 
period, the possibilities before Texas as an independent nation, the 
danger to the United States involved in her permanent nationality, 
the scheme of a new confederacy, the status and influence of the 
annexation issue in the politics of this country, and several others. 
Fourthly, the desire has been to avoid leaving the matter, as it is 
easy to do when using first-hand sources, in such a condition that the 
reader could not see the forest for the trees. And finally a strong 
and long-continued effort has been made to secure not only complete- 
ness but accuracy. Of course perfection has not been reached, 
however, and it is hoped that all mistakes may be pointed out. The 
truth of history is surely more important than a writer's dream of an 
impossible inerrancy, and serious criticism, based upon knowledge, 
is co-operation of a most useful kind. 

Those who were pleased to commend the style of the author's 
latest work. Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, may feel sur- 
prised that the present volume is so different. It seems to him 
clear, however, that one's manner of writing should depend on one's 
subject and object. In the former case his dominant theme was. 
the early, impulsive stage of a popular revolution in the name of 
Liberty, and his principal business was to recount the out-door 
proceedings — often peculiarly dramatic and exciting — of ardent and 
f reciuently somewhat crude young men ; whereas at present his 
concern is with diplomats and statesmen pursuing with dignity and 
deliberation their profoundly studied lines of policy. The earlier 
book, in order to make the extraordinary facts entirely compre- 
hensible to minds quite unfamiliar with such a state of things, en- 
deavored to place its readers in the thick of events and impart in 
some degree a sense of the agitation and enthusiasm of the time, 
to which end a vivid and rather highly colored style, answering to 
the character of the persons and events presented, seemed appro- 
priate and even necessary ; but now one is occupied with complicated 
intellectual efforts of a high order, which are best viewed from an 



PREFACE. Vll 

elevation and a distance; and these require only to be made known 
as clearly, calmly and unobtrusively as possible. 

The footnotes cover all the statements of the text except a few 
matters of common knowledge, but of course a fact once proved is 
not proved again. To some readers the number of references will 
seem unnecessarily great, and so they appear to the author himself. 
But as almost every foot of the ground is controversial, the per- 
centage that could safely be omitted is rather small, and the saving 
would hardly justify the abandonment of a complete and logical 
system for one of the opposite character. In order not to fill the 
page with annoying figures, the references — standing in the order 
of the statements they support — are grouped by paragraphs, and an 
indication of the bearing of the reference is given when this is not 
obvious. Naturally in some cases a citation confirms more than a 
single sentence, and it should be remembered, too, that for reasons 
of convenience the first page of a document is the one specified 
unless there is a particular occasion for doing otherwise. To carry 
such a body of figures with perfect accuracy through the processes 
of compiling, revising, copying and printing is extremely difficult, 
especially as the author's attention is liable to be diverted momen- 
tarily from the mathematics to the meaning of the citation ; but it 
can be said that unsparing pains have been taken to ensure correct- 
ness, and that a trained historical worker has gone over the entire 
work of verification independently. 

While engaged on this investigation at the Public Record Office, 
London, the author was so fortunate as to have for neighbor Dr. 
Ephraim Douglass Adams, the fruit of whose researches, covering 
to a small extent the same ground as this volume, has recently been 
offered to the public. As it fell to the present writer in another 
place to view that monograph, British Interests and Activities in 
Texas, in the manner which it invited by describing itself as " purely 
technical," he will only say here — though it does not need to be 
said — that anything coming from such a source deserves very care- 
ful attention, and express the hope that all concerned with Texan 
history will read the l)ook. One cannot help wishing that Professor 
Adams's investigations had extended to the Texan, Mexican and 
American archives. Mention must also be made of an interesting 
and valuable work by Dr. Jesse S. Reeves, entitled American Diplo- 
macy imder Tyler and Polk, based largely on documents which he 
as well as the present writer was permitted to examine at the State 



Vlll PREFACE. 

Department, Washington. Neither of these volumes, it is proper to 
add, was read by the author of The Annexation of Texas until 
after the completion of his Own manuscript. In this place, too, the 
important investigations conducted by a number of Texan scholars 
and made known to the public in various learned periodicals, notably 
the Quarterly of their State Historical Association, are entitled to a 
grateful and very respectful recognition. 

Finally the author desires to acknowledge with the highest appre- 
ciation the indispensable assistance of President Roosevelt. Presi- 
dent Diaz, Secretary of State Root, Minister of Foreign Relations 
Mariscal, Senator Lodge, and Ambassadors Reid at London, White 
at Paris and Clayton at Mexico; and to express a warm sense of 
obligation to his distinguished friends Dr. J. Franklin Jameson, Mr. 
Worthington C. Ford and Mr. Gaillard Hunt for aid in his search 
for documents. To the man}- others who have kindly co-operated 
in minor yet important ways, particularly by granting permission 
to examine the MSS. in their custody, his thanks are likewise very 
cordiallv tendered. 

J. H. S. 

Boston, July 26, 191 1. 



CONTENTS. 

I. The Beginnings of the Annexation Question ... i 

II. Texas and Mexico, 1836-1843 34 

III. Texas and the United States, 1836-1843 52 

IV. Texas and Europe, 1836-1843 76. 

V. Tyler Desires to Effect Annexation loi 

VL Tyler Proposes Annexation 116 

VII. Foreshadowings of the Annexation Struggle .... 130 

VIII. The Annexation Treaty is Negotiated 147 

IX. The Annexation Issue is Placed before the 

Country 180 

X. The Administration Changes Front 194 

XI. The Negotiations are Made Public 221 

XII. The Annexation Question is Thrown into Politics 234 

XIII. The Fate of the Treaty 258 

XIV. The Issue is Re-shaped 281 

XV. The Annexation Question in the Presidential 

Campaign 297 

XVI. Annexation is Offered to Texas 322 

XVII. The Attitude of Rejected Texas 356 

XVIII. The Policy of England and France in Reference 

to the Annexation of Texas 382 

XIX. The Annexation Question before Mexico 414 

XX. The Crisis 432 

XXI. Annexation is Consummated 462 



IX 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



I. 

The Beginnings of the Annexation Question 

First of all, in approaching our difficult subject, it will be useful 
to refresh the memory regarding certain main facts of Mexican 
history. The outbreak of the revolt against Spain took place in 
1810; and in September, 1821, Iturbide, the brilliant leader of the 
revolutionary forces, entered the capital in triumph. Eight months 
later, after much political wrangling, he was proclaimed Emperor 
by some of his troops, and this usurpation was grudgingly, but of 
necessity, ratified by the Constituent Congress then in session. 
Before long, however, a military officer at Vera Cruz named Santa 
Anna, who had fallen out with Iturbide and understood how much 
hostility against the Emperor there was, revolted in favor of a 
republican system ; and, as the insurrection proved successful, Itur- 
bide soon resigned the throne and left the country. In October, 
1824, a federal constitution, based in a considerable measure upon 
that of the United States, was proclaimed; and Victoria, elected 
President under this organic law, served his term without inter- 
ruption.^ 

' General Note, — The text is based mainly on diplomatic correspondence, and 
when nothing to the contrary is indicated in the footnotes, it may be understood 
that a despatch to a minister or consul proceeded from the foreign affairs depart- 
ment of his government, and that a despatch from such an official was addressed 
to that department. Thus "To Butler, Sept. 28, 1833," means a despatch from the 
American department of State to Butler, and " Butler, Jan. 10, 1832," means a 
despatch from him to the department. Also, if nothing to the contrary is indi- 
cated, it may be assumed that the documents are to be found as follows : Amer- 
ican despatches in the archives of the State department at Washington ; British 
at the Public Record Office, London, in the Foreign Office volumes ; Mexican in the 
archives of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City ; and Texan in 
two volumes entitled Texan Diplomatic Correspondence published by the Amer- 
ican Historical Association. The French archives for the annexation period are 
not accessible ; but all the essential documents have, it is believed, been discovered. 
Some were printed in French periodicals ; some exist in the American or Mexican 
archives ; and since England and France co-operated in the Texas affair, a much 
larger number are filed in the British records. As a rule the printed version of 
a document is cited, if it has been published in full and with substantial accuracy ; 
and in these cases the reader is of course informed where to look for it. In a few 
cases, it will be seen, no numbers are attached to despatches, but any one who 
looks up the references given will easily find them. 

2 I 



2 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

In 1828 Pedraza was chosen in his place, but a revolution forced 
Congress to annul the election and give the office of chief magistrate 
to the popular soldier, Guerrero. During the summer of 1829 a 
Spanish expedition, designed to bring Mexico back to her allegiance, 
landed on the coast, but from a variety of causes, among which was 
incompetence and perhaps was treachery, finally surrendered ; and 
Santa Anna, the Mexican leader, became a popular hero. In the 
following December Bustamante, though he occupied the second 
place in the government, organized a revolution; and Guerrero, after 
a brief struggle, took flight, was treacherously captured and was shot. 
Three years later an uprising engineered by Santa Anna overthrew 
Bustamante in turn, and the victor was soon afterwards elected 
President. Before long he nullified acts of Congress, forbade that 
body to assemble, changed State and city administrations at his will, 
and sanctioned a revolutionary Plan that pointed to him as the one 

The American Secretaries of State principally concerned were Forsyth, Webster, 
Upshur, Calhoun and Buchanan. The American ministers most frequently men- 
tioned were Everett at London, King and Martin (charge) at Paris, Ellis, Thomp- 
son and Green (charge) at Mexico, and in Texas the charges La Branche, Eve, 
Murphy, Howard and Donelson. The British foreign minister chiefly concerned 
was Lord Aberdeen ; and the principal British representatives abroad were Cowley 
at Paris, Fox and then Pakenham at Washington, Pakenham and then Bankhead 
(and Doyle, charge) at Mexico, and Elliot and Kennedy (consul) in Texas. The 
leading Mexican Ministers of Foreign Relations during the period were Bocanegra, 
Rejon and Cuevas ; and the principal representatives abroad, Almonte at Washing- 
ton, Arrangoiz (consul) at New Orleans, Murphy at London and Garro at Paris. 
The Texan Secretaries of State requiring mention here were Jones, Ashbel Smith 
and Allen ; and the chief representatives in foreign parts Reily, Van Zandt, Hender- 
son and Raymond (charge) at Washington, and Henderson, Ashbel Smith and 
Terrell in England and France. The French minister of foreign affairs was 
Guizot ; and the most important foreign representatives in the field of this history 
were Sainte Aulaire at London, Pageot at Washington, Cyprey at Mexico, and 
Saligny in Texas. In the case of all officials not named above, the needed indi- 
cations are given in the footnotes. 

To avoid marring the text with innumerable figures, the references, standing 
in the order of the statements they support, are grouped by paragraphs, and when 
it has seemed necessary, a catch-word has been introduced to indicate the bearing 
of the citation. As a rule a document is cited only once, even though used more 
than once, in the notes of a paragraph, but if used in the next paragraph it is again 
cited. 

The following abbreviations, besides a few that require no explanation, have 
been used in the footnotes: Adv., Advertiser; arch., archives; Bank., Bankhead ; 
Buch., Buchanan; Bull., Bulletin; Com., Commercial; conf., confidential; con., 
consular; Const., Constitutionnel ; corn, correspondence ; Crit., Crittenden ; Debats, 
Journal des Debats; desp., despatch; Diario, Diario del Gobierno Mexicano ; dipl., 
diplomatic; Don., Donelson; Enq., Enquirer; F. O., Foreign Office (British); 
Hend., Henderson ; Intell., Intelligencer ; Journ., Journal; leg., legation; Lib., 
Liberator; Madis., Madisonian ; Memor., Memoranda; min., minister; Nat., 
National; Niles, Niles' Register; Pap., Papers; Penn., Pennsylvanian; Pub. Rec. 
Off., Public Record Office; Relac, Relaciones ; Remin., Reminiscences ; Repub., 
Republican; res., reservada ; Spect., Spectator; Sria., Secretaria ; Van B., Van 
Buren ; Van Z., Van Zandt. 

In the List of Sources will be found full titles, dates of editions, etc., of the 
publications cited. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 3 

source of authority. In effect he thus became dictator; and a new 
Congress, elected under these auspices, was ready of course to 
accept his acts. A centraHzed form of government was now 
adopted in place of the federal system, and in October, 1835, the 
State legislatures were replaced with Departmental councils.- 

April 28, 1836, Spain acknowledged the independence of Mexico. 
The following year, Santa Anna having been defeated and cap- 
tured by the Texans, Bustamante came again to the head of afifairs ; 
but at one time a revolt at the capital — finally quelled — succeeded in 
taking possession of the palace and making him a prisoner. The 
French war of 1838 cost Santa Anna a leg but made him once more 
the idol of the nation; and in 1841 a fresh revolution gave him a 
virtual dictatorship. It was proposed, however, to draw up a legal 
constitution later, and the following year a Congress met for this 
purpose ; but it was forcibly dissolved. Early in 1844 Santa Anna 
exchanged his dictatorship for a constitutional presidency, but in 
December, having exhausted the patience of the nation, he was 
overthrown by a truly popular outbreak and Herrera succeeded him. 
A closer examination of the history would show many instances 
"in which, no less truly than by force of arms, the constitution 
and the laws were nullified in high official action ; but this bare cata- 
logue of essential facts is enough to prove that in reality that interest- 
ing but " unfortunate " country, as its public men of all shades con- 
curred for many years in styling it, possessed at this time neither 
law nor constitution, and that its government was conducted in a 
manner to which no American could possibly have felt reconciled. 

Next in order comes naturally a recapitulation of the principal 
incidents of early .Texan history. This brings us at once to the 
cauldron of anti-slavery agitation ; and, in order to understand the 
subject, we must endeavor to realize the two points of view in that 
controversy. In both cases this is done with difficulty. On the one 
side it shocks us to find men of intellect and station laboring de- 
liberately in the cause of human slavery, and many of us can hardly 
view anything done by them without a sense of distrust. We are 
ourselves, however, in somewhat the same situation as were they. 
Our competitive social system admittedly inflicts much sufifering and 
many wrongs, while it rewards with honors and wealth not a few 
who rank low if judged by the moral and intellectual standards we 

- So much of the early part of this chapter concerns matters of common knowl- 
edge that few references are needed. (Overthrow of the constitution, etc.) 
Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 143 ; Yoakum, Texas, i., 366 ; Mexico a traves, iv., 

340-345- 



4 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

profess to believe in. With more or less justice pictures of life 
about us rivalling in blackness any from Uncle Tom's Cabin can be 
drawn, and the victims are often of a far more sensitive quality than 
were the slaves. Yet we do nothing about the matter, disclaiming 
responsibility for a regime thrust upon us, and honestly believing 
that its destruction would do vastly more harm than good. Just so 
the slaveholder defended himself; and in addition he pointed to the 
recognition of his system, not only by thinkers like Plato, but by 
the New Testament and the American constitution, his loftiest 
standards of moral and political wisdom. Doubtless we can detect 
the fallacies in his argument, but there are persons who ofifer to 
do as much for ours; and this thought may reasonably help us to 
view with some charity the Southern practices of a former day. 

On the other side, we are staggered to find men of pure char- 
acter and noble aims asserting mere suspicions as positive facts, 
trampling rough-shod on the dearest sentiments and interests of 
fellow-countrymen, exerting their utmost efforts to discredit their 
lawful rulers, and in some cases espousing the side of any nation 
that seemed ready to attack their own. But here again harsh 
criticism would of course be an error. These individuals, looking 
at things with the singleness of vision common among reformers, 
viewed slavery with such horror that upholders of it appeared to 
them capable of almost any crime. As many inner facts of our 
politics and diplomacy could not at the time be fully revealed, they 
were very much in the dark. It therefore seemed entirely justifiable 
to place the worst construction upon all mysterious doings of the 
other party, and quite proper to secure the aid of their sleepy neigh- 
bors by shouting " Fire ! " at the first sign of a spark. In particular, 
they believed that the annexation of Texas meant the infernal con- 
secration of the United States to a blood-stained and ruinous career 
of aggression in the interest of slavery. Dr. William E. Channing, 
a noted clergyman of Boston, said, " Our Eagle will whet, not gorge, 
his appetite on his first victim, and will snuff a more tempting 
quarry, more alluring food, in every new region which opens south- 
ward " ; John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary : " The annexation 
of Texas to this Union is the first step to the conquest of all Mexico, 
of the West Indies, of a maritime, colonizing, slave-tainted mon- 
archy, and of extinguished freedom " ; and one can hardly be 
surprised that in such a mood patriots and philanthropists could not 
wait for the slow investigation and careful balancing of facts, even 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 5 

SO far as the evidence was at that time accessible. For us, how- 
ever, the institution of slavery is neither an interest to be defended 
nor an outrage to be denounced, but merely a bygone state of 
things, through which — as through many another unfortunate con- 
dition of society — the evolution of the human race has carried it ; 
and we can therefore devote ourselves to an investigation of our 
subject with no prejudice except in favor of historic truth.^ 

Near the close of the seventeenth century, a Canadian seigneur 
named La Salle planted a colony on the Texas coast near the mouth 
of the Colorado river; and this achievement gave France a claim to 
a broad but vaguely defined region in that quarter, included under 
the name Louisiana. The United States asserted for many years 
that the title extended to the next large stream, the Rio Grande, 
and there are indications that France held the same view. Here, 
however, it need only be said that in such cases the right from 
discovery has a wide yet not unlimited reach, and that the claims 
of the United States are now generally regarded as too broad. In 
1763 Louisiana was transferred to Spain, in 1801 was retroceded, 
and finally in 1803 was purchased by the United States. Article 
IIL of the treaty by which we secured it read as follows : " The 
inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the 
Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible accord- 
ing to the principles of the Federal Constitution to the enjoymtnt 
of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the 
United States. ..." Texas, however, had been and continued to 
be under Spanish jurisdiction; and it shared to some extent in the 
Mexican revolution.* 

In 1819 the United States surrendered, as part of the considera- 
tion for Florida, whatever territory we possessed beyond the Sabine, 
the language of the treaty being as follows : " The United States 
hereby cede to His Catholic Majesty, and renounce forever, all their 
rights, claims, and pretensions to the Territories lying West and 
South of the above described Line ; and, in like manner, His Catholic 
Majesty cedes to the said United States all his rights, claims, and 
pretensions, to any Territories, East and North of the said Line, 

' (Channing) Jay, Mexican War, io6. Adams, Memoirs, xii., 49. It is 
rather curious to note that the denunciations of the annexation project uttered by 
eloquent men like Channing and Adams continue to exert their influence, both 
directly and by reflection in the works of other writers, although time has shown 
how far astray were the apprehensions upon which they were based. 

* (La Salle) Garrison, Texas, 21. (Claim based upon La Salle's expedition) 
Winsor, America, vii., 551. Treaties in Force, 176. Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 4, 17. 



6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

and for himself, his heirs, and successors, renounces all claim to 
the said Territories forever."^ 

Now there appears at once to be something wrong here. This 
language implies that the United States had extended west of the 
Sabine, and if they had, the territory owned there was a part of 
Louisiana ; so that, as we had promised to admit to the Union all 
the inhabitants of Louisiana, we had no right to make the cession 
of 1819. In reply, it has been argued that in reality no cession 
took place ; that such phaseology was employed to make it look 
as if Spain were getting something in that quarter and so reconcile 
her to the surrender of Florida. But in fact she seems to have 
admitted that we had a valid claim to territory beyond the Sabine, 
so that a real surrender of ownership would appear to have taken 
place on the part of the United States." 

At any rate, these two treaties gave rise later to certain views 
which were so interwoven with the issue of annexation that it 
is well to explain them on the threshold. The wording of 1819 
seemed to many a proof, confirmed by the arguments put forth on 
our part in the preceding discussions with Spain, that Texas had 
formerly belonged to the United States ; and the point that at 
most Spain conceded our claim to but a part of the region covered 
by that name was easily overlooked. Hence arose the term " re- 
annexation," which became very popular with the advocates of the 
measure, because it seemed to imply that were Texas acquired, we 
should only be recovering our own, and also because it appeared 
to ease the constitutional difficulty of introducing a foreign state 
into the LTnion. The additional fact that Spain was probably willing 
in 1819 to let us have certain territory beyond the Sabine made men 
feel that the United States had somehow been defrauded ; and the 
evidence, including a letter from President Monroe himself, that 
so great a sacrifice was deliberately made to please New England, 
naturally intensified this feeling in the Southwest. Further it was 
often argued that since the L'nited States were bound to admit the 
people of Louisiana to the L'nion, the cession of 1819 was void, and 
Texas (all of it, so men assumed) continued to be ours. If this 
was the correct view, the revolution of 1836 was an insurrection 
against the United States, which our government could not possibly 

^ Treaties in Force. 594. 

' Onis, the Spanish representative, claimed credit for having obtained a more 
valuable territory in exchange for Florida : Woodbury, Works, i., 362 ; Onis. 
Memoria. 1820. (See also For-um. July, 1901, p. 537.) 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 7 

recognize ; but no one observed this. Moreover, if the treaty was 
invalid, Florida still belonged to Spain ; but nobody thought of 
returning Florida, and in fact that could not be done. Technically, 
then, a wrong had perhaps been inflicted upon a very small number 
of persons residing in northeastern Texas ; but far more harm 
would have been caused by upsetting the treaty of 1819, and the 
only practicable course was to abide by that agreement. The United 
States, therefore, could no longer assert the slightest claim to any 
territory beyond the Sabine.'^ 

To complicate matters, however, certain Americans who had 
crept into Texas and remained there unmolested, rebelled soon 
after this treaty was made, because — as they alleged — their expecta- 
tion of being incorporated in the United States had been frustrated 
by the agreement with Spain, and the only resource left them was to 
become independent. It is by no means clear that such newcomers 
could fairly appeal to the promise of 1803, but it was easy and 
perhaps natural to describe their action as a protest on the part of 
Texas against the cession to Spain ; and thus was reinforced con- 
siderably the feeling that the territory still belonged of right to the 
United States. Another view also grew out of these facts. It was 
held by some that, as the United States did not admit Texas to the 
Union yet possessed no power to surrender it, the region became 
dc facto independent, simply because no nation could maintain a 
claim to it. In reality this and all the other theories are to be 
brushed aside. Texas belonged to Spain ; it recognized the Spanish 
government; and the application of Moses Austin for permission to 
plant a colony there was made to and granted by the Spanish author- 
ities. Yet it is useful to see how easily many honest and fairly 
intelligent men could lose themselves, especially when influenced by 
feeling, in these convenient and somewhat plausible ideas.* 

As Mexico succeeded to the authority of Spain, Texas became 
inevitably Mexican, and this connection was further proved by her 
sharing in the rebellion against the mother covmtry and by her send- 
ing a representative to the Constituent Congress of 1824. When the 
federal constitution was adopted, not having enough population 
to stand by herself, she was made a part of the compound State 
Coahuila-Texas (Coahuila y Tejas), with a distinct intimation that 
later she was to be given a constitution of her own. Now all the 

'Monroe to Jefferson, May, 1820: Wash. Globe. Feb. 17, 1845 (see also 
Madis., April 15, 1844). 

' Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 47, 48, 60. 



8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

States of the confederation, Coahuila-Texas like the rest, were 
termed sovereign and independent; and hence it came to be urged 
sometimes in discussing annexation that Texas, even under Mexican 
rule, was really independent. This view, however, arose from a 
misconception. During the rule of Spain these States — such of 
them as had at that time a distinct existence and a name — were 
merely provinces, with no pretensions to mutual independence. 
Their position was, therefore, very different from that of the 
British-American colonies. But when the federal constitution was 
drawn up, it became necessary to assume that there were separate 
political entities to combine, for otherwise a confederation was im- 
possible, and hence they were called forth into a theoretical exist- 
ence. In reality the States, despite their high-sounding titles, were 
still neither sovereign nor independent. Some of them, notably 
Yucatan, undertook to apply the theory under the form of seces- 
sion ; but such a step was the signal for war. In a word, then, 
Texas, while she remained a part of Mexico, had no real title to 
sovereignty ; and this was the more true because she was not an 
actual but only a prospective State. ^ 

In 1825 President Adams and Henry Clay, then Secretary of 
State, undertook to acquire the whole or a large part of Texas by 
negotiation with Mexico, and the desire of our government to obtain 
the territory was enough to cause alarm. Moreover Ward, the 
British representative at Mexico, now began to warn the authorities 
against the danger of permitting Americans to settle beyond the 
Sabine; and Tornel, one of the most active and ingenious of the 
Mexican public men and peculiarly unfriendly toward the United 
States, who was now a Deputy in Congress and private secretary of 
the President, may safely be presumed to have supported that view. 
The following year a small rebellion of American settlers took place 
in Texas, as a result of the arbitrary and illegal action of the 
authorities, and this was distinctly ominous. Orders were therefore 
issued in 1827 and 1828 for the purpose of preventing or hindering 

'Yoakum, Texas, i., 301, note. (Const. Cong.) Sedgwick, Thoughts, 5, note. 
(Intimation) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 131. (Urged) Richardson, Messages, iv., 
479 ; Woodbury, Works, i., 363. The character of local popular sovereignty in 
Mexico is illustrated by the constitution of Coahuila-Texas, which after declaring 
that the political sovereignty resided in the people added: "but they shall not of 
themselves exercise any other acts of sovereignty than those indicated in this con- 
stitution, and in the form which it prescribes" (Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 85). See 
Mayer, War between Mexico and the U. S., 2-}. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 9 

the immigration of our citizens, but the execution of them was not 
at all efficient. ^° 

Up to the year 1829 negro slavery existed in Mexico. It was 
not prevalent, however, for a more profitable system occupied the 
ground. The Indians were kept in a state of virtual serfdom known 
as peonage, which was about as convenient and did not require the 
master to care for his laborers in sickness and old age. In Texas, 
on the other hand, this resource was not available. Consequently, 
since proprietors could not develop large estates without assistance 
and the free helpers were naturally few, the country could have been 
improved but very tardily without slaves. Besides, most of the 
settlers came from the southern States, and were accustomed to no 
other kind of labor. For these reasons slavery was carried into 
Texas. President Guerrero, emphatically a scion of the common 
people, appears to have thought that a decree of emancipation would 
be an easy device to please the masses, win glory abroad, gratify 
his own liberal instincts, and prevent or greatly discourage the 
immigration of Americans into Texas. As he felt somewhat com- 
promised by his intimacy with the American minister, Tornel prob- 
ably urged that he could silence in this way the tongue of calumny, 
and possibly still other considerations pointed in the same direction. 
In 1829, therefore, in accordance with a policy initiated five years 
before, the abolition of slavery was proclaimed. North of the Rio 
Grande, however, this measure excited strong opposition. Stephen 
F. Austin, the political chief of the Department and the Governor 
of the State, all protested ; and after a time the Texans were ex- 
empted from the efifects of the edict.^^ 

In 1829 Jackson and his Secretary of State, Van Buren, undertook 
to purchase Texas, and the efifort was continued for several years 
with great secrecy. Very naturally this renewed attempt to obtain 
the territory excited fresh apprehensions ; and early in 1830 Alaman, 
the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, took hold of the situa- 
tion somewhat vigorously. In consequence of his initiative, a decree 
was enacted in April forbidding entrance from the north without a 
Mexican passport, forbidding the introduction of slaves, and prac- 

' ^'Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 88. Ward to F. O., Sept. 22, 1825: F. O., 
Mexico, xiv. (Tornel) Pak., No. 6, May 7, 1827. (Rebellion, orders) Bancroft, 
Pac. States, xi., 103-110, 113. See also Tornel, Reseiia, 85. 

"Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 90-92. Poinsett's reports, passim: State Dept. 
Garrison, Texas, 158, 172, 173. Niles, xxxviii., 291. Frederic Leclerc (Revue des 
Deux Mondes, April 15, 1840, p. 220) said that Guerrero's decree " certainly broke 
one of the conditions " which had drawrr the Americans to Texas. 



10 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

tically forbidding — so far as valid outstanding contracts permitted 
— all American colonization in Texas. It was also resolved to send 
up convicts with a view to their becoming residents at the end of 
their term ; and still other measures were decided upon in the hope 
of confirming the grip of Mexico upon that region. General Teran 
was despatched with troops to enforce the law; military posts were 
established ; and garrisons, chiefly composed of felons, occupied 
them. Some recently arrived immigrants were expelled ; some 
intending settlers were stopped at the border ; and only three colonies 
were permitted from that time on to receive Americans.^- 

The term of years during which various articles needed by the 
colonists could be imported free of duty had just expired, and the 
customs were now collected in a tyrannical manner. Indeed Teran 
interfered arbitrarily in civil affairs, and the soldiery perpetrated 
many outrages. To render the situation even worse the State, in 
which Texas formed only one of several Departments, was entirely 
governed by the Mexican element. In various ways Texan interests, 
being very different from those of Coahuila, were sacrificed to 
gratify the majority; and in 1832 the legislature passed a law em- 
bodying the harsh spirit of the national decree of 1830. On all 
these grounds the settlers felt discontented, and at times they ex- 
pressed their dissatisfaction in ways that were violent and illegal. 
This was undoubtedly wrong; but in a country where the supreme 
law was the law of strength, it would have been astonishing indeed 
had the bold, enterprising Americans been always tame and punctil- 
ious. The greater fault was undoubtedly that of Mexico, which had 
suddenly changed a policy of neglect into one of outrage and 
oppression. ^^ 

Santa Anna, probably in order to keep the Texans quiet while 
he was establishing his autocratic power, showed a conciliatory 
spirit, however ; and some influential Mexicans favored the adoption 
of a liberal policy towards the settlers, because — as the British 
minister reported — they owned large grants which they desired an 
opportunity to sell at a good price. In 1833 the prohibition against 

'* According to J. Q. Adams (Memoirs, ix., 377). Forsyth told him that no 
proposition to purchase Texas was ever made by the U. S. ; but the Mexican gov- 
ernment must have known what we had in view. Butler to Jackson, July 28, 1843 : 
Jackson Pap. Alaman, Mexico, v., 663. Garrison, Texas, 170, 173-174. The 
exemption of the Texans from Indian attacks, really due to their prowess, excited 
suspicion in Mexico: Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 90. (Felons) Visit to Texas, 112; 
Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 115. 

"Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 114-116, 118, 132 ct scq. Garrison, Texas, 176 
et seq. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION II 

the entry of Americans was repealed, and the State authorities were 
urged to deal more fairly with the minority. At one time Austin, 
who visited the city of Mexico that year as delegate to obtain a 
separate organization for Texas, felt hopeful regarding the inten- 
tions of the national government ; while on the other hand he and 
other Texans assured the British minister that on general principles 
— though determined to have no more Mexican troops among them 
and to maintain the titles of those Americans who had come into 
the country since the passage of the prohibitory law — the settlers 
had no desire to assert their independence.^"* 

But after a time Santa Anna's purposes ripened, and the federal 
system was doomed. The great State of Zacatecas, which dared to 
oppose him, was brutally crushed. Coahuila-Texas also claimed 
the rights given by the old constitution ; and in consequence of 
this attitude her lawful authorities were deposed, members of the 
legislature who remained within reach were arrested and banished, 
and a new Governor was appointed. The feeling in other parts of 
Mexico as well, against the destruction of the organic law, was 
strong. The State of Tamaulipas in particular would no doubt have 
been glad to resist, as may easily be inferred from the later conduct 
of the people ; but a considerable force of Mexican troops, main- 
tained at Matamoros, overawed it. Federalist leaders and Federalist 
manifiestos commonly spoke of annexation to the United States as 
preferable to an acceptance of Santa Anna's tyrannical rule ; and 
even in the dictator's own State the change of system produced an 
outbreak. To expect the American settlers to accept it willingly 
would have been absurd. Not only was the overthrow of the liberal 
regime by a military chieftain every way ominous, but one of 
the new laws justified the worst anticipations. It was decreed that 
the militia should be reduced to one man for every five hundred of 
the population, and that all citizens not enrolled in it must surrender 
their arms. Obedience to this order would have left the colonists 
almost helpless against the outrages of Mexico's convict soldiery 
and the bloody forays of the Indians. Under the circumstances their 
acceptance of such a decree was practically unthinkable.^^ 

At first the advocates of resistance in Texas, though clamorous, 

"Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 137. Pak., No. 60, Oct. 5, 1833. In 1833 the 
Texan " Consultation " voted by more than two to one for the constitution of 1824 
in preference to independence. 

"Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 153, 152, 155. (At Matamoros) Crawford to F. O., 
April 4, 1837: F. O., Mexico, cvi. Pak., No. 47, July 26, 1834; No. 95, 
Dec. 21, 1836. (Militia, etc.) Mexico a traves, iv., 353, 340-345. 



12 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

were but few, while a party equally determined, which sided 
with the mother-country, opposed them, and the mass of the 
population desired to stand aloof from all political troubles. 
No doubt the American settlers had little sympathy with the 
Mexicans — particularly the kind of Mexicans near them — and 
felt drawn toward their kindred in the United States. It seems 
very possible, indeed, that many and perhaps most of them 
looked forward to an eventual reunion with their native country 
as desirable. In talking with Butler, the American repre- 
sentative at Mexico, Austin was naturally more frank than in con- 
versation with the British minister ; and Butler reported him as 
saying that all anticipated a separation from Mexico at some future 
day. A common view appears to have been that a permanent union 
between races differing so radically was impossible, and that in time, 
when the American element had become strong, secession could be 
effected with little or no bloodshed. But this condition of things 
had not yet arrived. General Wavell, an Englishman in the service 
of Mexico, visited Texas in 1832, and he became satisfied that the 
principal settlers did not wish to sever their connection with the 
metropolis. Morfit, sent down by the American State department 
in 1836 to investigate the situation, reported that since they had 
declared their independence the feelings of the Texans had " entirely 
changed," and they had now come to " look for no affiliation but 
with the United States," which implies that previously their senti- 
ment had been favorable to a continuance of Mexican rule. In 
1835 the Texans pledged themselves most solemnly to support the 
old constitution, and the Declaration of Independence that soon 
followed might no doubt have been prevented by taking them at their 
word. In fact, the immortal heroes of the Alamo died under the 
Mexican flag, fighting for the organic law of 1824. Whatever, then, 
were the dreams of many settlers and even the purposes of a few, 
some of whom may have crossed the Sabine with the deliberate aim 
of endeavoring to bring their new home under their old flag, it 
seems clear that an overwhelming majority of the people had no 
desire for the breach that actually occurred. ^'^ 

'" An examination of the documents relating to the Texan revolution appears to 
show that the people had no predetermined aim in view and slowly felt their way 
(So. Hist. Soc. Assoc, vii., viii.). (Three parties) So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v., 451. 
Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 155. Butler to Jackson, Oct. 2, 1833: Jackson Pap. 
(View) Foote, Texas, ii., 10. Yoakum, Texas, i., 312. Wavell, Memoir: F. O., 
Texas, xi. Morfit to Forsyth, No. 7, Sept. 6, 1836: State Dept., Desps. from Mins.. 
Texas, i. (1835) Garrison, Texas, 196, 197. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION I3 

But, as was almost unavoidable, the friction increased. The 
course of things was somewhat like that in the American colonies 
during the years preceding our revolution, but here the mutual dis- 
trust was aggravated by profound differences of race, ideas and 
customs. As Frederic Leclerc explained in the Revue des Deux 
Mondes, " The most hostile acts and the most compromising deci- 
sions, sometimes not intended on either side but resulting inevitably 
from the situation, followed one another, blow for blow." More and 
more of the Texans joined in the opposition to the new regime. 
More and more it became evident that no support in the stand for the 
old constitution could be expected from other parts of the country. 
And finally, when it became known that Santa Anna's bloody troops 
were coming from Zacatecas and that orders had been issued to 
seize the leaders of the Texan opposition, it was felt that nothing 
remained save a choice between destruction and resistance. March 
2, 1836, the settlers therefore declared themselves independent; and 
their catalogue of grievances, though naturally marred by exaggera- 
tions, gives reasons enough for the step. Morfit wrote to the 
American Executive as follows: "The question is then asked by 
the Texans : is a nation, which is incapable of protecting any form of 
government from overthrow by a few military leaders, entitled to 
hold the peaceable citizens of a distant part of her country forever 
subject to all the evils of anarchy?" Naturally Morfit saw things 
largely through the eyes of the Americans about him, but he was a 
man of judgment and evidently counseled mainly or altogether with 
the old, responsible and quiet colonists. An article in the Edinburgh 
Reznew spoke in these terms: "To this new home they [the Ameri- 
cans of Texas] had wedded themselves for better and for worse; 
and though it was their duty to submit to the laws of their adopted 
country, and to bow to the will of the majority, soberly expressed by 
its constitutional organs, no law of God or man ever bade free and 
intelligent men to obey every power that might spring from civil 
war, or submit to every successful violation of the law and the 
constitution." From such an opinion few Americans will dissent. 
The revolt of Texas, then, was not so much revolution as resistance 
to revolution.^" 

^'' Revne des Deux Mondes, April 15, 1840, p. 222,. It is worth noting that 
the No. Amer. Review (July, 1836, p. 250) pronounced it " a matter of amaze- 
ment " that the Texans did not prepare for the contest with Mexico, and so it must 
appear if we believe they deliberately planned to revolt at this time. (Choice) 
Garrison, Texas, 190-191 ; So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v., 469. Morfit to Forsyth^ 
Aug. 22 \ Sept. 14, 1836: Ex. Doc. 35, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 6, 28. Edinb. Rev., 
April, 1841. 



14 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

This brief sketch of the circumstances leading up to that move- 
ment is perhaps enough for the present purpose ; but in order that 
our view of the whole subject of annexation may be freed from 
certain traditional misconceptions, it seems desirable to consider the 
subject a little further. Many Americans denounced the revolution 
bitterly; and Dr. Channing, evidently moved by an intense detesta- 
tion of slavery, addressed an open letter on the subject to Henry 
Clay, which — as it exerted a wonderful influence in the United 
States, Europe and Mexico and still echoes in current books and in 
public sentiment — is entitled to particular attention. 

Channing denounced the Texan revolt as positively criminal. He 
said that the colonists had agreed to conform to the religious and 
civil institutions of Mexico and knew what the regime was likely 
to be; that had they submitted in good faith to the laws, it was a 
fair question whether they would have suffered at all from Mexican 
rule ; that in swearing allegiance to the nation they promised to take 
their chances ; that in so unsettled a state of society there could not 
have been such a fixed purpose in the mind of the government to 
spoil them of their rights as to justify a violation of their allegiance; 
that the change from the federal system was sanctioned by the 
people ; that in fact the experience of Mexico had shown the need 
of adopting a centralized regime; that the Texans, like the inhabi- 
tants of a Massachusetts county, were too few to set themselves up 
as a nation ; and that the baselessness of the revolution was indicated 
by the course of the older and wealthier settlers, who opposed it.^^ 

Every one of these opinions, however, in the light of the evidence 
now within reach can be seen to be incorrect. While the newcomers 
agreed to accept the institutions of Mexico, they did not promise to 
welcome violations of the law and the destruction of the constitu- 
tion. They could not have known what the regime was to be, for 
Channing's letter shows that he — a man of superior intelligence who 
had studied the subject — possessed a very inadequate conception of 
the reality. Submission to the laws did not save the Mexicans them- 
selves from being plundered, outraged and oppressed by their rulers. 
No heir of the American revolution can hold that the duty of 
allegiance requires freemen to accept blindly the will of those in 
power as mere baggage takes the chances of its conveyance. A 
settled purpose did certainly exist in Santa Anna's mind to rob the 
citizens of their political rights and to a greater or less extent of 

"Channing, Works, ii., 183. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 1 5 

their property ; a plan was legally adopted to reduce Texas to that 
worst of conditions, the status of a penal colony ; and most of the 
soldiers sent there to overawe the people were wretches not only 
able but sure to perpetrate outrages upon them. Sound evidence — 
for example the testimony of the British minister at Mexico — proves 
clearly enough that the overthrow of the federal system was due, not 
to the choice of the nation, but to the machinations of Santa Anna. 
The centralized regime was not, as Channing argued, better adapted 
to the requirements of the situation, and it lasted but a short while. 
Texas was far indeed from being, like a Massachusetts county, an 
integral part of an orderly and efficient political system. Its history 
shows that it was not too weak to declare its independence ; and noth- 
ing is proved regarding the merits of the case by the fact that many 
of the older and wealthier citizens, like not a few Americans of that 
class in 1775, leaned to the conservative side.^^ 

After thus clearing the grovmd, as he supposed, Channing went 
on to explain what in his opinion really caused the Texan revolt : 
to wit, a land speculation. Grantees (emprcsarios) , he said, or the 
companies to which their titles were transferred, sold in the United 
States great amounts of illegal scrip said to be exchangeable for 
lands ; more scrip was issued upon lands fraudulently granted ; still 
other titles were manufactured with no basis whatever; and so a 
great number of persons held claims which could only be made good 
through the separation of Texas from Mexico. In this representa- 
tion an element of truth certainly existed, and it is likely enough 
that some of the grantees and some of the settlers were consciously 
dishonest in the business ; but this is very far from covering the 
whole ground. It seems highly improbable that large numbers of 
poor men expended money for titles which they knew to be worth- 
less. Had it been their intention to occupy lands to which they had 
no right and then make their holdings good by overturning the 
government, they would not have cared to buy titles. It would 
therefore appear likely that the purchasers of defective claims, to 
whom Channing attributed the revolt, bought in good faith, and 
discovered the fraud perpetrated upon them only after they reached 
the distant plains of Texas. Indeed we read as follows in a book 
written by one of these unfortunates : " I had some conversation 
with Mr. Austin [at Brazoria, Texas] on the purchase of land I 

^° (Penal colony) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 113-115; Wooten, Texas, i., 808. 
(Troops) Garrison, Texas, 174. Pak., No. 4, June 25, 1835. The general desire 
of the Mexicans was to have the federal system amended, not destroyed. 



I6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

had made at New York. ... he regarded the certificate I held, and 
the scrip which it represented, as of no value whatever." Before 
long this immigrant discovered that " numbers had already come out 
to Texas under impressions [regarding their titles] as erroneous as " 
his own. Yet he and probably they, on account of the difficulty, 
expense and mortification of going home, remained still in the 
country.-'* 

How stood the case then? Mexico had little ground for com- 
plaint. She had eagerly desired colonists. As late as 1845 -^^ Sigh 
XIX., the most intelligent of her journals, remarked, " One of 
the great needs of this country ... is no doubt the colonization 
of her vast uncultivated areas (baldios)" ; and this was peculiarly 
true of the northern parts, where fierce Indians harried the border 
unceasingly. Recognizing her need, Mexico had passed an inviting 
law to bring colonists in, and here were now the most efficient of 
settlers. Contrary to her intention they were mostly non-Catholic, 
to be sure ; but their religious quality, which was by no means a 
striking characteristic, signified little in comparison with the racial 
and political dififerences to which she had felt reconciled, and the 
technical defects of their titles did not impair their muscle or their 
brain. Moreover their coming with such papers was largely the 
fault of Mexico herself. Long before Teran crossed the Rio 
Grande the government should have exposed the frauds effectually. 
Had this been done, the American newspapers would have pub- 
lished the facts, and people would have investigated the properties 
offered them. The many honest immigrants with bad titles had, 
therefore, a substantial grievance against Mexico, reinforced by the 
maladministration of public affairs in Texas, while her complaint 
against them was only technical, and was more than offset by their 

^" Contractor" would be in one respect a more accurate term than "grantee." 
for there was an obligation to introduce colonists. Visit to Texas, 26, 45, 46. 
See also No. Amer. Rev., July, 1836, p. 245. Since the text was written, the author 
has read an excellent article on the land speculations by Dr. E. C. Barker (Tex. 
State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly., x., 76), which brings out among other points the follow- 
ing: I, Certain speculators in land, who went to Mexico, "had a keener sense of 
the danger " from Santa Anna's plan of Centralism than their stay-at-home neigh- 
bors, and hence sounded an alarm ; 2, while that promoted agitation it seriously 
hindered the revolutionary movement, since many looked upon this as a speculators' 
plan; 3, the wastefulness of the Mexican authorities in granting lands disgusted 
many Texans and thus had some, but not much, effect in bringing on the crisis ; 
4, there is no evidence to support the charge that interest in land speculations was 
the motive which brought a large number of Americans to the aid of Texas. Ref- 
erence should also be made to a pamphlet by G. L. H., "A Texian," who not only 
denied that the revolution was effected by Americans for speculative reasons, but 
offered grounds for his assertion that it did much to counteract the frauds of the 
speculators. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 1 7 

potential value as colonists. Had they been governed efficiently and 
well, she would have had ample reason to be glad they came.^^ 

Akin to Channing's accusation there was, however, a more seri- 
ous charge. The Mexican government never wearied of declaring 
that multitudes of Americans crossed the frontier in open defiance 
of laws expressly enacted to keep them out ; and the inference 
naturally follows that such men, having no right whatever to be 
within the country, were disposed to establish their position by excit- 
ing a revolution. To a certain extent this view was just. But 
there were two elements in the matter: enactment and enforcement. 
Laws to which obedience is not required are soon regarded as of no 
significance. Such may be found in many statute books, and they 
are cheerfully ignored. So a landowner who had permitted the 
neighbors to cross a field of his for ten years, would not be allowed 
by public opinion suddenly to exact damages from every one that 
had technically trespassed. Until well on in 1830 nothing effectual 
was done by the Mexican government to bar out Americans. The 
feeling by that time prevalent in the public mind could not be cor- 
rected in a moment, and in about two years a complete cessation of 
efforts to enforce the restriction on immigration made it seem once 
more a meaningless form. Such were notoriously the enactments 
regarding slavery and the religion of the immigrants, and why might 
not this be like them? In Mexico, wrote Frederic Leclerc, laws 
were " nothing but the merest fictions," and " therefore it would 
be very astonishing if . . . the Anglo-Americans of Louisiana, 
Arkansas and the other adjacent States had regarded Texas as a 
sacred land and religiously refrained from entering it." The very 
fact that so many crossed the boundary leaves Mexico, according to 
her own statement, in much the same position as a country that pro- 
claims a blockade but does not enforce it, and soon finds the world 
ignoring its proclamation.^- 

Just what percentage of the Texans belonged to these two 
classes — those with defective titles and those with no right at all 
to be in the country — it is probably impossible to say ; and pre- 
cisely how much influence they exerted in promoting trouble and 
bringing on the crisis can only be surmised. They had it in their 
power to increase the irritation by their own acts and by arousing 
the sympathy of others ; and their presence doubtless led the Mexi- 

'^ Sigh XIX., Sept. 13, 1845. (Mexico invited) Von Hoist, U. S., ii., 552. 
^ (Cessation) Alaman, Mexico, v., 875 ; Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 128. 
Revue des Deux Mondes, March i, 1840, p. 638. 

3 



1 8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

cans to make unpleasant remarks and to feel that by expelling them 
on the technically good grounds available they could greatly weaken 
the American element. Here are four causes of friction conceivably 
traceable to them. But in view of the suggestions that have been 
offered regarding the equities of the situation one cannot think them 
very culpable, especially when judged by the principles that have 
usually guided men under like circumstances, if they refused to be 
expelled from the land which their own labor had redeemed. In the 
next place it must be remembered that three colonies — one of which 
constituted the predominant factor in Texas down to the time of 
the revolution — were admittedly lawful, so that, as all of these 
joined in the movement, the main body of its adherents was irre- 
proachable from this point of view. And, finally, when Santa Anna, 
wholly without reference to any American interlopers in Texas, 
pursued a course that justified resistance, it was well that the 
settlers of unquestioned legitimacy were encouraged by the presence 
of allies to stand their ground; and the latter, as the supporters of a 
just revolution, acquired then, if not before, good standing in the 
country. The matter of land titles, therefore, had no essential 
significance; and we return to the conclusion already formed, that 
the revolution, although — like all such movements — not without its 
objectionable features, was in reality a legitimate measure of self- 
defence.-^ 

We now come to another point of Channing's : that a further 
cause of the rebellion in Texas was a desire to prevent the abolition 
of slavery there. On this view it seems fair to remark that, after 
Mexico had continued to maintain in its full vigor the system of 
peonage and had made Texas an exception to the edict of emancipa- 
tion, there would have been good reason to protest against an anti- 
slavery crusade proclaimed by that government under the guise of 
philanthropy for the purpose of injuring Texas, and against the 
sudden and violent uprooting of an institution which had developed 
under Mexican assent until the property, industries and commerce 
of the settlers depended almost wholly upon it. In England, for 
example, such a destruction of vested rights would produce an out- 
break at once. But as a matter of fact, however possible may have 
been this cause of trouble, there was no controversy on the subject 
between the Texans and Mexico when the rebellion occurred, and 
therefore no occasion for the colonists to act. On the other hand, 

^ (Lawful) Garrison, Texas, 174, 157. (Predom.) lb., 157. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION I9 

the principal slaveholders obviously belonged to that wealthier por- 
tion of the community which was said by Channing himself to oppose 
the revolution.-* 

Finally, it has been urged, particularly by the Mexicans, that the 
people of Texas had been treated with such kindness and liberality 
that besides being traitors they were ingrates ; and one or two state- 
ments from American sources, bearing on the premise, have often 
been cjuoted in support of the conclusion. Nor is the representa- 
tion wholly without a basis. While there had been some oppression 
and much more was intended, indolence, deep ignorance of the 
state of things in the north, and constant preoccupation with home 
politics had caused Mexican statesmen — as the impartial reports of 
the British representatives in their country show — to let the Texans 
manage their own affairs as a rule, which was the greatest possible 
kindness ; and the belief that a colonization of her waste lands was 
for the interest of the nation led to the suspension of certain customs 
duties in that quarter which has already been mentioned. But past 
good fortune, even had the cause been deliberate benevolence, could 
have bound no one to welcome intentional tyranny. It was the right 
as well as the duty of Mexico to rule Texas, but she had no au- 
thority to outrage and crush it. It was her right and duty to make 
good laws and enforce them, but she was not excusable for legislat- 
ing unjustly nor for executing her decrees unfairly.^^ 

We may now proceed with the narrative. After declaring their 
independence the Texans asserted a boundary line, which followed 
on the southwest the Rio Grande river. This gave rise to an im- 
mense deal of discussion, particularly as regarded the claim to the 
region between that stream and the Nueces ; but for our present 
purpose it is only necessary to observe that the limits claimed were 
inadmissible, since they included a large portion of New Mexico to 
which no shadow of a title could be found. The boundary was 
probably asserted partly in the hope of making it good, and partly 
with the idea of having a liberal basis for compromise in the final 
settlement with Mexico. Santa Anna now invaded the country, 
and the butchery of nearly four hundred prisoners in cold blood at 
Goliad by his express orders, flanked with similar atrocities enacted 

^ Alaman's report to Congress, March 30, 1830, which was the basis of the 
policy soon adopted with reference to Texas, expressly recommended that slavery 
should be permitted to continue there (Ho. Ex. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 319). 
(Attitude of large slaveholders) Mag. Amer, Hist., March, 1882, p. 161. 

^ (Amer. support) Child, Naboth's Vineyard, 6. 



20 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

at the Alamo and elsewhere, appeared to justify very fully the appre- 
hensions of the Texan people and the revolutionary course adopted 
by them for self-protection. In April, 1836, however, he was routed 
at the battle of San Jacinto and made a prisoner, and by his direction 
the Mexican forces remaining in the field withdrew beyond the Rio 
Grande. Thus ended the campaign.-*' 

The next month David Burnet became the first President of 
Texas, and soon commissioners were despatched to the United 
States with instructions to broach the subject of annexation as well 
as to urge that of recognition. In the following July these gentle- 
men proposed the incorporation of their country in the United 
States in a letter addressed to the American Secretary of State. 
This was an informal proposition, for the credentials of the Texan 
representatives were imperfect, and — even had there been no diffi- 
culty on that score — our government could not officially receive 
envoys from an unrecognized country ; but the authorities of that 
nation had now taken a stand in the matter, and when the people 
pronounced in favor of annexation two months later by an almost 
unanimous vote, it was plain enough — especially in view of the 
declared sympathies of many American citizens — that a great ques- 
tion, the question of Texas, had placed itself before our country.^^ 

To clear the way for an unprejudiced view of that subject, it 
seems well now to inquire how far the United States were respon- 
sible for the revolution just described, since the judgment of many 
persons on the annexation problem has been deeply colored by their 
opinion on this point. The facts already discovered — that a cruel 
and unprincipled schemer transformed Mexico in effect from a re- 
public modeled largely on the United States into a despotism ; that 
a large portion of the country, though with far less reason than 

^ (No title) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 313. After he was a prisoner, Santa Anna 
signed a treaty with Texas, recognizing its independence. Though made under 
duress, this treaty was binding if the President had authority to bind the nation 
(Woolsey, Internat. Law, 175)- As Mexico possessed no constitution at this pre- 
cise time, it is not easy to decide this point; but (i) the Congress had previously 
been and did afterwards constitute a part of the treaty-making power, and (2), on 
learning that Santa Anna had been captured, the Congress declared that any 
agreement with the enemy made by him would be void. It was sometimes argued, 
in the annexation debates, that Mexico enjoyed the fruits of the treaty and there- 
fore was morally bound by it. But they were enjoyed very unwillingly, and were 
rejected so far as the Congress was able to reject them. See Mex. a traves, iv., 
375. 376 ; Sen. Doc. i, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 37. 

^Yoakum, Texas, ii., 13. Burnet to Collinsworth and Grayson, May 26, 1836: 
Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 89. C. and G. to Forsyth, July 16 [14], 1836: Jackson Pap. 
Grayson to Burnet, Aug. 2, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 117. (Earlier efforts of the 
Texans to establish relations with the Amer, govt.) Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 19. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 21 

Texas, opposed the change and one State resisted in arms ; that 
the Texans, whatever aspirations to join the Union eventually many 
of them may have entertained or whatever deliberately treasonable 
designs may have actuated a few, did not desire the revolution that 
actually occurred ; and that they were forced by Mexico to revolt 
or else feel upon their necks the foot of the most irresponsible, 
ignorant, vicious and brutal of soldiery, led by one of the most greedy 
and unscrupulous of chiefs, alien in race, language, customs and 
every social, political and religious conception — these bare facts 
indicate plainly enough that an adequate inspiration to rebel came 
from the south ; but certain charges have been made against the 
United States, and it is our duty to consider them. 

In the first place, it has often been asserted that the American 
government instigated the revolt or at least fomented it. The Lon- 
don Times, for example, declared that it " was known, watched 
and encouraged by the Cabinet of the day at Washington." The 
Mexicans clung tenaciously to this view ; and thirteen members of 
the American Congress united in alleging that the failure of the 
mother-country to recover Texas was partly due to " the direct and 
indirect co-operation of our own Government " with the rebels.-^ 

The charge of instigation, however, is entirely without support. 
Daniel Webster denied it squarely, and a single despatch from the 
State department seems almost conclusive in the negative. In 
March, 1833, Livingston wrote to our diplomatic agent at Mexico, 
who was endeavoring to buy Texas, " The Situation of afifairs in 
the State of Texas y Coahuila makes it important that your negotia- 
tion on that subject should be brought to a speedy conclusion. It is 
at least doubtful whether in a few weeks any stipulation could he 
carried into effect." In other words, the American government 
looked upon a Texan revolt as something distinctly contrary to their 
wishes and inconsistent with their aims. In December, 1835, the 
provisional Governor of Texas directed Austin, Archer and Whar- 
ton, commissioners to the United States, to ascertain whether — 
should the colonists declare for independence — they would imme- 
diately be recognized by this country ; and the first two of these 
gentlemen replied from Louisville, Kentucky, in the following March 
that they could not be received by the authorities at Washington, 
and it had appeared unwise to go there. Here a total absence of 
collusion seems to be shown ; and that state of things is indicated 

^Times, May 15, 1844. (Congressmen) Detroit Adv., May 15, 1843, 



22 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

also by the fact that scarcely had the banner of the new republic 
been unfurled, when its representatives at Washington, D. C, were 
instructed to enter a "solemn protest . . . against the right of 
Mexico to sell or the U S. to purchase [Texas], Setting forth in 
full the declaration of Independence." The head of the American 
government at this time was Jackson, and when his personal attitude 
comes to be studied, still further light will be thrown upon this 
point.-^ 

The hypothesis that our national authorities fomented the Texan 
revolt is, to say the least of it, superfluous. Ward, the British 
representative in Mexico, who was notably suspicious of our govern- 
ment, expressed the belief in one of his reports that no interference, 
even secret, on the part of the American Executive was needed, so 
warm and so general a sympathy with Texas was felt in the southern 
States. As for evidence none can be offered, save the undeniable 
fact that our citizens were not prevented from aiding the colonists. 
Men, money and supplies actively crossed the border, and perhaps 
nobody was punished for violating the neutrality laws. This aid, 
however, has been exaggerated, and the rights of neutrals have been 
underrated. It has often been asserted, for instance, that the battle 
of San Jacinto was mainly won by Americans visiting Texas to fight 
the Mexicans ; but it has been found to be almost certain that ninety- 
eight per cent, of the little patriot army were men already settled 
there or men who became permanent residents. With regard to 
the Americans who crossed the Sabine as genuine colonists Mexico 
could not complain, for Monasterio, Minister of Foreign Relations, 
used this language in reference to such persons : " they neither are 
nor can be viewed otherwise than as Mexicans, having voluntarily 
ceased to be what they previously were " ; and his own government 
went so far as to decree that a foreigner who merely enlisted in their 
military or naval service should be considered a citizen. Contribu- 

^ Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ho. Ex. Doc. 266, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 7. 
To Butler, No. 27, March 20, 1833. It has been argued that this despatch indicated 
an improperly intimate knowledge of the plans of the revolutionary party in Texas ; 
but (i) it was the duty of the American government to know what was in the wind 
there, (2) so many Americans were in Texas that it was not difficult to do this, 
(3) Sam Houston was there in Feb., 1883, as an American agent to deal with 
certain Indian matters, and he reported on the political situation (Williams, 
Houston, 79), and (4) the opinion expressed by Livingston was by no means sus- 
piciously correct, for the convention of April i, 1833, pronounced only for separation 
from Coahuila, and years instead of weeks passed before the Texans repudiated 
the authority of Mexico. Smith to A., A. and W., Dec. 8, 1835: Tex. Dipl. Corn, 
i., 52. A. and A. to Smith, March 3, 1836: ib., 72. To Childress and Hamilton. 
April I, 1836 : ib., 76. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 23 

tions to the Texan cause were pronounced lawful by a United States 
court; and, as Webster pointed out, the President had no power 
to prevent an American from emigrating. We could not stop the 
adventurers without assuming to stop emigration altogether, further 
explained the Arkansas Secretary of State; and a gun on the 
shoulder of a man going to settle near the Indians was only a neces- 
sary precaution. Merchants could legally sell to the belligerents, 
and Webster stated in 1842 that during the preceding six years the 
United States had done more business in contraband with Mexico 
than with Texas. The English government declared officially that 
there was no prohibition against the purchase or export of arms 
by private individuals. In Great Britain two war steamers were 
built for Mexico expressly to operate against Texas ; their arms, 
officers and crews were obtained there ; and when these vessels 
actually engaged in a fight with the Texan fleet, the men serving 
their guns were mostly Spanish or English. On the other hand the 
Texan ships, though built in the United States, did not take their 
fighting crews from this country ; and when the commodore en- 
deavored to enlist men at New York, not only were legal proceed- 
ings begun against him, but our Secretary of State notified the 
Texan envoy that any repetition of the ofifence by officers of his 
country would cause the exclusion of their vessels from all American 
waters.^" 

The only plausible grounds for complaint against our govern- 
ment have reference to certain expeditions of considerable magni- 
tude notoriously intended for the aid of the Texans. These were 
no doubt substantial violations of the neutrality law. But the 
lapse cannot be shown to have been the fault of our national authori- 
ties. The government announced a firm intention to be strictly im- 
partial ; they issued positive orders to their subordinates ; and in 
general, said Lord Palmerston, they showed " a strong disposition " 
to fulfill their obligations. The truth is that a democratic system 
has its limitations. In our country men cannot be punished for 

^^ Ward to F. O., No. 75, Nov. 19, 1835 : F. O., Mexico, xciii. (S. Jacinto) Tex. 
State Hist. Assoc. Quart., v., 29, note ; ix., 260. Monasterio to [Forsyth], Nov. 19, 
1835: Ex. Doc. 256. 24 Cong., i sess., 10. (Decree) Pak., No. 83, Sept. 10, 1842. 
(Contributions) Niles, xlix., 205. Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ho. Ex. 
Doc. 266, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 7. Fulton to Jackson, Jan. 26, 1839 : Jackson Pap. 
(Officially) Aberdeen to Murphy, May 31, 1842: F. O., Mexico, clvii. (Steamers) 
Smith's memo., June 29, 1842 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 990. Smith, Remin., 39. Doyle, 
No. 59, Aug. 29, 1843. (Crews) Smith to Aberdeen, [Dec. 12, 1842] : Tex. Dipl. 
Corn, ii., 1075. Forsyth to Dunlap, Jan. 15, 1840 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 437. Chapter 
iii. will present other facts showing the coolness of the American government 
toward the Texan cause. 



24 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



crime without legal proof of the offence charged, and in these cases 
public sentiment did not permit such proof to be given. Once at 
least — at New Orleans — the matter was thoroughly tested, and no 
proper evidence could be obtained. One infers from the affidavits 
that some, if not all, of the witnesses were afraid to tell what they 
really knew ; but so far as the prosecution was concerned, it was the 
same as if they had been truly in the dark. The District Attorney 
even asked the Mexican consul to put him on the track of legal 
evidence, and the consul admitted his inability to do so. Another 
form of the difficulty is shown in the case of Captain Grundy, a 
Tennessee District Attorney, who organized a band of seventy 
men. Grundy, reported the Texan agent at Nashville, " has formal 
orders to arrest and prosecute every man who may take up arms 
in the cause of Texas or in any way Violate the Neutrality of the 
U. S. He says he will prosecute any man under his command who 
will take up arms here and he will accompany them to the boundary 
line of the U S. to see that they shall not violate her Neutrality and 
when there, if the boys think proper to step over the line as 
peaceable Emigrants his authority [over them] in this Govt will 
cease and he thinks it highly probable that he will take a peepe at 
Texas himself." In such a case what could orders from Washing- 
ton effect ?^^ 

Crawford, the British consul at Matamoros, visited Texas in 
1837 and reported that after making "all and every inquiry" during 
his stay, he was convinced that no assistance had been given or 
connived at by the American government. He added : " Whenever 
there was a suspicion attached to expeditions, there has been a 
prosecution of the Parties by the United States, though generally 
such prosecutions have failed, because of the difficulty of obtaining 
sufficient evidence, owing to the sympathies of this People of 
America being roused by the Attrocities of the Campaign of 1836 
and their interests also being deeply engaged in the success of the 
struggle of their Sons and other relatives, the Colonists of Texas." 
The British minister at Mexico was instructed to represent to that 
government " the impossibility of preventing the interference of the 
People of the United States " ; and, writing to the same official in 

"* (Announced) To Butler, Nov. 9, 1835. (Orders) Ho. Ex. Docs. 256, 24 
Cong., I sess. ; 74, 25 Cong., 2 sess. (Palmerston) Stevenson to Forsyth, No. 9, 
Oct. 29, 1836: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., England, xliv. (N. Orl.) Ho. Ex. 
Doc. 74, 25 Cong., 2 sess. Carlton to Consul, Nov. 14, 1835 : Sria. Relac. Carson 
to Burnet, June i, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Com, i., 92. See also Sen. Doc. i, 24 Cong., 
2 sess., 41, 42, 53, 67. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 2$ 

1842, Lord Aberdeen expressly disclaimed any intention to criticize 
the American administration in this matter. The minister for his 
part informed Santa Anna plainly that he believed our authorities 
had done all that was to be expected or that lay in their power; 
and Santa Anna did not venture to challenge this opinion. To sum 
up, Daniel Webster, who was neither a slaveholder nor a " friend 
of Texas," declared at about the same time: "The conduct of the 
government of the United States in regard to the war between 
Mexico and Texas, having been always hitherto governed by a 
strict and impartial regard to its neutral obligations, will not be 
changed or altered, in any respect, or in any degree. "^^ 

In the next place, it has been charged that Andrew Jackson 
caused the Texan revolution. Under this head there are really 
two accusations, which it has not been customary to distinguish 
clearly. The first is that Houston, relying on Jackson's connivance, 
planned to seize the country beyond the Sabine with a force raised 
in the United States. Some such scheme may in fact have germi- 
nated in his fertile imagination and may have been set forth by 
his drink-loosened tongue ; but certainly recruiting officers could 
not have been active in the eastern cities, thousands of volunteers 
could not have been enrolled, and the implied accumulation of funds 
could not have existed, as Mayo and Child wished the public 
to believe they did, without attracting the least public notice. No 
sign of such an expedition could be discovered on the frontier ; and 
as a matter of fact Houston went to Texas quite unattended. 
Equally certain is it that Jackson, though his faith in the tale was 
justly feeble, wrote urgently to Houston himself, to the Governor of 
Arkansas and afterwards to the Secretary of that Territory, express- 
ing emphatic opposition to the rumored enterprise and manifesting 
the clearest intention to prevent it. So far, at least, his conduct 
appears irreproachable.^^ 

^-Crawford to Pak., May 26, 1837: F. O., Mexico, cxxxvii. To Pak., Nos. 26, 
34, July I, IS, 1842. (Pak. and S. Anna) Thompson, No. 3, June 20, 1842. To 
Thompson, No. 11, July 13, 1842. It has often been urged that the U. S. govern- 
ment showed more zeal for neutrality in the case of the Canadian rebellion of 1837 
than it had done in the Texas affair. On this point the Democ. Rcviezv said (May, 
184S, p. 427) that in 1837 the difficulty occurred in a section where it was more 
feasible to act with effect, and larger powers had by that time been conferred upon 
the government. Of course, too, no atrocities occurred in Canada to excite the 
sympathy of the Americans. 

^ It has even been argued that Jackson, regarding the cession of Texas in 1819 
as void, considered himself bound by his oath of office to recover it as best he 
could ; but if this was the case his oath bound him to put down the Texas revolu- 
tion, as an insurrection against the U. S. (The charge) Child (Mayo), Naboth's 



26 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

The second count is that later he sent the ex-Governor of Ten- 
nessee to Texas for the purpose of exciting a revolution against 
Mexico. To prove this theory a recent biographer of Houston 
proceeds thus: first he quotes the following words from Parton, — 
"When "we consider the relations. existing between General Jackson 
and General Houston, it is difficult to believe that the President was 
ignorant of Houston's designs [to organize the expedition just men- 
tioned]. His office, however, compelled him to assume an attitude 
of hostility toward them " ; and then the biographer continues, 
" There is also in the Clay Correspondence a reference, which I have 
lost, to Houston's being once discovered in a gathering of midnight 
conspirators about a failing fire. This is about all that can be 
learned. Yet, among probable things, there are few more certain 
than that, at the end of 1832, after the Stanberry affair, Houston 
went forth to Texas with a conditional authorization from Jackson." 
This is airy proof indeed. Another biographer gives additional 
evidence, however. Finding from an English traveller that Houston 
— then a notorious drunkard and gambler — was said to keep him- 
self out of sight all day at Nacogdoches in February, 1833, and 
to pass his nights at play, and finding also that strangers were in 
town just then for the alleged purpose of buying land, he surmised 
that our closeted reveller " was undoubtedly busy in consultation 
with the men who were scheming for the acquisition of Texas from 
Mexico." Now it is true that Houston, who had lived with the 
savages and understood them, held at this time a commission from 
Jackson to negotiate with certain Indian tribes in Texas. But 
only gross partisanship can find proof in this mere collocation of 
circumstances and guesses that the President of the United States 
was a hypocrite, a liar and virtually an oath-breaker.^* 

Undoubtedly Jackson desired to acquire Texas ; but a wide gulf 
yawns between wishing to purchase an article and conspiring to steal 
it, and no good evidence has been unearthed in support of the 
highly improbably theory that he crossed the gulf. Moreover, he 
was not a coward or dissembler, and the language used by him at 
the time was perfectly clear. Writing to the American minister at 

Vineyard, 6. (No sign) Fulton to State Dept., Feb. 13, 1838: Miscel. Letters. 
(Unattended) Fulton to Jackson, Jan. 26, 1839: Jackson Pap. Jackson to Houston, 
June 21, 1829: Yoakum, Texas, i., 307. Id. to Gov. Pope, 1829: Amer. Hist. Rev., 
xii., 802. Id. to Secy. Fulton, Dec. 10, 1830 (cut from Wash. Globe) : Jackson Pap. 
(of, David Fulton to Jackson, Feb. 18, 1839: ib.). 

** The biographers need not be named. (Houston's mission) Williams, Hous- 
ton, 77. Some of the Indians belonged in the United States. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 27 

Mexico, he said that a revolt in Texas was probable and added these 
words, "This our Govt will be charged with fomenting; altho all 
our constitutional powers will be exercised to prevent." Living- 
ston's despatch mentioned above closely followed a memorandum 
from the President, and Jackson gave notice personally to the Mexi- 
can minister that a convention was to meet in Texas on the first 
of April, 1833, ^^ furtherance of a scheme of secession. After the 
rebellion began, he informed the Texan envoy that the United States 
must observe " strict neutrality," saying further, " it is our boast 
that we conform strictly with all our national engagements & keep 
inviolate our national faith." To Governor Cannon of Tennessee 
and to General Gaines, commanding in the Southwest, he used 
similar language. Just before the battle of San Jacinto Austin 
made a very touching appeal for assistance, and on the back of his 
letter Jackson endorsed these sentences : " The writer does not 
reflect that we have a treaty with Mexico, and our national faith is 
pledged to support it . . . [The rebellion] was a rash & premature 
act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained." To suppose that 
he sacrificed his honor to incite a revolution yet was too honorable 
or too cowardly to aid it at the critical moment is hardly possible. 
The truth of the matter probably is that he thought the essential 
characteristics of the Americans made the permanence of Mexican 
rule in Texas highly improbable, and in fact on this very ground 
he believed that Mexico should sell the territory ; but as regards the 
rebellion that actually occurred, he deemed it ill-advised and un- 
favorable to his plans. In a letter to W. B. Lewis he clearly stated 
that only in consequence of failing to purchase Texas, and only 
after the battle of San Jacinto, did he take up the idea of recogniz- 
ing Texan independence and eventually securing the country by an- 
nexation.^^ 

^^ Jackson to Butler, Oct. 19, 1829: Jackson Pap. Jackson's memo, on Butler's 
despatch of Feb. 10, 1833 : State Dept., Desps. from Mins. Montoya to Relac, April 
II, 1833: Sria. Relac. The convention referred to was that of April i, 1833, in 
view of which Livingston wrote the despatch mentioned above: see note 29, (4). 
Jackson to Dunlap, July 30, 1836: Jackson Pap. Id. to Cannon, Aug. 5, 1836: ib. 
Id. to Gaines, Sept. 4, 1836: ib. Jackson, Memo., April, 1836: ib. About a year 
after Texas declared its independence, Jackson still entertained the idea of pur- 
chasing that territory of Mexico (Wharton to Rusk: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 187), 
which looks little as if he had originated or encouraged a plot — thus far successful 
— to get it for nothing. Jackson to Lewis, Sept. 18. 1843: N. Y. Pub. Lib. (Lenox). 
It is noticeable that Von Hoist (U. S., ii., 565), though in general he follows the 
anti-slavery leaders regarding annexation, holds that what occurred in Texas up to 
Nov., 183s, revived Jackson's desire to purchase Texas — a view rather incon- 
sistent with the theory that he was inciting a rebellion there. (Believed) Jackson 
to Butler, Oct. 19, 1829 : Jackson Pap. 



28 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Let US look now at Houston. He first became prominent in 
Texan affairs at the head of a committee appointed to draw a 
State constitution, the acceptance of which by Mexico would have 
prevented the rebellion that soon occurred. In October, 1835, he 
wrote, "Our principles are to support the Constitution [of 1824] 
and dozi'u with the usurper!!" Not he, but Anson Jones, appears 
to have set the ball of independence rolling. In fact, no trace of 
him is to be discovered for more than two years during the critical 
stage of the budding revolution, and when he reappears, it is not 
at the principal seat of the movement. Hundreds of Texan and 
Mexican documents bearing on the genesis of the rebellion have 
been searched for his name without success ; and when the Mexican 
authorities made a demand for the chiefs of the war party, he was 
not mentioned. Finally, he spoke on the subject at a barbecue near 
Nashville in 1845. Addressing former constituents and friends, he 
might have been excused for straining the truth a little in order to 
make them believe that a great purpose had underlain his terrible 
plunge from their statehouse to a Cherokee wigwam, and that he 
could claim the credit for a revolution which was now adding an 
empire to their country. But what he said was this : " To the 
principles of our provisional government of 1835, by which we 
pledged our fortunes and our sacred honor to the maintenance of 
the Constitution of 1824, we had adhered with a tenacity little 
short of religious devotion " ; and he attributed the revolution 
simply to the necessity of self-defence against the Mexican invasion. 
If, then, any understanding existed between Jackson and Houston 
with reference to a Texan uprising, it would seem to have been that 
the colonists had not strength enovigh to justify such a step, and — 
particularly as the United States desired still to buy the territory — 
ought to be deterred from taking it. In other words, both appear 
to have been against, instead of for, the revolt that actually 
occurred.^'' 

We have now to consider the view that the Texan revolution 
was caused by the American slavocracy for the purpose of adding 
slave territory to the United States. Here again certain facts, when 
placed side by side, look suspicious. An extension of the slave area 
was needed to offset the western growth of the free North ; citizens 

'* Yoakum, Texas, i., 311. (Houston) Nilcs, xlix., 144. Jones, Memor., 13, 23, 
547. (No trace, etc.) Amer. Hist. Rev., xii., 802. (Speech) Nash. Union, July 
12, 1845. When Houston found that a revolution was inevitable, of course he 
supported it. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 29 

of the southern States migrated to Texas taking their negroes with 
them ; when abohtion was decreed by Guerrero they protested ; after 
becoming strong they revolted ; they were aided by slaveholders in 
the United States ; and finally Texas was carried into the Union 
as slave territory. A mind inflamed with a passionate hostility to 
human bondage and gifted with a talent for special pleading could 
build on such facts a mountain of confirmatory hints and circum- 
stances. Lundy spoke in these terms : " It is susceptible of the 
clearest demonstration, that the immediate cause and the leading 
object of this contest [in Texas] originated in a settled design, 
among the slave holders of this country, (with land speculators and 
slave traders,) to wrest the large and valuable territory of Texas 
from the Mexican Republic." Instead of demonstration his book 
presented suggestions only ; but it had a great efifect in spreading 
this idea, which — like the feeling against Jackson, Houston and 
our government — still influences public opinion.^" 

Great events, however, do not often come to pass in so delight- 
fully simple a manner, and the Texas revolution was no exception 
to the rule. Propinquity and similarity of climate caused that region 
to be settled mainly from our southern States, and the introduction 
of slavery was practically inevitable. Why the colonists opposed 
abolition and why they revolted we have seen. The reasons for a 
special interest in their affairs on the part of the Southern people 
could be detected from afar. Grimblot, for instance, pointed them 
out in the Revue Independante. Texas was nearer to the States of 
that section ; many of their citizens had gone there ; frequent reports 
made it familiar and revealed its resources ; and the opportunities 
for traffic, particularly in negroes, were fine. The need of getting 
more slave territory was not generally realized when the coloniza- 
tion of that region began. The penetration of settlers beyond the 
Sabine was a part of the general expansive movement that peopled 
the whole area west of the Alleghenies ; and it was impossible, as 
Grimblot said, for the people in the neighboring States to neglect 
such an opportunity. Instead of finding the South organizing to 
pour settlers into Texas, we find Texas taking deliberate steps to 
obtain them ; and in September, 1836, $30,000 were ordered to be 
taken from her meagre treasury for that purpose. The poverty and 
disorganized condition of the republic during a long term of years 
and its threatening approach to collapse, are inconsistent with the 

''Lundy, War in Texas, 3 ; Greeley, Amer. Conflict, i., 149. 



30 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

theory that an organzation of rich and farseeing American planters 
was behind it. Had such a body been at work, it would have sent 
leaders to preside over its interests, and such leaders are not found. 
Burnet came from New Jersey. Lamar, the second head of the 
nation, was not one likely to be selected by practical men to manage 
such an enterprise. Houston we have studied somewhat ; and Anson 
Jones, the last President, was from Massachusetts. Morfit appears 
to have discovered no sign of such an organization. Some of the 
people, he said, had come from the United States to avenge rela- 
tives butchered by the Mexicans, some to profit by the salubrity of 
the climate and the prospect held out by a new country, and some on 
account of the fertility and easy cultivation of the soil; and he 
expressed the opinion that should the independence of Texas be 
acknowledged, that region would " afford a great Haven for the 
planters of our Southern States," which implies that up to that date 
— August, 1836 — it had not been so regarded.^® 

Some signs of a colonization enterprise we do, to be sure, 
unearth; but we discover them at New York. In 1845 the New 
York Herald remarked that the movement which had ended in the 
acquisition of Texas began on Manhattan Island probably ten or 
twelve years before ; and this may be accepted as evidence that such 
a movement existed, though it is very far from proving that Texan 
independence resulted from that cause. In 1834, a gentleman wrote 
from New York to Van Buren that Texas was fast filling up, 
because no exertions were spared at that point; that in spite of the 
bad season three schooners full of emigrants had left within four 
weeks ; and that two more were preparing. At the end of April, 
1836, books for a Texas loan were opened in that city, and $100,000 
were subscribed in a single day. On the other hand Forsyth and 
McDuffie, the former our Secretary of State and the latter serving 
as Governor of South Carolina, were southern men; yet they 
strongly stood out against Texas.^^ 

Finally, we are met by the charge that the separation of Texas 
from Mexico was due to the United States as a nation, — to the 

^ Rev. Ind., Aug. 25, 1844. (Need of more slave territory not felt) Von Hoist, 
U. S., ii., 550. ($30,000) Morfit to Forsyth, No. 8, Sept. 9, 1836: State Dept, 
Desps. from Mins., Texas, i. (see also Garrison, Texas, 195). (Lamar repudiated) 
Yoakum, Texas, ii., 187. Morfit to Forsyth, Aug. 27, 1836: Ho. Ex. Doc. 35, 24 
Cong., 2 sess., 11. Id. to Id., Aug. 27, 1836: State Dept., Desps, from Mins., 
Texas, i. 

^'Herald: London Spectator, Oct. 25, 1845. Gutierrez to Van B., May 29, 
1834: Van B. Pap. (Loan) Richmond Eni?.. May 3, 1836. Even Von Hoist admits 
the untenability of Lundy's view (U. S., ii., 553). The facts about Forsyth and 
McDuffie will appear later. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 3I 

American people. This assertion has more to stand upon. There 
can be little doubt that she would have failed to maintain her inde- 
pendence without the men, funds and moral support given her by 
citizens of the United States. But it is essential to discriminate. 
In all probability there were persons at New York, New Orleans, 
Nashville and other places in our country who were willing, for 
pecuniary gain, to disregard the laws of Congress and the laws of 
conscience, and to trade upon the unselfish enthusiasm of their 
neighbors. These deserved of course the sternest reprobation. But 
such characters are peculiar to no period and to no country; and 
they compel us to blush, not for the United States, but for mankind. 
The cohort of schemers and speculators formed, however, but 
a small company among the friends of Texas. What roused the 
American public was the belief that a small people were bravely 
struggling against the tyranny of a much greater one. The fact 
that the " patriots " were next-door neighbors and blood-relatives 
powerfully reinforced this impression ; and the stupid atrocities of 
the ]\Iexicans, perpetrated — according to newspaper reports — 
against unarmed immigrants as well as prisoners of war. set all these 
ideas aflame. Shortly before the battle of San Jacinto the New 
Orleans Courier said : " We feel confident that the American people 
will not look on [as] silent spectators, when the lives and liberties 
of their countrymen are in such imminent danger;" and the same 
journal remarked a little later : " The people of the southern States 
have become alarmed, dismayed, disgusted ; not at the success of 
Mexico, for in that they take no particular interest ; but at the 
rapid strides with which fiendish and horrid barbarity, cruel and 
unmerciful treatment towards human beings, are advancing almost 
on our borders." Said the Daily Georgian: " It will not, we opine, 
redound much to the credit of our country, if we permit an indis- 
criminate slaughter, on our borders, of all the Texians, even to their 
women and children, without some efifort to arrest the relentless 
arm of the Mexicans." In May, 1836, a meeting at Washington, 
D. C, went on record thus : " Be it resohrd, that Santa Anna, 
in waging a contest, on his part, of indiscriminate massacre against 
the freemen of Texas, has, in the name of zvar, set an example of 
wide-spread, unsparing, multifarious murder, at which humanity 
stands aghast, and upon which civilized nations are not bound to 
look with indifference." " I shall never forget the deep, the heart- 
rending sensations of sorrow and of indignation which pervaded 



32 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

this body when we first heard " of Santa Anna's " inhuman butch- 
eries," said Buchanan later on the floor of the United States Senate. 
The New York correspondent of the London Times, who called 
himself Genevese, declared that a desire for vengeance had deeply 
stirred not only the relatives of the persons massacred, but the com- 
munities from which they had gone. At Philadelphia, about the 
middle of April. 1836, a Texas meeting at the Tontine was attended 
by such crowds that many could not gain admittance. The Chief 
Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote thus : " The savage 
babarities of murdering Fanning and his core, after a Capitulation, 
has so enraged the people of this Country, that they were raising 
men openly to fight St. Anna. . . . The men under 35, and all the 
women, are for having St. Anna shot, and the Texas Eagle planted 
on his capitol." Here we have the essential causes of the assistance 
given Texas by the Americans ; and our conclusion as to its dis- 
interestedness is confirmed by finding, as the agent of the United 
States reported, that a suspicion of land-speculating as an ele- 
ment in the revolution, greatly and at once abated the enthusiasm of 
the American volunteers.'**' 

The action of our citizens was quite in accordance wnth our 
principles and practice. Help had been given to Greece, to Poland 
and to Mexico herself; and the Canadian revolt of 1837, though 
infinitely less deserving of sympathy, was encouraged by Americans. 
Moreover the course of our people was essentially right. Those 
who enjoy the blessings of freedom not only have an interest in 
sustaining the cause of liberty but are under a certain obligation to 
do so, and in this instance another duty also required attention. 
The atrocities perpetrated in the name of Mexico called for retri- 
bution ; there were no tribunals to take cognizance of them; and it 
fell to the Americans, both as nearest neighbors and as next of kin, 
to act. Allowing for the absence of these special circumstances. 
other countries went as far. The British government declared that 
the babarities had stained the character of the Mexican nation with 

*° N. Orl. Courier, April ii, 25 (immigrants), 29, 1836. Daily Georgian, April 
21, 1836. (Washington meeting) Sen. Doc. 384, 24 Cong., i sess. (Buch.) Cong. 
Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 723. London Times, June 27, 1836. Pennsyh'dtiiau, 
April 19, 1836. Catron to Jackson, June 8, 1836: Jackson Pap. (Volunteers) Morfit 
to Forsyth, Sept. 9, 1836: Ho. Ex. Doc. 35, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 18. The popular 
and disinterested character of American aid was further illustrated by the remark 
of the New Orleans Bee in 1843: "Many of the people of these states have im- 
poverished themselves in raising supplies for Texas" (Nilcs. Ixiv., 175). though 
probably some of the losers were simply unsuccessful speculators. With reference 
to the atrocities it should be remarked that when not excited the Mexicans are as 
a people kind and even tender-hearted. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 33 

" deep disgrace " ; and the British and French ministers at Mexico 
called upon the President to urge that less severity be shown. " All 
political communities," observed Canning to the Spanish government, 
" are responsible to other political communities for their conduct." 
Another consideration, too, may be worthy of mention. In a sense, 
and that perhaps a very important one, the unchecked action of 
American citizens in leaving their homes to aid the Texans may 
have been fortunate for Mexico herself. The New York corre- 
spondent of the London Times declared that the South and South- 
west were eager for war with that country on account of Santa 
Anna's cruelties ; and, had the feeling in the United States been 
somehow dammed up, it is very possible that an outbreak highly 
injurious to her as well as to this nation would have resulted.*^ 

We conclude therefore, on a broad view of the matter, that while 
in this as in every such case improper factors can be discovered, the 
government and people of the United States appear to stand 
acquitted of serious blame. 

*^ N, Y. Evening Post, April 11, 1836. (Aid to Mexico) To Thompson, July 
8, 1842: Ho. Ex. Doc. 266. 27 Cong., 2 sess., 7. To Pak., No. 19, Aug. 15, 1836. 
Pak., No. 32, April 21, 1836. Times, June 29, 1836. Canning, March 25, 1825: 
Arch. French Foreign Office. One cannot view without pain the falsehoods and 
the disregard of law chargeable to some Americans in this affair, but they were 
explained as excusable because under the circumstances unavoidable. This is a 
dangerous principle, and yet it must be admitted that the common sense of man- 
kind has fully recognized it, punishing severely those who are thought to have 
applied it unnecessarily. Washington, for example, sent out spies with the expecta- 
tion that they would lie, and he was accessory before the fact to the killing of 
many persons ; yet no one censures him. 



II. 

Texas and Mexico, 1836-1843. 

The people of Texas were in certain ways peculiar and notable. 
Walt Whitman, who knew the type, depicted them in striking words : 

" They were the glory of the race of rangers. 
Matchless with horse, rifle, song, supper, courtship, 
Large, turbulent, generous, handsome, proud and affectionate, 
Bearded, sunburnt, dressed in the free costume of the hunters ; " 

and General Wavell, in a memoir submitted to the British Foreign 
Office, completed the picture in the following terms : " To as much 
if not more natural Talent, and energy to call it into play, and 
knowledge of all which is practically useful under every Emergency 
of the most Civilized Nations, they add a reckless hardihood, a 
restless Spirit of Adventure, resources and confidence in themselves, 
keen perception, coolness, contempt of other men, usages, and Laws, 
and of Death, equal to the Wild Indian."^ 

This description did not apply primarily, of course, to the 
townsmen ; but the towns were few and small in Texas at that day, 
and all partook in a greater or less degree of these characteristics. 
Every colonist had ventured, from choice or necessity, into a strange 
and undeveloped country in the face of peril from the Indian and 
the uncertainties, if nothing worse, of alien rule. Most of the 
settlers, one must believe, were genuine pioneers of the sort Ameri- 
cans are proud to remember; but some had left their homes because 
of crimes, due in many instances to the heat of passion rather than 
to any vicious disposition, or because of financial misfortunes, result- 
ing often from bad luck, imprudence or hard times and not from 
any moral shortcomings ; while a smaller number, though very likely 
endowed with manly qualities, had to be classed as desperadoes. 
Such men were no weaklings, and their necks bent readily to no 
yoke. They were strong, free, independent, inclined to be insur- 
bordinate, and in frequent instances very determined in pushing 
their individual fortunes.- 

For a few months Burnet stood at the head of the republic, 

' See General Note, p. i. Wavell, Memoir, Nov., 1844: F. O., Texas, xi. 
^No doubt the American panic of 1837 drove many good men to Texas. 

34 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 35 

but in October, 1836, Sam Houston became President. Here was 
a man suited to his environment. He had been bad enough to 
command the admiration of the worst, while his efforts to redeem 
himself won the respect of the best. As a soldier he had been able 
to gain the esteem of Andrew Jackson and to overthrow the dictator 
of the JMexican republic ; and as a politician he had reached while still 
young the gubernatorial chair of Tennessee. A domestic tragedy 
had exiled him to the forest, and Chief Bowles of the Cherokees 
had there served him as preceptor. From this training he emerged 
with his great natural powers curiously developed but in no sense 
destroyed. In his conceptions one felt a certain bigness well suited 
to the vast plains of Texas ; his intellectual processes were somewhat 
meandering like the rivers of the Gulf slope, but like them flowed 
onward to the sea ; and his language was often marked with a humor 
and an eloquence very appropriate to the Lone Star Republic. 
Though vain, selfish and domineering, bitter in his personal animosi- 
ties, and much given to stirring up strife, he could be a genial, hail- 
fellow-well-met with the commonest of his fellow-citizens; and his 
apparent violence of passion was mainly, if not wholly, the cloak 
of deliberate calculation. He was fond of alluding to himself as 
" Old Sam " ; but he could wrap himself at will in the dignity of 
one able to rule his country and even to rule himself. Probably 
nothing in ordinary human nature escaped his observation ; he was 
perfectly willing to veer and turn in his apparent attitude as the pre- 
judices and feelings of the people required; and he showed himself 
extremely dexterous in making the faults as well as the abilities of 
others — and of himself also — contribute to further his designs. 
According to the British representative in Texas he was perfectly 
pure-handed and mainly actuated — not by a small desire for office 
or a smaller greed for money — but by a grand ambition to associate 
his name with a nation's rise. His administration, however, did 
not prosper very well. In the existing state of dissension growing 
out of public difficulties and private aims full success was doubtless 
unattainable, and at the close of his term in December, 1838, he 
retired from office a distinctly unpopular man.^ 

His successor was Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, brother of 
Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar of the United States Supreme 
Court. As the Christian names of the two suggest, there was a 

' This estimate of Houston is based to a considerable extent on the despatches 
of the British charge in Texas, who was well qualified to form a sound judgment 
regarding him and had every motive for expressing his true opinion. 



26 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

peculiar strain in the blood,— something soaring and impractical. 
No doubt the President was brave, able, chivalrous, of high inte- 
grity and of disinterested patriotism; but Anson Jones appears to 
have come somewhere near the mark in characterizing him as " a 
sort of political Troubadour and Crusader." His ideas, though in 
many respects admirable, mounted too high for the situation. In 
planning for the future he overlooked the time being. Texas was 
overburdened with officials, for example, and their salaries were 
extravagant. During the year ending September 30, 1839, the 
revenue was less than $188,000, while the expenses rose to over 
$900,000 ; and this disparity was permitted at a time when promis- 
sory notes to the amount of more than $1,800,000 were already out. 
In June, 1840, these notes were worth about 17 per cent. ; and at the 
end of the year 14 per cent. Their effect upon real money was the 
same as elsewhere ; and while almost every other method to main- 
tain credit was considered, the simple one of reducing expenses to 
a safe basis appeared to be overlooked. About the middle of 1841, 
the captain of a French corvette reported that Texas possessed no 
coin, and had no trade except in rum, gin and brandy, while the cost 
of living was exorbitant.* 

During Lamar's term the Federalists of northern Mexico were 
trying to make head against the government, and in the autumn of 
1839 one of their leaders visited Texas, asking for her co-operation 
and promising the recognition of her independence in case of suc- 
cess. This proposal was no doubt a strong temptation to the 
Executive. The colonists themselves had taken up arms against 
Mexican Centralism in the name of the constitution ; and, as Gen- 
eral Hamilton showed in a letter to Lord Palmerston the following 
year, the idea was entertained of securing an increase of territory 
by helping the malcontents of northern Mexico to revolutionize 
that region. But the Texan authorities were endeavoring at this 
time to secure recognition from the mother-country by negotiation, 
and were rather confident that with foreign aid this covild be brought 
about. Naturally, therefore, it was felt that co-operation with the 
enemies of the government would be impolitic, and there were even 
hopes that Mexico would be disposed to reward Texas for standing 
aloof. It was also desired to raise a foreign loan, and a conserva- 
tive policy seemed necessary to inspire confidence abroad. In ac- 
cordance with these ideas Lamar issued a proclamation in 1839 

* Smith, Remin., 32. Jones, Memor., 34. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 281-286. (Cap- 
tain) Pak., No. 68, July 8, 1841. 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 37 

against engaging in hostilities beyond the Rio Grande. In fact, 
the Texas Congress passed secret resolutions almost unanimously, 
promising to support the Executive in making a pacific settlement 
with Mexico, and in the course of 1840 and 1841 a secret agent and 
two plenipotentiaries were sent to that country. The President's 
authority, however, was not sufficiently respected to secure obedi- 
ence, and in 1839 Texans joined with Canales in his campaign 
against the Centralists. At the beginning of the next year, the 
Republic of Rio Grande was proclaimed by this general at Laredo, 
on the northern side of the river, with a constitution based on that 
of 1824; and Texans fought with him until, despite the treachery of 
their allies, they gained a victory at Saltillo the following October. 
This insubordination tended little to strengthen Texas or enhance 
the prestige of her government ; and the envoys sent to Mexico failed 
entirely.^ 

Another event of Lamar's administration that had a bad efifect 
was an ill-starred expedition to Santa Fe. It was believed that 
many — perhaps most — of the people of New Mexico would welcome 
amalgamation with Texas, and in fact report had it that the expedi- 
tion was invited. Success would materially have increased the 
wealth and strength of the nation and enabled it to assert practically 
its claim to this portion of its boundary. There was, however, 
another reason for the experiment. A large and profitable trade 
was carried on between the United States and Chihuahua by way 
of St. Louis and Santa Fe ; and it was believed that the shorter 
and easier rout from Galveston, if once opened up, would soon 
monopolize the business. The Congress refused to appropriate 
money for this enterprise, but Lamar ordered the expenses of 
fitting it out paid from the treasury. Through a series of mis- 
fortunes, however, the costly expedition totally failed, and the mem- 
bers of it were captured by the Mexican authorities. In short, at 
the end of this administration it was substantially true, as Anson 
Jones affirmed, that Texas was " brought to the extremest point of 
exhaustion consistent with the ability of being resuscitated."" 

° Docs, in Tex. Arch. La Branche to State Dept., No. 29, Oct. 25, 1839 : State 
Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, i. Webb to Dunlap, March 14, 1839: Tex. Dipl. 
Corr., i., 372. Gordon to Pak., April 29, 1839: F. O., Mexico, cxxiii. Hamilton 
to Palmerston, Oct. 14, 1840: ib., Texas, i. Minutes of meeting held Sept. 21-23, 
1839: Tex. Arch. (Hopes) Webb to Pak., June 16, 1841 : F. O., Mexico, cxlv. 
(Loan) Burnley to H. Smith, Nov. 10, 1838: private coll. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 288, 
274, 289, 293. (Congress) Hamilton to Pak., Jan, 2, 1840: Tex. Arch. (Agents) 
Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. 15, 1848. 

® Yoakum, Texas, ii., 321-323. (Invited) N. Orl. Com, Bull.: Boston Adv., 
July 22, 1841. (Trade route) Kennedy, Jan. 10, 1842. Jones, Memor., 23. 



28 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

At the beginning of December, 1841, Houston was recalled to 
the helm of state. In his inaugural Message he declared that there 
was not a dollar in the treasury, that the debt amounted to ten or 
fifteen millions and that the nation had no credit. He was charged 
with exaggerating the badness of the situation for effect; but, 
as he was obliged to inform Congress about six months later that 
want of money had entirely stopped the transportation of the mails, 
the case must have been hard indeed. At about the time of his 
inauguration, the Galveston Advertiser stated that the entire revenue 
was not enough to pay the interest on the national debt, and that in 
many counties nearly half of the lands were under seizure for taxes.^ 

Houston's programme was simple but wise, and admirably cal- 
culated to inspire confidence abroad. Toward the Indians, with 
whom he was naturally able to maintain more friendly personal 
relations than most white men could have done, he advocated a 
humane and kindly attitude; toward Mexico he insisted upon a 
pacific role, arguing that it would exasperate that country and 
weaken Texas to take part in the disputes of her political parties ; 
and so far as home affairs were concerned, he enforced a system 
of rigid economy. None of these policies was acceptable to every- 
body, but with commendable courage he persevered.^ 

Up to 1842 Mexico had been so busy with revolutions and her 
treasury had been so empty, that she could not disturb Texas or 
even seriously threaten it. In 1837, a handful of troops went as 
far north as the Nueces, and in July, 1841, a small band captured 
a few Texans near Corpus Christi ; but these were. trivial raids. In 
1842, however, probably in order to refute the conviction rapidly 
gaining ground abroad that the war had ended, Mexico bestirred 
herself somewhat. In March her forces took San Antonio and two 
other points, retiring before they could be attacked. In July there 
was a skirmish on the Nueces ; and in September San Antonio was 
again captured.® 

The effect of these incursions upon the welfare of Texas was 
extremely serious. In the first place they produced a sense of in- 
security and uncertainty, which depressed the inhabitants and dis- 
couraged immigration. In the second, calling the able-bodied men 

* Yoakum, Texas, ii., 337. (Charged) Kennedy, Jan. 10, 1842. (Mails) 
Yoakum. Texas, ii., 359, Adv.: N. Orl. Courier, Dec, 10, 1841. 

'Elliot to Doyle, private, June 21, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Yoakum, Texas, ii.. 
332, 337. Garrison, Texas, 236. 

"Yoakum, Texas, ii., 241, 319, 349, 350, 361, 363. 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 39 

from home, they placed the women and children in many instances 
at the mercy of the Indians and the slaves. In the third place, 
interrupting every sort of peaceful occupation, they not only put a 
stop temporarily to agriculture and trade, but caused embarrass- 
ment for some time to come ; and finally they laid a very heavy 
financial burden upon the struggling community. In March, 1842, 
at least 3,500 Texans had to take the field, and in September they 
were called out again ; and all this was to attack an enemy that 
fled as rapidly as he came. Even more disturbing than such in- 
vasions was the fact that Mexico had ordered two war steamers 
built in England, for — were Galveston to be occupied — nearly all the 
commerce and public revenue of the nation would cease ; and in 
March, 1842, every citizen of that town who did not go to the army 
was called upon to labor in constructing batteries.^** 

On the other side a deep sentiment in favor of invading Mexico 
naturally existed. In April, 1842, a meeting at Galveston declared 
hotly for this policy, and Houston found it necessary to promise 
that he would do all in his power to promote the design at the first 
opportunity. He even addressed a minatory epistle to Santa Anna, 
threatening that the flag of Texas should float as far south as the 
Isthmus of Darien ; and the Congress passed a bill authorizing 
offensive operations. Houston did not, however, desire to revive 
the war. As there were no funds for any army, Colonel Dainger- 
field visited New Orleans to raise a loan of $1,000,000; but, in all 
likelihood not without the President's assent, he returned with an 
empty wallet. The opposition of the United States to an outbreak 
of hostilities no doubt had a good deal of influence on Houston; 
Jackson and Justice Catron of the United States Supreme Court ex- 
postulated with him ; and finally he vetoed the bill. The Texan 
forces, however, advanced to the Rio Grande ; and then, as the 
commander showed no enthusiasm for proceeding farther, a large 
part of his army seceded, crossed the river, and eventually, after 
performing most courageous deeds, were overpowered and captured 
at Mier by greatly superior numbers. This misfortune consider- 
ably impaired both the fighting strength of the nation and the 
prestige of the government.^^ 

The condition of Texas at this time was indeed serious. In 

"Yoakum, Texas, ii., 351, 364. Eve, No. 15, March ig, 1842. 

"Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. N. Orl. Com. Bull., May 7, 1842. 
Boston Adv., April 11. 1841. (H.'s desire) Elliot to Pak., April 14, 1843: F. O., 
Texas, vi. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 360, 362, 368-372. Catron to Jackson, March 9, 
1845 : Jackson Pap. (Vetoed) Nat. Intel!., Aug. 10, 1842. Garrison, Texas, 247. 



40 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

January, 1842, the Congress passed a law which brought the treasury 
notes down to only two per cent, of par, — virtual bankruptcy. The 
New Orleans Courier described the country at this time as without 
money, credit, a regular army or an able and popular general, 
threatened by Mexico and harassed by the Indians; and the same 
month Eve, the American representative, informed Webster that 
not a regular soldier was in the field ; that the public resources were 
exhausted ; that the population amounted to only seventy or seventy- 
five thousand ; that great danger was to be apprehended from Santa 
Anna, now all powerful at Mexico ; and in brief that Texas could 
not maintain her independence. On learning of the capture of San 
Antonio two months later, he added that the administration was " in 
a most deplorable condition," and that excitement against the Presi- 
dent for supposed military negligence ran high. In August he re- 
ported that the American volunteers, who had marched in to assist 
the feeble republic, had become dissatisfied with Houston and had 
left for home ; and in November the London Times quoted an 
American paper as adding to this picture that such vessels as the 
Texas navy possessed were lying idle at New Orleans from lack 
of funds. About the same time the British minister stated that no 
adequate organization existed and no resources ; that the govern- 
ment were not respected ; and that, should the Mexicans really 
come as they were reported to intend, bad roads would be their 
principal difficulty. The Mobile Advertiser printed a Galveston 
letter dated November 3, which said, "We have a bankrupt Treas- 
ury, a feeble and imbecile Executive, and disunion and confusion 
everywhere existing. A crisis seems to be approaching, and, unless 
foreign aid should interpose in our behalf, we cannot but anticipate 
the most disastrous consequences. ... It would be difficult to 
imagine a more critical and inauspicious state of things." In De- 
cember Houston's ]\Iessage to Congress admitted that the nation 
had neither currency nor public resources, nor even jails for its 
criminals ; and Eve confided to Governor Letcher of Kentucky that 
all in western Texas were intensely hostile to the President, charg- 
ing him with having left that whole region exposed to the enemy, 
and threatening to take his life should they be driven from their 
homes. January 15, 1843, a letter from Galveston, published at 
New Orleans, informed the world that distrust pervaded all classes, 
that there was no more money in trade than in the national treasury, 
that credit was equally wanting, that in case of serious invasion 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 4I 

assistance could be obtained nowhere, and that not a few were leav- 
ing the country in despair. The next month Eve reported that 
many accused Houston publicly of co-operating with the national 
enemy in order to become the dictator of Texas under Mexican 
authority, and added that Galveston did not possess enough ammuni- 
tion to defend the city fifteen minutes against a respectable force. 
As for the navy, its commander disobeyed orders and was pro- 
claimed an outlaw. ^- 

San xA.ntonio, much the largest and richest city, lay on the very 
frontier with not even a screen of population to protect it. Gal- 
veston was described a little later by a friendly visitor as containing 
about 300 buildings " which a bold person would or might call 
houses." Generally these were made of planks nailed on like clap- 
boards, with a block about two feet high under each corner. Only 
one brick chimney could be found in the city. Even the dry-goods 
stores were usually in water or mud, and almost every house was 
surrounded with oozy prairie ; while pigs, in most cases cropped of 
ears and tails by the dogs, roamed at will in the haphazard streets. 
In December, 1842, Eve found the President at the seat of govern- 
ment in a house of three small rooms without a single glass window ; 
and the ministers of the United States and England, with four 
strangers, lodged at the tavern in one small room, which had no 
window at all. Indeed, Houston himself, though accustomed to 
a wigwam, described things at the capital as " rather raw."^^ 

To sum up the situation, Van Zandt, the Texan charge at 
Washington, explaining in March, 1843, why the commercial treaty 
which he had negotiated with the United States had not been ac- 
cepted by our government, represented the Senators as saying in 
the debate upon it : " Texas is rent and torn by her own internal 
discords ; she is without a dollar in her treasury ; her numbers are 
small ; her laws are set at defiance by her citizens ; her officers, 
both civil and military, cannot have their orders executed or obeyed ; 
Mexico is now threatening to invade her with a large land and 
naval force ; she cannot long stand under such circumstances ; the 
chances are against her. She will either have to submit to Mexico, 

^^ (Bankruptcy) Von Hoist, U. S., ii.. 608. Courier. Jan. 22, 1842. Eve, Jan. 6 ; 
March 10; Aug. 22 (No. 23), 1842. Times, Nov. i, 1842. Elliot, No. 11, Oct. 17, 
1842. Adv.: Nat. Intell., Nov. 18, 1842. (Message) Niles, Ixvi.. 18, 19. Eve to 
Letcher, Dec. 22, 1842: Crit. Pap. N. Orl. Com. Bull.. Jan. 21, 1843. Eve, No. 
Z7, Feb. 10, 1843. (Navy) N. Orl. Courier, May 24, 1843. 

" (S. Ant.) Smith, Remin., 29. (Galv.) Houstoun, Texas, i,, 255 et seq. Eve, 
No. 31, Dec. 10, 1842. Elliot, private, Nov. 15, 1842. 



42 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



or come under some other power." Then the situation improved 
somewhat ; but in the following October the secretary of the Texas 
legation at Washington proposed to resign in order to spare the 
national treasury the expense of his salary. ' In a word, as Anson 
Jones once remarked: "Texas was then a rich jewel lying derelict 
by the way."" 

Santa Anna, now the master of whatever strength his country 
possessed, understood the condition of her lost province. During 
1842 the Mexican consul at New Orleans forwarded to the ministry 
of foreign relations a steady stream of newspaper clippings, rich in 
details. In September Pakenham, the British representative at 
Mexico, reported that according to the general impression there 
entertained poverty and dissension had made Texas helpless. In 
February, 1843, he said the exulting government were so thor- 
oughly satisfied of this fact that it would be useless to offer media- 
tion ; and at about the same time Almonte, the Mexican minister to 
the United States, informed a member of our Congress that at 
last his nation had strong hopes of reconquering its province. Un- 
fortunately for Santa Anna, however, a war with rebellious Yucatan 
still dragged on, sapping the military and financial strength of the 
country ; and evidently his best policy was to press that, conclude it 
as soon as possible, and improve the interim by adopting some 
plan to divide the Texans and to make his own people feel that he 
was not overlooking the matter.^^ 

Circumstances now came to his aid. With other prisoners from 
Texas in the fortress of Perote lay Judge Robinson, formerly 
Lieutenant-Governor of that country. He found the confinement 
irksome ; and, probably with no view save to escape from it, he ad- 
dressed a letter to the dictator, proposing that Texas acknowledge 
the sovereignty of Mexico on certain terms; that an armistice be 

" (Van Z.) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 394. Van Z., No. 109, Oct. 16, 1843. Smith, Remin., 
46 (Smith states that in 1843 Texas was harmonious and prosperous, but of course 
he means that it was comparatively so). Jones, Memor., 80. The question arises 
whether, such being her condition, Texas had really established herself as a nation. 
But she had adequate potential strength to maintain her independence against 
Mexico, — to wit : the sympathy of great numbers in the United States and the pos- 
sibility of making such terms with England regarding slavery and free trade as to 
secure effectual British aid. It may, however, be answered that nationality existing 
only by the aid of foreigners is not independence. But we date our national exist- 
ence from 1776, yet only French assistance at a later date saved it; and Holland, 
Belgium and Denmark would soon be absorbed but for foreign support. 

"Mexican Consul, N. Orl., passim: Sria. Relac. Pak., No. 89, Sept. 10, 1842; 
No. 8, Feb. 24, 1843. (Almonte) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 406. (S. Anna's aims) 
Thompson, Oct. 2, 1843; Smith, Remin., 59; to Smith, May 8, 1843; N. Orl. 
Picayune, April 27, 1843. 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 43 

granted in order to facilitate a discussion of the plan in his country, 
— a discussion which he declared would lead to the unanimous 
acceptance of it ; and that he and one or two of his comrades be 
made commissioners to present the case. Santa Anna sent for 
Robinson, satisfied himself that he would prove a good envoy — so 
very good, apparently, that the release of one or two of his com- 
rades would be superfluous — and in February, 1843, despatched 
him to Texas with a proposition definitely drawn up and officially 
signed. In substance it included six points : Texas was to acknowl- 
edge the sovereignty of Mexico, become a Department, be repre- 
sented in the national Congress, originate all her local laws and 
rules, be granted a general amnesty, and be exempt from the pres- 
ence of Mexican troops. One other point of no less importance 
was involved but not stated. An acceptance of Mexican sovereignty 
meant the abolition of slavery, first, because the law of the land made 
slavery illegal, and secondly — according to the dictator — because an 
agreement with England forbade the toleration of it in any part of 
the country.^*^ 

Santa Anna admitted at this time, the American minister re- 
ported, that he had no expectation of favorable results from the 
negotiations thus initiated, — that is to say, direct results ; but he 
counted so much on his proposition as the means of accomplishing 
what he had in view, that he invoked the good offices of England 
in its behalf. He also tried to recommend his terms to the Texan 
people by menacing that country. In April his Secretary of 
Foreign Relations notified the British charge in efifect that soon it 
was to be attacked in the most ruthless manner, and the charge 
was sufficiently impressed to warn the British representative in 
Texas ; and two months later a Mexican decree that recalled the 
atrocities of Goliad and the Alamo was issued, threatening im- 
mediate death to all foreigners taken in arms there. ^^ 

Houston, seeing a way to gain time, dictated now a confidential 
letter to Santa Anna — ostensibly written by the Judge — in which 
he represented himself as noncommittal regarding the proposed 
settlement, denied the existence of those factions in Texas upon 

" (Robinson Lieut. -Gov. in 1835) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 372. Robinson 
to S. Anna, Jan. 9, 1843 : State Dept., Arch. Tex. Legation, Yoakum, Texas, ii., 
387. (Terms) Robinson to Galv. Times, March 27, 1843: Nat. Intell., April 11, 
1843. (Agreement) Thompson to Green, March 27, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from 
Mins., Mexico, xii. 

" (S. Anna) Thompson: previous note. (Invoked) Pak„ No. 21, March 23, 
1843. Doyle to Elliot, April 20, 1843 : F. O., Texas, xxiii. Decree, June 17, 1843 : 
ib., Mexico, clxii. 



44 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

which the dictator had counted, and plausibly repeated the sug- 
gestion of an armistice. He also gave notice through the British 
representatives that he was disposed, in view of the Robinson terms, 
to send commissioners to Mexico, but that calm deliberation on 
the subject would be impossible while the danger of invasion con- 
tinued ; and then through the same channel the dictator signified his 
willingness to grant a truce. As the result, Houston proclaimed 
a suspension of hostilities on the fifteenth of June, setting a trap 
for Mexico by announcing that it should " continue during the 
pendency of negotiations between the two countries for peace." 
Santa Anna took a similar step regarding hostilities ; but he would 
not accept Houston's language in reference to the duration of the 
truce, for obviously that would have enabled Texas to continue it at 
will by merely protracting the discussions, and he proposed to 
leave this matter to the military officers charged with arranging the 
details. Steps were then taken to perfect the armistice. Tornel, 
the Minister of War, gave his orders to General Woll on the seventh 
of July ; before long commissioners were duly appointed on both 
sides ; and those of Texas — Hockley and Williams — set out for 
Matamoros about the middle of October. ^^ 

But all this was a comedy. Not only did Santa Anna expect 
nothing as a direct result of the peace negotiations, but the other 
party were quite of the same mind. When the Robinson terms 
were made known, a paper of English proclivities — the Galveston 
Ck'Uian — spoke favorably of them, but its voice could scarcely be 
heard amid the chorus of denunciation. Said its neighbor, the 
Times, "They will be, by every reflecting Texian, consigned to the 
contempt which alone they merit." Anson Jones, the Secretary of 
State, notified his minister at Washington that they were rejected by 
" one unanimous response from the whole country," saying further, 

"Yoakum, Texas, ii., 388. Elliot to Pak., April 14, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. 
It fell to Doyle to act for Pak. Doyle, No. 24, May 25, 1843. Id. to Elliot, May 
27, 1843: F. O., Texas, xxiii. Elliot to Jones, June 10, 1843: ib., vi. Jones to 
Elliot, June 15, 1843: ib. Doyle, No. 51. July 30, 1843. Elliot to JTones, July 24, 
1843: F. O., Texas, vi. (Tornel) Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 84. (Set out) 
Elliot, private. Oct. 10, 1843. It should be noted that there was a suspension of 
hostilities (which, to avoid confusion, will be termed the "truce") but that the 
formal armistice proposed did not come into effect because Texas would not accept 
the terms arranged by the commissioners. It should be noted also that a cessation 
of hostilities, suggested by Robinson, and demanded by Houston as a sine qua noii 
of considering the Robinson proposition, was granted by Santa Anna because he was 
anxious to have that proposition considered, and not because England requested 
him to grant it. Doyle's despatch of May 25 shows that when he presented to 
Santa Anna Houston's view that a truce was an " indispensably necessary " pre- 
liminary, Santa Anna replied at once that such was his own opinion. 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 45 

" Mexico must restore us our murdered thousands before we can 
ever entertain the proposition of being re-incorporated with that 
Government " ; and Murphy, the American representative, reported 
that people and press ahtiost without exception scorned the pro- 
posals. To all appearances, then, Judge Robinson's move signified 
nothing regarding a final settlement between the two countries. 
The danger of hostilities was merely suspended.^" 

Meanwhile Santa Anna continued to labor with Yucatan. In 
July negotiations began, and in December that Department returned 
to the Union on a basis of semi-independence analogous to the 
condition offered Texas. Evidently the Lone Star republic was 
now in a most critical situation. She had as good a title to inde- 
pendence as Mexico herself had possessed from 1821 to 1836, during 
which interval she had been treated as a sovereign power by all 
countries except Spain. Indeed Pakenham had said four years 
earlier: "The state of the question between this Country [Mexico] 
and Texas is precisely the same as was for a long time that of the 
question between Spain and this Country. . . . Reconquest is ad- 
mitted to be impossible and yet a feeling of mistaken pride, foolishly 
called regard for the National Honour, deters the Government " from 
ending the war. It was evident that Mexico did not intend to recog- 
nize Texas, and did propose to distress and impoverish her citizens 
for an indefinite period by harassing raids, menaces of a formidable 
attack and, if possible, serious invasions. Such a state of things 
was almost intolerable. In March, 1843, Pakenham felt satisfied 
that all of the Texans who had anything to lose were tired of the 
alarms and uncertainties ; and about the first of November Houston 
himself stated that the citizens were getting weary of their political 
condition, and were ready for almost any change, — almost any, he 
meant, except a return to Mexican domination.-*^ 

One conceivable resource was oflftcial American aid ; but the 
door of annexation, as we shall find, had been closed ; our settled 
rule to avoid entangling alliances precluded any other method of 
assistance ; and the two countries appeared to be growing less and 
less friendly. Another possibility was the purchase of European 
support ; and Texas appeared to be increasingly intimate with France 

"Galveston Civilian and Times: Nat. IntelL, April ii, 1843. To Van Zandt, 
May 8, 1843. Murphy, No. 3, July 6, 1843. 

=" Mexico a traves. iv., 507. Pak. No. 45, June 3, 1839: No. 21, March 23, 
1843. (Houston) Murphy, No. 11, Nov. 7, 1843. Von Hoist (U. S., ii., 62^) admits 
that if matters went on as they were, Texas " would soon have to cast itself into 
the arms of the first power which opened them to it." 



46 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

and England, particularly England, as presently will be discovered. 
There existed, however, a third alternative — quite compatible with 
the second — and this it is in place to consider here. Paradoxical 
though it may sound, the struggling republic, while very weak for 
defence, had great latent possibilities for aggression, and the condi- 
tion of northern Mexico was extremely tempting. Already we have 
seen the strong Federalist sentiment which existed in that region 
and manifested itself in civil \var; but that was only one phase of 
the matter. 

In spite of two decrees of expulsion many old Spaniards had 
remained in this part of the country, and they showed a persistent 
unfriendliness toward the national authorities, while the debility 
and badness of the administration were in some respects peculiarly 
felt at so great a distance from the capital. Behind these facts, 
moreover, lay a strong centrifugal tendency inherent in the political 
character of the Spanish ; and the logical consequences followed. 
Not long after the fall of Iturbide there was a movement for inde- 
pendence in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Texas, and 
these districts formed a Junta at Monterey to promote the design. 
In 1829 Pakenham, a keen observer, discovered that the great State 
of Jalisco had invited four other members of the confederation to 
form a league with it, and he believed this combination would be 
made with secession from the Union as one of its aims. Three 
years later he reported that should the civil war then raging con- 
tinue, it was not improbable that Durango, Jalisco, Zacatecas, 
Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and San Luis Potosi would unite as an 
independent nation. In 1836 the New Orleans Bee published a 
letter written at Zacatecas in July, which stated that the northern 
parts of Mexico, including New Mexico and California, appeared 
to be in favor of forming a republic in alliance with Texas. The 
next year Pakenham expressed the opinion that an unsuccessful at- 
tempt to reconquer Texas would hasten the defection of other 
districts, and said the army should remain on guard at Matamoros in 
order to preserve the territory still held by Mexico. The wisdom 
of this judgment seemed to be proved by the fact that revolts of a 
serious nature broke out that year in San Luis Potosi and Sonora, 
—the latter having at its head the Comandante General, — followed 
during 1838 by similar outbreaks in various quarters. In Novem- 
ber, 1838, Tampico began a rebellion which lasted for eight months; 
and in 1840 the British consul at that point represented the people 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 47 

about him as likely to declare again for secession. In 1839, as we 
saw, the Federalists of northern Mexico endeavored to establish 
cordial relations with Texas, and certain of them soon afterwards 
proclaimed the Republic of Rio Grande. At about this time the 
British minister informed his government that the insurrection in 
Coahuila and Nuevo Leon had not yet been extinguished, remarking 
in explanation that the remote Departments obtained no advantage, 
but only harm, from their connection with Mexico, since they had to 
pay the troops employed to oppress them, even when there was 
no money to support courts of justice or repel the savages. Leclerc, 
who had visited Texas recently, stated in 1840 that without doubt 
a large part of the people in five Mexican Departments were dis- 
posed to unite with that country or form a new republic under her 
protection. In April, 1841, the New Orleans Courier said the news 
from Tampico and Matamoros indicated that all northern Mexico 
was going to secede ; and, about the middle of the year, the New 
Orleans Commercial Bulletin remarked : " It would not be surprising 
if in a short while the Texas league included all the States between 
the Del Xorte and the California Gulf." In Tamaulipas the war 
against the central power continued nearly three years, and although 
Arista, the government general, succeeded in beating the Federalist 
leader, it was charged against him later that he himself thought it 
possible to create a new republic out of the Departments bordering 
on the Rio Grande ; while the editors of the New Orleans Picayune 
stated positively that he had corresponded with influential Texans 
regarding the accession of northeastern Mexico to their country, and 
anxiously desired to effect this. Moreover it should not be forgotten 
that intimate business relations were constantly drawing the two 
sides of the Rio Grande together. In August, 1844, it was estimated 
that about 16,500 Mexicans were interested more or less directly in 
this trade. -^ 

"Ward to F. O., No. 15, Jan. 29, 1827: F. O., Mexico, xxxi. Mexico a traves, 
iv., 98. Pak., No. 83, Sept. 18, 1829; private, Aug. 30, 1832. Bee, Sept, 3, 1836. 
Pak., No. 30, July 26, 1837. Ashburnham to F. O., No. 9, May i, 1837; No, 58, 
Nov. 7, 1837 ; No. 7, Jan. 31, 1838 ; No, 70, Sept. 13, 1838 ; No, iii, Dec. 31, 1838 : 
F. O., Mexico, cvi,, cviii., cxiii., cxv., cxvi. Pak., No, 52, June 22, 1839. Craw- 
ford to Pak., April 3, 1840: F. O., Mexico, cxxxv, (Rep. of Rio Gr.) N, Orl, Com. 
Bull.. March 12, 1840, Pak., No. 21, Feb. 9, 1840. Revue des Deux Mondes, April 
15, 1840, p. 253. Courier, April 3, 1841. Com. Bull.: Boston Adv., July 22, 1841, 
The Rio Grande was also called the Rio Bravo del Norte and, for short, the Bravo 
and the Del Norte. Pak., No, 100, Oct. 26, 1840. (Arista) Bank., No, 56, April 
29, 1846 : Picayune, Aug, i, 1845 '. Polk, Diary, i., 230, A recent book says the people 
of northern Mexico desired to maintain a state of things on the border that would 
permit them to plunder the Texans, But the fact that parties of rancheros accom- 



48 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

New Mexico, as the supposed attitude of not a few toward the 
Santa Fe expedition suggested, was discontented, even though the 
insurrection of 1837 had been quelled. The Californians maintained 
a state of chronic revolt. In 1837 Pakenham concluded that an 
understanding existed between them and Texas; and seven years 
later the British consul at Monterey, California, commenting upon 
" that spirit of hatred and antipathy toward Mexico and the Mexi- 
can Government," which he said had " always existed in the breasts 
of the Californians," declared that he found "but one universal 
sentiment of unqualified aversion to the continuance of Mexican 
Authority " there. In fact, the people rebelled that very year, drove 
out the national troops, and estabhshed a revolutionary g6vernment 
of their own. All northern Mexico was thus evidently in a state of 
disintegration ; and the British consul at Tepic, after a long period 
of observation, formally expressed the judgment that the nation, if 
left to itself, was destined to break up into small tribes like those 
of Asia. The indications were, however, that matters would not 
be allowed to drift.-^ 

In April, 1844, the American charge at Mexico informed Cal- 
houn that a ]Mr. Hastings of Ohio, who had led a party to Oregon 
some two years before and had been in Mexico about the first of 
January, admitted that a well digested plan to follow the example 
of Texas existed in California, and that its promoters were only 
waiting for him to return with more settlers. Sonora was expected 
to join in the movement, and it was understood that for some time 
New Mexico had been on the eve of a revolution. It is hardly 
conceivable that all this was going on at their door without the 
knowledge of the Texan authorities ; and in fact, when the success 
of the annexation project rendered a longer silence unnecessary, 
the National Register let it be known that a plan had been matured 
by many leading men in Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sonora 
and California to form a union with Texas. According to the New 
Orleans Picayune, this representation was stated to emanate from 
" the best authority."" 

panied the Mexican troops on their raids across the line and occasionally did a 
little marauding on their own responsibility signifies practically nothing in view 
of the political sympathies, military co-operation and profitable commercial inter- 
course between the two sections. Reliable accounts agree, too, that what the 
great body of Mexicans on the Rio Grande principally desired was to enjoy peace 
under a settled government. (Estimated) Galveston Civilian, Aug. 31, 1844. 

^'Pak., Xo. 13, Feb. 14, 1837. Forbes to Barron, Sept. s, 1844: F. O., Mexico, 
clxxix. Id. to Bank., July 2, 1846; ib., cxcviii. 

*• Green to Calhoun, April 11, 1844: Jameson. Calh. Corr., 945. Nat. Register: 
Nat. Inlell.. Nov. 14, 1845. Picayutte, Oct. 25, 1845. 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 49 

So far, to be sure, the governmenf of Texas had been very 
unwilHng to attack IVIexico, largely because she desired to legalize 
her existence by obtaining recognition from the mother-country ; but 
whether the coveted boon were granted or persistently withheld, the 
deterrent power of this consideration was sure to disappear. There 
would then be left a crumbling political organization in a rich land, 
face to face with a people of extraordinary vitality and enterprise. 
In April, 1842, Henry A. Wise held up before the American House 
of Representatives a picture of Texas, guided by her own bright 
star, marching on to her enemy's capital. Webster looked upon 
such utterances as mere vain and senseless bravado; but in 1836 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee had written to 
Jackson that, should the war in the Southwest continue for a twelve- 
month, forces from the Mississippi valley would take possession of 
Mexico City. With money, said the representative of Texas at 
Washington the same year, " we can muster an army of any size that 
may be necessary"; and until after our war with Mexico this con- 
tinued to seem feasible. In 1842 the Commercial Bulletin of New 
Orleans advised Texas " to call to her standard the thousands of 
impatient, daring, and ambitious spirits in the South West, by whom 
a march to the city of Montezuma would be embraced as an adven- 
ture full of fun and frolic, and holding forth the rewards of opu- 
lence and glory." The British minister in Texas, who knew the 
South quite well, expressed the opinion that the men of that section, 
increasing in numbers and " almost entirely without steady occupa- 
tion," were " unscrupulous, fearless and enterprising," and had 
" exaggerated notions of the wealth of Mexico." He believed that 
the project of a raid into the land of the Montezumas was extremely 
popular there, and that a little success, leading to a great eruption, 
might result in the permanent occupation of at least the northeastern 
parts ; and he assured Pakenham that should Houston raise his voice 
for war, he would be followed in less than six months by twenty 
thousand riflemen from the States. Any one who has read the 
diaries and letters of the volunteers who marched into Mexico in 
1846 and 1847, knows how large a place in their thoughts was held 
by sheer love of daring and a belief in the riches of that country. 
Precisely the same motives that impelled such men to join the 
armies of the United States in those years would have carried them 
across the Sabine in 1843, ^^^d the crusade of adventure, plunder, and 
revenge for Goliad and the Alamo been preached; and Houston, 

5 



50 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



instead of fearing that recruits would fall short in the event of 
hostilities, feared that his country would be overwhelmed by them. 
With such a backing and the support of the provinces willing to 
join her, Texas could probably— or at least very possibly — have 
forced Mexico to accept her terms.-* 

What could have stopped such a war? A policy of self-aggran- 
dizement on the part of our youthful neighbor would have dis- 
pleased the American government and many of our people ; but it is 
not easy to see on what grounds we could have interfered consis- 
tently. From England the danger of interposition was perhaps 
greater. But England, though her interests prompted her to main- 
tain good relations with Mexico, was continually obliged to complain 
of its government, and would have had reason to welcome even the 
conquest of that country by an allied and not too powerful nation. 
It would not have been difficult for Texas to give most satisfactory 
assurances regarding British interests there, hold out the induce- 
ment of free trade — with possibly that of abolition also — and offer 
her merchants a new route to the coast of Asia; and, with such 
arguments in favor of the crusade, England would not have been 
likely to check it.-^ 

In short, then, Mexico — especially the remoter portions of it — 
had been falling steadily into chaos from the time of its first Presi- 
dent ; Santa Anna, the one man after Iturbide who seemed able to 
unite and upbuild the nation, had now — from essential defects of 
character, intellect and training — become an almost insurmountabte 
stumbling-block in its path ; and the country appeared to be swiftly 
going to ruin ; while close at hand stood a people not only qualified 
to conquer and rule, but able to draw to their standard countless 
ambitious and enterprising young men from Europe and the 
southern States. Naturally it seemed to many that destiny called 
upon Texas to reach out for the sceptre. The opinion that a great 

-* (Wise) Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 422. (Webster) Adams, Memoirs, xi., 
347. Catron to Jackson, June 8, 1836: Jackson Pap. Wharton to Austin, Dec. 11, 
1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 151. Com. Bull., March 17, 1842. Elliot, No. 4, Jan. 28, 
1843. Id. to Pak., April 14, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Houston to Jackson, Feb. 16, 
1844: Williams, Houston, 280. Lord Ashburton told Henry Clay that England 
would sooner expect Texas to conquer Mexico than Mexico Texas (Reily, No. 83, 
April 14, 1842). In waging such a war no doubt the Texans would have encoun- 
tered serious financial difficulties, but it would have been conducted in a very 
different manner from that of 1846-8. Money and provisions would have been 
taken from the enemy with an unsparing hand, and immense districts available 
for agriculture or mining could have been offered as pay for the troops or security 
for loans. There was a powder mill at Zacatecas, the author thinks, and Mexican 
mines produced large quantities of lead. 

' (Complain) Pak. and Bank., Despatches, passim. 



TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 5I 

future was possible for her as an independent power had existed 
there from the first, it will be discovered. As conservative a man as 
Austin had advised that her territory be left undefined, with a view 
to the extension of it beyond the Rio Grande. From 1838 through 
1841, said Anson Jones, a "vast majority" of the people were for 
offensive war, and in 1842, as we have observed, the sentiment 
favorable to such a policy was hotter yet. At that time, said the 
New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, the country was full of the idea 
of conquering Mexico, and her Congress actually voted to extend 
the national boundaries to the Pacific. Nor were the hopes of 
future greatness a mere dream of local pride. Leclerc, writing in 
the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1840, dwelt upon " the grandeur of 
the role" which he believed Texas was "destined" to play; and the 
British government predicted two years later that she was fated to 
be populous and powerful.-'^ 

^ (Austin) Kennedy, Texas, ii., 170. Jones, Letter: Niles. Jan. i, 1848. Com. 
Bull., April 26, 1842. (Pacific) Nat. IntclL, March 3, 1842. Houston vetoed this 
bill. Revile des Deux Mondes, March i, 1840, p. 606. To Pak., No. 26, July i, 
1842. 



III. 

Texas and the United States, 1836-1843. 

The relations of the United States and Texas that principally 
concern us are under five heads: the questions of recognition and 
annexation, official American action with reference to the Texan war 
of independence, and public sentiment in each country regarding 
the other. 

In June, 1836, Joseph N. Bryan, writing from Nashville in the 
central State of Tennessee to Martin Van Buren, said that the sym- 
pathies of the public had been so roused by the cruelties of the 
Mexicans that the joy over the victory of San Jacinto was perhaps 
extravagant, and that all classes of the people there, " old and young, 
all," were for " a speedy acknowledgment of the Independence of 
Texas." This state of mind was obviously a logical corollary of the 
popular enthusiasm for Houston and his fellow-citizens ; and at first 
it was manifested strongly by the people north as well as by those 
south of Tennessee.^ 

Only five days after the defeat of the Mexicans, Morris of Ohio 
presented in the Senate of the United States the suggestion of a 
meeting held at Cincinnati that Texas should be recognized, upon 
which King of Alabama expressed the opinion that such action 
would be premature. Senator Walker from Mississippi protested 
that the sun was not more certain to set than she to maintain her 
independence, and that Santa Anna's party, having overthrown the 
constitution and established a military despotism, were the true 
rebels ; but finally, as King proposed and Morris consented, the 
request of the Cincinnati meeting was laid upon the table.- 

Two weeks later Preston of South Carolina brought in a memo- 
rial from citizens of Pennsylvania making a similar request; but, 
while exhibiting deep sympathy with the Texans, he took the ground 
that Congress could not act upon the petition, and proposed to treat 
it in the same way. Webster and Buchanan, though evidently they 
shared the popular sentiment regarding the two parties in the 

' See General Note, p. i. Of course the history of the acquisition of Texas 
would begin with Adams's effort to buy it in 1825. Bryan, June 6, 1836: Van 
B. Pap. 

''Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 331. 

52 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 53 

Struggle, agreed that the Senate must be firm for neutrality ; and the 
memorial was disposed of as Preston desired.^ 

A week later, resolutions to the same efifect from citizens of 
North Carolina were offered, and again Preston objected. Before 
voting for recognition, he said, he must be sure that Texas had a 
de facto government, and he deemed " a short waiting of events " 
necessary. When another week had passed. Walker presented the 
same request from residents of Mississippi. By this time news of 
Santa Anna's overthrow had arrived ; and the Senator urged that 
in case it was true and a dc facto government existed, the United 
States were bound on the principles followed before in such cases 
to recognize the new republic at once. Webster admitted that if 
Texas possessed such a government, it was " undoubtedly " the 
duty of this country to recognize it. Calhoun, while declaring for 
the measure, advised that official accounts of the Mexican defeat 
should be awaited. Brown objected that the effort to secure recog- 
nition for Texas was an effort to change radically the neutral and 
pacific character of the American government. Rives, urging the 
necessity of caution, asked that the resolutions go to the committee 
on foreign relations in order that the Senate might have the benefit 
of its views ; and though Calhoun said his own mind had been 
made up "long ago" and he desired the opinion of no one else, it 
was so ordered. Memorials of the same tenor from New York, 
Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Kentucky and Connecticut were pre- 
sented on that and succeeding days.* 

Just at this time the Chief Justice of the supreme court of 
Tennessee, writing to Jackson, predicted that in case the war should 
continue, great numbers of American volunteers would carry the 
banner of the Lone Star into the enemy's country; then Mexico 
would appeal to England ; and England, pursuing somewhat the 
same policy as in India, would gain control of Mexico, the Gulf and 
the mouth of the Mississippi. On the other hand, he argued, "If 
the Independence of Texas is recognized by our Government, then 
Texas can be controlled by us. This alone will end the war. We 
can coerce both sides to peace. Say to the Mexicans — Stand off! 
to the Texians — Hold in!" To this he added the remark, "If any 
member of Congress should vote against Texas Independence his 

' (May 9) Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 359. 

* Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 378, 393, 395, 396, 435, 438. As the Conn, resols. 
were not passed until May 27, it is a mistake to say — as has been said more than 
once — that they originated the movement for recognition. Other similar memorials 
came in later. 



54 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



political prospects would be ruined." It can readily be supposed that 
Catron's last sentence throws light upon the course of the American 
Congress; and one can easily believe that his other ideas also may 
have presented themselves to the Senate committee on foreign 
relations.^ 

At all events, on June i8 Clay reported for that committee as 
follows : " The independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged 
by the United States, whenever satisfactory information shall be 
received that it has, in successful operation, a civil Government, 
capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an 
independent power." About a week later, in response to a resolu- 
tion of Preston's asking information regarding the condition of that 
country, President Jackson informed the Senate that measures to 
ascertain the facts had already been taken by the Executive, and at 
the same time submitted certain correspondence that had passed 
between him and its representatives.** 

On the first day of July Clay's report was taken up. Webster, 
Buchanan and Niles expressed the opinion that the time for recog- 
nition had not yet arrived ; Southard doubted whether the war had 
really come to an end ; Benton — though anxious not to deprive New 
Orleans of business by incurring the ill-will of Mexico — declared 
that Mexico and Texas could not possibly live together, and that 
he was prepared to recognize " the contingent and expected inde- 
pendence " of the revolting state ; and finally the resolution was 
unanimously adopted. The object of the Senate in going so far yet 
stopping short of actual recognition was, according to the National 
Intelligencer, to prevent the matter from " being pressed upon 
Congress in a more imperative form." In other words, one may 
understand, it aimed to diminish the urgency of public sentiment 
without incurring the risk of taking imprudent action.^ 

Jackson was represented by the Secretary of State in a conver- 
sation with the Texan envoys as desiring to recognize their country, 
but not until the step could be taken " with propriety," and a memo- 
randum of his that may be found among the Van Buren papers 
indicates that anxious thought was given by him to the merits of the 
question. He felt, as did others, that her vote in favor of joining 
the United States had complicated a matter already difficult enough ; 

° Catron to Jackson, June 8, 1836 : Jackson Pap. 

° Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 453. Richardson, Messages, iii., 230. 
' Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 479, and Benton's Abr. Debates for the day. 
Benton, Letter: Wash. Globe, May 2, 1844. Nat. IntelL, July 16, 1836. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 55 

and when the next session of Congress opened, he expressed him- 
self in a Message substantially as follows : Our conduct regarding 
this war is to be governed by the same principles as guided us during 
the struggle of Spain with Mexico; it is natural that our citizens 
should feel a preference between the contending parties, and this 
fact must teach us great caution, lest our policy should be governed 
by partiality or prejudice; "our character requires that we should 
neither anticipate events nor attempt to control them," and this is 
the more necessary because " The known desire of the Texans to 
become a part of our system, although its gratification depends upon 
the reconcilement of various and conflicting interests, necessarily a 
work of time and uncertain in itself, is calculated to expose our 
conduct to misconstruction in the eyes of the world. "^ 

On the twenty-first of December came another Message. No 
steps towards recognizing Texas have been taken by the Executive, 
stated the President. Our custom has been to regard these matters 
as questions of fact, and " our predecessors have cautiously 
abstained from deciding upon them until the clearest evidence was in 
their possession to enable them not only to decide correctly, but to 
shield their decisions from every unworthy imputation." In the 
case of the Spanish-American colonies we waited until the danger of 
re-subjugation "had entirely passed away." Unquestionably it is 
true that the Mexicans have been driven from Texas, but there 
is a great disparity of physical force in favor of their country, and 
consequently the issue is still in suspense. Recognition at this time, 
therefore, "could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that 
prudent reserve with which we have heretofore held ourselves 
bound to treat all similar questions," Moreover, special reasons for 
caution exist in the present instance, for Texas has been claimed as 
ours, and some of our citizens, reluctant to give up the claim, are 
anxious for reunion. A large proportion of the civilized inhabitants 
went from the United States, and the nation, after establishing a 
government like ours, has proposed to join us. Under these circum- 
stances premature action might subject us to the imputation "of 
seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a 
view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves ;" and " Prudence, 
therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and main- 
tain our present attitude ... at least until the lapse of time or the 

* Envoys to Burnet, July 15, 1836: Tex. Dipl, Com, i.. no. The memo, is 
printed in Tex. State Hist, Assoc, Qtrly,, Jan., 1910, p. 248. Richardson, Messages, 
iii., 237. 



f 



\ 



55 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the 
ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate 
sovereignty and to uphold the Government constituted by them." 
In such terms spoke the President, and his language was by no 
means intended merely for effect. The day after this Message was 
dated, the Texan envoy reported that Jackson was unwilling to 
grant recognition until some European power should have done so, 
feeling that there might appear to be a preconceived scheme to make 
her "a Competent contracting party" for the express purpose of 
then taking her ; and the President would unbend only so far as to 
say that the preamble of a resolution passed by the House of Repre- 
sentatives intimated that the power to recognize a new state belonged 
to Congress, and that he was disposed to concur in this view.^ 

Naturally the agitators for the measure felt a good deal sobered, 
especially since Jackson was known to be a friend of the cause. 
January 11, 1837, however, the indefatigable Walker offered a 
resolution to the effect that, as Texas possessed a competent civil 
organization and there was no " reasonable prospect " of Mexico's 
prosecuting the war with success, it was " expedient and proper, and 
in perfect conformity with the laws of nations, and the practice of 
this Government in like cases, that the independent political exist- 
ence of said State be acknowledged by the Government of the United 
States." Jackson had intimated that the fate of that country might 
be considered as depending on the outcome of a projected Mexican 
expedition under General Bravo ; and Walker announced that 
according to advices from Vera Cruz this expedition had proved 
abortive. A more serious cause of delay, however, as the Texan 
envoy felt satisfied, was the fear of the Van Buren party that, should 
the independence of Texas be acknowledged, the subject of annexa- 
tion would immediately be pressed, the Democrats would divide 
sectionally upon it in the approaching elections, and their leader — 
compelled to lose one wing or the other — would find his friends a 
minority in the next Congress. On this difficulty the abandonment 
of Bravo's enterprise had no bearing, and Walker's resolution was 
merely permitted to slumber on the table. ^"^ 

About the middle of February he called it up and urged that 
immediate action be taken; but the Senate gave the preference to an 

" Richardson, Messages, iii., 266. Wharton to Austin, Dec. 22, 1836 : Tex. Dipl. 
Corr., i., 157. 

'"Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 83. Wharton to Houston, Feb. 2, 1837: Tex. 
Dipl. Corn, i., 179. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 57 

army bill. Two weeks later he repeated his attempt, but again the 
subject was postponed. On the Kalencls of March, however, he \/ 
returned once more to the charge ; and this time, despite the opposi- 
tion of Buchanan, he carried his resolution by a vote of 23 to 19. 
As the figures indicate, the Senate was by no means full. According 
to the Alexican minister the advocates of the motion had entertained 
little or no hope of securing a victory; but at the evening session, 
observing that eight or nine of their opponents were absent — at a 
banquet, it was said — they exerted themselves to the utmost and 
triumphed. Silas Wright of New York then reported a bill making 
appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the govern- 
ment, and he himself moved to amend it by providing for a Secre- 
tary of Legation in Texas. This was agreed to; but when Walker 
proposed as a further amendment that a minister be actually sent 
to that country as soon as the President should receive satisfactory 
evidence of her independence, his motion failed by a vote of 16 to 
21. The next day Wright's bill, as amended by himself, passed the 
Senate.^^ 

In the House a move toward recognition was made at the end of 
April, 1836, and was voted down. During the last week of June 
Bell of Tennessee brought up the matter of providing a salary and 
outfit for an agent in Texas, whenever the President should deem 
it proper to send such a representative, and asked for a suspension 
of the rules in order that his proposition might be considered ; but 
the subject was laid on the table by a vote of 135 to 56. July 2, 
however, notice was given by the committee on foreign affairs of an 
intention to report on the great question ; and two days later it pre- 
sented the resolution that had been offered by Clay's committee and 
adopted by the Senate. Adams moved to lay the matter on the 
table, but was defeated by a vote of 40 to 108. On the ground that 
no time to discuss the subject remained, the previous question was 
then ordered, and the resolution passed by a vote of more than 
six to one.^- 

In the next session of this Congress, the President's Message 
of December 21 was referred without opposition to the House 
committee on foreign affairs. About three weeks later Pickens 
inquired on the floor when a report concerning the Texas affair 

" Castillo to Relac, No. 37, March 9, 1837: Sria. Relac. Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 
2 sess., 175, 210, 214, 216. The vote on Walker's resolution was given in the 
Cong. Globe as 23-19, but only 22 names appear in the Affirmative list. Six of 
these were from the North, and four of the Noes came from the South. 

^^ Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 338, 469, 483, 486. 



58 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

would be ready, and Colonel Howard of Maryland, the chairman, 
replied that "almost undivided attention" had been given to the 
subject but as yet no conclusion had been reached. Near the end 
of January an attempt was made to instruct the committee to bring 
in a resolution acknowledging the independence of Texas, but this 
was blocked by adjourning. About a fortnight later, Waddy 
Thompson of South Carolina undertook to lay the matter before the 
full House sitting as a committee of the whole on the state of the 
Union ; but a technicality tripped him. Finally on the eighteenth of 
February the committee reported, first, that the independence of 
Texas '' ought to be recognised," and secondly, that a salary and 
outfit should be provided for " such public agent " as the President 
might " determine to send " there. ^^ 

Three days later this matter was reached in due order. Thomp- 
son and Pickens expressed great eagerness for the immediate con- 
sideration of it; but on the plea that other committees wished to 
report, it was laid upon the table. February 2^, however, the bill 
for the civil and diplomatic expenses came up, and this Thompson 
moved to amend by inserting a provison for the salary and outfit 
of a diplomatic agent to be sent to the " independent republic of 
Texas." In supporting his proposition, Thompson said it was not 
his fault that so little time remained for discussing it, the attention 
of the House having been squandered on personal or local matters. 
Why has this question been so long postponed ? he demanded ; " Are 
gentlemen afraid of the argument? Are they afraid that a spon- 
taneous burst of popular enthusiasm will force them to do that to 
which the cold, selfish, and sectional feelings of politicians are 
opposed?" Mason of Ohio replied that Texas was unable to 
maintain her national position without aid from the United States 
and did not really wish to be independent; that she had desired 
from the first to enter the Union; that her chief offices were 
filled by Americans ; and that, at all events, the United States ought 
to confer with Mexico before recognizing her; and Thompson's 
amendment was lost by a vote of two to one. The next day, how- 
ever, he renewed his attempt; but he then consented to omit the 
word "independent" and to add the qualification, "whenever the 
President of the United States may receive satisfactory evidence 
that Texas is an independent power, and shall deem it expedient 
to appoint such minister," and in this form his motion passed.^* 

"Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 45, 96, 129, 181, 194. 

"Cong. Globe. 24 Cong., 2 sess., 196, 211, 213. Benton, Abr. Debates, xiii., 325. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 59 

Both Houses of Congress had now acted in a sense rather in- 
consistent with the judicious pohcy recommended by the President 
within three months, and it is highly interesting — particularly in 
view of the hue-and-cry raised by the anti-slavery men — to inquire 
what reasons there were for such a course. Apparently it was quite 
open to censure. 

Very good reasons existed. Toward the close of 1836 the 
Mexican minister had called for his passports, and before leaving 
the country had circulated among the diplomatic corps a pamphlet 
criticising in such a manner the government to which he had been 
accredited that it became a serious issue between the United States 
and his nation. Of course there was very great anxiety to know 
whether his action would be endorsed by his superiors ; and about 
the middle of January, 1837, it was learned at Washington that ac- 
cording to the official Diario his conduct in this country had been 
approved. December 28, 1836, Ellis, our minister at Mexico, unable 
to obtain any satisfaction regarding the American claims, withdrew 
the legation, and therefore our government felt deeply injured not 
only in their dignity but in their interests. War appeared to be 
the only recourse, and a tender regard for the susceptibilities of 
Mexico seemed quite uncalled for. This, however, was but one 
element of the changed situation. A secret reason for postponing 
the recognition of Texas had been the hope of arranging matters 
through a treaty with Santa Anna, and that hope vanished in Jan- 
uary or February, 1837. Ellis arrived at Washington bringing what 
seemed to be conclusive evidence that another invasion of Texas was 
not possible ; while Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, made a 
virtual recognition of Texan independence — the only recognition that 
could be expected from that proud country for many years to come 
— by freely confessing before Jackson and the cabinet that his nation 
could not hold the rebellious province were they to conquer it in the 
field, and even announced that he strongly desired, as one step 
toward a definitive settlement with Texas, that the United States 
recognize her.^^ 

^^Niles, Nov. ig, 1836. (Pamphlet) Ex. Doc. 190, 25 Cong., 2 sess. Forsyth 
characterized the pamphlet as " defamatory." (Issue) Ex. Doc. 252, 25 Cong,, 3 
sess., pp. 15, 16. (Diario) Ellis, Dec. 9, 1836: Sen. Doc, 160, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 
157. (Withdrew) Id., Jan. 12, 1837: ib., 169. Id. to Monasterio, Dec. 7, 1836: 
Ex. Doc. 139, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 60, etc. Id., No. 41, Dec. 14, 1836. (Reason) Wharton 
to Austin, Dec. 31, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 166. S. Anna was in Washington 
near the end of Jan., 1837 (Niles, Jan. 21, 1837). (Conclusive) Wharton to Hous- 
ton, Feb. 2, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 179. (S. Anna) Wharton to Rusk, No. 9, 



6o THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

It was brought home to Jackson after his two Messages were 
sent in, that for want of American acknowledgment before the 
world Texan lands worth fully a dollar an acre could hardly be 
sold for half that price; and he, regretting the injury done that 
country by his action, however necessary the action might have 
been, intimated that he should take no offense were Congress to 
move now in the opposite direction. Moreover the President saw 
a new light — or rather a new darkness — in another quarter also; 
and, as he made it known to the House of Representatives, he prob- 
ably did not conceal it from the Senate. " There is no doubt," he 
v/rote to Howard, " if the Independence of Texas be not acknowl- 
edged by the U. States, an effort will be made by Texas to Great 
Britain to have the Independence of Texas acknowledged by her, 
giving & securing to Great Britain as a consideration, exclusive com- 
mercial benefits."^" 

Further still, Jackson asked for an interview with Howard, 
which suggests that he imparted something even more special. 
What this was, can only be surmised ; but we know that an anti- 
slavery New Englander, Daniel Webster, had forewarned the gov- 
ernment of European attempts to purchase Texas ; we know that in 
July, 1836, Pakenham had notified the British Foreign Office of 
Mexico's desire to have Great Britain own that territory ; we know 
that a move to effect the transfer was undertaken in the Mexican 
Congress during March, 1837, and almost certainly must have been 
preceded by a rather long period of talk ; we know that the American 
consul in Mexico was soon writing about the matter ; and we know 
that Ellis, quite sure to be informed of it earlier than the consul, 
had arrived at Washington by the date on which Jackson asked for 
this interview. Now if there was thought to be even a possibility 
of such a transfer, the immediate acknowledgment of Texan inde- 
pendence was a natural and proper counterstroke.^^ 

At all events, whether England was bargaining for the territory 

undated: ib., 187 (193). In Feb., 1837, the President formally recommended 
reprisals against Mexico, and a little later the House of Representatives expressed 
the opinion that amicable relations with that country did not exist and could not, 
without a sacrifice of the national honor, be restored by sending a minister to it 
(Ho. Report 1056, 25 Cong., 2 sess.). 

'"(No offense) Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837: Tex, Dipl. Corr., i., 168. 
Jackson to Howard, Feb. 2, 1837: Jackson Pap. 

"Jackson to Howard (note 16). (Webster^ Abr. Debates, xii., 763. Pak., 
No. 48, July I, 1836. (Congress) Parrott to State Dept., July 29, 1837: Con. 
Letters, Mexico, ix. (Consul) Jones to State Dept., March 28, 1837: Tex. Dipl. 
Corn, i., 212. (Arrived) cf. Jackson to Howard with Ellis to State Dept., Jan. 
12, 1837 (Note is). 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 6I 

or not, Texas was evidently in sore straits ; and the danger was ap- 
parently real and pressing that if coldly repulsed by the United 
States, she would not only buy European assistance with commercial 
arrangements injurious to American business interests, but would so 
entangle herself in foreign relations as to render her annexation 
to our country extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, at 
any future time. Besides, Van Buren had been told in plain terms 
that since it rested with him to ensure or prevent recognition at the 
session of Congress then proceeding, should the measure be defeated 
he would lose the support of the entire South ; and in all probability 
he exerted himself at the White House and at the Capitol to avert 
so dire a calamity. Such, then, were the circumstances, and it is not 
at all surprising that Congress acted as it did. The sole condition 
of acknowledgment regarded as necessary by Webster and Clay, by 
the Senate committee on foreign relations and by the Senate as a 
body, was evidence that a competent government existed in Texas ; 
in the opinion of many persons — justified by later history — such 
evidence was at hand ; and revolutionary governments have usually, 
or at least often, been recognized before absolute proof of this fact 
could be given. The claim of Mexico was virtually relinquished by 
her President. Disregard of her feelings appeared to be made 
excusable by her course toward the United States ; and certain ele- 
ments of the situation seemed not only to authorize but really to 
demand immediate action. Finally, it should be remembered that 
while Mexico was recognized about seven months after her revo- 
lutionary troops entered the capital, our acknowledgment of Texan 
independence was deferred until more than ten months had elapsed 
after the power of the mother-country in the province had been 
demolished and her President captured. ^^ 

According to Anson Jones, a little later Texan minister to the 
United States, the President was " very reluctant " to recognize 
Texas at this time, and no doubt he did shrink from appearing to 
change his attitude so soon. To the last he positively refused to 

" (Van B.) Wharton to Rusk, Feb. 12, 1837: Tex, Dipl. Corr., i., 184. Webster 
(to Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ex. Doc. 266, 2y Cong., 2 sess., 7) declared that the 
independence of Texas was recognized " only when that independence was an 
apparent and an ascertained fact." The point has been made that Jackson had 
no time to " receive satisfactory evidence " of the condition of Texas between Feb. 
28 and the night of March 3. To this it may be answered (i) that he had time 
for confere:ice with numerous persons well informed on the matter, and it was 
for him to decide whether their testimony was "satisfactory evidence"; and (2) 
that the rtal requirement was that he should he in possession of such evidence 
before acting. Iturbide entered Mexico Sept. 27, 1821. Monroe declared for 
recognition, March 8, 1822; the House, March 28; the Senate, April 30. 



62 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

send in a Message embodying his new convictions, but he admitted 
that his opinion regarding the propriety of action had changed, and 
on the final day of his term he addressed the Senate. Both Houses, 
he said, have inserted in the general appropriation laws (as the 
result of repeated discussions regarding Texas) a provision for the 
salary and outfit of a diplomatic agent, who is to be sent to that 
country whenever the Executive is satisfied of her independence and 
deems it expedient to appoint such a minister; and the Senate, the 
constitutional advisers of the President, have expressed the opinion 
that it is now expedient and proper to acknowledge the independence 
of this young republic. " Regarding these proceedings as a virtual 
decision of the question submitted by me to Congress, I think it 
my duty to acquiesce therein, and therefore I nomxinate Alcee La 
Branche of Louisiana, to be Charge d'Afifaires to the Republic of 
Texas." Having thus committed himself, at a little before mid- 
night he completed the work by sending for the Texan envoys to 
have a glass of wine with him, and by causing them — reported the 
Mexican minister — to be invited like other members of the diplo- 
matic body to the ceremonies of inauguration day.^° 

These are the facts. In consequence, all the violent denuncia- 
tions of Jackson as insincere and crafty, based upon his change of 
attitude between December 21 and March 3, seem quite unfounded; 
and, in view of the repeated efforts of the friends of Texas in both 
Senate and House to bring up the question of acknowledging her 
independence for full discussion and a deliberate verdict, one is 
surprised to find thirteen members of Mir national legislature de- 
claring that she had been recognized "by a snap vote, at the heel 
of a session of Congress," as if that body had fallen victim to a 
conspiracy and a trick. No doubt Walker took advantage of his 
opponents' blunder ; but that is customary in legislative bodies, and 
the manner in which they had endeavored — it would seem — to pre- 
vent the matter from receiving fair consideration, justifi J him still 
further. Besides, his proposition had been before the Senate a long 

"Jones, Memor., 79. (Refused) Wharton and Hunt to Rusk, Feb. 20, 1837: 
Tex. Dipl. Com, i., 197 ; and the fact that he sent no such message. Richardson, 
Messages, iii., 281. Wharton to Hend., March 5, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 201. 
(Inv.) Castillo to Relac, No. 37, March 9, 1837 : Sria. Relac. The Senate adjourned 
without acting on the nomination of La Branche, but he was confirmed later. His 
instructions were of the conventional sort. It has been objected (Von Hoist,. U. S., 
ii., 591) that at this time it was not yet certain that Texas would be able to perform 
the duties of an independent state ; but the same was true of the U. S. in 1778 and 
of the Spanish-American republics when we recognized them, and evidently must 
often be true in such cases. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 63 

time, and the debate on it began in the afternoon, so that every one 
had a full warning.-" 

Recognition, however, in the minds of many was only a prelude 
to annexation. In November, 1836, after Texas had voted in favor 
of joining the United States, Wharton, her minister at Washington, 
was directed to make an effort in behalf of that project. The next 
month Henderson, acting for the time as Texan Secretary of State, 
wrote that unless the Union would accept the oft'er, commercial 
arrangements with England or some other European power might 
be made, " which would forever and entirely preclude the people of 
the United States " — particularly those of the North — from finding 
any profit in Texan business ; while also, by suggesting that a joint 
resolution of the American Congress could admit his country, he 
pointed the way to the method finally adopted. Accordingly, 
Wharton and Hunt addressed to Jackson an affecting appeal in 
favor of the project. But in addition to embarrassments caused by 
sectional differences in Congress, Forsyth, our Secretary of State, 
believed that annexation ought to be the work of " a Northern Presi- 
dent," and nothing beyond recognition could be gained at that time. 
Possibly in consequence of this failure. Hunt then suggested that 
an acknowledgment of their country be purchased from England 
with commercial concessions, expressing the opinion that success in 
this manoeuvre, added to the ardent interest of the South, would 
ensure acceptance by the United States ; and Henderson was ap- 
pointed envoy to England and France in the following June. The 
next month Hunt was able to report that this movement had aroused 
fresh ardor among the friends of Texas, and to intimate that Presi- 
dent Van Buren himself was likely to favor the cause. Probably, 
too, he believed that in view of the Southern disposition to secure 
the coveted territory even at the cost of disunion the administra- 
tion would hardly venture, whatever might be its preference, to 
stand in the way ; and finally, thus' encouraged, he presented to our 
Secretary of State on the fourth of August, 1837, a formal proposi- 
tion for the adoption of his country.-^ 

^ (Thirteen) Detroit Daily Adv., May 15, 1843, and other newspapers. 

^'Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 127. Hend. to Hunt, 
Dec. 31, 1836: ib., 161. Wharton and Hunt to Jackson, March 3. 1837: Jackson 
Pap. (Forsyth) Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 168. Hunt 
to Hend., April 15, 1837: ib., 208. (Apptd.) Irion to Hend., June 25, 1837: Tex. 
Dipl. Corr., ii., 808. Hunt to Tex. Sec. State, July 11 ; (disunion) Aug. 4, 1837: 
Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 235, 245. Id. to Forsyth, Aug. 4, 1837: Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., 
I sess., 2. 



64 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Meantime the subject made its appearance in the American Con- 
gress. One day after the battle of San Jacinto was fought, Walker 
set the ball in motion by suggesting that the rebellious province be 
purchased. A month later Calhoun announced that he stood for 
annexation as well as recognition, declaring that the slave States 
were greatly interested to prevent Texas from having the power 
to annoy them, and that for the shipping and manufacturing in- 
terests of the East the acquisition of that country was no less 
desirable. In July, on the other hand, Benton took the position that 
to consider as yet the admission of Texas would be "to treat her 
with disrespect, to embroil ourselves with Mexico, to compromise 
the disinterestedness of our motives in the eyes of Europe, and to 
start among ourselves prematurely, and wthout reason, a question, 
which, whenever it should come, could not be without its own in- 
trinsic difficulties and perplexities " ; and, up to the time when an- 
nexation was formally proposed by the Texan representative, no 
definite move was made in either House ; while President Jackson, 
though doubtless keenly desirous of acquiring the territory, would 
not lift a hand.^- 

In his application. Hunt gave a brief history of Texan affairs 
from the first stages of American colonization, and asked for an- 
nexation on the grounds that his fellow-countrymen were of the 
same blood as the citizens of the United States, possessed the same 
liberties, entertained the same devout reverence for the constitution, 
were quite worthy to become a part of the American people, and 
could add to our national power and wealth resources of immense 
value. As a member of the Union, Texas could also aid to protect 
the western frontier of the United States and assure us the control 
of the Gulf ; while, were she to remain independent, she would 
become a formidable rival, and on account of tariffs and the very 
similarity of the two peoples and their institutions, would very 
possibly come to be involved in difficulties and collisions with the 
neighboring States.-^ 

To this argument Forsyth replied three weeks later that the 
President had read Hunt's paper with " just sensibility " but with- 
out assenting to his proposal. With the historical aspects of the 
matter the American government could not properly concern them- 
selves, he remarked, since acknowledgment had reference only to an 

^Cotig. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 378, 394, 479. For Benton's remarks see his 
Abr. Debates, July i. 1836. (Jackson) Wise, Decades, 152; Jones, Memor., 81. 
==■ Hunt to Forsyth, Aug. 4, 1837 : Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., 2. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 65 

issue of fact, not to one of right; while as regarded the incorporation 
of Texas in the United States,_ the President deemed it inexpedient 
to raise the questions whether the organic law contemplated the 
annexation of an independent state, and if so "in what manner" it 
should be accomplished. Furthermore, this country was bound to 
]\Iexico by a treaty of amity, which would be " scrupulously ob- 
served " so long as hope remained that the other party would 
pursue a similar course ; and the government might be suspected of 
a disregard of the friendly purposes of this compact, " if the over- 
tures of General Hunt were to be even reserved for future considera- 
tion, as this would imply a disposition on our part to espouse the 
quarrel of Texas with Mexico, a disposition wholly at variance with 
the spirit of the treaty, with the uniform policy and obvious welfare 
of the United States." Hunt rejoined by urging that, if the United 
States could rightfully have bought Texas, as they had endeavored 
to do, from a revolutionary government not yet acknowledged by 
the parent nation, they could now rightfully annex it, intimating 
that the commercial policy of his country would become unfavor- 
able to the United States, and hinting that she might find England 
and France deeply interested in her fortunes ; but his arguments 
appeared to produce no effect whatever.-'* 

Precisely what considerations actuated Van Buren's adminis- 
tration were clearly and no doubt with substantial accuracy ex- 
plained by Hunt. The American government, including the Presi- 
dent himself, desire to receive Texas, he wrote ; " But hampered 
as they are by their party trammels on the one hand, and their 
treaty obligations with Mexico on the other, by the furious opposi- 
tion of all the free States, by the fear of incurring the charge of 
false dealings and injustice, and of involving this country in a war, 
in which they are now doubtful whether they would even be sup- 
ported by a majority of their own citizens, and which would be at 
once branded by their enemies at home and abroad as an unjust 
war, instigated for the very purpose of gaining possession of 
Texas and for no other, they dare not and will not come out openly 
for the measure, so long as the relative position of the three parties 
[the United States, Mexico and Texas] continues the same as it is 
at present " ; while many, even among the friends of annexation, 
dread to bring on — by raising this issue — a life-and-death struggle 
between North and South, involving as it would " the probability of 

"Forsyth to Hunt, Aug. 25, 1837: Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., 11. Reply, 
Sept. 12, 1837 : ib., 14. 
6 



66 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

a dissolution " of the Union. It was therefore useless, Hunt con- 
cluded, and it would be derogatory to his country, to urge the 
proposition further. By February, 1838, however, a flurry of hope 
sprang up. The prospect of a treaty between Texas and England, 
which might create international relations incompatible with annexa- 
tion, alarmed Van Buren, and Calhoun thought the measure might 
pass at once. But the hope soon faded, and Forsyth evidently took 
the ground that, as he stated a few months later, the Texan proposi- 
tion had been " disposed of.""^ 

The executive department, however, was not the only one con- 
cerned in this matter, and the twenty-fifth Congress was kept very 
warm by it. Calhoun threw down the gauntlet in December, 1837, by 
offering a resolution which affirmed the just and constitutional right 
of the South and West to extend their limits or increase their 
population without regard to the effect of that course upon slavery ; 
but Preston succeeded in laying this resolution upon the table 
in order to clear a way for a more direct issue presented by himself 
(January 4, 1838), which was a definite resolution in favor of re- 
annexing Texas whenever that could be done " consistently with the 
public faith and treaty stipulations of the United States " and with- 
out disturbing the harmony subsisting between this country and 
Mexico.-** 

But by this time the general enthusiasm for the brave freemen 
struggling against a horde of cruel oppressors had greatly abated 
here. One illustration will suffice. President Burnet was from 
Newark, New Jersey, and in April and May, 1836, the Daily Ad- 
vertiser of that city expressed much sympathy for his nation ; but in 
October it permitted its readers to see that great disorder and 
confusion reigned beyond the Sabine, and a few weeks later it 
referred to Texas as a " Quasi Republic." Nor was there merely 
a subsidence of feeling. In view of the certainty that annexation 
would be urged, people had to think ; and even in South Carolina 
the Executive and House agreed that until the war should end, this 
question ought not even to be entertained by the American Con- 
gress. In the North Governor McDuffie's arguments had no less 
weight than at home, and they were supplemented by others not 
inferior in strength. As early as September, 1836, the cor- 
respondent of the London Times reported that the eastern and 

=* Hunt to Irion, Jan. 31 ; Feb. 3, 1838: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 284, 290. Forsyth 
to Van B., May 30, 1838: Ex. Doc. 409, 25 Cong., 2 sess. 

■"Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 55, 76, 96, 98; App., 108, 555, 556. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 67 

middle States were " warmly opposed " to the idea of annexation 
because it involved the slavery issue ; and the Advertiser of Albany, 
New York, declared that the project would raise a storm in the 
North, of which " murmurings were already heard." This feeling 
was no doubt much intensified by the imprudent course of many 
newspapers — even leading ones — in the South. A dissolution of the 
Union was boldly threatened as the alternative of accepting Texas ; 
and boasts were made that Northern domination would come to 
an end, were that extension of the national area secured. Language 
like this, as the Texan minister himself pointed out, was calculated 
to drive the free States into an inveterate hostility to the admission 
of his country ; and probably the average common sense of moderate 
and conservative Northerners, while avoiding that extreme, settled 
down to about the opinion expressed by the National Intelligencer, 
that annexation was perhaps inevitable but would certainly be an 
evil. Such a mood was by no means favorable.-'^ 

Aloreover many in that section were not satisfied with passive 
resistance, and not a few bestirred themselves mightily. In June, 
1837, the American Anti-Slavery Society circulated petitions and 
invited signatures with great activity. Texas, it protested, would 
make six or eight States as large as Kentucky ; the annexation of it 
would therefore enable the South to dominate the nation and take 
away the rights of petition, free speech and the like ; the North 
would probably not submit; and a dissolution of the federal bond 
might be the consequence. Philanthropy, Anglo-Saxon devotion to 
liberty and American love of the Union were supplemented, too, by 
the fact that Southern domination might result in the overthrow of 
the protective tariff, the crippling of Northern manufacturers, and 
serious injury to the Northern shipping business. A combination 
like this — the slavery question, the rights of petition and free speech, 
the tariff and the rest — was a mighty force. Petitions, memorials 
and resolutions poured in upon Congress in such numbers that the 
chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs described those 
in his own keeping as measurable " by cubic feet." Garrison's 
Liberator declared that at a single session of Congress more than 
600,000 signatures appeared, " it was said," in the adverse papers. 
Eight States presented themselves in formal protest. Vermont 

^ Daily Adv., Oct. i ; Nov. 14, 1836. (McDuffie) Boston Daily Adv., Dec. 10, 
1836. (House) Amer. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1904, p. 84. Times, Oct. 13; Dec. 20 (Alb. 
Adz'.), 1836. Wharton to Austin, Dec. 11, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 151. Nat. 
Intel!., July 16, 1836. 



68 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

feared that the proposed annexation would give the slaveholding 
interest such weight that probably soon the Union would be dis- 
solved or the free section degraded. Rhode Island said that a new 
compact would be necessary for the incorporation of Texas, and 
that any attempt to bring in this alien territory would be looked 
upon by the freemen of the country as manifesting a willingness to 
destroy the constitution. Massachusetts insisted that only the 
people themselves could admit a foreign nation, and that any 
action taken by the government for such a purpose would be null 
and void. When Alabama passed resolutions in the opposite sense, 
Ohio and Michigan protested against them. Meanwhile those 
newspapers in the North which adopted similar views kept up a 
fierce clamor. " The whole nation," said a prominent member of 
Congress, " was in a state of agitation, working like a troubled sea." 
Under such circumstances and with such dangers threatening to 
follow the enactment of an annexation law, nothing in that direction 
could be accomplished. Preston's resolution was laid on the table 
about the middle of June by a vote of 24 to 14; and a similar one 
offered in the House by Waddy Thompson was smothered by John 
Quincy Adams, who consumed the morning hour from June 16 until 
the close of the session was near at hand with a three-weeks 
address. Doubtless many of the friends of annexation, astonished 
and dismayed by the strength of the enemy, now gave up in despair. 
Even the abolitionists felt satisfied that a final victory had been 
won ; and in a few months Texas formally withdrew from the door 
of the United States (October 12, 1838).-^ 

This rebuff, on the one hand official and on the other popular, 
could not fail to awaken her resentment, and there were circum- 
stances tending to magnify its efifect. Probably every thoughtful 
Texan could see advantages in remaining independent. As their 
dread of another Mexican attack wore ofif, the people began to 
realize — the British consul at Matamoros learned — that they and 
the Americans were naturally competitors, and began to calculate 
the profits of a direct commerce, impeded by no high tariff, with 

'^ Daily Georgian, Sept. 5, 1840. (Chairman) Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 
453- Lib., March 7, 1845. Ex, Docs., 25 Cong., 2 sess., Nos. 55, 182, 196, 211, 373, 
etc. (Protest) Lib., March 14, 1845. Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 443. See also 
Ho. Journal. (Satisfied) Lib., March 7, 1845. Jones to Vail, Oct. 12, 1838: State 
Dept., Notes from Tex. Legation, i. (cf. Irion to Hunt, May 19, 1838: Tex. Dipl. 
Corn, i., 329). The reason for the withdrawal was that the pendency of the propo- 
sition had an unfavorable effect upon negotiations with other powers, and placed 
Texas in an undignified posture before the world. (See Jones, Memor., 65 ; 
Nilcs, xlix., 161.) 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 69 

foreign nations. Only two months after they declared for annexa- 
tion by an overwhelming majority, their Secretary of State informed 
Wharton, the envoy to the United States, in certain " Private and 
Special instructions,'' that many were thought to have voted in that 
sense on account of sentimental considerations and " the peculiar 
circumstances of the times," rather than " mature reflection, on the 
future glory, interest and prosperity of Texas." " Should our 
affairs," continued the Secretary, " assume a more favorable aspect 
by a termination of the war, and a treaty with Mexico, and by the 
manifestation of a friendly disposition towards us by England and 
France, it will have a powerful influence on public opinion ; and in 
all probability decide it in favor of remaining independent." That 
such a course would be expedient many friends of Texas in the 
United States felt sure, and they strongly advised her, instead of 
coming into the Union and suffering from the protective tariff and 
the anti-slavery agitation, to stay outside, acquire the best parts of 
Mexico and become a great nation. At the end of 1837 the Texan 
Secretary of State expressed the opinion that probably, were the 
question of annexation to be laid before the people at the next 
election, a majority would vote in the negative. Frederic Leclerc, 
who seems to have obtained his information on the ground, attri- 
buted a part of Houston's unpopularity at this period to his wish — 
resulting doubtless from the apparent impossibility of maintaining 
a national position — to join the United States ; and a test of public 
sentiment in the autumn of 1838 tended to confirm this opinion, for 
Lamar, who desired that his country enjoy an unrestricted trade 
with all quarters, was chosen President. In his inaugural address 
the new chief magistrate declared strongly against annexation ; a 
nearly unanimous vote of the Congress appeared to sustain him ; 
and the nation as a whole seemed willing to acquiesce. The next 
year a prominent Englishman, who visited New Orleans and talked 
with a number of persons from Texas, reported that Mexico was 
no longer feared there, and that " all desire of admission into the 
American Union " had " ceased."-" 

"^ (Consul) Crawford to Pak., May 26, 1837 : F. O., Mexico, cvi. Austin to 
Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 135. (Friends) Wharton to Austin, 
Dec. II, 1836: ib., 151. Irion to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1837: ib., 2yT. (This expression 
of opinion may have been made for effect upon the U. S. government, hut there is 
no reason to doubt its substantial sincerity.) (Leclerc) Rev. dcs Deux. Mondcs, 
April IS, 1840, p. 246. (Lamar's policy) Public letter, Galveston News, Nov. 22, 
1845. Lamar, Inaug. Address. (Congress, nation) Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. i, 
1848, p. 281. Buckingham, Slave States, i., i, 378, 379, 



70 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Little by little, however, filial sentiment revived in the country 
as the people forgot how their overture had been received; and 
when Texas found herself, early in 1842, weak and disorganized at 
home and threatened by the consolidated power of Mexico, she 
turned again toward the United States. In January the charge at 
Washington was instructed to study the sentiment of Congress and 
the people, and to ascertain what probability existed that our 
government would favor annexation. When Van Zandt succeeded 
Reily, he was referred in this matter to the instructions of his pre- 
decessor and carefully followed them. But nothing came of these 
moves, nor was any step taken upon the American side. In Novem- 
ber, 1 84 1, the Natchez Free Trader said it had reason to believe that 
a proposition would be brought forward at the next session of 
Congress by a distinguished gentleman, presumably Senator 
Walker; and the New York Courier and Enquirer revealed at about 
the same time " the cloven foot of the devil ... in all its hideous 
deformity," as the Liberator announced, by uttering a similar hint ; 
but apparently the distinguished gentleman received no encourage- 
ment, and certainly nothing was done. Texas then began to revive 
in strength and hope, and probably, finding that so little was to be 
gained by courting our favor, her government decided to resume 
the system of exciting our jealousy. In February, 1843, Secretary 
of State Jones informed the charge at Washington that the United 
States must " take some step in the matter, of so decided a char- 
acter as would open wide the door," before Texas could authorize 
a treaty of annexation ; and on the sixth of the following July 
Van Zandt was instructed to pursue the subject no farther.^'^ 

In other respects as well as in regard to this question the Ameri- 
can government appeared rather less than kind. We did indeed 
maintain stoutly, in opposition to the arguments of Mexico, that 
Texas was an independent nation, but in a sense consistency 
required this after we had recognized the country ; and we protested 
vigorously against predatory and barbarous operations on the part 
of her enemy, but the same remonstrance was delivered to herself. 
So far as concerned mediation we stood perfectly aloof. In 

*" (Revived) Sheridan to Ganaway, July 12, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. To Reily, 
Jan. 20, 1842 (printed) : ib., xiv. Jones (Memor., 8i) says that Reily was author- 
ized at the beginning of 1842 to inform Tyler verbally that Houston favored 
annexation. To Van Z., July 26, 1842. Van Z., No. 93, Dec. 23, 1842. (See also 
Houston's account in his letter to citizens, Oct., 1845: F. O., Texas, xiv.) Free 
Trader, Nov. 6, 1841. Lib., Dec. 31, 1841. To Van Zandt, Feb. 10, 1843 (printed) : 
F. O., Texas, xiv. To Id., July 6, 1843. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 71 

September, 1836, replying to a letter from Santa Anna, President 
Jackson said that the United States would not interfere in the con- 
flict unless Mexico should signify her willingness to accept our 
good offices ; and this position was restated several times in succeed- 
ing years. So scrupulous was our impartiality, that our minister at 
Mexico was rebuked for advancing money to needy Texan prisoners 
in that capital; and we declined to join in a proposed triple media- 
tion between the contending parties. After much urgency on the 
part of Texas, a commercial treaty with that country was negotiated 
in 1842; but the Senate of the United States rejected it, and accord- 
ing to Webster the chief cause of this action was a very unpleasant 
feeling against our neighbors growing out of their alleged failure to 
be honest. Furthermore it was believed on the other side of the 
line that Americans who had committed an outrage upon a Texan 
custom-house were protected by an officer of the United States ; and 
a party of Texan soldiers occupying ground that was claimed by 
their country were disarmed by troops of ours.^^ 

Public sentiment in the United States, as the years passed on, 
seemed little kinder than the government. In Mississippi the proj- 
ect of bringing the long desired territory within the pale was never 
lost sight of ; but elsewhere the matter appeared to be forgotten, 
and — with the further exception of New Orleans, the commercial 
centre of Texas — that country wellnigh ceased to be heard of 
among us. Astonishing indeed seem the evidences of this neglect as 
one studies, day by day and column by column, the newspapers of all 
political tones and in all the States for 1840, 1841 and 1842. The 
Savannah Republican of 1841, for instance, in a file lacking but 
six numbers, contains only half-a-dozen news items touching that 
portion of the earth's crust. The Charleston Courier for 1840 
hardly alluded to Texas, and mentioned it but very little in 1841 and 
1842. The Richmond Enquirer, afterwards noted as perhaps the 
foremost advocate of annexation among the newspapers, was almost 
silent about the trans-Sabine territory during 1840 and 1841. The 
Advertiser of Newark, New Jersey, contained four pieces relating 

^^To Thompson-, July 8, 1842 (note 18). To Eve. No. 24, March 17, 1843: 
State Dept., Instrs. to Mins., Texas, i. (Remonstrance) Eve to Jones. April 
13, 1843 : Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 163, Jackson to Santa Anna, Sept. 4, 1836: Doc. 84, 
24 Cong., 2 sess. ; Forsyth to Dunlap, July 17, 1839: State Dept., Notes to Texas 
Leg., vi. ; Id. to Bee, May 4. 1840: ib. ; to Thompson, No. 9, June 22, 1842. 
(Money) F. Webster to Thompson, No. 17, Sept. 5, 1842. (Mediation) Van Z. to 
Webster, Jan. 24, 1843 : State Dept., Notes from Tex. Leg., i. ; to Thompson, No. 26. 
Jan. 31, 1843. (Treaty) Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 576, 614 (Webster). (Outrages) Sen. 
Doc. I, 28 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 92, 93, 97, loi, 104, 109. 



72 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to it in 1840, and thirteen in 1841. A complete file of the Boston 
Advertiser for 1841, minus a single issue, shows four mentions, and 
that for 1842 shows eighteen, mainly referring to the Sante Fe and 
Mier expeditions and the threatened Mexican invasion ; while the 
Boston Atlas of 1843, equally complete, alluded to Texas only six 
more times than it alluded to Yucatan and Campeche. Nor should 
it be forgotten that two of the three principal matters which caused 
the country to be mentioned were not such as to enhance its reputa- 
tion. " The first step that led to the injury of the fame of Texas," 
wrote Jackson, " was that foolish campaign to Santa Fe ; the next 
the foolish attempt to invade Mexico, without means and men 
sufficient for the occasion. "^- 

In 1842, as the file of the Boston Advertiser suggests, interest 
revived somewhat, for Mexico seemed about to overwhelm the 
struggling republic with a powerful army. Again meetings were 
held; again funds were subscribed; and again the "emigrant," 
lifting his rifle from the wall, hurried to Galveston. But this excite- 
ment was by no means wholly due to sympathy with Texas. As the 
jMexican consul at New Orleans reported to his government, the 
belief was " general all over the United States " that the invasion 
had been instigated by England, and that English money was to pay 
the cost of it; and the real object was supposed to be the abolition 
of slavery, the development of Texas as a rival cotton-growing 
country, and the execution of British designs against the prosperity 
of the United States. The negroes of the Southwest would find a 
refuge on the farther bank of the Sabine, it was thought ; war would 
follow; the Indians and the blacks would be armed by the enemy; 
and a servile insurrection in the slave States might ensue. Again 
arguments for annexation began to he heard; and Tennessee and 
Louisiana took a formal stand on that side.^^ 

Yet even now the New York Tribune declared that a move in 
such a direction would arouse the bitterest hostility throughout the 
civilized world; and that, if the Texans wished to live under the 
American government, they could come back far more easily than 

^Miss. Hist. Soc. Pub., ix., igi. Jackson to Houston, Aug. 31, 1843: Yoakum, 
Texas, ii., 406. The Snively expedition was calculated to have a similar effect, but 
was less conspicuous and perhaps more debatable. 

'"(Seemed) Nat. hxtcll, Oct. 20, 1842. Consul, No. 79, April i, 1842: Sria. 
Relac. Crescent City, June 20, 1842, N. Orl. Adv.: Sav. Repub., April 2, 1842. 
(Stand) Mex. Consul, N, Orl., No. 95, April 11, 1843: Sria. Relac. In connection 
with this excitement, the British government again warned Mexico that the U, S. 
authorities had no power to prevent citizens from going to the aid of Texas (To 
Pak., No. 34, July 15, 1842). 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 73 

remain where they were ; while the radical abolitionist sentiment of 
the time was shown by the comment of the Liberator when the New 
York Journal of Couuncrcc hoped that Texas might "be found 
equal " to the crisis. " It is thus," wrote Garrison, *' that, in a single 
sentence, may be comprehended and expressed all conceivable prof- 
ligacy of spirit and inhumanity of heart. ... It is impossible for 
any honest man to wish success to Texas. All who sympathize 
with that pseudo republic hate liberty, and would dethrone God." 
More painful still, perhaps, was the crown of ridicule. Early in 
1842 a New York paper announced a meeting of the Friends of 
Texas, and the next morning some two hundred persons came to- 
gether in front of the city hall. The announcement proved a hoax ; 
but a loaferish fellow talked for ten minutes from the steps, exhort- 
ing his listeners to march for the Southwest, and then a ragged 
urchin of twelve took his place and cried, " Friends of Texas, I 
propose myself for the ofifice of Brigadier General."^* 

Remoteness counted for much in this neglect of an important 
region. Probably, too, the tariff that went into effect there in 
February, 1842, and bore hard upon American products and manu- 
factures, had an influence. But no doubt the supposed character of 
the population signified a great deal more. Every now and then 
some bad or unfortunate man hurried to that refuge; and of course 
one absconding debtor or escaping criminal made more noise than 
fifty sober and industrious emigrants. Annexation, protested the 
New York Sun in 1838, would merely give us land and some "un- 
profitable members of society." In 1842 a correspondent of the 
Salem, Massachusetts, Observer exclaimed, " We have territory 
enough, and bad morals enough, and public debt enough, and slavery 
enough, without adding thereunto by such a union." " To all intents 
and purposes," lamented the Savannah Republican in 1844, "Texas 
has been the Botany Bay of the United States for the last eight 
years." About the same time Dr. Everitt, a citizen of that country, 
returned home from a trip to New York and the Northeast, and he 
summed up his observations in these words : " Texas, in the 
Northern States, stands as low in the grade of nations as it is 
possible a Nation can be and exist." Charles J. Ingersoll, a promi- 
nent member of Congress from Pennsylvania, remarked that at this 

^* Tribune, Nov. 14, 1842. Lib., Oct. 14, 1842. N. Y. Journ. Com.: Savannah 
Rcpub., April 6, 1842. 



74 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



period our next neighbor on the south was little known by the greater 
part of us and was less liked.^^ 

In short, after the early attempts at annexation had failed, one 
discovers in the United States no general wish to bring her within 
the pale, no zeal to draw closer the mutual ties, and only the 
faintest public interest in her existence. No pressing need of lands 
could, indeed, be felt in so big and so undeveloped a country as ours 
then was. Individuals crossed the frontier as they were moved by 
the spirit or the sherifif, and in that way the process of expansion 
was going on there as elsewhere in the West, aided in this instance 
by immunity from the effect of American laws. But that, is all 
one can safely assert; and the ignorance, indifference and disesteem 
that prevailed in reference to the Lone Star republic became im- 
portant factors when the annexation issue finally appeared at the 
front.^^ 

On the other side Murphy, our charge in Texas, reported 
privately to the Secretary of State in July, 1843, that he observed 
ill-feeling and sometimes resentment against his country among all 
parties and in every quarter. The basis, too, of the feeling was in 
part no less disquieting than the fact. Not only had the wish of 
the nation to join us been coldly received, not only had the American 
government extended no aid to that country in her struggle to 
obtain recognition from Mexico, not only had there been other 
general and particular causes of dissatisfaction, but the archives of 
our legation had been so carelessly guarded that certain despatches 
had become public, and these were freely cited as evidence that 
the United States could not be counted upon as a friend. In an 
emergency, therefore, assistance was to be expected only from Eng- 
land or France. Indeed an administration organ, the National 
Vindicator, of which the charge sent a specimen, v>'ent so far as to 
declare that our government had not even kept their promises ; and 
this assertion. Murphy added, expressed " the avowed sentiments of 
the administration."^^ 

The disposition of Texas to remain independent and extend had 

* (Tariff) Nat. Intell, March 2, 1842 (flour. $1.00 per bbl, ; most grain, 20 
cents per bushel ; pork, $3.00 per bbl. ; hats, shoes and boots, 25 per cent. ; clothing, 
furniture and tinware, 30 per cent.; etc.). Sun, Jan. 24, 1838. Observer: Lib., 
March 4, 1842. Repub., May 11, 1844. (Everitt) Jones, Memor., 270. Cong. Globe, 
28 Cong., 2 sess., 84. 

*' It is confirmatory of this view that Tyler's annexation treaty was fiercely 
condemned for the alleged reason that it presented a new issue, upon which the 
people of the day had not reflected. 

" Murphy to Legare, July 8, 1843, private: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 72. 



TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 75 

therefore a profound meaning for the United States. It suggested 
the appearance on our flank of an ambitious, aggressive and un- 
friendly state, owning the mineral wealth of Mexico and California, 
possessing the finest port on the western shore of North America 
and what is now the most valuable harbor on the Gulf, threatening 
to outdo us in the production of a staple that was at once our most 
important export and our strongest lever on the Old World, likely 
for many years to injure not a little our commerce, manufactures 
and national revenue by wholesale smuggling, and almost certain to 
make us trouble with one or more of the great European powers. 
Nor had the government of the Union any excuse for ignoring this 
disagreeable prospect. In December, 1837, the Texan Secretary of 
State wrote to the charge at Washington, evidently for effect upon 
our Executive, that should Texas retain her sovereignty she would 
pursue the destiny suggested by her emblem, " the evening star," 
" embrace the shores of the Pacific as well as those of the Gulf," and 
become " an immense cotton and sugar growing nation in intimate 
connection with England, and other commercial and manufacturing 
countries of Europe."^* 

** In 1844 the smuggling on Red River was said to be notorious (Galv. Civilian 
in Houston Telegraph, June 26. 1844). Irion to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1837: Tex. Dipl. 
Corr., i., 277. Hunt's correspondence with Forsyth also was very suggestive. 



J 



Texas and Europe, 1836-1843. 

France acknowledged the independence of Texas in 1839; and 
when Mexico protested, the President of the Council replied that the 
government, having made a "mature and impartial study of the 
situation'" and satisfied themselves " that the existence of Texas was 
an accomplished fact, against which all the efforts of Mexico would 
be unable to prevail (iie saiiraient prcvaloir) ," had felt compelled to 
consult the interests of their country and sign a treaty with the new 
nation. From this time on France wore a decidedly cordial face, and 
her minister to Mexico was instructed in 1842 to bring about, if he 
could, an amicable settlement between the belligerents. Not only 
her support but her example also was valuable, and in 1840 Texas 
was recognized by Holland and by Belgium. The influence of 
Prance in Texan affairs during the period of this chapter was, 
however, but slight. In the first place her policy had no ends in view 
except a natural development of trade in what seemed like a promis- 
ing quarter; in the second her chief representative, the Comte de 
Saligny, had a strong preference for New Orleans as a place of 
sojourn; and in the third that gentleman quarrelled with the govern- 
ment of the nation to which he was accredited in a way that added 
nothing to either his popularity or his prestige. '^ 

By all odds the most important European relations of Texas were 
with England. Obviously her first step was to secure from that 
power an acknowledgment of her independence ; and as early as 1836 
the Texan envoy to the United States was instructed to talk with 
the British minister, point out the benefits that could be derived from 
his country, and endeavor to obtain the much desired recognition. 
In June, 1837, as we have seen, Henderson was appointed envoy to 
England and France, and by him the formal advances were made. 
At the following Christmas, however, he learned from Palmerston 
that the British cabinet not only declined to recognize the new repub- 
lic then, but would not promise to do so should her national position 

* See General Note, page i. Garro, No. lo, Oct. 13, 1839. Smith to Van Z., 
conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 1103. (Sojourn) Newark Adv.. April 30, 
1845. (Quarrel) Garrison, Texas, 252; London Times, July 13, 1841; Ainory to 
Mayfield, May 20, 1841 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 495. 

76 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 77 

be maintained for a certain length of time ; and the years 1838 and 
1839 passed by with equal ill-success.- 

These facts, however, did not signify that England felt the 
country had no title to recognition. In July, 1836, Pakenham, the 
British minister to Mexico, reported that in his belief the men in 
power there saw they could not regain the lost province. Two years 
later Ashburnham, then charge at the same capital, wrote that he 
hoped no insuperable obstacle stood in the way of recognizing Texas 
and added : " The re-conquest of that Country by the Mexican Gov- 
ernment is highly problematical ; its power to retain it, if re-con- 
quered, scarcely within the bounds of possibility;" and the delusion 
of attempting to reassert its former sovereignty, very injurious to 
the mother-country. By April, 1839, the British Foreign Office was 
convinced that a war to put down the colonists would probably fail, 
and that in any event Mexico could not hold the territory; and soon 
it was confirmed in this opinion by learning that the Mexican Minis- 
ter of Foreign Relations entertained the same view. Meantime 
Pakenham was insistently pointing out the prospect that Texas would 
rapidly grow and the importance of securing her friendship. Yet 
still she was not recognized by Great Britain.^ 

Nor did this inaction signify indifference. As early as 1830 Hus- 
kisson declared publicly that the United States could not be suffered 
" to bring under their dominion a greater portion of the shores of 
the Gulf of Mexico" than already belonged to them; and from his 
connection with Canning it may be supposed that the Foreign Office 
felt apprehensive of the annexation of Texas to this country and had 
resolved to oppose it. Naturally, then. Great Britain watched with 
great interest the revolution of 1836 and in particular everything 
suggestive of American interference. All the articles in our news- 
papers bearing upon these subjects, reported our minister, were 
" eagerly " republished by the British journals ; and he said that 
England, already looking to the probability that Texas would enter 
the Union, was "preparing" to stand in the way. In August, 1836, 
the subject came before the House of Commons. It was protested 
that we could not be allowed to " pursue a system of aggrandise- 
ment " ; and Palmerston himself went so far as to say, that any 

= Austin to Wharton, Nov. i8, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 135. Irion to Hend., 
June 25, 1837: ib., ii., 808. Hend. to Irion, No. 4, Jan. s, 1838: ib., 839. 

*Pak., No. 48, July i, 1836. Ashburnham to F. O., No. 47, June 24, 1838: F. 
O., Mexico, cxiv. To Pak., No. 9, April 25, 1839. Pak., No. 45, June 3, 1839. 
See Adams, British Interests, 29. 



yg THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

danger of the annexation of the territory in question to the United 
States "would be a subject which ought seriously to engage the 
attention of that House and of the British public."* 

For certain reasons, moreover, it was distinctly advisable to recog- 
nize Texas. Obviously England, having large investments in Mex- 
ican mines and other properties and enjoying the lion's share of the 
foreign trade of that country, wished her to prosper and therefore 
wished her to be at peace. At first, as Palmerston afterwards ad- 
mitted in the House of Commons, it was hoped that she would 
recover the province, but that prospect soon faded ; and then it was 
clearly seen to be desirable that she accept the situation and refrain 
from wasteful efforts, which a British acknowledgment of the col- 
onists, tending strongly to show the futility of all attempts at recon- 
quest, would help to make her do. England also wished to sell as 
many goods as possible to the Texans, and for that reason had an 
interest in promoting their success. Unless outdone in sagacity by 
the London Colonial Gazette, she perceived that so long as the 
American protective tarifif remained in force, there was a feasible 
way to escape the duties by sending merchandise to the United 
States via Galveston instead of via New York. Certainly, too, she 
desired Texas to become an independent cotton-growing state and 
relieve her from an embarrassing dependence upon the American 
planters ; and in fact Palmerston said this in the House of Commons. 
The London Times considered it important that the new republic 
become both a barrier and a rival to the United States, and probably 
no tuition from a newspaper was necessary to suggest such ideas to 
the government. In view of all these inducements it is not surpris- 
ing that in October, 1838, the British minister to Mexico was in- 
structed to press upon the authorities of that country the wisdom of 
recognizing their former subjects as independent. Why, then, did 
not England herself take the step that she recommended?^ 

It has been suspected that she feared lest her taking it should 
facilitate annexation ; but the course thus urged upon Mexico was 
calculated to work far more strongly that way, and moreover the 
United States had refused to receive Texas in 1837. A certain delay 
was doubtless necessary for the watching of events and calculating 

* (Huskisson) Ant. Hist. Rev., x'u, 795, note, Stevenson to State Dept., No. 
4, Aug. 6, 1&36: State Dept., Desps, from Mins., England, xliv. (Commons, Aug. 
5) Hansard. 3 ser., xxxv., 928-942. 

'(Palmerston) London Times, March 2, 1848. Col. Gas.: Phila. No. Ainer., 
Jan. 6, 1 84 1. London Times, Nov. 27, 1840. Pak., No. 45, June 3, 1839, refers 
to the verbal instructions. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 79 

of chances; but by the time she was ready to advise another nation 
what pohcy to adopt she must have had a pohcy herself. No doubt 
there was a reluctance to offend the mother-country by recognizing 
her rebellious daughter; but England was not afraid of Mexico and 
had less need of her than had she of England. Much more fruitful 
is a different line of thought. The British government ardently 
desired at this time to bring about the abolition of slavery in Texas. 
Palmerston admitted publicly at a later day that they would have 
been " most delighted " to obtain this concession. Evidently they 
tried to carry the point, for he said, " We could not obtain it " ; and 
the Texan envoy, in announcing his total failure to win recognition, 
placed slavery in the first position among the obstacles encountered. 
The colonial secretary of Barbadoes, who had visited Texas, reported 
that in his opinion she would give up the peculiar institution to secure 
from Great Britain an acknowledgment of her independence; the 
British government had no doubt been able to suspect as much from 
her eagerness to gain that favor ; and it seems reasonable to suppose 
that they deferred recognition in the hope of obtaining sooner or 
later in exchange for it the concession they desired.® 

In 1840, however, the acknowledgment was granted. Weighty 
considerations now required the step to be taken. In the first place 
Texas was at this time clearly entitled to what she asked. In the 
second British interests demanded that a commercial treaty should 
be made with her. Thirdly, England wanted to deprive the United 
States of support on the great question of the right of search, and 
Texas was willing to concede that sine qua non of acknowledgment. 
Again, England wished her to remain free from the restrictions of 
the American tariff both as an open market for British manufac- 
tures and as the means of attacking that tariff by smuggling, wished 
her still to be an independent producer of cotton, and wished her to 
stand permanently as a barrier against possible encroachments on 
Mexico; and while there was danger even yet that recognition might 
facilitate her incorporation in the United States, there was also a 
hope now that admittance into the family of nations and a swelling 
tide of prosperity might render her strong enough and proud enough 
to maintain her nationality. To prevent her from falling a prey to 
the American Eagle, English advice could be very helpful, and ob- 
viously the British could not expect to wield much influence in her 

" (Palmerston) : note 5. Hend. to Irion, No. 4, Jan. 5, 1838. Sheridan to 
Ganaway, July 12, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. 



8o THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

counsels unless they consented to recognize her, especially as the 
United States and France had already taken this step. Finally the 
British government may have believed, as an envoy of Texas had 
urged, that an acknowledgment of her independence would tend to 
bring about peace between her and Mexico, and thus would render 
British interests in the latter country considerably less precarious. 
Accordingly in November, 1840, a treaty of amity and commerce, a 
treaty providing for mediation, and a treaty aimed at the suppression 
of the slave trade were concluded ; and Palmerston, in reply to the 
protest of JMexico, frankly described her hopes of recovering Texas 
as " visionary." There occurred, however, a delay in carrying these 
treaties into effect. For some reason the slave trade agreement did 
not reach Texas promptly, and from this and other causes it failed 
to be ratified immediately by that government. Very possibly the 
British ministry became suspicious that a scheme to evade it existed, 
and they declined to exchange the ratifications of the other instru- 
ments until the whole business could be completed. But finally on 
the twenty-eighth of June, 1842, this was done and the republic of 
Texas thereby recognized.'^ 

In consequence of the conclusion of these treaties in 1840 Cap- 
tain Charles Elliot of the royal navy was appointed consul general 
for that country, and the intention was announced of making him 
charge d'affaires also on the exchange of the ratifications. In May, 
1842, he was directed to proceed to his post " with as little delay as 
possible," and, besides acting as consul, to collect and transmit polit- 
ical information; and on the twenty-eighth of the following June he 
was duly invested with a diplomatic character. Evidently the British 
government felt a desire to understand the situation in the new re- 
public, and the natural inference is that the possibility of effecting 
something advantageous there seemed worth considering. The addi- 
tional fact that before Elliot could be placed in position a semi- 
official agent visited the ground, gathered facts and smoothed 
the way to full diplomatic intercourse tends to confirm this inference.^ 

Elliot was described while in Texas as appearing like " a frank, 

'Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Note i. Hamilton to Palmerston, 
Oct. 14, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. To Smith, March 9, 1842. Palmerston to Murphy, 
Nov. 25, 1840: F. O., Mexico, cxl. (Delay, etc.) Worley : Tex. State Hist. Assoc. 
Qtrly., ix., 4, 13, 14. (Declined) Everett, No. 13, May 6, 1842. (Done) Nat. 
Intell., July 25, 1842. 

"To Elliot, Aug. 4, 1841 ; May 24, May 27, No. 3, May 31 ; No. 6, June 28, 
1842. Kennedy, author of a valuable book on Texas, was sent there in 1841 (see 
also Adams, British Interests, 74-78). He was made consul at Galveston in Sept., 
1842, so that Elliot's consular duties were nominal. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 8I 

bold, honest-hearted Englishman," and also as being an " accom- 
plished gentleman." He had represented his country at Canton; and, 
in the exceedingly difficult circumstances which led to the first 
" opium war " between England and China, had failed to give uni- 
versal satisfaction at home. Apparently he was not quite anxious 
enough to save the great stocks of the illicit drug owned by British 
merchants. After a while he was recalled ; and the London Times, 
voicing the mercantile sentiment of the metropolis, declared that he 
was " notoriously unfit to manage a respectable apple-stall," — that is 
to say, an apple-stall selling gin without a license, — that while acting 
in China he had betrayed an outrageous lack of judgment, and that 
he was a person " utterly regardless of British property, or wholly 
unacquainted with the proper means of protecting it," all of which 
could be regarded under the circumstances, like many other thun- 
derings from the same source, as on the whole a compliment. He 
has also been described as an abolition enthusiast and a political 
dreamer. But he was no more hostile to slavery, so far as we are 
aware, than his nation had shown itself, and the British have usually 
been thought fairly hard-headed ; and though he, like many an able 
statesman, failed to see his plans realized, he was no more visionary 
than Sam Houston. Indeed a careful study of his ideas with full 
knowdedge of the conditions appears to show that however bold they 
may have been they were nearly all sagacious, and the one or two of 
which perhaps that can hardly be said at present were based upon 
views held at the time by many highly intelligent men. Sir Robert 
Peel testified in Parliament that he exhibited ability and integrity in 
Texas, while the Texan Secretary of State, writing to the Texan 
minister at London, spoke warmly of his " great capacity and intelli- 
gence, his high character, [and his] enlarged and liberal views of 
national policy " ; and from an examination of his correspondence 
and proceedings one concludes that until ill-health, disappointment, 
"private distresses" and the sense of struggling against heavy odds 
imparted a touch of desperation to his planning, he displayed a very 
creditable degree of judgment, insight and tact.® 

The mediation treaty provided that if, within thirty days after it 
was made known to the government of Mexico by the British repre- 

" Daingerfield to Jones, Feb. 4, 1843: Jones, Memor.. 207. Smith, Remin., 22. 
Times, Nov. 22, 1841 ; (Peel) May 25, 1842. To Smith, Sept. 30, 1843. As will bo 
mentioned in Chapter xviii., a most competent judge of men, acquainted rather 
closely with Elliot, described him as '"shrewd and cunning." Elliot to Bank., 
private, June 11, 1845: F. O., Texas, xiii. 



82 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

sentative, an unlimited truce should be established between her 
and Texas, and if within six months from the same date she 
should conclude a treaty of peace with Texas, then the latter country 
would assume a million pounds sterling of the Mexican foreign debt. 
But with a view, it may be supposed, to her general interests Eng- 
land had undertaken the office of mediator long before agreeing to 
do so. In the spring of 1839, in accordance with the instructions 
received the previous autumn, Pakenham urged upon the Mexican 
Minister of Foreign Relations the wisdom of recognizing Texas, 
dwelling upon the advantage of having a barrier state on the north. 
At this time Santa Anna occupied the Presidential chair ad interim, 
while Bustamante was commanding in the field, and it could hardly 
have been expected that the prisoner of San Jacinto would cordially 
accept such a recommendation. Some months later Bustamante 
resumed his functions, and Pakenham then brought the matter to 
his attention. The President favored the idea of a settlement, and 
Cahedo, the Minister of Foreign Relations, felt willing to take the 
lead in that direction provided his colleagues would support him ; but 
Cafiedo added that more pressing affairs were in the way, and it 
would be some time before he could move. Pakenham followed the 
matter up and had several talks with the minister ; but after a time 
the latter receded somewhat from his position, shrinking like all 
other Mexicans from the contemplation of Texan independence, and 
near the close of the year Pakenham found that the attacks of the 
opposition — particularly those of a newspaper controlled by Santa 
Anna — had frightened the government from their own conclusion. 
Then came a swing the other way; and in April, 1840, there were 
negotiations with Treat, a confidential agent of Texas. ^"^ 

Finally, after procrastinating in the hope of evading responsi- 
bility, the administration decided to ask for powers to adjust the con- 
troversy; but on proposing to the Council of State a policy looking 
toward a cessation of hostilities, Caiiedo was beaten by Gorostiza. 
The debate was then made known — probably by the latter — to an 
opposition paper, and Congress demanded to be informed of every- 
thing done regarding the affair. The government now found them- 
selves involved in very serious difficulties ; retired still farther from 
their conciliatory attitude in order to court popularity ; apathetically 

'" (Treaty) Tex. Arch. To Pak., No. 9, April 25, 1839. Pak.. Nos. 45, 56. 74, 
82, 96; June 3; Aug, i ; Sept. 12; Oct. 5; Nov. 24, 1839. Id. to Hamilton, Dec! 
12, 1839: F. O.. Mexico, cxxxiv. Id., Nos. 42, 25, April 30; March 3, 1840, 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 83 

permitted Treat to withdraw from the country in disgust ; showed 
themselves more and more determined, whatever might be the real 
interest of the country, to " save their responsibility with the public " ; 
eventually took the ground that the Texans were ungrateful beggars 
whom Mexico could not think of recognizing (June, 1841) ; and soon 
afterwards, in spite of all their truckling to the sentiments of the 
people, were overthrown by Santa Anna.^^ 

Early in 1842 Ashbel Smith was appointed Texan charge to Eng- 
land and France and instructed to press the subject of mediation. 
In May he presented himself to Everett, then our representative at 
London, with a letter of introduction from Houston, and by Everett 
he was introduced to Lord Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign 
afifairs. Somewhat unfortunately perhaps for his mission Kennedy, 
the British consul at Galveston, had written to the Foreign Office a 
few months before that while the President of the United States 
desired to obtain Texas, in his own opinion the country inclined 
toward a Mexican connection, — in other words toward a return to 
Mexican allegiance in some form, the first choice of the British 
government. No doubt Aberdeen had this possibility in mind when 
he talked with Ashbel Smith ; and apparently he was not at all sorry 
to express, as he did, the " decided opinion " that British mediation 
would be unsuccessful.^- 

After having thus discouraged the Texan hope of obtaining 
recognition from Mexico, he found it necessary to go through the 
form at least of doing something, since the mediation treaty was 
very soon consummated; and in July, 1842, he instructed Pakenham 
to bring before the Mexican government the desirability of settling 
the tedious controversy. Santa Anna, however, who was now in 
supreme power, valued the afifair as a convenient pretext for the 
large army that he needed, and the government replied sternly that 
the war would go on. With apparent justice, therefore, the Foreign 
Office reiterated to Smith in October that mediation was utterly 
hopeless; yet probably, as Elliot suggested a little later to his chief, 
it was " only necessary for Lord Aberdeen to say to Santa Anna, 
' Sir, Mexico must recognise the independence of Texas,' " for per- 
haps the dictator might on the whole have welcomed, as Elliot 

" Pak., Nos. 54, 63, 82, 89, 107; May 18; July 5; Aug. 22; Oct. 7; Dec. 19, 
1840. Id., Nos. 25, 56; Feb. 26; June 10, 1841. 

"To Smith, March 9, 1842. Smith to Everett, May 12, 1842: Tex. Dipl. 
Corr., ii., 979. Id., No. 4, May 17, 1842. Kennedy, Jan. 10, 1842. Smith, No. 
6, June 3, 1842. 



84 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

thought he would, a good excuse for taking this very step, so as to 
end the Texas difficuhy and leave himself free to establish his 
dynasty on the throne of Mexico, and certainly he could not have 
faced the possibility of a war with Great Britain at a time when there 
were fair prospects of a conflict with the United States and a con- 
flict with France. Why, then, did not England reply to the dictator 
in this decided manner? It seems more than possible that now, ob- 
serving how little talk of annexation had been caused by Santa 
Anna's threats of crossing the Rio Grande, she thought it well to 
have the Texans hang in suspense for a time. At any rate Ashbel 
Smith suspected that her aim was to let them be worried and harassed 
until they would " yield the point of slavery " in exchange for a 
British guaranty of their independence and " some commercial and 
financial advantages " ; and there was also the chance that when 
sufficiently weary of the struggle they would accept some form of 
Mexican allegiance with abolition as its corollary. ^^ 

After Aberdeen informed Smith in May, 1842, that British medi- 
ation could not succeed, Texas formed the idea of a triple interposi- 
tion by England, France and the United States, and in August this 
was proposed to both of the European powers. The French govern- 
ment acceded to the request, but Aberdeen refused to do so. He ex- 
plained the decision of the cabinet by saying that the efforts already 
made by England had not met with encouragement, and that still 
less satisfaction could be expected from an offer to mediate in con- 
junction with the United States, a country towards which Mexico 
felt angry on account of alleged offences against neutrality. It is 
easy, however, to surmise that other reasons existed. England had 
far more influence in Mexico than the United States and France 
combined ; yet were the three powers to act in concert there, she 
would receive but about one third of the credit for anything accom- 
plished. It seemed, no doubt, much better to have Texas, who well 
understood her important position at Mexico, look to her alone as a 
friend to be relied upon. If she desired to control events in the 

"To Elliot, No. 3, July i, 1842. To Pak., Nos, 26, 34, July i, 15, 1842. Pak., 
No. 80, Aug. 29, 1842. Bocanegra to Pak., Sept. 23, 1842: F. O., Mexico, 
civ. Smith, No. 23, Oct. 17, 1842. Elliot, secret, Feb. 5, 1843. Smith to Van 
Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1103. Apparently the British 
government were inconsistent if they advised Mexico to recognize Texas while 
discouraging the Texans' hopes of recognition. But their policy, as explained by 
Palmerston, was to have Mexico recover the province if possible, and if not. make 
a friendly settlement ; and as she could not be expected to act promptly on their 
advice, there was a possibility that Texas would yield meanwhile. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 85 

Struggling republic, that was clearly the shrewder policy ; and since 
she adopted it, one infers that very likely such was her aim.^* 

Among the men to whom tracts of land north of the Rio Grande 
had been conceded under the Alexican regime was an Englishman 
named Beales, whose patent covered almost half a million acres. In 
September, 1842, Croskey, who represented the claimants under this 
grant, addressed a letter to the British Under Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs requesting that the government present the claim to the 
Texan authorities. In point of fact there was no basis at all for 
urging it, since Beales had not fulfilled the conditions ; but Croskey 
cheerfully overlooked this point, and endeavored to recommend his 
cause with arguments a little outside the legal view. The coloniza- 
tion of these lands by Englishmen, he wrote, would perhaps render 
Great Britain entirely independent of American cotton. This of 
itself would be an immense advantage, and another advantage would 
follow. The loss of the British market would lessen the value of 
slaves on the southern plantations of the United States. That value 
would be diminished still further by a prohibition of their introduc- 
tion into Texas resulting naturally from British colonization and 
the settlement of free laborers there; and in the course of time 
slavery in the United States would come to an end. Thus argued the 
claim was taken up by the British government, and in February, 
1843, Elliot presented to the Texan Secretary of State a long plea in 
its behalf.^2 

It is thus clear that England felt much interested in Texan 
slavery and strongly desired to uproot it ; the indications apparently 
suggest that other ideas than pure philanthropy had a place in her 
calculations ; and we come now to facts of a still more interesting 
character. In July, 1840, the colonial secretary of Barbadoes sent 
home the account of Texas, probably fuller than anything the gov- 
ernment possessed at that time, to which a reference has already been 
made. It was an argument for acknowledging the independence of 
the republic; and — after giving a somewhat lurid account of the wild 
characters taking refuge beyond the Sabine, and vividly picturing 
the Sheffield bowie-knives eighteen inches long, warranted in beauti- 
ful tracery on the blade to be " the genuine Arkansas toothpick " — 

"Smith to Guizot, Aug. 15, 1842: F. O., Texas, xviii. Id. to Aberdeen, Aug. 
19, 1842: ib. To Cowley, Oct. 15. 1842. (Understood) Smith, No. 41, July 2, 1843. 
The action of England in regard to triple mediation could hardly fail to excite sus- 
picion in the U. S. so far as it was known. 

" Elliot to Jones, Feb. 4, 1843 : F. O., Texas, vi. Jones to Elliot, Sept. 19, 
1843: ib., xxii. Croskey to Addington, Sept. 15, 1842: ib., v. 



86 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

he recommended that his government insist upon the ultimate aboH- 
tion of slavery there, adding, "I really believe that twenty years 
would not pass away, before England (if necessary) might exclude 
every Bail of Cotton made in the States." Certain advantages to 
accrue from such a result have just been indicated by Croskey, but 
the subject had still other phases. In June, 1842, Sir Robert Peel 
remarked in the House of Commons that he had grave doubts 
whether the British West India colonies, in which the negroes had 
been emancipated, could compete with regions using slave labor — 
which meant of course that he felt sure they could not; and some- 
what later the London Mercantile Journal remarked that freeing the 
blacks had ruined those islands, and that an adoption of the same 
policy by the United States would greatly reduce our production of 
cotton. Evidently the idea was familiar in high British quarters as 
early as 1842 that an effacement of slavery here would tip or tend to 
tip the scale of competition in favor of the British empire ; and as 
that government, in the opinion of the Texan representative at Lon- 
don, concluded before the end of January, 1843, that annexation to 
the American Union was " extremely improbable," they very likely 
began to feel that a quiet move in this direction by the way of gentle 
pressure upon Texas could now be safely made.^® 

According to the terms of accommodation proposed in the spring 
of 1843 through Judge Robinson, Texas was to accept Mexican 
sovereignty while retaining control of her own internal affairs. 
Such an arrangement, as we have remarked, would necessarily havt 
put an end to negro servitude, and it is evident that England did as 
much as prudently she could to secure the acceptance of the proposi- 
tion. In discussing the plan with Ashbel Smith, Under Secretary 
Addington expressed the belief that as soon as Santa Anna had dis- 
posed of Yucatan he would proceed to subjugate Texas, — clearly a 
recommendation to gain shelter in time. Neither Addington nor 
Aberdeen would give any encouragement at this juncture with refer- 
ence to such a settlement as the Texans desired; and Smith, in 
reporting these facts, described the minister's attitude as distinctly 
cool. He was even informed that for some time past the British 
representative at Mexico had ceased to urge the subject upon the 
attention of the Mexican government, which plainly signified that 
Texas must look out for herself ; and the British Foreign Office went 

"Sheridan to Ganaway, July 12, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. (Peel) Hansard. 3 ser., 
Ixiii., Col. 1227. Merc. Journal, Dec. 16, 1844. Smith, No. 34, Jan. 28, 1843. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 87 

SO far as to give the opinion that peace on the terms desired by that 
country could not be obtained through the mediation of any or all of 
the friendly powers. Elliot himself ventured farther and counselled 
Houston to accept the Robinson terms, saying that it was " not at 
all probable " Santa Anna would concede full independence, that he 
hoped " these advances would end in an honourable and durable 
pacification between the two Republics," that no friendly effort would 
be wanting " on the part of Her Majesty's Government to secure that 
result," and that, were the "nominal concession" of sovereignty 
made, the peace and prosperity for which — as he told the Foreign 
Office — Texas was gasping would come at once. Moreover he did 
not hesitate to insist that most likely, if Santa Anna would recognize 
the country at all, he would do so only upon the basis of abolition. ^'^ 

All conceded that the destruction of Texan slavery would have a 
great effect upon the same institution in the United States. As the 
Journal dcs Dcbats pointed out, the example and the loss of the 
market for young negroes would have counted for much ; the oppor- 
tunity afforded runaways from the southwestern States by a bound- 
ary line described as two hundred leagues in length, might have 
signified a great deal; and preventing that diffusion which the ex- 
travagant agricultural methods of slavery made necessary would per- 
haps have meant still more. And now we not only find the British 
cabinet and its agent endeavoring to draw Texas into a position 
where her slaves would be freed, but find the Texan Executive say- 
ing in response that " concurring in the views entertained by Her 
Majesty's Government," he would " accede to the proposition [re- 
garding a truce] made by Gen. Santa Anna."^® 

Everett, while acting as American minister at London, stated offi- 
cially that Ashbel Smith was " a person of more than ordinary talent 
and capacity for affairs " and " exceedingly well respected " at the 
British court ; and it goes without saying that his opportunities for 
acquiring information there and his zeal to understand whatever 
concerned the interests of his country were exceptional. Now in 
January, 1843, Smith wrote as follows to Van Zandt, the Texan 
charge at Washington : 

''Smith, No, — , June 16; No. 41, July 2, 1843. Elliot to Doyle, June 21, 
1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Id. to Jones, June 10; July 24, 1843: ib. (Gasping) Id., 
private, Dec. 16, 1842. (Insist) Galveston letter to Upshur, Nov. 20, 1843: N. 
Orl. Repnb., July 27, 1844. 

^^ Dcbats, May 20, 1844. (Boundary) N. Orl. Repub., July 3, 1843. Jones 
to Elliot, July 30, 1843: Tex. Arch. 



88 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

"It is the purpose of some persons in England to procure the aboli- 
tion of Slavery in Texas. They propose to accomplish this end by 
friendly negotiation and by the concession of what will be deemed equiv- 
alents. I beleive the equivalents contemplated are a guarantee by Great 
Britain of the Independence of Texas — discriminating duties in favor of 
Texian products and perhaps the negotiation of a loan, or some means 
by which the finances of Texas can be readjusted. They estimate the 
number of Slaves in Texas at 12,000 and would consider the payment for 
them in full, as a small sum for the advantages they anticipate from the 
establishment of a free State on the Southern borders of the slave hold- 
ing States of the American Union. 

"In July last in London, two matters were submitted to me in con- 
versation by a person then and now having relations with the British 
Govt. One was, whether the people of Texas would listen to and con- 
sider a proposition from the English Government to abolish Slavery in 
consideration of concessions and equivalent advantages to be offered by 
that Govt. The second matter was, whether Texas would not be induced 
to divide itself into two States, one slave-holding the other nonslave- 
holding. It was argued that but few slaves would probably be introduced 
into Western Texas by reason of its proximity to Mexico, and that 
therefore, it would be conceding but little to establish " a free state " on 
this frontier : and the Colorado was proposed as a dividing line. I do 
not know to whom is due the initiative of these matters : but I was 
informed that the propositions in question, had been a subject of con- 
versation with Lord Aberdeen. And I am aware that in another con- 
versation in which Lord Aberdeen took part, it was maintained that the 
population which would flock into this " free state " from Europe would 
be enabled to vote down the Slave holders, and thus the Texians would 
of themselves establish an entire non-slaveholding country. . . . 

" I may be mistaken in regard to the equivalents to be offered by 
England as they were not dwelt upon in detail. But in regard to the two 
propositions, one to abolish slavery throughout the entire territory, the 
other to establish a nonslave holding state in Western Texas; and in 
regard to the personal standing and relations with the Govt, of the 
Gentleman making the propositions, I cannot be in error. . . . 

" The independence of Texas and the existence of Slavery in Texas 
is a question of life or death to the slave holding states of the American 
Union. Hemmed in between the free states on their northern border, 
and a free Anglo Saxon State on their southern border and sustained 
by England, their history would soon be written The establishment of a 
free state on the territory of Texas is a darling wish of England for 
which scarcely any price would be regarded as to great. The bargain 
once struck what remedy remains to the South? "^^ 

"Everett. No. 317, May 15, 1845- Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: 
Tex. Dipl. Com, ii., 1103. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 89 

At the beginning of July, 1843, Smith wrote as follows to the 
Texan Secretary of State: 

"... About a fortnight since I saw Mr. S. P. Andrews at a meeting 
of the " General Anti Slavery Convention " in this town. The abolition 
of Slavery in Texas was among the objects of his visit to Europe, and I 
have had several full conferences with him on this subject. He has 
been and continues to be actively engaged with some parties in London 
in devising means to effect abolition. He has had interviews on the 
subject in question with Lords Aberdeen, Brougham and Morpeth and 
with other persons, all of whom are extremely eager to accomplish this 
purpose. Lord Aberdeen said "Her Majesty's Government would employ 
all legitimate means to attain so great and desirable an object as the 
abolition of slavery in Texas,'' and he used other expressions of the same 
purport. These observations were made to Mr Andrews and the Com- 
mittee of the Anti Slavery Convention which waited on his Lordship. 
The Anti Slavery Convention gave the subject of abolition in Texas a 
very full consideration, deem it of great importance, will spare no 
efforts to accomplish it, and count confidently on the cooperation of the 
British Government. . . . 

" Different plans or ways of effecting and carrying out abolition have 
been proposed here. Among the principal is, first, a Loan to Texas to 
enable the Government to purchase the slaves and emancipate them, on 
the condition that the introduction of slaves hereafter be prohibited. 
Lord Aberdeen said the British Govt, would guarantee the interest of a 
Loan raised and applied for this purpose but no other Loan whatever. 
A second plan is the raising of a sum of money to buy large quantities 
of land in Texas on the same condition, namely the abolition of slavery ; 
but according to the latter plan no credit is to stand open against Texas: 
the monies proposed to be paid for lands are to enable Texas to abolish 
slavery, and the lands are to become the bona fide property of those who 
furnish the money and to be held by them in fee simple. A plan 
similar to the second, is recommended by Mr Andrews. The plan at 
one time contemplated of encouraging an emigration to Texas which 
should " vote down" slavery, has been wholly abandoned as tedious, 
expensive, uncertain and inconsistent with the views of England zvhich 
wishes to direct all its emigration to its ozvn colonics. . . . 

" The abolition of slavery in Texas by itself considered, is not re- 
garded in England as of any great importance, but it is ardently desired 
as preliminary to its abolition in the United States and for the purpose 
of placing Texas in a rival if not unfriendly attitude towards that 
country. Besides motives of philanthropy, the British people wish the 
abolition of slavery in America in reference to the culture of sugar and 
cotton, in which there exists a rivalry with their colonies, and in refer- 
ence to the advantages which the production of cotton in America gives 



90 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to its manufacturers and the employment which these staples afford to 
American shipping. You will not hence be surprised to learn that on 
several occasions indeed generally, where the abolition of slavery has 
been discussed I hear it mainly advocated for its anticipated effects on 
slavery in the Southern U. States and eventually on the agriculture, 
manufactures and commerce of that country. . . . Their [the British 
government's] policy in relation to slavery in all other countries is 
avowed, and they will cooperate by all legitimate means with any parties 
in their own country having for their object the abolition of slavery in 
Texas."-*' 

On the last day of the same month the Texan charge reported 
in these words : 

"... In my interview with Lord Aberdeen on the 20th Instant, . . . 
His Lordship replied in effect, that it is the well known policy and wish 
of the British Government to abolish slavery every where ; that its aboli- 
tion in Texas is deemed very desirable and he spoke to this point at 
some little length, as connected with British policy and British interests 
and in reference to the United States. . . . The British Government 
greatly desire the abolition of slavery in Texas as a part of their gen- 
eral policy in reference to their colonial and commercial interests and 
mainly in reference to its future influence on slavery in the United 
States."2x 

As a gloss upon this despatch, which passes over certain points 
very lightly, it is worth while to bring forward also the testimony of 
the London Morning Herald, given at a later date when frankness 
appeared safe. Said the Herald, which was regarded by the Revue 
de Paris and other well informed periodicals as the voice of the 
British ministry : 

" Mr. Calhoun says that Great Britain, having in some degree crippled 
her tropical commerce, by the substitution of free labour for slave labour, 
is interested in causing the suppression of slavery. No Englishman dis- 
putes the proposition. . . . Great Britain, says Mr. Calhoun, would 
obstruct the annexation of Texas as a means of promoting the abolition 
of slavery, first in Texas, afterwards in the United States. We confess 
the whole charge. . . . We do wish to see slavery abolished in the 
United States, not merely upon moral but upon commercial grounds also. 
These commercial grounds . . . are as much political as commercial. 
While the United States shall have the monopoly of the supply of raw 
cotton, they will hold in their hands the means of disturbing the social 
state of all the manufacturing countries of Europe, . . . but the mon- 

=» Smith, No. 41, July 2, 1843. 

-'Smith, No. 43, July 31, 1843. Smith added that Aberdeen mentioned the 
instructions to Doyle dated July i, 1843: note 28. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 9I 

opoly of the production of raw cotton cannot be very speedily taken from 
the States while these States retain the advantage of slave labour. "-- 

The next day after sending off his despatch of July 31, Smith 
wrote to Aberdeen that the persons who were endeavoring to enlist 
the British government in the cause of emancipation in Texas 
were in no manner recognized and their proceedings were not at all 
endorsed by the constituted authorities of his nation. To this note 
His Lordship replied six weeks later that the British cabinet dis- 
claimed all purpose to interfere " improperly " in the domestic affairs 
of Texas, but were anxious to see slavery disappear everywhere, and 
felt no surprise that private individuals, entertaining the same feel- 
ing, "should exert every effort in their power to attain an object so 
desirable." This qualified assurance told, of course, very little so 
far as the ministry's operations were concerned, and it showed 
very distinctly an intention to smile upon any unofficial agency work- 
ing in so laudable a cause.-^ 

Of course the principles and aims that shaped the policy of the 
British government in this matter had been worked out before Elliot 
sailed for Galveston ; but the reports of that gentleman must have 
tended to confirm and extend them. In November, 1842, after hav- 
ing been at his post long enough to study the situation fairly well, he 
wrote that he had a plan for bringing about the abolition of slavery 
and the adoption of free trade. The present slaveholders, he sug- 
gested, could be compensated by a loan raised in England ; and one 
of the effects of the new system, in his opinion, would be to draw 
Europeans to Texas and thus balance the power of the United 
States.24 

The next month he pursued the subject farther. The best course 
for England, he thought, would be to obtain peace for Texas on the 
condition that she place herself in a position of real nationality by 
immediately and thoroughly organizing her social, political and com- 
mercial institutions and policy on a sound and independent basis, — 
by which he doubtless meant an abandonment of slavery and an 
adoption of free trade. The policy he recommended was, in brief, to 
establish that nation firmly between the United States and Mexico 

'^Herald, Jan. 8, 1845. Revue de Paris, April i, 1845. 

^ Smith to Aberdeen, Aug. i, 1843: Tex. Arch. Aberdeen to Smith, Sept. 11, 
1843 : ib. 

*• Elliot, private, Nov. 15, 1842. Sept, 11, 1841, the London Times remarked, 
with reference to Texas : " An independent state with no tariff at all would be 
the most formidable check possible against the demands by a neighbour for a high 
tariff." 



92 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



as " the best barrier " available, " with a considerable coloured popu- 
lation perfectly free of political disabilities, and a commercial policy 
of the most liberal description." Money expended to emancipate the 
negroes and give to the black race a position and a voice in that 
quarter would, he suggested, '' render as profitable returns as money 
spent for fortresses and military works on the Northern frontier of 
the United States," for those men's hearts would be with England 
"beyond the third and fourth generation," and Texas would be 
separated effectually from the neighboring States; while the adop- 
tion of a free trade system would detach it no less completely from 
the northeastern section of the great republic. In his judgment, he 
added later, it was an "object of considerable moment" to England 
that the Texas question should be " firmly and speedily settled."-^ 

Though naturally compelled to be exceedingly circumspect in the 
matter^ Elliot even ventured to take up the delicate issue with the 
Texan government. In June, 1843, he said to Houston that in his 
opinion the existence of slavery in Texas was greatly to be regretted ; 
to which the President replied that he thought the same, and that 
unless the settlement with Mexico should somehow eliminate this 
element of the situation, his country would become, to its incalculable 
injury, the "impound" — the receptacle, he doubtless meant — of the 
colored population of the United States. In October the charge went 
a step farther. He reminded Houston of the "settled feeling" of 
England regarding slavery, and stated that he expected instructions 
to " press that topic." England, he intimated, would " dwell upon 
. . . the deplorable error " of founding the nation on a wrongful, 
decadent institution, acknowledged wherever it existed to be a cancer. 
To this Houston answered that without going into details he could 
promise that the views of Great Britain would always receive the 
most attentive consideration from the government and people of 
Texas. Elliot's moves had every look of what is called " breaking 
ground," and the ground, so far as the President was concerned, had 
the appearance of being notably mellow.-'' 

In February, 1844, James Love of Galveston wrote to Judge 
Nicholas of Louisville, Kentucky, a letter that seemed worthy to be 
placed in the hands of Senator Crittenden. The writer said : 

^Elliot, private, Dec. i6, 28, 1842. The plan of giving the negroes all civil 
rights was particularly in view when a doubt of Elliot's full wisdom was expressed 
above ; but, as the slaves were not very numerous, it might have worked well. 

=" Elliot, secret, June 8 and Oct. 31, 1843. It seems impossible to believe that 
without some prompting from his government Elliot would have dared to speak 
as he did in October. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 93 

"If Texas could be tempted to abolish slavery by the adoption of 
organic laws, her best and most generous patron and friend would be 
England. The abolition Society there, backed by her Majesty's ministers, 
are ready to pay us their full value and apprentice them for a term of 
years, at nominal wages only, and to take our public lands at U. States 
prices in payment of money advanced, added to this the guarantee of our 
independence by Mexico, and the certainty of an immense European 
emigration to purchase those lands already appropriated. In making 
this statement to you, I do not wish you to believe that I indulge in the 
idle rumors of the day, but that it is made on authority yoti would not 
question, were I at liberty to give you all the information I have." 

From this it would appear that the plans proposed in London and 
encouraged by Elliot's despatches became tangible enough and prom- 
ising enough to be a practical subject of discussion among leading 
citizens of Texas. -'^ 

While cautiously endeavoring to edge that country into an accept- 
ance of the Robinson terms and also encouraging unofficial plans to 
end slavery there, the British government decided in June, 1843, to 
proceed by still another method, and they wrote to Doyle, the charge 
at Mexico, that by offering those terms Santa Anna had " virtually " 
conceded the point of recognition, and it would be best now to do so 
formally. The despatch then added : 

" By adopting such a course, the Mexican Government would be 
enabled to enter with great advantage on Negotiations with Texas, 
since by offering so great a boon as the complete independence of Texas, 
the main point in fact for which the Texians have been contending for 
years past, the Mexican Government would have it in their power to 
insist with greater effect on any Terms which they might wish to pro- 
pose as the condition on which that boon would be conceded. It may 
deserve consideration whether the abolition of Slavery in Texas would 
not be a greater triumph, and more honourable to Mexico, than the reten- 
tion of any Sovereignty merely nominal." 

In other words, Doyle was to recommend officially that Texas 
be recognized on the condition that she emancipate her negroes.-^ 

Elliot was duly notified of this communication, and in reply he 
offered some interesting remarks upon it. He believed that if Mexico 
would allow the Texan government a sufficient period for delibera- 

^ Love to Nicholas, Feb. i, 1844: Crit. Pap. This letter was not written to 
further the cause of annexation in the U. S., for the writer said that under the 
existing circumstances annexation was impossible. Probably in line 7 he intended 
to write " England " instead of " Mexico." 

^ To Doyle, No. 10. July i, 1843. Here and in a very few other cases, where 
such words as " honorable " were written in British despatches without the letter m. 
the author has made the spelling conform to the usual English method. 



94 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



tion and a liberal boundary, the project could be carried through. 
Moreover, with a prospect before them that either emancipation or 
hostilities with Mexico would almost certainly occur, slaveholders 
would hesitate to come in from the United States. Were the system 
of free labor thus to be established west of the Sabine, " there would 
very soon be an end of the remunerative production of Cotton by 
Slave labour in the United States " ; and should peace be obtained on 
the proposed basis, within ten years Texas would be producing a 
million bales annually. British goods would come over in exchange 
for them; and either the American and Mexican tarififs would be 
reduced or Texas would " rapidly come to be the seat of a consider- 
able trade," — that is to say, wholesale smuggling. In corresponding 
with Doyle, Elliot made further remarks. Should Mexico simply let 
it be understood that abolition was to be an essential preliminary of 
a settlement, " The tide of immigration from the Slave States would 
be at once arrested " ; laborers would come in from the northern 
section of the Union and from Europe ; and the tie connecting Texas 
with the southwestern States would be severed. One may fairly 
assume that the British Foreign Office was at least equal in sagacity 
to a mere charge. Unfortunately, however, for this line of work, 
Doyle broke off diplomatic relations with Mexico at the end of Sep- 
tember on account of a small British flag displayed among the 
trophies of the Texas campaign, and Mexico began to think of war 
with England. The British government condemned the action of 
their representative, but naturally that did not make him persona 
grata again at the Mexican capital ; and as Bankhead, the new minis- 
ter, did not reach his post until the following March, negotiations on 
delicate matters like this were now impracticable for about six 
months.-'' 

Near the end of 1842 the policy of England bore fruit in an ex- 
plicit admission from Houston that he felt " an intense anxiety for 
peace with Mexico," and in a direct request for the assistance of the 
British representative to obtain it. Six months more, and the Presi- 
dent went so far as to intimate that in return for effectual aid Texas 
would side with England, should that power find herself at war with 

=* Elliot, No. 28, Sept. 30, 1843. Id. to Doyle, Oct. 10, 1843: F. O., Texas, 
vi. Id., No. 32, Nov. 29, 1843. Doyle to Elliot, Oct. 5, 1843: F. O., Texas, 
xxviii. Id., No. 79, Oct. 30, 1843. Thompson, Oct. 3, 1843. To Doyle, No. 34, 
Nov. 29, 1843. Bank., No. i, March 31, 1844. The interim was really longer 
than the text states, for of course the new minister had to proceed very slowly 
at first, removing hard feelings and establishing confidential relations. As will be 
seen, an abolition movement of some strength developed in Texas itself during 
the spring of 1843. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 95 

the United States, as he suggested that she was hkely soon to do ; 
upon which ElHot wrote after due dehberation to the British repre- 
sentative at Mexico that the government of Texas had no bias 
towards the United States, and that Santa Anna by acknowledging 
her independence in a prompt, hberal way could " pretty rapidly " de- 
tach her from " the people and things East of the Sabine," make her 
a rival and enemy of her great neighbor, and not only "roll back" 
the threatening American tide, but have an ally in case of trouble 
with the United States and signally increase "the just and power- 
ful influence of his own Country on this Continent." An argu- 
ment more interesting to the dictator of Mexico or more danger- 
ous to the Union could hardly have been devised ; and it does not 
appear that Elliot's ideas and action in this regard were frowned 
upon in any way by his government.^'' 

The circumstances of the truce were evidence of a friendly con- 
nection between Houston's government and the cabinet of Great 
Britain, but not the only evidence. In the summer and autumn of 
1843 it was noted in the United States that several newspapers of 
Texas,, commonly regarded as administration organs, were insisting 
that any wish of the American Executive to interpose for the benefit 
of that country would be thwarted by Congress, whereas Great 
Britain had both the will and the ability to render aid. The National 
Vindicator, a journal which probably had closer relations with the 
government than any other, hinted that the United States were dis- 
posed to sacrifice the interests of Texas for their own advantage, and 
were trying to create among her people a feeling hostile to Great 
Britain in order to prevent that power from successfully mediating. 
On the eighth of November Houston delivered an address in which 
he said : " There is a constant efifort made to prejudice Texas against 
England. Why? Because England ha^ done us service." Had she 
acted toward us, continued the President, as our neighbors have, 
what would have been the clamor ! The United States have dis- 
armed our troops a hundred miles within our boundaries ; they de- 
nounce us as bandits and pirates ; and they threaten to send convoys 
across our territory to the Rio Grande. We cannot fight so great a 

^Houston to Elliot, Nov. 5, 1842; May 13, 1843 (private): F. O., Texas, iv., 
vi. In the latter he said : " If England produces a pacification between this 
country and Mexico, s|[ie will thereby secure a friend on the gulf whose contiguity 
to the United States, in the event of a war, would not be desirable to that country. 
All movement on the part of the U. States would seem to indicate that they have 
an eye to a rupture at some period not remote." Elliot to Doyle, private, June 21, 
1843; ib., vi. 



96 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

power; " but we will maintain our just attitude by a moral appeal to 
the nations." And then he made his climax by declaring, " It is the 
beginning of the end. What the end will be, is known only to 
Heaven." How could all this be understood except as meaning 
that Texan affairs were soon to be settled in one way or another, that 
the American republic was an enemy and England a friend, and that 
the nation should look to the latter power for advice, guidance and 
protection ?^^ 

By this time Houston's influence in Texas had become over- 
whelming. The government newspapers wielded of course a special 
authority with the public. As the trading vessels were almost ex- 
clusively English and nearly all of the money was in British hands, 
most of the business men were of that nationality or necessarily 
affiliated with Great Britain; and the Galveston Civilian acted as a 
spokesman for that side. Not many years had passed since the 
citizens had chosen an anti-annexation champion as their chief 
magistrate ; they felt offended with the United States on several 
grounds ; and it is not surprising if at this time they swung toward 
the British party. They appreciated the disposition of England to 
assist them, said Ashbel Smith later. For a long while at this 
period, wrote Anson Jones, European intervention would have been 
welcomed by an almost unanimous voice. Elliot is all powerful and 
Texas appears likely to become as obedient to British interests as 
Jamaica, the New Orleans Tropic had declared some months before, 
and the prediction seemed to be coming true.^- 

There was, moreover, an influence at work that appeared sure to 
strengthen the tendency. This was the swelling tide of immigration 
from overseas. In the matter of attracting European settlers Texas 
had a distinct advantage. Between the shores of the Old World and 
her vacant lands direct water communication was available, whereas 
the colonist disembarking at New York found himself still far from 

^^ Madisonian, Nov. 20. 1843. Vindicator, July i, 1843. Citizen, Houston, 
Texas, Nov. 18, 1843. Murphy to Upshur, No. 15, Dec. 25, 1843. In 1842 there 
was a prospect of friction between Great Britain and Texas in consequence of 
the inefifective Texas declaration of a blockade of the Mexican ports, but in Oc- 
tober Houston ended the nominal blockade. 

^ Houston had many bitter enemies, there were sectional animosities against 
him, and his policy or supposed policy in regard to slavery and the foreign rela- 
tions of Texas was deeply distrusted by some; yet his hold on the nation was 
very strong. (Money) Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. (Civilian) 
Murphy, No. 26, May 24, 1844. Smith, Remin., 47. Jones, Memor.. 95. Tropic- 
Wash. Globe, May 22, 1843. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 97 

his opportunity. A British periodical of high standing, the Edin- 
burgh Reviczij, had already called attention to this new territory, 
declaring that " a country more inviting to the settler of the English 
race" it was "impossible to conceive." About the middle of 1843 
the advertisement of a Texas colony stated that a large number of 
immigrants were expected from England. French colonists, also, 
seemed likely to come in great numbers. In June, 1842, it was an- 
nounced by the New York Journal of Commerce that a contract for 
1,700 settlers of that nationality had been made.^^ 

It is thus clear that England aimed to encourage the develop- 
ment of Texas as a cotton-growing country so as to be independent 
of the United States, and apparently had in view a flank movement 
against the American tariff. We have seen placed before her govern- 
ment the self-evident proposition that a falling off in the demand for 
our great staple would cause the planters to value their negroes less 
highly and so would pave the way for emancipation. We have seen 
also that she endeavored to effect the destruction of slavery in Texas, 
— trying to gain the point first as the price of recognition, then by 
discouraging the Texans' hope of peace with the mother-country on 
the basis of independence, next as the equivalent for the cessation of 
hostilities according to the Robinson terms, and finally as the condi- 
tion of full Mexican recognition ; and we have seen that she chiefly 
desired abolition in Texas with a view to this country. In such 
attempts there was of course nothing improper on the part of the 
British cabinet. England not only had a right to advance her own 
interests, but in this matter she was entitled to credit for wishing to 
promote along with them the success of a great moral cause ; and so 
far as the United States were concerned, it was for them to detect 
and circumvent any foreign aims likely to prove injurious. But the 
facts are incontestable that her designs in regard to Texas were deep 
and persevering; that they were believed by herself, by the Texan 
representative at her court and by her own representative in Texas to 
be very unfavorable to American interests ; and that her relations 
with President Houston were most intimate and cordial ; whereas 
in the United States the Texas question had been treated as a mere 
issue of party and sectional policy checkered at the North with 
philanthropy, the new republic — which Great Britain felt had a 

^Review, April, 1841, p. 249. Nat. IntelL, Aug. 19, 1843. Journ. Com., June 
24, 1842. 



q8 the annexation of TEXAS 

truly important role to play — was generally regarded as a bagatelle, 
to be picked up at any convenient moment or never be picked up 
at all, and the pronounced development of anti-American, pro-British 
sentiment in that quarter seemed of no particular importance to the 
public mind.^* 

The outlook for Texas appeared therefore to be a rapidly grow- 
ing population of a European cast, an early absorption of most 
valuable portions of Mexico, and a predominantly British tone due 
to past obligations and existing interests. To have thus, not only a 
strong and unfriendly rival, but one controlled by the nation we most 
feared and most suspected planted on our flank was clearly undesir- 
able for the American Union, and the seriousness of the case was 
deeply emphasized by the existence of slavery. How the United 
States might be affected by the abolition of that system in Texas 
and what Great Britain desired to accomplish in this regard, the 
previous pages have indicated. On the other hand were the institu- 
tion to survive there, a powerful community of interest — slavery at 
bay — would tend to draw Texas and our southern States together 
and disrupt the Union. The possibilities involved in this idea had 
already been suggested officially to her government, for in April, 
1837, her minister to the United States had written that a combina- 
tion with our slave section and a conquest of Mexico would build up 
" the greatest nation upon earth. "^^ 

What, now, was the real aim of Texas? That is to say, what 
was the real aim of Sam Houston, who — though he may have derived 
much assistance from Anson Jones and others — appears to have 
been decidedly the moulder of her policy? Unfortunately, though 
about all the evidence in the case is most likely before us, a positive 
answer to this question cannot even yet be given. Endowed with a 
remarkably fertile and crafty mind, trained successfully as an 
American politician, finished in the school of Indian cunning, a 
gambler of long experience, a genius in the art of political histrionics, 
a diplomatist whose only idea of method was to triumph and not be 
found out, and a statesman able and determined to keep his own 
counsel, Houston worked in a situation beautifully adapted to facili- 
tate the concealment of his aims, and had powerful motives for 

■■'* It follows that the suspicions regarding British designs then entertained in 
the United States were warranted. 

^ Hunt, April 15, 1837. Slavery existed of course to some extent elsewhere. 



TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 99 

making the utmost use of this advantage. To catch him is hardly 
easier than it was to fix Proteus. Yet a working hypothesis may be 
framed, and each may carry this on through the intricate diplomacy 
of the Texan administration to be verified or disproved. 

Mexican rule, then, he was fully determined of course never to 
accept. Annexation to the United States he regarded as tolerable if 
no better arrangement could be made, growing warmer or colder 
toward that plan according to circumstances. But his real desire 
was to obtain recognition from Mexico as the legal certificate of 
sovereignty, ensure an opportunity for growth by winning a guar- 
anty — more or less formal — of Texan independence from the United 
States, England or both, lead his people forward then, unhindered, in 
the path of development, and gain a lofty place in history as the 
founder of a nation. To compass these ends, he designed to play 
off England and the United States against each other, exciting this 
country by dwelling publicly on the assistance received from across 
the ocean and letting it be felt that his relations yonder were danger- 
ously intimate, and stimulating Great Britain at the same time by 
keeping the annexation issue alive and prominent. Finally the 
human element must not be overlooked. Though a patriot, Houston 
was no idealist. It was far from his intention to sacrifice his per- 
sonal fortunes for the halo of martyrdom ; and no doubt he proposed 
so to manage that whatever wind should blow, the vessel bearing his 
pennant should reach a port. 

Early in 1844 he outlined in a letter the possible future of his 
country. Texas, he wrote, were she to stand forth permanently by 
herself, could hold aloof from all international quarrels, be the 
universal friend, and derive profit as a neutral from every conflict. 
The overflowing population from Europe would rapidly supply her 
with settlers. Admitting British goods at a low rate of duties, she 
could place them in the markets of northern Mexico and the southern 
States at prices to defy competition. European nations would 
eagerly protect her existence and promote her growth in order to 
counterbalance the American Union in the only possible way. Cali- 
fornia and other portions of Mexico would be glad to join the 
rising state for the sake of good government and protection against 
the Indians. Oregon, not separated from Texas as it was from the 
United States by tremendous mountains, could easily be acquired ; 



100 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

and before long the republic would be able to vie — if necessary, cope 
• — with the greatest of powers. Such was Houston's forecast, and it 
seems every way probable that he drew it up in his mind long before 
putting it on record.^^ 

^"Houston to Murphy, May 6, 1844: Crane, Houston, 366. Doubtless the idea 
of a possible combination with the southern States was in Houston's mind, but in 
this letter— addressed to a representative of the Union — he could not mention it. 
Likewise Houston believed or at least professed to believe that Texas could wage 
a profitable war against Mexico, but he did not wish to have this done, since it 
would draw adventurers into the country, and so he does not mention that possibility 
here. It is worth nothing that at the beginning of the civil war Houston was sus- 
pected of desiring that Texas in leaving the Union should become a sovereign 
nation and of working with that in view (Williams, Houston, 361). With refer- 
ence to this letter see Chapter viii., note 42. 



V. 

Tyler Desires to effect Annexation. 

It is now time to place ourselves at a distinctively American point 
of view and unravel the genesis of the annexation " conspiracy," if 
we can. Certain facts already presented will necessarily appear again 
here ; but these will be few, and they will show themselves at a new 
angle. 

John Tyler had the rare misfortune of descending into history 
cursed by one political party yet without a benediction from the 
other ; and it is very difficult for a person condemned by his country- 
men with such apparent unanimity and impartiality to regain stand- 
ing. Yet until his accession to the highest dignity within the reach 
of an American citizen precipitated him to the lowest depth into 
which an American public man can fall, he seemed to be very highly 
favored both by the people and by the stars. For ten years he had 
served in the General Assembly of Virginia, for five in the national 
House of Representatives, for one term and a part of another as 
Governor of the commonwealth, and for nine years in the United 
States Senate ; and then he had been elected by the country at large 
to the Vice-Presidency. 

So long and so brilliant a career of honors could hardly fall to a 
contemptible or incompetent person, and in truth he seems to have 
been neither. Though not a giant, intuitive rather than logical in 
his judgments, and more tenacious than masterful in his determina- 
tions, he possessed insight, eloquence, courage and address. No 
doubt he was a politician, a State-rights man and a believer in slavery ; 
but others as well as he have been moulded by their environment ; 
all the leading public men of his day schemed; and he gave a proof 
of devotion to principle, such as few of his contemporaries equaled, 
by resigning the high office of Senator rather than please his con- 
stituents at a sacrifice of principles. Capable of holding his 
eye firmly upon the point he would gain but without the nervous 
power for downright combat, he necessarily pursued a course which 
may have seemed to men of less acumen and more force than him- 
self rather insincere ; but he could hardly be expected to let opponents 
dictate his plan of campaign. Very human frailties were his. He 



102 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

could scarcely say "No" to a friend; more than a due share of van- 
ity had fallen to him ; and no doubt he was ambitious. But ambition 
is a trait of almost all public men; few had the excuse for vanity 
that he could offer; and loyalty to friends was not only a part of 
his constitution but a part of the social code in which he was reared. 
Most Americans have regarded him as worse than a failure ; yet it 
was much to carry on the government at all under the circumstances ; 
it was much to leave his notable record for honest and economical 
administration; it was much to remain genial, graceful and kindly 
under a cataract of the most violent abuse; it was much to retire 
with untarnished equanimity to the life of a Virginia farmer; and 
it was much also to bring about the settlement of the northeastern 
boundary dispute and the annexation of Texas. 

To discuss his political difficulties at length is no part of the 
present undertaking, but something must be said of them. Though 
he was known to have been a steady opponent of a national bank all 
his life, he was nominated in 1840 by the free choice of the Whigs 
for the Vice-Presidency. His acceptance of the honor required no 
change of view, for the convention made no platform; and if the 
party expected him to forswear his principles for the sake of an 
office, it counted upon the leopard's giving up his spots and convicted 
itself of choosing a candidate whom it believed to be grossly unfit. 
Clay, however, after the victory was gained, used his power over 
Congress to have a bank bill enacted. This placed the President — 
for Harrison's death had now promoted Tyler to the first office — in 
a dilemma. Either he must prove himself cowardly and unprincipled 
by forsaking his colors at the bidding of a political chief, or he must 
satisfy his conscience at the risk of disappointing and offending 
the party. Each alternative threatened ruin ; and probably Clay was 
not unwilling to sweep from his path in this easy manner one who 
seemed likely to prove a dangerous competitor for the next Presi- 
dential nomination. In so hard a situation Tyler doubtless tried 
anxiously to find a way of escape from both horns, and perhaps he 
employed some hesitating and equivocal language ; but in the end he 
proved faithful to his convictions. Upon that he was duly read out 
of the party and abandoned by nearly all of his cabinet; and then, 
because he turned toward the Democrats for the support essential to 
the conduct of the government, he was denounced as a traitor again. 
At one and the same time, said Webster, the National Intelligencer 
would "have the Whigs be against the President " and " have the 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. I03 

President be for the Whigs." Many Democrats, on the other hand, 
entertained a deep grudge against him for joining in the opposition 
to Jacksonism ; and for several reasons the Van Buren wing in 
particular found it more than hard to accept him. Between two 
horses, therefore, he fell to the ground, and hence the project of 
acquiring Texas, espoused and urged by him, was tarred with an 
extra, accidental and partisan opprobrium, against which — clearly 
recognizable now — it is a plain duty to maintain our guard. ^ 

Scarcely had Tyler seated himself in the White House, when 
Henry A. Wise, his most intimate political friend, advised him to 
obtain Texas as soon as possible. The new President concurred in 
the advice ; and a few months later he wrote as follows to Daniel 
Webster, the Secretary of State: 

" I gave you a hint as to the possibility of acquiring Texas by treaty 
— I verily believe it could be done — Could the north be reconciled to it 
would anything throw so bright a lustre around us ? It seems to me that 
the great interests of the north would be incalculably advanced by such 
an acquisition — How deeply interested is the shipping interest? Slavery 
— I know that is the objection — and it would be well founded if it did not 
already exist among us — but my belief is that a rigid enforcement of the 
laws against the slave trade, would make in time as many free States, 
south, as the acquisition of Texas would add of slave States — and then 
the future (distant it might be) would present wonderful results. ''- 

Tyler's primary motive at this time in desiring to make the acqui- 
sition was apparently an ambition to do something brilliant for the 
country and gain fame in its history. His letter to Webster shows 
how the idea of glory occupied his thoughts. The execution of this 
design would throw a bright " lustre " around him. By encouraging 
a tone of fraternity in the cabinet, he said he should best promote 
his own fame and advance the public good. " I shall truly rejoice 
in all that shall advance your fame," was his assurance to the Secre- 
tary of State. Moreover such an achievement, he doubtless hoped, 
would give him that personal following in the nation which he 
desired to acquire. Though unable to please either Democrats or 
Whigs as party men, he thought he could please them all as Amer- 
icans by identifying himself with something of non-partisan value. 
" Our course is too plainly before us to be mistaken," he wrote to 

^ See General Note, p. i. Standard Histories. Tyler, Tyler, ii., passim. 
Webster, Writings, xv., 185. 

^Wise, Decades, 182. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 254. Tyler to Webster: note 3. Oct. 
II, It was alleged after the trouble began that Tyler let it be understood before he 
was nominated that his views regarding the bank had changed or would change, but 
this is emphatically one of the cases in which we are not to believe all that we hear. 



104 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Webster; "We must look to the whole country and to the whole 
people."^ 

That the step he proposed would give him strong friends in one 
part of the nation seemed almost certain. The mere fact that Henry 
A. Wise suggested it implied that the project was regarded by 
shrewd politicians as favorable to the South. In November, 1841, 
the New Orleans Courier remarked that it would add much to the 
President's popularity to obtain Texas, and a year later his partisans 
in Congress believed that it would make him omnipotent in the South 
and Southwest. Indeed any one could see why it might. The slave 
States were plainly falling behind politically. According to the 
chairman of a Congressional committee appointed a year or so later, 
in order to have about the same relative strength in the House of 
Representatives as in 1790 that section needed to send loi of the 
members instead of the 87 that it did send. These figures meant 
that in one branch of Congress it was permanently the weaker side, 
and therefore that it must reinforce its position in the other. To 
do this was of course ardently desired by the politicians who repre- 
sented it, and for the President's assistance they were certain to be 
grateful.'* 

To be sure, reasons could easily be seen why the accession of 
Texas would not promote the financial interests of the Southerners, 
for its rich soil would very likely draw planters from the older 
States and the value of land in these would be diminished, while the 
competition of its abundant crops would reduce the prices of what 
the less fertile areas could produce ; and it was possible that in many 
minds these unpleasant probabilities might outweigh the remoter 
gains of political power and the consequent strengthening of slavery. 
Some no doubt, like the Natchez Free Trader, declared that Eng- 
land was aiming to bring about abolition in Texas, and if this could 
be proved, the South might entirely ignore mere economic argu- 
ments; but the only known indications of such a design were the 
British recognition of Texas and the making of a treaty with that 

'Tyler to Webster. Oct. 11. 1841 : Webster Pap. 

* N. Orl. Courier, Nov. 4, 1841. Van Z., No. 93, Dec. 23, 1842. Report by 
Zadok Pratt: Wash. Globe, Dec. 18, 1844. To be fair, one must admit that had 
the conditions been reversed, the North would have endeavored to safeguard its 
position in the national government. In view of the doubt which has existed as 
to the paternity of the annexation project, the following words, written by Murphy 
(U. S. charge in Texas) to Tyler, April 25, 1844, may be pertinent: "The 
measure is all your own ... I hold the evidence of the fact in the sacred 
archives of this Legation " (Arch. Tex. Leg., State Dept.). See also Tyler's 
letter: Tyler, Tyler, IL, 278. 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. 105 

country intended to facilitate the suppression of the slave trade, and 
the United States themselves had both acknowledged Texan inde- 
pendence and smitten that iniquitous traffic. Others thought Eng- 
land was scheming to become independent of American cotton ; but 
it was answered that Texas would probably never, and certainly 
could not soon, be a serious competitor. It was therefore as yet a 
debatable question for the business men of the South ; but, all things 
considered, that section was practically certain to prefer the acqui- 
sition of Texas. '^ 

At the same time Tyler believed he could offer great benefits to 
the North also, and therefore " the whole country " and " the whole 
people " would be grateful to him for proposing and effecting annex- 
ation, while his own affections and interests, bound up with the slave 
section, would be safeguarded. Nor were these things all. In addi- 
tion to the calculations of personal advantage, however legitimate, it 
must in fairness be supposed that the President wished for patriotic 
reasons to promote what he considered the welfare of the nation; 
and further still, as a knowledge of the Texan scheme of expansion 
doubtless existed in the State department, one may reasonably con- 
clude — especially as Henry A. Wise pictured certain phases of that 
danger in startling colors — that our chief magistrate felt it his duty 
to suggest a precautionary measure.*^ 

Thus early, perhaps, came also the idea that Van Buren and 
Clay might be embarrassed by the appearance of the annexation 
issue, since their followers would almost certainly be more or less 
divided upon it, and nobody could foretell precisely how. As for 
these leaders themselves, Tyler appears to have figured that neither 
of them could oppose the plan. Both seemed to be committed in its 
favor. Both had tried to obtain Texas : Clay as Adams's Secretary 
of State and Van Buren as Jackson's. Clay, besides, was a Southerner ; 
and it had been thought " more than probable " by well-informed 
men in 1837 that should the administration fear to espouse the cause 
of annexation, the Kentucky orator would step forth as its cham- 
pion ; while Van Buren not only had taken no positive stand against 
this measure but was a disciple of Jackson, long so eager to gain the 
territory, and — as we have observed — had been thought by the 
Texan envoy to favor the acquisition of it himself after he became 
President. Jackson said that he and all Van Buren's other friends 

^ Free Trader; N. Orl. Courier, Aug. 14, 1841. 

* (Wise) Chapter ii., last paragraph but two and p. 131. 



I06 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

expected him to support the project in 1844, and it was not unrea- 
sonable on Tyler's part to anticipate as much. Adams, Forsyth 
and Livingston, too, had concurred in efforts to obtain Texas. Thus 
all sections of the country, statesmen of many stripes, the politicians 
and the non-politicians, appeared in a way to be favorably disposed ; 
and in particular the advantages that could be offered to the North 
seemed enough to placate, partially at least, not only the anti-slavery 
feeling, but that general opposition to southern and western ex- 
tension which Monroe had found himself unable to resist. So the 
plan presented itself, one may suppose, in the President's more san- 
guine hours.'^ 

The other side of the shield had its turn, however. Anti-slavery 
sentiment had shown itself terribly active and terribly stubborn in 
this Texas affair; and against it could be urged only financial con- 
siderations, which — appealing mainly to capitalists — might fail to 
reach the great body of citizens. Besides, the President could never 
forget that no party marched at his back. His only solid support now 
was a section of the Whigs; and Webster, standing at their head and 
at the head of the cabinet, was opposed to slavery and Southern 
domination. In regard to Texas indeed the great Secretary appeared 
friendly, though he considered the port of San Francisco worth 
twenty times the whole of it ; but against annexation he had long 
been committed, and now in the opinion of the Texan envoy he 
feared the abolitionists among his constituents. Consequently he 
exhibited, to quote Houston, an " utter disinclination ... to take 
any action upon the subject." Spencer also opposed the project ; and 
so the President saw that in working for' it he would lack not only 
popular strength, but even that support in his official family which 
he particularly desired to have in all important affairs. Still further 
to embarrass him, the question of Texan independence appeared 
less firmly settled than it had been supposed to be, for that country 
was now more seriously threatened by the Mexicans than at any 
other time since the battle of San Jacinto; and finally she herself 
had apparently put an end to the plan of annexation by withdrawing 

* The Madisonian of April 16, 1844, stated "upon advisement" that annex- 
ation was not intended to operate against either party, but did not say the same 
with reference to the leaders. (Clay) Grayson to Houston, Oct. 21, 1837: Tex. 
Dipl. Corr., i., 264. (Van B.) Hunt to Tex. Sec, State, July 11, 1837: ib.. 240. 
When Clay and Van B. came out against immediate annexation, the Democratic 
Central Committee of Virginia said they did so " to the astonishment of all " 
(Rich. Enq., May 10, 1844). Jackson to Blair, Sept. 19, 1844: Jackson Pap. 
Many others also believed that Van B. would favor annexation, — re. g.. Detroit 
Adv., April 3, 1844. Madis., April 12, 15, 1844. 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. 107 

her overture. Under such circumstances Tyler could only wait and 
feel about for elements of support ; but he was flexible and tenacious, 
and considerable time lay before him.^ 

In January, 1842, the American charge in Texas cast a beam of 
light by writing that he had been desired again to lay the subject 
before his government; and in expressing the opinion that the 
country would be compelled to unite her destiny with some foreign 
nation, he pointed out how greatly she could add to the resources 
and the trade of the American Union ; but this despatch, aside from 
showing that an earnest wish to be sheltered under the old flag 
existed still around its author, added little to the arguments which 
Tyler had already been prepared to give. Not long afterwards 
Texas herself, as we have seen, tentatively suggested annexation; 
but the President had to reply that while he was anxious to bring it 
about, he feared the Senate would not consent. In addition to this 
difficulty, the business connected with the Webster-Ashburton treaty 
was now making very large demands upon the attention of the gov- 
ernment ; and our relations with Mexico had become so unpleasant 
that were steps taken toward annexation, it was liable to look, when- 
ever they should be made known, as if we had purposely increased 
the tension in order to acquire Texas by means of a war, should that 
method prove necessary. In the latter part of the year Van Zandt 
brought the matter up once more, and he found the President and 
most of the cabinet decidedly favorable to it so far as language went ; 
but apparently the thing seemed to be too impracticable at that time 
for serious consideration, and the Texan government received an 
impression that ''weak and blind indifference" on the subject pre- 
vailed at Washington. In Houston's language. Van Zandt's advances 
were met by the American authorities with " habitual apathy," — 
good evidence that Tyler, notwithstanding his eagerness for annexa- 
tion, did not forget the dignity of his office.^ 

* (Friendly) Van Z., April 19, 1843. (San Frans.) Curtis, Webster, ii., 249. 
(Committed) Adams, Memoirs, xi., 347. (Feared) Van Z. to Jones, March 15, 
1843: Jones, Memor., 211. Houston's letter to citizens, October, 1845: F. O., 
Texas, xiv. Spencer, Letter, Sept. 12, 1847: Niles, October 2, 1847, p. 69. It 
has been suggested, as one reason why Tyler made no move for annexation in 
1842, that the United States were trying to secure an amicable settlement of 
our claims against Mexico. But this business would not have prevented a secret 
negotiation with Texas, and still less have required a delay of eight months after 
a settlement with Mexico was effected. 

° Eve, Jan. 6, 1842. Reily, No. 83, April 14; No. 89, June [July] 11, 1842. 
(Unpleasant) To Thompson, July 13, 1842. Van Z., No. 93, Dec. 23, 1842. 
(Indifference) Jones. Memor., 81. Houston to Texas Banner, July 18, 1847: 
Niles, Sept. 4, 1847. 



I08 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Then, however, the outlook began to brighten. Early in the 
winter of 1842-3 A. V. Brown, a member of the House of Repre- 
sentatives from Tennessee, feeling deeply interested in the subject 
and afraid that Tyler's want of party strength would make him hesi- 
tate about proposing so important a measure, wrote to the Hermitage 
explaining the situation, and asking for something with which to 
stimulate the President. This was setting the match to gunpowder. 
It has been customary to think of the zeal for obtaining Texas as 
distinctively a Southern prod«rtt, but in reality it was more natively 
Western. As early as the beginning of 1831, William Carroll of 
Nashville wrote to Van Buren, " There is no subject upon which the 
government may be called to act, about which the whole Western 
States feel so deeply interested as the acquisition of the Province of 
Texas " ; and Jackson, who resided close to Nashville, replied 
promptly to Brown in the line of Carroll's ideas. England, he rep- 
resented, could now make an alliance with the feeble nation at our 
gate, place twenty or thirty thousand men on her border, organize 
them before the design had become known in the United States, gain 
a lodgment on the Mississippi, master the navigation of that stream, 
and excite a servile insurrection in the southern States ; whereas 
were that region in our hands, the militia would harass an invading 
army until a competent force could be led to the field. This letter 
encouraged the President, Brown stated afterwards ; and such an 
effect was very natural, for it showed that a strong leverage could 
be brought to bear on the Southwest and indeed on the entire coun- 
try, and he knew that Jackson's attitude would do a vast deal towards 
placing the Democrats behind the measure as a party. Besides, the 
letter was shown about at the Capitol, said Benton; and the con- 
currence which no doubt it evoked must have enhanced its influence 
upon Tyler considerably. ^° 

The head of the United States bank had been Nicholas Biddle; 
and although that institution was now defunct, Biddle's prestige had 
not yet vanished. He was a Northern man, too, so that his influence 
was greatest where the President most needed it ; and Biddle further 
stimulated the President by pointing out as a matter of great impor- 
tance that the acquisition of Texas would give the United States a 

'"The results of the Congressional elections of 1842 may have encouraged 
Tyler. (Brown's statement) Benton, Abr. Debates, xv., 145. Benton's own account 
of the origin and intended use of this letter seems baseless. Carroll. Feb. 6, 1831 : 
Van B. Pap. Jackson to Brown, Feb. 12, 1843: ib. Brown to Polk, Dec. 20, 
1848: Polk Pap., Chicago. Benton, View, ii., 584. 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. 109 

substantial monopoly of cotton, which — as any one could see — meant 
not only a guaranty of Southern prosperity, but a rope constantly 
round the neck of the foreign nation most to be feared, Great Britain. 
This consideration, the monopoly of cotton, Tyler afterwards repre- 
sented as in his mind the most important of all. No doubt it counted 
for much with him, and so it must have counted with all thoughtful 
men, north as well as south. ^^ 

To overcome one great difficulty it was proposed to place the 
sovereignty of Texas on firm ground, and for this purpose Tyler 
planned to negotiate a tripartite agreement, by which Mexico should 
acknowledge Texan independence and cede northern California — 
including San Francisco — to the United States, while England should 
induce her to yield the point of recognition, should help pay for the 
cession, and should accept as an equivalent for this assistance the 
undisputed possession of Oregon as far south as the Columbia. 
Lord Ashburton encouraged the scheme by saying that he did not 
think his government would object to our obtaining the California 
territory; and it was proposed to settle these points and remove 
another difficulty at the same time by sending Webster to England 
as a special envoy to negotiate the tripartite arrangement. Unfor- 
tunately, however, for these plans Mexico did not acquiesce. Indeed 
she could not, for the government of that country had no power to 
cede any portion of her territory, and the people not the least dis- 
position in the world to mortify their pride in such a way; nor did 
the American Congress prove willing to appropriate money for the 
special mission. It was then planned that Webster should take 
Everett's place as minister to Great Britain ; but Everett showed no 
desire to give up that comfortable office in exchange for a journey to 
China and back.^- 

Tyler's readiness to have Webster leave the country suggested 
plainly enough, although the President was cordial and friendly in 
his manner, that a change in the headship of the cabinet seemed to 
the Executive rather desirable. In fact the course of politics had 
made this change almost imperative. Massachusetts had nominated 
Henry Clay for the Presidency ; and the fact that Webster and his 
friends could not swing even their own State in Tyler's interest, 

"Tyler, Tyler, ii., 431. Tyler to his son, 1850: Mag. Anier. Hist., June, 
1882, p. 387. 

"Tyler, Tyler, ii., 256, 260, 262, 263. Tyler to his son, Dec. 11, 1845: ib., 
448. Adams, Memoirs, xi., 327, 347. Schouler, U. S., iv., 447, note, 436. Tyler 
to Webster, undated: Webster Pap. Id. to Id., Feb. 26, 1843: ib. Reeves, Amer. 
Diplomacy, 102. 



no THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

made it evident that he could expect no effectual aid from them in 
conducting the government, and compelled him to strike out on a 
new line. On the other hand a longer stay in the cabinet would 
probably have compromised Webster seriously with his Whig asso- 
ciates. Moreover he doubtless understood that annexation was in 
view and felt that it would be indelicate on his part to stand in the 
way of his chief's design by insisting upon the retention of \ii^ 
portfolio. He believed — probably because he foresaw that a strong 
move in this direction would follow his retirement — that he ought 
to remain ; but under the circumstances resignation seemed the 
better course, and in May, 1843, he took leave of the administration. 
In all probability a successor had already been chosen. Logic and 
the President's desire to be supported by his entire cabinet pointed 
clearly toward the selection of a strong annexationist for his place ; 
and Judge Upshur of Virginia, one of Tyler's group of intimates 
and at the same time a friend of Calhoun's, had been described by 
Van Zandt the previous month as one of the best men for the inter- 
ests of Texas that could be appointed. Upshur, said the Texan 
envoy, had the nerve to take responsibility and act with decision ; 
and Webster himself admitted that no better choice was possible. 
Accordingly the energetic V^irginian was soon invited to the post of 
honor.^^ 

Now in March, 1843, England's design to effect emancipation 
in Texas if she could, and in that way strike at American slavery 
and our agricultural and shipping interests, was made known to the 
President through Ashbel Smith's letter of January 25, which has 
already been placed in evidence. Whether the letter was shown or 
read as a whole to any member of the administration cannot be 
known, but that seems more than possible ; and at all events Van 
Zandt, according to his own report, used in his conversation with 
Tyler not only ideas but phraseology derived from the charge at 
London. Moreover Smith has stated in his Reminiscences that his 
letters on the subject went to Calhoun and from Calhoun to Upshur, 
so that his revelations of January 25 may have reached the Execu- 
tive by this route also. " I received," said the President later, 

"Curtis, Webster, ii., 211. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 248, 263. Wise (Decades, 203) 
says that Webster retired " magnanimously " to make way for an annexationist. 
(Believed) Webster to [Ketchum], May i, 1843: Seventy-second Anniv. of 
Webster's Birthday, 20. It has been charged that Tyler kept Webster in ignorance 
of the Texas " conspiracy," but in fact nothing was done in the matter during 
his incumbency. Van Z., April 19, 1843. Webster, Writings, xviii., 173. There 
was a brief interregnum under Legare. 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. Ill 

"authentic information" of foreign designs "at war, as I firmly 
believed with the permanent interests of the United States." It now 
appeared, therefore, that more reasons existed than he had previ- 
ously supposed for acquiring Texas, since evidently the annexation 
of that country would eliminate all such dangers. As a Southern 
man and a slaveholder he naturally desired to protect the cherished 
institution of his section, and as an American citizen he doubtless 
resented foreign meddling, — especially meddling intended to injure 
us. Besides, he could not fail to see that as the British designs 
threatened what was a powerful interest in one half of this country, 
a bold and successful antagonist of them would no doubt be amply 
rewarded with political favor ; while it was equally evident that such 
interference would be opposed by the North with no less vigor than 
by the South, and consequently that a new method of arousing 
annexation sentiment in the free States had been discovered.^* 

The effect upon him was such that Van Zandt said, in reporting 
on the matter, that both Tyler and the cabinet appeared to desire 
annexation heartily, and that in his own judgment it would be neces- 
sary to rouse the feeling of the American government against Eng- 
land only a little more to make them act. The evidence derived fjom 
Smith was, however, confidential. Even if the President saw the 
actual letter, he could make no public use of it; and perhaps the 
exact source of information was not revealed. Tyler knew, then, 
what was going on, but had no proofs with which to rouse the 
country. Moreover the Senate's rejection of Wise, nominated as 
minister to France, and of Gushing, selected as head of the Treasury 
department — both of them committed to the plan of annexation — 
embarrassed the Executive not a little at this time.^^ 

But now something very suggestive occurred. In the spring of 
1843 an abolition movement suddenly made its appearance in Texas. 
The New Orleans papers were alarmed by it, and the news went 
rapidly north. In May the New York Journal of Commerce took 
the matter up in a leader. According to private advices, announced 

"Van Z., No. 97, March 13, 1843. Smith, Remin., 54. It is of course un- 
certain at what date Smith's letters reached Calhoun. Tyler Tyler, ii., 425. 
Tyler said " other nations," probably to avoid naming England. Tyler's account 
of the sources of his information regarding English designs (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 
428: letter to Rich. Enq.. Sept. i, 1847) is shown by the documents to be inaccu- 
rate. This is not surprising. He no doubt left the details to the Secretary of 
State; his mind at the time was much agitated; and several years had elapsed 
when he wrote. But he states clearly that he received information from Ashbel 
Smith, and on such a point he was not likely to be mistaken. 

'^ Van Z., No. 97, March 13, 1843. 



112 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

the editors, measures were already " in progress " to secure the 
emancipation of the negroes, the total value of whom was believed 
to be only about $5,000,000. We think, said they, that a loan for 
this amount could be obtained in England, and if so "we are strong 
in the belief " that slavery will be abolished, for it is supposed that 
this change would stimulate immigration and help England to make 
peace between Mexico and Texas, and cotton is now so cheap that 
no great reason for holding slaves exists ; besides which the Texans 
may feel it would be better not to found the nation on a system that 
is bound to disappear before long. Evidently the editors regarded 
the movement as serious, and they deemed it of particular interest as 
perhaps foreshadowing a similar one in the United States. Still 
further reasons for abolishing slavery in Texas were suggested by 
other pens. The negroes were said to escape so frequently across 
the Rio Grande as hardly to be worth owning ; and it was urged that 
such a measure would appeal to the sympathy and admiration of the 
people in England and the northern States, from whom no little aid 
could then be expected. Many leading men were said to support 
the new departure, and some of the Texas papers appeared to sub- 
stantiate this assertion. In short, the movement was believed to be 
important; and the New Orleans Tropic, for example, denounced 
poor Texas as ungrateful for Southern assistance, its government as 
" utterly contemptible," most of the people as " not fit to be free," 
and the nation in sum as bringing ridicule upon the name 
" republic."^« 

Foremost among the advocates of the reform was S. P. Andrews, 
and his character and ability aided much to give the matter impor- 
tance. Some time before he became prominent in this light, the 
Galveston Advertiser described him as possessing "talents of the 
first order " and as standing " confessedly at the head of the bar " in 
Texas, where he had been practising law some three years. His 
place of residence was Houston ; but about the middle of March, 
1843, ^""e proceeded with a Mr. League to Galveston, and began 
cautiously to unfold the project of emancipation. Some of the 
people soon compelled him to leave the island. But the editor of 
the New York Journal of Commerce stated that a citizen of Texas, 

"N. Orl. Bee. April 22, 1843; N. Orl. Com. Bull., April 26, 1843. N. Y. 
Journal of Com., May 19, 1843. N. Orl. Tropic: Wash. Globe, May 22, 1842. 
Bait. Amer.: Sav. Repub., May 12, 1843. Boston Daily Mail, May 2t„ 1844. 
Tropic: Detroit Adv., June 27, 1843. 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. II3 

not an abolitionist himself, reported that the scheme of discarding 
slavery still met with a good deal of favor in that country. ^^ 

By many Americans England was believed to be behind the move- 
ment. British influence was thought by not a few to be dominant 
in the nation, and as we have seen, reasons for this opinion could 
easily be discovered in the attitude of the administration newspapers 
and in the public utterances of the President. The New Orleans 
Tropic, which was not a Tyler sheet, said in May that as we had 
neglected Texas, the English now had a preponderant voice there, 
while popular sentiment — particularly on account of the American 
tariff — was indifferent or sometimes hostile to the United States. 
The public prints, doubtless under British influence, lean toward 
abolition, it added. The important Picayune of the same city 
announced that the English were reported to be aiming at the de- 
struction of slavery in Texas ; and a Galveston communication in the 
London Times mentioned that the emancipation scheme was attrib- 
uted to Elliot. More significant still the New Orleans Republican, 
like many other papers in the United States, printed a letter from A. 
J. Yates to a Mr. Converse dated at Galveston in ]\Iarch, 1843, which 
stated that the writer had had " several conversations " with the 
British representative, and had learned from him that abolition 
would ensure Texas the warmest support of England in the struggle 
with Mexico and adequate financial means to effect the reform. 
Yates added that within sixty days the people would be ready to 
consider the subject in a convention, and that — particularly should 
free trade be adopted — the results would be most important ; and he 
even declared that reports of Elliot's, despatched from Galveston at 
that very time, fully confirmed all this. Later he explained that his 
letter was hastily written, and that his remarks about the English 
minister were based upon "the substance of impressions received 
from conversation with him," together with his own " knowledge of 
the feelings and opinions of the British nation." But the obvious 
reasons for making some kind of an explanation and the character 
of the explanation itself left so wide a gap for suspicion as to what 
Elliot had really said, that probably the earlier communication was 
discounted but little; and this was the more natural because the 

"Adv.: Nat. Intel!., June 12, 1844. Kennedy, Sept. 6, 1843: Pub. Rec. Off., 
"Slave Trade" reports, xxxii. N. Y. Journ. Com., May 25, 1843 (edit, and Galv. 
letter). 



114 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



British minister had gained the reputation of being an avowed 
abohtionist.^^ 

Further it was alleged, as Elliot himself reported, that England 
had insisted upon the surrender of slavery as the condition of 
mediating between two South American republics, and it was then 
inferred that "the same concession" had been "required" of the 
Texans, for whom it was fully understood in the United States that 
she had agreed to interpose her good offices. Said the New Orleans 
Republican, " England is about procuring a settlement of the dispute 
between Mexico and Texas, and there is too much reason to fear 
that the reward for her interference will be the control of Texian 
affairs, for many years to come," which would involve, as the editor 
proceeded to explain, the disappearance of slavery; and the Texas 
Times gave in detail the story about English mediation in South 
America, and the resulting emancipation of the blacks in Uruguay. 
In short, said the Baltimore American, an able and conservative 
newspaper, there was little reason to doubt the active interposition of 
Great Britain in Texas on the side of abolition.^'' 

In addition to all this it was stated by the American charge that 
Andrews was known to be a close associate of Houston's and to 
have been with him at this period. It was a fact also, as we have 
discovered, that Houston favored emancipation ; and as one holding 
so decided an opinion could hardly fail to let it appear occasionally, 
one is not surprised that the Bee of New Orleans attributed to him 
editorially a share in the design of making Texas " an abolition 
empire." Furthermore the Robinson terms had become known to 
the public, and though the people had expressed a decided sentiment 
against them, they had been made the basis of formal negotiations ; 
and any thoughtful person could see that they implied the extinction 
of slavery. Thus there appeared to be a wide-reaching though 
mysterious tangle of England and the English with Houston's 
administration, Mexico and the abolitionists; and it was very pos- 
sible to conclude, as did ex-President Lamar, that slavery in Texas 
was threatened by Great Britain in collusion with the Texan govern- 
ment. Public sentiment in the United States began to be aroused, 
and the results of all this began to be pointed out. The Baltimore 

"rro/itc; Wash. Globe, May 22, 1843. Picayune: Newark Adv.. July 11, 
1843. Times, Oct. 19, 1843. Repnb., July 3, 1843. (Later) Galv. Civilian, Aug. 
9, 1843. Smith, Remin., 75. 

"Elliot, secret, June 8, 1843. (Understood) Nat. Intell., July 25, 1842. 
Repub., July 3, 1843. Times, March 18, 1843. Amer.: Sav, Repnb., May 12, 1843. 



TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. II5 

American, for example, declared that should the scheme be carried 
through, the inhabitants of Texas would become alienated from 
those of the slave States ; and, as she would naturally drift into 
British control, England could use her effectively against us in time 
of war.-" 

Our investigation of the matter has shown us that all these cur- 
rent suspicions had a substantial basis. Yet after all there was no 
very definite and tangible evidence of a public nature ; nothing the 
masses could fasten upon; nothing Tyler himself could offer as 
fully satisfactory proof. June 24 the Madisonian burst out in this 
wise : " If Great Britain, as her philanthropists and blustering presses 
intimate, entertains a design to possess Mexico or Texas, or to inter- 
fere in any manner with the slaves of the Southern States, but a few 
weeks we fancy, at any time, will sufffce to rouse the whole Ame- 
rican People to arms like one vast nest of hornets. The great 
Western States, at the call of ' Captain Tyler,' would pour their 
noble sons down the Mississippi Valley by Millions." This utter- 
ance, described later by the National Intelligencer as the first note of 
the Presidential organ in the cause of annexation, seems to reflect the 
attitude of the administration at that date. Tyler felt well enough 
satisfied that English designs were afoot in the Southwest, though 
he knew his information was incomplete and could not lay before the 
public even what he possessed ; and he was trying to rouse popular 
sentiment in the United States in favor of securing Texas by appeal- 
ing to the natural jealousy of foreign interference, exciting the prev- 
alent distrust and fear of that old enemy, England, and touching in 
a suggestive way on the vague but general suspicion that somehow 
she was trying to undermine American slavery.-^ 

-"Murphy, No. 7, Sept. 24, 1843. N. Orl. Bee, April 22, 1843. Lamar, 
Letter, Nov. 18, 1845: Galv. Nen's, Nov. 22, 1845. Aiiier.: Sav. Repiib., May 12, 
1843- 

^ Madis., June 24, 1843. Nat, IntclL. March 23, 1844. 



VI 



Tyler Proposes Annexation 

Presently events occurred which gave an open and undeniable 
sign that slavery in Texas was receiving close attention in England, 
and suggested plainly enough a great deal more. In June, 1843, ^s 
the concluding scene of a World's Convention on the same subject, 
the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society held its annual meet- 
ing at London. Lord Morpeth presided, and his principal speech 
began to be known in the United States before the twenty-fifth of 
July. According to the London Times he said he rejoiced to hear 
that there was a prospect of the abolition of slavery in Texas ; while 
other accounts represented his language as much more pronounced. 
A letter published in the Richmond Enquirer said the address was 
as fiendish as ever came from the lips of a professing Christian. 
Another speaker observed, " I take this meeting as an indication 
that Great Britain is prepared to use every weapon she can wield to 
put an end to slavery " ; and the logical connection between this 
remark and Texas could easily be made out. Resolutions were 
adopted by the Society expressing their " trust " that the abolition 
movement in that country would be " encouraged and strengthened 
by the due exertion of the influence of the Government and people " 
of England ; and a letter from an American in London, published 
soon at New York, not only stated that the British cabinet had 
promised for its own share to comply with this desire, but affirmed 
that the promoters of the scheme felt sure of succeeding. Texas 
would then become, inferred the writer, an asylum for runaways 
and a perpetual incitement to murder, insurrection and outrage by 
the slaves of the southern States.^ 

Lewis Tappan was present at the convention. He went there, 
at the urgent request of John Quincy Adams, expressly to urge this 
subject upon the anti-slavery men and the government of England, — 
at least so a London letter printed by William Lloyd Garrison stated ; 
and Tappan thrilled the convention by relating, if we may believe 

'See General Note, p. i. Rich. Enq., July 25, 1843. London Times, June 
22, 1843. Enq., Aug. 11, 1843. (Resolutions) London Times, Aug. 11, 1843. 
(Letter) N. Orl. Repub., Aug. 2, 1843. 

116 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. II7 

Duff Green, how Adams had said to him that Great Britain ought as 
a Christian nation to require the abohtion of slavery in Texas. 
Moreover Stacy pubHcly informed the Society that a number of the 
delegates had called upon Aberdeen, and that His Lordship — besides 
hearing attentively all they chose to say — had " promised that no 
legitimate means should be spared to effect the great object "of 
eliminating slavery from that republic. Thus could be seen the 
organized abolition sentiment of Great Britain, undoubtedly a tre- 
mendous force, concentrating its attention on this part of the world, 
reaching out with one hand to the advocates of freedom in the 
northern American States, and grasping with the other the foreign 
policy of the British government. So much was publicly known. - 

The American Executive had also private advices ; and since 
Everett was out of touch with the administration as a New Eng- 
lander, as a Whig, and as an official whom Tyler had tried to shelve, 
they naturally received attention in spite of the minister's ignoring 
the matter. One source of news was probably the Texan envoy at 
the Court of St. James, whose despatch of July 2 has already been 
presented. Smith recognized the importance of having his colleague 
in the United States well informed as to matters of importance in 
Europe, and it seems very likely that he sent a copy of that docu- 
ment to him. If he did, its contents were in all probability imparted 
more or less fully to Upshur, with whom Van Zandt was having 
most satisfactory interviews at about this time; and it may also have 
reached the secretary by way of Calhoun. Moreover Tyler's biog- 
rapher states that Smith wrote directly to the President, and we find 
Tyler saying under the date of August 28, 1843, that information 
had been received from the Texan representative at London.^ 

With reference to another avenue of communication from that 
capital we can speak still more positively. Duff Green was in Lon- 
don at this time on a semi-official errand ; and as a Southern poli- 
tician closely connected with Calhoun he had strong claims to the 

- (Tappan) Lib.. July 28, 1843. (Green) N. Y. Weekly Herald, Oct. 14, 1843. 
(Stacy) London Times, June 21, 1843 (the words are those of the Times). 
Stacy's report of Aberdeen's promise was given in Niles' Register, July 22, 1843. 
(A report of the meeting) Madis., Aug. 4, 1843. 

^ Smith, No. 41, July 2, 1843: see p. 89. (Informed) Reily, No. 89, June 
[July] II, 1842; Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 
1 1 03. Smith wrote to Everett, Oct. 31, 1843. that he would send full information 
to Van Z. (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1145). but this does not prove that he had not 
already sent a brief account. (Interviews) Van Z.. No. 104, Aug. 10, 1843. 
Among Calhoun's papers we find a letter from Smith to Jones dated July 31, 
1843 (Jameson, Calh. Corr., 866), and others may have gone to Upshur and not 
have been returned. Tyler, Tyler, iii., n8, 121. 



Il8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

confidence of Smith. Probably he, and certainly some person 
vouched for by Upshur as " a man of great intelligence, and well 
versed in public affairs," now sent over a mixed but sufficiently alarm- 
ing report of the British designs, and soon this document reached 
the State department. As the writer mentioned that confidential 
information on the subject had been furnished him by Smith, one 
may fairly suppose — though we have only a passage of the letter — • 
that all the important points known to the Texan envoy were more 
or less fully given in this communication ; and so it is clear that by 
the end of the first week in August the American Executive was 
notified that fairly definite plans, countenanced by the English 
government, had been devised to bring about abolition in Texas, and 
thus to gain important advantages at the expense of the United 
States.* 

The effect of this was doubtless considerably enhanced by a ruse 
of Houston's. Just how the truce with Mexico came about we have 
taken pains to ascertain, and we are aware that it was not due, 
except in a very minor sense, to the good offices of England; but 
the Texan Executive in proclaiming it contrived to give the matter 
a flamingly red color, and shook it broadly at the United States. 
" Whereas," he began, " an official communication has been received 
at the department of state, from Her Britannic Majesty's Charge 
d'Affaires near this government, founded upon a despatch he had 
received from Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Mexico, announc- 
ing to this government the fact that the president of Mexico would 
order a cessation of hostilities on his part " ; and any intimation that 
the truce was not entirely attributable to the interposition of Great 
Britain was successfully avoided. " England," wrote Murphy with 
reference to the affair, " England may at this time be, setting on foot 
a negotiation, of vast consequence to the United States — and in all 
probability such is the case." Upshur doubtless had the same idea. 
Early in August Van Zandt found that he was " fully alive to the 
important bearing" which Texan slavery had upon that institution 
in the South, and very apprehensive that Great Britain was endeav- 
oring to secure undue influence in the counsels of the junior republic; 
and, with a view doubtless to earn good-will in that quarter, our 
government decided at about this time to remonstrate against the 
sanguinary threats of Mexico.'' 

* (Green's mission) Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 125. Letter: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 
Cong., I sess., 18. 

" Aberdeen told Smith he did not think the Robinson plan had any connection 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 



119 



Upshur now communicated some of his ideas on the Texan 
question to Murphy for the general guidance of the charge. First 
he quoted a passage from the letter probably written by Duff Green, 
unraveling its tangled account of the British plans with an ease that 
was almost Solomonic unless he had been given the benefit of 
Ashbel Smith's clear statement, and concluding that England had no 
doubt offered to co-operate in one way or another in favor of 
emancipating the Texan bondmen. He then proceeded to argue that 
probably this move was part of a general abolition scheme intended 
to develop " new markets for the products of her home industry, 
and at the same time to destroy all competition with the industry of 
her colonies." Continuing, he pointed out the value of the Texas 
market, the natural desire of Great Britain to sell goods and buy 
cotton there, the impossibility of preventing smugglers from bring- 
ing her manufactures into the United States by way of the Louisiana 
rivers, the weakness of Texas and the advantages that England could 
gain by controlling her, and the consequent injury threatened against 
the agriculture, the manufacturing, the shipping business and the 
public revenue of the United States. In the Secretary's opinion, 
however, the most serious danger lay elsewhere. For several rea- 
sons a " free " Texas would prove much worse than Canada or the 
non-slave States as an asylum for runaway negroes ; friction would 
arise between it and the South ; collisions would follow ; the Ame- 
rican government would have to choose between waging war upon 
its neighbor and attempting to coerce one-half of the Union; and in 
any event discord and injury would be certain to result. The scheme 
of a predominant British influence and the abolition of slavery in 
Texas, therefore, could "not be permitted to succeed without the 
most strenuous efforts " on the part of the United States to de- 
feat it.« 

This despatch has been condemned on several grounds. In the 
first place, it has been said to look toward interference in the con- 
cerns of an independent state. But no one would maintain, for ex- 
ample, that France ought to refrain from influencing the policy of 
Russia, Italy, Holland and Belgium, and permit Germany to combine 
those powers against her. All civilized nations interfere now in the 

with English mediation (Smith, June 16, 1843). (Proclamation) A^iles, Ixvi., 
251. Murphy, No. 3, July 6, 1843. Van Z., to Jones, Aug. 12, 1843: Jones, 
Memor., 243. Van Z., No. 104, Aug. 10, 1843. (Remonstrate) To Thompson, 
No. 43, July 27, 1843. 

"To Murphy, No. 6, Aug. 8, 1845: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 18. 



120 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

affairs of their neighbors. Only the kind of interference is open to 
question ; and in this instance what Upshur had in mind — though not 
yet ready to announce the fact — was the admission of Texas with 
the free assent of her people to an equal share in what he regarded 
as a most beneficent political system. The indictment may, however, 
be amended, and it may be said that we meddled with a domestic 
affair of a foreign country. But as it happened, Texan slavery had 
international bearings just then, and the Secretary's action was taken 
altogether for that very reason. In the next place, the attitude 
of the American government has been condemned as looking toward 
national interposition in behalf of a local institution, slavery. But 
mackerel fishing is a local affair, yet the federal authorities would 
have been called upon without hesitation by New England, had any 
defence of the fisheries been necessary. Again, the President and 
the Secretary have been severely handled for proposing to commit 
the nation in the cause of a detestable institution. But this line of 
thought merely carries us back to the two points of view discussed 
in an earlier chapter. To those who regarded the support of slavery 
as an inexcusable crime the despatch could only appear heinous, but 
it must always be borne in mind that Upshur and Tyler considered 
slaves a form of property quite as legitimate as a mackerel fleet. 
To protect it seemed to such men a right and a duty; and it should 
certainly occasion no surprise that Southerners, finding themselves 
in possession of the government, used the power frankly in defense 
of their interests, just as Webster would no doubt have employed 
it in support of the tariff, which multitudes of good citizens re- 
garded as merely highway robbery legalized. 

By others the despatch has been thought exaggerated and alarm- 
ist; but in reality it made no mention of several points that keen 
eyes had in view. Nothing was said of the possible expanding of 
Texas with British support until she should become a rival of the 
United States, nothing of her obtaining the coveted port of San 
Francisco and even Oregon, nothing of her filling with monarchical 
Europeans wholly out of sympathy with the United States, nothing 
of her becoming the ally of England in a war against the Union, 
nothing of naval supremacy in the Gulf, nothing of her serving as 
a barrier and check to this country ; and it is interesting to note that 
tlie Rc7'iic dc Paris and other able journals of France expressed 
substantially the same opinions as the Secretary. No less worthy of 
remark as a comment upon the despatch is the view of Governor 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 121 

Troup of Georgia. Should Texas abolish slavery, he wrote, her 
freedmen would cross the line and incite the American negroes to 
cut the throats of the white women and children, and against this 
danger the southern States would have a right "to protect them- 
selves by all means in their power, as a case of imminent peril, and 
one not admitting of delay." With such a spirit at work friction 
and collisions could very safely be predicted.^ 

One popular criticism of the despatch, however, seems at first 
sight very just. How astonishing the disproportion between premise 
and conclusion ! Apparently Upshur was ready to set the world 
afire on account of a rather vague and incoherent letter from a 
private citizen roaming in foreign parts. But this view of his 
course is impossible. He was a man of intellect, occupying a post 
of the gravest responsibility; and it is entirely probable that his 
letter received the sanction of the President and nearly or quite all 
of the cabinet of the United States. There must, then, have been 
some respectable basis for it, and this consideration tends very 
strongly to confirm the idea that in one way and another the sub- 
stance of the information sent across the ocean by Ashbel Smith had 
been imparted to our Executive. So obvious is this inference, that 
one is surprised to find no conception of such a possibility cool- 
ing the imaginations of Upshur's critics ; and one is the more sur- 
prised, because Tyler himself stated afterwards that alarming intelli- 
gence received from [Duff Green then in] London was confirmed 
by the representative of Texas at that post.® 

Scarcely had the despatch to Murphy left Washington, when 
another red cloak was flaunted before the government's eyes. July 
6 the Texan Secretary of State had notified Van Zandt that Houston 
deemed it inadvisable to pursue the subject of annexation farther 
at that time, preferring to occupy himself exclusively in settling 
affairs with Mexico ; and the charge, after waiting until he felt sure 
that Upshur had addressed the promised remonstrance to Mexico, 
communicated this decision verbally to him. Later Houston repre- 
sented his action as intended to stimulate the annexation sentiment of 
the United States, and perhaps that was the true reason for it. But 
one ignorant of this purpose and in full view of the truce proclama- 
tion might only perceive that such a policy chimed most happily with 

''Revue de Paris, Feb. 15, 1843; Le Corrcspondant, June, 1844. Harden, 
Troup, 526. 

"Tyler to Eds. Rich. Enq., Sept. i, 1847: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428. 



122 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

the British designs in general and the great aboHtion scheme in par- 
ticular.^ 

Some time afterwards Jones wrote that his instructions to Van 
Zandt under the date of July 6 "aroused all the dormant jealousies 
and fears " of the American government, and caused them to shake 
off " the apathy of seven years sleep over the question." Here one 
sees the author's partiality for his own work. Upshur's despatch to 
Murphy was by no means apathetic. But without a doubt Van 
Zandt's communication had the stimulating effect of a cold plunge, 
and the charge proceeded to heighten the afterglow by studiously 
parrying all Upshur's inquiries on the subject. Then, to continue 
the sensation, the American newspapers announced early in Sep- 
tember that Beales's huge claim had been presented to the Texan 
government ; and, as Henderson thought the British Queen appeared 
to have in view " some other object than a desire of securing the 
rights of her subjects " in pressing their land claims at this time, so 
natural an idea may well have occurred to Upshur also.^° 

On the eighteenth of September Van Zandt wrote to Jones sub- 
stantially this: The announcement that my instructions regarding 
annexation had been suspended has seemed to fire Upshur's zeal. 
In every interview he has spoken of the project; and he has assured 
me several times that it was the great measure of the present ad- 
ministration, that under directions from the President he was 
actively preparing the minds of the people for it, and that as soon 
as it should be thought safe, the proposition would be renewed by 
the United States. Today he told me that early action was con- 
templated, and he desired the Executive of Texas to be so informed 
immediately, in order that our representative here, should a treaty 
be favored by us, might be given power to act on the proposition in 
case it should be made — as Upshur thought would be the fact — 
before the assembling of Congress. He said that he could not make 
the overture now, and probably not in time to receive an answer 
before Congress would convene; but he believed the next Senate 
would favor the measure, and he explained in detail the grounds of 
his opinion, such as reports from correspondents in various parts of 
the country. In all this I consider him serious, but the state of 

•To Van Z., July 6, 1843. Van Z., No. 104, Aug. 10, 1843. Houston to 
citizens, Oct., 1845 : F. O., Texas, xiv. 

"Jones, Letter: Miles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. (Parried) Van Z. to Jones, Aug. 
12, 1843: Jones, Memor., 243. (Beales) E. g., Baltimore Clipper, Sept. 7, 1843. 
Hend. to Jones, Oct. i, 1843: Jones, Memor., 257. 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 123 

things here is such that nothing can be considered certain until it is 
done. There would be a fierce fight in the Senate, yet in the end I 
think the cause of annexation would triumph. ^^ 

The next day the packet-ship Victoria arrived at New York with 
fresh oil for Tyler's fire. In the House of Lords on August i8 
Brougham had spoken in effect as follows : Were Texas to abolish 
slavery a demand for free labor would ensue, and that would be of 
importance to all countries having a surplus population. This makes 
me " irrepressibly anxious " to have the negroes unshackled there. 
When the United States, losing the Texas market, find they can no 
longer *' be a breeding country, you will have solved that great 
problem of the human race — they must emancipate their slaves." 
Now there is " a very great chance " that Texas would adopt this 
reform if Mexico should make it a condition of recognizing her, and 
therefore I have " the greatest hopes " that if through our good 
offices this recognition is given, an end will be put to " the hideous 
crime " of breeding negroes in the United States for sale beyond the 
Sabine, and consequently to the existence of slavery in that great 
country. What, then, is the state of negotiations with Texas? To 
this Lord Aberdeen replied that England had done all she could to 
obtain recognition for the young republic, and that he scarcely needed 
to say that " every effort would be made " by the British government 
" to effect the result which was contemplated by the noble and learned 
lord who had just addressed the house." Said the New Orleans 
Commercial Bulletin with reference to this colloquy, " The distinct- 
ness and boldness of these announcements indicate that the plot is 
nearly ripe " ; and apparently the remark was not without some 
justice. ^^ 

Three days after the Victoria came in Upshur wrote confidentially 
to Murphy. I am sorry, he said, that any in Texas misconstrue the 
friendly sentiments of the United States. We have every motive " of 
interest as well as feeling" to sympathize with, encourage and aid 
that country, and we are anxious to have this understood, for the 
" policy and measures " of England in that quarter have given us 
good cause for alarm. Already she claims to exercise control there, 
and men in Parliament speak of maintaining her " ascendancy." 
Unfortunately for us it is " somewhat doubtful " how far the Execu- 

" Van Z., No. 107, Sept. 18, 1843. A distinct intimation will be noted here 

that Tyler desired to lay the subject before Congress in his annual Message. 

^'^ Nat. Intell., Sept. 2Z, 1843. London Times. Aug. 19, 1843. Dull.: Madis., 
Oct. 9, 1843. 



124 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



tive would be supported by the people in giving Texas prompt and 
effectual aid, as he would be glad to do. In the slaveholding section, 
however, no difference of opinion in this matter exists, and many 
in the other States are " sufficiently liberal to embrace a policy abso- 
lutely necessary to the salvation of the South, although in some 
respects objectionable to themselves." In reality the annexation of 
Texas would mainly benefit the North. The other section would 
only gain security at the expense of raising up a powerful agricul- 
tural competitor, but the North would obtain new markets, cheaper 
cotton, and more employment for its vessels. "No effort will be 
spared to lay the truth" before the people in that quarter. If we 
succeed in convincing them, the cause of Texas will be bright; and 
if not, it will be no worse than now. Hence that country has every 
reason to await patiently the result of our exertions. If she accepts 
British protection, she will be the lamb in the embrace of the wolf. 
You cannot be authorized to say these things officially, because it is 
not certain how far Congress will sustain the Executive ; but you 
should know our views and feelings, and you are to use your own 
discretion in giving informal expression to them. Do not allow 
Texas to favor England with the idea that the American government 
or people are hostile or even cold. Watch Great Britain closely. 
Her policy threatens to endanger the peace of the world. ^^ 

After revolving the subject in his mind about a week more Up- 
shur addressed Everett, calling his particular attention to the remarks 
of Brougham and Aberdeen in the House of Lords. Brougham 
undoubtedly knew, observed the Secretary, that England had contem- 
plated negotiations with Texas for the abolition of slavery there, 
and that probably such negotiations were already in progress. 
But he had in mind as more important the emancipation of the 
negroes in the United States ; and as he declared that Aber- 
deen's reply would be " received with joy " by all who favor the ob- 
jects of the anti-slavery societies — that is to say, favor universal 
emancipation — it may be inferred that Aberdeen also had our coun- 
try in mind. This appears the more probable because the minister 
said nothing, in answering Brougham, to show that he had been 
misunderstood ; and he would not in so serious a matter have per- 
mitted a misapprehension to pass. It is therefore fair "to under- 
stand his language as an avowal of designs which, whether so 
intended or not, threaten very serious consequences to the United 

"To Murphy, Sept, 22, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 25. 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 125 

States " ; and " information received from other sources " points 
to the same conckision. Now foreign governments must not inter- 
fere with our institutions, and so we must " know distinctly, and with- 
out doubt, how far our just apprehensions upon this point are well 
founded." Even v/ere the designs of Great Britain limited to Texas, 
we could not be indifferent. Abolition there would be " highly in- 
jurious to us " ; and while we could not complain, were Texas of her 
own free will to give up that system of labor, we can rightfully 
object if she is constrained to adopt such a policy. What then is the 
truth? Is England aiming to bring about the emancipation of the 
negroes in Texas ? Does she design to destroy or affect slavery as it 
exists in the United States? What measures has she adopted to 
accomplish both or either of these ends? Obtain information from 
all sources, particularly from the Texan representative and by direct 
application to Lord Aberdeen, and send us full and frequent 
reports.^* 

These instructions were supplemented with a confidential letter, 
for a Massachusetts man like Everett could not be expected to take 
a Southerner's view of the matter without assistance. England, he 
pointed out, desires to bring about universal emancipation in order 
to build up her colonies, in order to gain control of Texas with a 
view of monopolizing that market for her manufactures, and in 
order to embarrass a formidable rival by destroying slavery in 
the United States ; and then he took up his third point in detail. 
Should the negroes of the southern States be emancipated, he said, 
they could not remain as equals where they have existed as slaves and 
they would stream rapidly away, ruining Southern agriculture by 
depriving that section of laborers, cutting off therefore a very 
large part indeed of our exports, reducing in the same propor- 
tion our ability to purchase abroad, breaking down our public 
revenue by greatly diminishing the volume of imports, com- 
pelling the government to gall the people with hateful and embar- 
rassing direct taxes, crippling the mills, railroads and canals by 
taking away in large measure all branches of the cotton business, 
and filling the North with a horde of ignorant paupers, who could 
not fail to be clamorous for civil and social rights, mortally harmful 
to the prosperity of the white laborers, and productive only of dis- 
cord and misfortune. To avert such evils the door would be shut 

"To Everett, No. 6i. Sept. 28. 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 
2T. Evidently Upshur expected nothing very important in answer to his letter, 
for he proceeded in the annexation business without awaiting a reply. 



126 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

against the freedman everywhere, and his extermination would be 
the consequence. After this exposition Upshur touched upon the 
dangers of smuggHng, of colHsions between the slave States and 
Texas, and of the ill-will between South and North that would soon 
follow, were Texas to come under British control and abandon 
slavery ; and finally he suggested that England might next proceed to 
secure a firm grip on the trade of the Gulf by bringing emancipation 
about in Cuba and gaining possession of what would then be an un- 
profitable island. Whether for weal or for woe, he concluded, 
slavery is fastened upon us ; it has become so closely interwoven 
with the life of the South, fibre with fibre, that no wise statesman 
would risk the experiment of attempting to eradicate it ; and no for- 
eign government can be permitted to interfere in the matter upon 
any pretext. ^^ 

By this time Calhoun had probably received the copy of the 
despatch written by Ashbel Smith to his government on the last day 
of July, which we find among his papers. In this, it will be recalled, 
the Texan envoy stated that in answer to a direct inquiry Aberdeen 
had referred to the extinction of slavery in Texas as very desirable, 
insisting upon this point not only as connected with British interests 
but also " in reference to the United States," and admitting that 
Doyle had been instructed to ofifer British mediation at Mexico on 
the basis of Texan independence conjoined with Texan abolition. 
England, remarked Smith, desires to effect this change in our coun- 
try with some regard to her own colonial and commercial interests, 
but " mainly in reference to its future influence on slavery in the 
United States." Such was his direct report of Aberdeen's admis- 
sions. Now Calhoun mentions that he sent the despatch to Upshur 
with a long letter urging him to adopt " some decided measure " to 
defeat the scheme ; and one may assume that he sent it promptly. 
By the middle of October, then, it was very likely in the Secretary's 
hands.i« 

]\Ieanwhile, however, domestic trouble seems to have created 
complications. The newspapers had a good deal to say at this time 
about dissensions in the President's official family. They were de- 
scribed as serious, and Texas was mentioned as the cause. Indeed 
Upshur admitted that one or two of his colleagues might not be 

"Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 31. 

'" Page 90. it seems far more probable that Calhoun received this copy 
from Smith or Van Z. than that Jones or Houston sent it to him. 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 127 

favorable to the grand project; and as Spencer had not yet retired, 
it is clear that such was the case. Another reason for delay was the 
desirability of ascertaining the opinion of the Senate, and Upshur 
informed Van Zandt that he was personally engaged in this investi- 
gation. Early in 1844 the Madisonian printed a letter signed by 
" William Penn," apparently a well informed person, who said the 
Secretary "communicated very fully and freely his purposes and his 
wishes in regard to this great measure" to Senators of both parties; 
and numerous indications tend to confirm the statement. Among his 
papers there was found after his death a list of Senators, and the 
names were marked " Certain for " or " Certain against." The 
former included two-thirds of the number, and the analysis was be- 
lieved to have reference to annexation. At Upshur's request Gilmer 
assisted in the work of inquiry, and not only were sentiments investi- 
gated but efforts were made to influence them. As an illustration of 
what could be done in this way, it was for the sake of mollifying 
Benton — or at least partly with that end in view — that Fremont had 
been appointed to lead the exploring expedition of 1843. Apparently 
the prospect was favorable. In fact the President himself stated 
later that before the proffer of annexation was formally made to 
Texas he received " assurances from the only reliable quarter that 
the treaty, when negotiated, would be ratified by a constitutional 
majority of the Senate"; and according to the editor of the Madi- 
sonian Upshur was led to expect that even Webster would not oppose 
the plan.^^ 

The question of method also had to be considered. A treaty 
seemed the most natural and proper avenue to annexation, though it 
was believed that Texas could be admitted as a State by an act of 
Congress. Besides, the treaty method was particularly favorable to 
secrecy ; and while it had a disadvantage as regarded the less im- 
portant party, since the treaty-making power could only admit her to 
the Union as a Territory, it presented an advantage with reference 
to ratification, for the great battle over slavery in that region 
would naturally be deferred until the question of statehood should 
arrive. Moreover the instructions of the Texan government to 
their representative in 1836 had required that a treaty should be 

"N. Y. Herald, Nov. lo, 1843. N. Orl. Courier, Nov. 20, 1843. Van Z., 
No. 107, Sept, 18, 1843. (Spencer) Niles, Oct. 2, 1847, p. 69. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 278, 
284, 283, 348, 276, 396. Madis., April 25 ; March 30, 1844. Upshur was killed 
Feb. 28, 1844. 



128 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

made, to be submitted to the Senate of that country for approval. 
It was therefore decided to adopt this method.^* 

On the sixteenth day of October, then, Upshur addressed a note 
to Van Zandt. The government and many people of the United 
States, he said, have been giving "serious attention" to the subject 
of a treaty annexing your country. Recent occurrences in Europe 
have presented this matter in " new and important aspects," and 
" unless the views of the administration shall undergo a very great 
and unexpected change, I shall be prepared to make a proposition to 
that effect, whenever you shall be prepared with proper powers to 
meet it." Obviously no positive assurance can be given that all 
branches of the government would accept the measure; but our 
desire is " to present it, in the strongest manner, to the consideration 
of Congress." In other words, as far as the American Executive 
was concerned the door of the Union stood at last unbarred. ^^ 

At this point one is tempted to offer a few reflections, — not as 
historian but merely as observer. Evidently there was no collusion 
between the American and the Texan governments and no conspiracy 
anywhere. Houston was playing his own game as best he could, and 
probably he intended to disappoint the United States ; and on the 
other side few politicians experienced enough and shrewd enough to 
reach the American Senate could have been sounded so delicately on 
the momentous issue of annexation as to prevent them from discov- 
ering what was in the wind, and of course they talked about it more 
or less confidentially with colleagues and friends, — that is to say, 
conveyed to a rather large circle, all told, some intimation of the 
matter. In the next place, Tyler's personal motives were entirely 
justifiable, as the world goes, and both he and Upshur did their plain 
duty as public men in their environment were sure to see it. One 
only need ask, as to this, what would be the verdict of history upon 
them as the executive officers of a people deeply engaged in the 
strife of international competition, had they closed their ears to the 
distinct intimations of danger that reached them, and permitted 
affairs to move on as we have found they were headed. Thirdly, 

'*W. D. Miller, special secretary of the Texan legation, stated to Jones, 
April 28, 1844 (Jones, Memor., 345) that annexation by act of Congress would 
be deemed unconstitutional " or at least irregular " ; and this probably repre- 
sented Tyler's apprehensions in that regard. N. Y. Jouni. Com., April 16, 
1844. Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 127. 

"Upshur to Van Z., Oct. 16, 1843: State Dept., Notes to Tex. Leg., vi., 
59. Tyler's account written some years later (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428) is in- 
accurate as to some details, as one would expect. 



TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 



129 



the method adopted to avert the peril was the most available and 
very likely the only effectual one that could have been devised ; and, 
finally, that plan involved no bloodshed or violence but rested on the 
anticipated assent of the countries principally concerned, was ex- 
pected to confer great benefits upon both of them, and probably 
would not be undone to-day by one sane individual out of our ninety 
millions. To require more than all this of statesmen would be 
exacting indeed. 



VII 

FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE 

Tyler did not wait very long after becoming President before 
letting it be seen that he had a kindly eye upon Texas. In his first 
annual Message, December, 1841, he said: "The United States can 
not but take a deep interest in whatever relates to this young but 
growing Republic. Settled principally by emigrants from the United 
States, we have the happiness to know that the great principles of 
civil liberty are there destined to flourish under wise institutions and 
wholesome laws, and that through its example another evidence is 
to be afforded of the capacity of popular institutions to advance the 
prosperity, happiness, and permanent glory of the human race." 
This warm eulogium, which represented the Lone Star republic in a 
considerably more rosy light than many had seen around it and was 
also rather dragged into the Message, had for the thoughtful a very 
significant look. Presidential newspapers, too, spoke so cordially of 
Texas that in the opinion of John Quincy Adams, as he noted in his 
diary, their utterances amounted to a " formal notice " of the annex- 
ation issue, served upon the public. As if to confirm this impression 
Henry A. Wise, the President's friend, was soon heard arguing in 
the House of Representatives for the acquisition of that country. 
One section, he urged, had a boundless outlook towards the west ; 
must its rival, at the bidding of the English party of the North, 
stop forever at the Sabine?^ 

Like others, a Washington correspondent of the Boston Courier 
invited public attention both to the President's eulogium and to 
Wise's speech ; and he mentioned also that the principal Tyler papers, 
which had steadily favored the incorporation of Texas, had been 
teeming for months past with news from that quarter and with 
tirades against Mexico, after the fashion of the old annexation cam- 
paign. The South is alarmed about losing the control of Congress, 
argued the correspondent ; Thompson, a prominent advocate of 
annexation, is appointed minister to Mexico; claims against that 

' See General Note, p. i. Richardson, Messages, iv., 70. Adams, Me- 
moirs, xi., 29. (Wise) Ho. Rep., Jan. 26, 1842: Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 2 
sess,, 174. 

130 



FORESH ADO WINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 131 

country are revived ; and the attempts to arouse a war fever over the 
imprisonment of the Santa Fe raiders are most persevering. Garri- 
son's Liberator copied this letter, and soon the Boston Liberty party 
adopted a resohition against receiving Texas or joining her in war 
upon Mexico. In some less impressionable quarters, also, attention 
was awakened. The South wants that region, concluded the Phila- 
delphia Gazette, for example. Generally, however, Wise's speech — 
an incidental and perhaps accidental outburst — appears to have been 
taken rather lightly. He was a friend of the President no doubt, but 
with equal certainty he was erratic and hot-headed ; and on a sharp 
sectional issue he was very liable to speak without full deliberation. 
But in April he returned to the charge. Why not annex Texas ? he 
demanded ; slavery is there already, and annexation instead of ex- 
tending the system would enable us to mitigate its evils. In fact we 
must annex that country, he insisted, or else allow her to conquer 
Mexico, plant slavery there, and become our most dangerous and 
formidable competitor.^ 

In September of the same year (1842) John Quincy Adams, 
addressing his constituents at Braintree, endeavored in a very 
elaborate manner to prove that a great conspiracy was afoot — and 
had been from the time of Jackson — to obtain territory at the expense 
of Mexico. The positions that he took were in several instances 
extreme, for probably his object was not so much to instruct as to 
excite sluggish and preoccupied minds ; and it must be conceded that 
a number of his statements are now seen to be incorrect. Jackson 
had gone so far, he asserted, as to offer the governorship of Texas 
Territory to Burton ; Houston had been " expatriated for the pur- 
pose" of creating a revolution there; and the Texan revolt had been 
"precipitated if not chiefly caused by the abolition of Slavery by the 
Mexican Government." It is not, however, necessary to examine 
this eloquent speech in detail. It must have produced a thrill, but its 
lasting results appear to have been very slight, for the people in gen- 
eral believed that no annexation project would now have a chance of 
success. Even the New York Tribune remarked that it had received 
letters for and against the acquisition of Texas, but had " no room 
to waste on fighting shadows."^ 

Soon, however, this particular shadow became substantial. In 
January, 1843, ex-Governor Gilmer of Virginia published a letter in 

-Courier: Lib., March ii ; April 15, 1842. Gazette: Lib., May 6. 1842. Niles, 
Ixiv.. 174. 

^ (Adams) Boston Atlas, Oct. 17, 1842. Tribune, Nov. 14, 1842. 



132 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



favor of annexation. The only interest in the country which could 
be injured by adopting the measure, he reasoned, was that of the 
cotton and sugar planters ; while the free States would reap great 
commercial advantages. As for slavery, he believed that the North 
desired the Union to continue and would be ready to confirm it by 
welcoming Texas, thus recognizing the mutual rights upon which the 
national compact rested. If we do not receive her promptly, con- 
tinued the Governor, England will " either possess or control " her, 
discord between the two republics will ensue, and the present incli- 
nation of the Texans to join us will disappear; consequently the 
opportunity now presented should be seized without delay. Such a 
letter was wholly unexpected, and it made its appearance quite un- 
heralded. Benton described it as " a clap of thunder in a clear sky." 
Very differently it sounded from remarks dropped in the heat of 
debate by the fiery Wise, and Gilmer's close political connections 
with Tyler and Calhoun naturally added to the weight of his utter- 
ance. Somehow the opening gun of a battle seemed to have been 
fired. In two weeks the Baltimore American observed: The subject 
of the annexation of Texas " begins to attract much attention " ; and 
D. L. Child, writing from Washington, said that Gilmer's act had 
revived the old question. Yet some of the leading journals totally 
ignored it, and presently like so many sensations it faded from sight.* 
John Quincy Adams and other anti-slavery members of Congress 
read the letter, however. They became alarmed, and early in March 
he and twelve of his colleagues issued a circular. It is proposed, 
they said, that " the undue ascendancy of the slave-holding power 
in the Government should be secured and riveted beyond all redemp- 
tion." With a view to this end, settlements have been made in 
Texas, difficulties with Mexico fomented, a revolt brought about, and 
an independent government established. The failure of the mother- 
country to recover her province has been due to the unlawful aid of 
American citizens and the co-operation of the American Executive. 
In a very improper fashion Texas has been recognized, and now it is 
intended to consummate the scheme. But " no act of Congress or 
treaty for annexation, could impose the least obligation upon the 
several States of this Union, to submit to such an unwarrantable 
act, or to receive into their family and fraternity such misbegotten 
and illegitimate progeny." The introduction of Texas, therefore, 

* (Gilmer) Madis., Jan. 23, 1843. Benton, View, ii., 581. Amer.: Rich. 
Enq., Jan. 26, 1843. Lib., Feb. 3, 1843. It was Gilmer's letter that gave A. 
V. Brown an excuse for writing to Jackson as we have seen that he did. 



FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 133 

would fully justify a dissolution of the Union. Indeed, it "would 
BE IDENTICAL WITH DISSOLUTION " ; and all should co-operate for 
the defeat of " this nefarious project."^ 

In line with the circular, resolutions were passed the same month 
by the ^Massachusetts legislature, declaring that annexation would 
be dangerous to the continuance of the Union " in peace, in pros- 
perity, and in the enjoyment of those blessings which it is the object 
of a free Government to secure"; and the New York Tribune soon 
protested that the adoption of Texas for the sake of strengthening 
slavery there and in the United States would " convulse all Christen- 
dom with indignation and alarm." In general, however, the circular 
met with little favor. The Baltimore Clipper, for instance, remarked 
that it had no wish for annexation but could not endorse the violent 
language of Adams and his associates; while the American of the 
same city went so far as to say that unless Texas could be bound to 
the United States in some way as a friend, she would inevitably 
become hostile. Little regard has been paid to Adams's warnings, 
admitted the New York Tribune in September; and the Detroit 
Advertiser confessed at about the same time that a general lethargy 
on the subject prevailed, attributing this condition of the public 
mind to the fact that the question of bringing Texas within the pale 
had been before the country a long time, yet its advocates had been 
able to accomplish nothing.^ 

]\Ieantime the administration, far from desiring to "spring" an 
annexation treaty upon the nation, began systematically to prepare 
the public mind for that subject. In August, for example, the 
Republican of New Orleans, which bore the words, " Official Gazette 
of the General Government," published a discussion of it; and the 
British consul at Galveston reported to his government that accord- 
ing to a person whose trustworthiness he had " long known," the 
materials for this and other articles in a similar vein had been 
received from a " qualified " source at Washington. From the same 
quarter came advice also. " This journalist was counselled to avoid 
political extremes, so that, by appealing to the interests of all sec- 
tions, unanimity of action might be secured " ; to stimulate the South 
by expatiating on the danger of emancipating 15,000 Texan slaves, 

° Detroit Adv., May 15, 1843. Nat. hitell., May 4, 1843. 

"(Mass.) Sen. Doc. 61, 28 Cong., i sess. Tribune, May 16; Clipper, May 
9; Amer.: N. Orl. Courier, May 15; Tribune, Sept. 20; Adv., Sept. 7, 1843. 
Von Hoist has expressed the opinion that the circular of Adams et al. made 
" a terribly forcible impression on hundreds of thousands " (U. S., ii., 620), 
but the evidence does not seem to support this view. 



134 "^^^ ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

as well as on " the loss, by Texan rivalry, in the Cotton Market of 
England " ; while " to the North, independent Texas was to be held 
up as a sort of British Colony, whose smuggling operations would 
defeat any Tariff, and whose Anti-American prejudices would be 
fostered by British capital and emigration." Needless to say, the 
Republican followed up the campaign, though perhaps with more 
local color than the instructions from Washington had contemplated/ 

According to the National Intelligencer, the New York Aurora 
best represented the views of the Executive, and a series of articles 
on this subject began to appear in its columns during the latter part 
of August. The first of these dwelt upon the identity of American 
and Texan interests, the kinship of the settlers beyond the Sabine, — 
who loved the Union all the more because just then away from home, 
— and the proposition to abolish slavery in their country on the under- 
standing that England would become a " foster-mother " to them ; 
and the second pointed out that abolition in Texas would cause the 
negroes of the Southwest to run away by the wholesale, produce 
irritation and armed collisions, fomented by England, between their 
masters and the Texans, lead to servile insurrection in the South, 
and finally bring about a dissolution of the Union. The Madisoman 
on the other hand kept itself discreetly in the background for a 
while, merely quoting from the Aurora and other papers ; but the 
remarks of Brougham and Aberdeen were too strong for its equa- 
nimity, and it revealed one side of Tyler's mind by declaring that 
whoever should contribute most efifectively to carry through the 
measure of annexation, so important for the United States and so 
ardently desired by Texas, would " receive the plaudits of the coun- 
try both present and future."^ 

To trace the consequences of the administration's promptings at 
length is unnecessary, but it is worth while to mention an editorial 
that appeared in the Old School Democrat, a distinctively Tyler 
paper of St. Louis. Its argument in this particular issue was, that in 

' (Prepare) Van Z., No. 107, Sept. 18, 1843. N. Orl. Repub., Aug. 29, 
1843. Kennedy, Sept. 6, 1843: Pub. Rec. Ofif., Slave Trade, xxxii. Clippings from 
N. Orl. Repub. sent by Arrangoiz, No. 96, Sept. 14, 1843. With reference to 
the famous accusation that Tyler intended to spring the Texan affair just 
before the Democratic convention in May, 1844, it is worth noting that accord- 
ing to Consul Kennedy the New Orleans journalist was notified from Wash- 
ington that the President would present the subject in his next Message (see also 
Chapter vi., note 11). 

''Nat. IntelL, May i, 1844. Aurora. Aug. 23, 24, 1843. Madis., Sept. 
27; Nov. 3, 1843. According to Scott (to Sen. Crit., Oct. 14, 1843: Coleman, 
Crit., i., 204), Upshur himself was the author of certain bellicose articles on 
British designs regarding Texas that appeared in the Madis. 



FORESHADO WINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 1 35 

order to balance the sections in Congress and protect an important 
southern interest recognized by the constitution, Texas ought to be 
annexed; and that were she to come under the influence of England, 
slavery in the United States would be imperilled. In other words, 
from the special Southern point of view the acquisition of that coun- 
try was desirable for two reasons : first, to strengthen slavery against 
domestic enemies by obtaining more political power in the United 
States government, which was important ; and secondly, to prevent 
England from undermining its very existence, which was essential.* 

These foreshadowings led many to conclude that a scheme of 
annexation was soon to be brought forward by the administration. 
The Cincinnati Herald, an abolitionist paper, began to predict this 
in August, 1843 > ^^^^ the Philanthropist and the Liberator followed 
suit. In October, the New York Tribune and the Milwaukee 
Democrat said that a strong push to secure Texas might be expected ; 
other journals pointed in the same direction ; and, on the last day 
but one of that month, the Vermont legislature protested that the 
annexation of the coveted area would be " unconstitutional, and 
dangerous to the stability of the Union itself."^** 

So pronounced, indeed, were the indications that the Mexican 
minister, Almonte, addressed our Secretary of State at the beginning 
of November, asserting that the American Congress was soon to 
consider the advisability of appropriating a valuable portion of 
the Mexican territory, and that, should the Executive sanction this 
aggression, he should consider his mission at an end, since his 
government were " resolved to declare war " on receiving notice of 
such action. To this a reply was made in the tone of aggrieved 
innocence ; upon which Almonte remarked that Adams's circular and 
the articles in the Madisonian seemed amply to justify his protest, 
and suggested that Upshur make a formal declaration denying all 
knowledge of plans to acquire the territory in question. This 
required the Secretary to come out of the shadow a little more ; and 
he answered that Mexico, before denouncing and threatening, should 
have inquired through the proper channel whether a scheme to annex 
Texas existed, and therefore in view of the course actually pursued 
a disavowal was not due from the President. Under no circum- 
stances, he continued, could the Executive undertake to speak for 

^ Old School Dem., Nov. 27, 1843. 

^"Herald, March 22, 1844. Philanthropist : Lib., Oct. 6, 1843. Lib., Nov. 3, 
1843. Democrat, Oct. 14, 1843. Tribune, Oct. 11, 1843. (Vt.) Sen. Doc. 166, 
28 Cong., I sess. 



136 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Congress ; but certainly the United States had good reason to regard 
Texas as an independent country, and they " would not consider it 
necessary to consult with any other nation " in their transactions with 
her government. This correspondence, while in no way conclusive, 
amounted to a strong hint that something was in agitation. Doubt- 
less, though veiled in diplomatic privacy, it became somewhat known 
and tended to make the public think; and at this time the Texan 
envoy reported that the interest in annexation was increasing daily. 
" It is the leading matter of inquiry by almost every prominent man 
I meet," he said. Those favorable to the measure assured him that 
no previous outlook had been so auspicious ; and the evident alarm 
of Adams was perhaps not less encouraging.^^ 

Precisely on the date of Almonte's protest the Madisonian took 
a fresh start. ]\Iurphy, the American charge in Texas, had obtained 
the correspondence between Elliot and Jones regarding the truce 
with Mexico ; and a very inaccurate version of it, sent by a Galveston 
correspondent to the New Orleans Tropic, had now reached Wash- 
ington. According to this account the Texan commissioners were to 
accept the nominal sovereignty of Mexico, Houston would become 
Governor General for life, and Texas would be transferred to Eng- 
land, with abolition and free trade as inevitable corollaries. The 
Tropic vouched for the information as " derived from the very 
highest and most undoubted source " ; and from this time on the 
alleged abolition negotiations of Houston with the British govern- 
ment became a burning topic not only with the Madisonian, but with 
journals in many sections and even as far north as Massachusetts. 
The Boston Advertiser, for example, expressed the opinion that 
" without doubt " such negotiations were going on ; and annexation, 
the natural panacea for all this, could not fail to receive more atten- 
tion in consequence of these alarms.^- 

As the sheets favorable to the administration pursued the subject 
and Congress was soon to meet, it seemed to many quite probable 
that something would be said about the great issue in the President's 
annual Message. Very likely, too, the confidential instructions ad- 
dressed to the New Orleans Republican and presumably to the 
Aurora and other journals, intimating that such would be the case, 

"Almonte to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., i sess., 38. Up- 
shur to Almonte, Nov. 8, 1843: ib., 41. Id. to Id., Dec. i, 1843: ib., 45, Van 
Z,, No. no, Nov. 4, 1843. 

"Letter to Tropic, Oct. 3. 1843: Madis., Nov. 3, 1843. Galv. News, Oct. 
10, 1843. Madis., Nov. 20, 22. 23, 1843. Adv., Nov. 7, 1843. 




FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 137 

leaked out. A considerable number of papers expressed the belief 
that something of the sort might be done, and the Madisonian fanned 
th< lame by replying with the query, " Who kuozi'S that the Prcsi- 
deni zvill say one zvord about Texas f"'^^ 

When the Message appeared, however, no recommendation on 
the subject was found there. Yet Texas did occupy a prominent 
place. Almonte's protest was mentioned with the comment that 
neither Congress nor the Executive would be influenced in its action 
by a fear of consequences. Quite significant seemed also the em- 
phatic declaration that war between Mexico and Texas ought now to 
cease. The effect of continuing hostilities, Tyler explained, might be 
to weaken Texas and enable foreign powers to interpose there in a 
manner injurious to American interests; and he further announced 
that we could not be expected to suffer patiently from a resumption 
of military operations after so long an interval of peace. What was 
more, said the President, " The high obligations of public duty may 
enforce from the constituted authorities of the United States a 
policy which the course persevered in by Mexico will have mainly 
contributed to produce, and the Executive in such a contingency will 
with confidence throw itself upon the patriotism of the people to 
sustain the Government in its course of action." Evidently this 
meant a good deal, but precisely what could not be told ; and Tyler 
made no efforts to enlighten the public. The President says little 
about Texas, wrote Webster; and almost the same day the National 
Intelligencer, pronouncing annexation " a mere dream " and ridicul- 
ing the talk of English anti-slavery designs in Texas, professed to 
believe that Tyler did not share the opinions emitted by the Madi- 
sonian on those topics. The Whigs, wrote A. V. Brown to Polk, 
decided that the President had nothing more to offer on Texan 
affairs, and suspected that his intention had been merely to cause 
trouble between North and South, hoping to profit by the confusion. 
Such, however, was not Brown's own belief, and three days later he 
confided to a correspondent that within a few weeks a treaty provid- 
ing for annexation would " most probably " be concluded.^'' 

" N. Y. Herald, Nov. 10; Newark Adv., Nov. 25; N. Y, Evening Post, Nov. 
15; Columbia (Pa.) Spy: Madis., Nov. 17; Boston Adv., Nov. 16; Phil. No. 
Amer., Nov. 24; Madis., Nov. 2Z, 1843. 

" Richardson, Messages, iv., 257. Tyler said (p. 260) : If the Mexican threat 
was designed to prevent Congress from considering annexation, " the Executive 
has no reason to doubt that it will entirely fail of its object," and the Executive 
will not " fail for any such cause to discharge its whole duty to the country." 
The British and French charges in Texas endeavored to make this Message seem 



138 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

The day Congress met, Brown spoke to Benton as they went 
down the Capitol steps, referred to the incorporation of Texas as 
imminent, and remarked that as the Missouri Senator not only had 
opposed the surrender of that region but had favored regaining it, 
he would be a proper person to take a leading part now in its recov- 
ery. Benton was evidently no stranger to the topic, and he replied 
hotly that on the part of some the project was an intrigue for the 
Presidency and a plot to dissolve the Union, while with others it was a 
scrip and land speculation, and that he himself was against it. This 
was rather discouraging; yet for a time the Madisonian kept up 
the fire vigorously, and during a large part of December articles on 
the subject appeared almost daily in its columns. English induce- 
ments offered to the leading men of Texas, the selfish interests of 
Britain, and the growth of abolition sentiment in the Northeast were 
favorite themes; and when the Commercial Advertiser of New York 
declared that the precious humbug of annexation was about done 
for, it retorted, " Humbug or not — • Texas will be Annexed to the 
United States." jMeanwhile the continued vitality of the question 
was suggested by the presentation of adverse resolutions and peti- 
tions in Congress ; and Black of Georgia made a similar suggestion 
by giving notice in the House (January 15, 1844) that he proposed 
to move the provisional incorporation of Texas. Somehow neither 
the favorable nor the unfavorable occurrences at the Capitol excited 
much remark there, but this did not mean that no one felt concerned 
about the matter. Annexation is the question of the day, reported 
the Texan charge, though both friends and enemies are careful to 
avoid mentioning it in the national legislature.^^ 

Gradually an impression became general, however, that for some 
reason the prospect of a campaign on this issue had grown fainter; 
and Horace Greeley, writing from Washington on the twentieth of 
December, said there was no need of an anti-Texas agitation, for 
that country did not ask for annexation ; England opposed it ; 
Mexico threatened war against it ; three-fourths of the Americans 
did not wish it; and even the South, having nothing to gain from 
it and favoring a strict construction of the constitution, stood on the 
same ground. What contributed largely, or perhaps mainly, to give 

to the Texans offensive (Yoakum, Texas, ii., 419). Webster to Allen, Dec. 3, 
1843: Webster, Writings, xvi., 417. Nat. IntelL, Dec. 2, 1843. Brown to Polk, 
Dec. 9, 1843; Polk Pap. Id. to Armstrong. Dec. 12, 1843: Jackson Pap. 

"Benton, View, ii., 582. Madis., Dec. 4, 12, 19, 1843. Cong. Globe, 28 
Cong., I sess., 55. 56, (Black) 147, 168, 174, 175, 243, 291, 337. 346. Van Z,, 
No. 112, Jan. 2, 1844. 



FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 139 

such an impression was the settHng now of the claims controversy 
with Mexico. A convention which accompHshed this was signed on 
November 20 and submitted to Congress about five weeks later ; and 
even the Madisonian, during January and February of 1844, had 
much less to say on its favorite theme than previously, confining 
itself chiefly to news items and citations from other journals. ^*^ 

This, however, was only the lull before the real tempest. On the 
twenty-third of January Daniel Webster addressed a letter to citizens 
of Worcester county, Massachusetts. It was written in answer to 
one from them — dated a month earlier — which expressed the fear 
that a proposition for the acquisition of Texas might be submitted 
to Congress at the session recently begun, and asked the ex-Senator's 
opinion on the issue. When this letter arrived, said Webster, he had 
" indulged a strong hope " that no such move would be made, but " an 
intention had recently been manifested" of bringing the subject 
before the national legislature. He then proceeded to deprecate the 
intrusion of this exciting topic and to argue against the proposition. 
The cases of Louisiana and Florida, he urged, were not precedents, 
because in those instances an overruling necessity compelled the 
United States to act. The constitution does not contemplate the ad- 
mission of new States formed from the territory of foreign nations, 
and the Texas project goes even beyond that, — proposing the ad- 
mission of a foreign country as a whole. A republic, not being held 
together by the military power of a master, needs the bonds of 
national sympathy and interest in a special degree, and therefore 
cannot extend itself unduly without peril. Already we have a vast 
area, and we should devote ourselves to developing, improving and 
strengthening it. " ' You have a Sparta,' — such was the admonition 
of ancient prudence, — ' embellish it.' " This in brief was the great 
orator's line of argument ; and ample quotations from his Niblo's 
Garden speech of 1837 were added to show that no change of opinion 
had taken place on his part. The letter was not printed at the time ; 
yet, written by Webster and addressed to a number of prominent 
citizens, it could not wholly escape publicity. By a coincidence, if 
nothing more, the day it was penned resolutions of the Massachusetts 
legislature against annexation were presented in the national Senate.^^ 

It was time now for the other side, and notable indeed was its 

'^^ Tribune, Dec. 22, 1843. Richardson, Messages, iv., 274. Madis., Jan. -Feb., 
i844._ 

''Webster to citizens, Jan. 23, 1844: Writings, xvi., 418. Cong. Globe, 28 
Cong., I sess., 175. 



140 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



deliverance. At the beginning of February, 1844, the Washington 
Globe printed a letter from Senator Walker, written to citizens of 
Kentucky about four weeks earlier, which proceeded substantially as 
follows : — In 1836 Texas voted to enter this Union, so that on her 
side the question is settled. As for ourselves annexation can be 
effected by treaty, by act of Congress under the power to admit new 
States (for the constitution cannot have intended to forbid our 
acquiring territory) or by the action of a single State with the sanc- 
tion of Congress. Each State had a right before the adoption of the 
constitution to extend its territory, and may now with the consent of 
Congress make an agreement or compact with another State " or 
with a foreign power." Texas was once ours, and therefore to 
refuse to re-annex it would be to deny the wisdom of the original 
purchase. Our claim to it was demonstrated by Jefferson, Madison, 
JMonroe and John Quincy Adams. Clay has always taken the same 
position. No doubt we appeared to give the region to Spain in 1819, 
but that we could not and did not do, for by the treaty of 1803 we 
had bound ourselves to keep Louisiana and admit the inhabitants 
thereof to the Union. Hence the cession of 1819 was in violation of 
the treaty, and we should rectify that error. The efforts that have 
been made to purchase Texas by Jackson and others prove the 
territory is worth having, and as a sovereign nation now holds it 
nothing stands in the way. 

Le us examine the reasons for taking this step. At present our 
boundary on the Southwest is as bad as it could be, for the Sabine 
runs within about one hundred miles of the ^Mississippi. The 
Arkansas and Red Rivers with all their tributaries ought to be in our 
possession. Texas is in close contact with many United States 
Indians and has many Indians of her own, and she could stir up all 
of them against the Mississippi valley. The Texans could descend 
Red River, isolate New Orleans and fall upon it. No harbor exists 
between the Mississippi and the Sabine, but there are good ones 
farther on. Texas extends within twenty miles of the pass through 
the Rockies which forms the door to Oregon. All these evils can 
be remedied by annexing that country, and at the same time we can 
secure access to the trade of northern Mexico and " a very large 
portion of the western coast of America." Clay stated publicly in 
1820 that the value of Florida was " incomparably less " than that of 
Texas, and lauded highly the physical features of the latter region. 
Brougham observed recently in Parliament that " the importance of 



FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 



141 



Texas could not be overrated." Should the project in question be 
executed, your State for example would have a great market for her 
meats, flour and corn, hemp, bagging and the like. To refuse an- 
nexation is therefore to reject a great benefit. Nay, it is more. It is 
to re-dismember the " mutilated " West. " It is to lower the flag of 
the Union before the red cross of St. George," and surrender both 
Texas and the mouth of the Mississippi to England. Kentucky 
cannot refuse to welcome her sons who have gone to Texas and in 
the case of war would use their unerring rifles for our defence. 
The case of re-annexation is therefore strong, and it is much 
stronger than would be a proposal to acquire new territory, especially 
since the people there are of our own stock. 

The objections are that our dimensions would be too large and 
that Texas has slavery. But Louisiana doubled the area of the 
Union, whereas Texas would add only one-seventh. England has 
more square miles in this continent than we should have with both 
Texas and California. *' Is it an American doctrine that monarchies 
or despotisms are alone fitted for the government of extensive terri- 
tories?" On the other hand, of all forms of government a con- 
federacy like ours is the one best fitted for extension ; yet the British 
Empire possesses 8,100,000 square miles, Russia 7,500,000, Brazil 
3,000,000, and the United States with Texas would have only 2,318,- 
000. The advance from thirteen to twenty-six States has not endang- 
ered but has strengthened the Union. A wide territory secures 
power and hence peace, and on account of the variety of soils, 
climates and productions it gives a home market. The acquisition of 
Texas would increase the prosperity of almost every American 
interest, and would thus have a tendency to bind the country together. 
Besides, it should be noticed that in effect the United States plus / 
all we propose to add would be much smaller now than were the ; 
United States of 1787, and also that this objection, if valid against 
Texas, is still more so against Oregon, which is both larger and more • 
remote. 

The only other obstacle is slavery. But is this question to be 
permitted to cripple our development and endanger our very ex- 
istence? *'Is anti-slavery to do all this?" If so, no eflforts of man 
can save the Union. The abolitionists are allies of England and 
enemies of their own country. If the negroes are emancipated, the 
South will no longer be able to buy the productions of the North. 
" and North and South will be involved in one common ruin." Three 



142 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

million freedmen will fly at once to the opposite quarter for protec- 
tion, filling it with crime and poverty. The census of 1840 proves 
that the blacks of the free States are in a worse condition than our 
slaves, and the number of freedmen is rapidly increasing at a vast ex- 
pense to the community. Annexing Texas would very materially 
hinder this increase, for the slaves would largely be drained away 
from the border commonwealths and therefore the number emanci- 
pated would be smaller. 

It is said that annexation would fortify an objectionable institu- 
tion, but in reality it would only change the abode of the blacks, not 
add to their number. The location and not the existence of slavery 
is therefore the question involved, and shall Texas be lost for that ? 
A transfer from the middle tier of States to the warm climate of the 
new areas would benefit the negroes. Moreover a great and increas- 
ing number of them would gradually slip away into Mexico, Central 
America and South America, mix with the natives (who are not 
despised as our blacks are), and thus rise in the social scale while 
relieving us of their presence. Indeed unless Texas is brought into 
the Union, we never shall be rid of that unfortunate class. By the 
time free labor shall be plentiful and therefore cheap, the slaves will 
be so numerous that they could not safely be emancipated, and the 
cost of supporting the great number of destitute, infirm and criminal 
negroes that would result from abolition would likewise prohibit 
freeing them. 

To refuse Texas would produce a hostile feeling there, and she 
would go over to our old enemy. A mutually advantageous arrange- 
ment between her and England would be the consequence. All told, 
her cotton planters would have an advantage of twenty per cent, 
over ours. The staple would cease to be raised on our plantations, 
and the North and the West would lose their market. " ]\Iust we," 
then, demanded the Senator, " Must we behold Texas every day 
selling her cotton to England free of duty, whilst our cotton is sub- 
jected to a heavy impost? And must we also perceive Texas receiv- 
ing in exchange the manufactures of England free of duty, whilst 
here they are excluded by a prohibitory tariff? Can the tariff itself 
stand such an issue; or, if it does, can the Union sustain the mighty 
shock? Daily and hourly, to the South and the Southwest, would be 
presented the strong inducement to tiuite Zinth Texas, and secure 
the same markets free of duty for their cotton, and receive the same 
cheap manufactures, free of duty, in exchange." Moreover the 



FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 143 

slaves States, if thus associated, would be building up cities of their 
own, whereas now they are building up New York. Should the 
proposed measure be defeated, " The South and Southwest, whilst 
they would perceive the advancing prosperity of Texas, and their 
own decline, would also feel that the region with which they were 
united had placed them in this position, and subjected them to these 
disasters by the refusal of re-annexation." One of three results 
would therefore be certain : i. The South and Southwest might unite 
with Texas ; 2, the tariff might be abolished ; or 3, vast smuggling 
operations might virtually nullify the tariff, destroy our revenue, 
demoralize our people, and make direct taxation inevitable. 

England now has the right to examine Texan vessels in the Gulf 
on a suspicion of their being engaged in the slave trade. This 
enables her to station cruisers off the Mississippi, search our vessels 
under the pretense that they belong to our neighbor, and seize our 
property and sailors. As a dependency of Great Britain, Texas 
would side with her in case of war and help her to take New Orleans 
or at least close the Mississippi against our western cotton, thus ob- 
taining a practical monopoly of that invaluable production. Even 
if Texas desired to remain neutral, she could not force her neutrality 
to be respected. Her people and the Indians would surely be used 
against us. We must prevent this, and in all probability now is our 
last chance to do so. 

But there is even more to apprehend. So far has the influence 
of England in Texas been pushed already that Houston in his mes- 
sage of December, 1843, speaks of Great Britain as a friend and of 
the United States as an enemy. What, then, would be the feeling 
of that country were she to be rejected by us? She would become 
not only a British dependency but in effect a British colony. In the 
north England already hems us in. She would then do the same in 
the South, control the Gulf, and be within two days' march of the 
Mississippi. She is no friend of ours. Her press and her books 
reek with abuse of this country, intended to render it odious to the 
world. England, moreover, is governed by aristocrats, the avowed 
enemies of our free system; and she is advancing rapidly toward 
universal dominion. Whoever does not wish to save Texas and the 
Gulf from her is himself a monarchist and a Briton, and would 
reduce the United States to their old condition as British colonies. 
Nor is this all. The West contributes freely for the defences of 
the East, and now it demands something as a defence to itself. Gen- 



144 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



eral Jackson says annexation is " essential." Is patriotism only a 
name, or will the whole country join in protecting the Mississippi 
valley ? 

To these arguments Walker added impressive tables of statistics 
and a detailed investigation of the American trade with Texas, pur- 
porting to show besides other points that in 1839 she had taken 
nearly one-third of all the domestic manufactures exported by the 
United States ; that in consequence of arrangements with foreign 
nations she had purchased less and less of our goods, until in 1843 
she bought less than one-eighth as much as in 1839, whereas had she 
been annexed, the trade would greatly have increased; and further 
that many sections and many interests had shared in the profits of 
the Texas business. Finally Walker referred again to the danger 
that free trade would be established in that country, pointing out 
that her government could be supported by sales of the public lands 
and the customs duties be absolutely cancelled, and arguing that 
enough illicit introduction of merchandise into the United States to 
destroy our tarifif would be the consequence. In short, he concluded, 
"This great measure is essential to the security of the South, the 
defence of the West, and highly conducive to the welfare and per- 
petuity of the whole Union. "^^ 

A wonderfully clever production was this letter. Besides argu- 
ments there was plenty of luscious rhetoric skillfully adapted to the 
imaginations and prejudices of the American public, and every ember 
of suspicion and ill-will toward England was deftly fanned. A New 
York Tribune leader called it a " long array of sophistry," and the 
special correspondent of that paper at Washington declared that its 
author's intellectual stature was like his physical, — that he was 
" the smallest mental edition of a man." The Boston Courier re- 
marked that it would not believe Texas was to become a dependency 
of England until it saw her slaves emancipated; that the manufac- 
turers of the North could not be benefited by strengthening the hands 
of the anti-tarifiF South Carolinians ; that if England could make 
favorable treaties with a nation, so could we; and that the inde- 
pendence of Texas was expedient for the slaveholders themselves — 
to prevent their negroes from escaping to Mexico. By the True Sun 
it was urged that markets could be made in Texas only by the migra- 
tion of Americans, who could buy more were they to remain at 

"Letter of R. J. Walker to Sanders and others, Jan. 8, 1844:. Wash. Globe, 
Feb. 3. 1844. 



FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 145 

home ; and that markets in that quarter would be of no vahie anyhow 
should our admission of the country enable the South to destroy our 
tariff. The Baltimore Clipper pronounced Walker's idea that annex- 
ation would lead to the disappearance of slavery " too absurd to be 
entertained by any man of common sense"; and various other state- 
ments of the letter could be and were attacked with varying degrees 
of success. ^^ 

Nevertheless the paper had no little influence, as Van Zandt 
reported to his government. Great numbers of people accepted it as 
gospel. In particular it was undoubtedly believed by not a few that 
the acquisition of Texas would draw slaves away from the States of 
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee to cultivate her more 
fertile soil, and thus would " enlarge the area of freedom." Many 
felt persuaded also that it would then — and under no other circum- 
stances likely to arise — become possible to eradicate slavery from the 
entire South, whenever changed conditions should render that sort 
of labor unprofitable as it had been found to be at the North, since 
the freedmen could be pushed off into Alexico, instead of remaining 
in the States as a heavy burden and a fearful menace. In many 
ways, therefore. Walker's argument was attractive. After more than 
two months had passed, the Washington correspondent of the Rich- 
mond Enquirer said that it continued to be " the theme, the talk, the 
fashion, the very rage " ; and by the middle of April it was stated 
that 50,000 copies of it had been circulated, and 2,253 letters received 
by its author in commendation of his views. Here, certainly, could 
be found proof that the annexation question was alive. -° 

It is thus evident that the Texas issue, like a rising wind, stirred 
the atmosphere of the United States more and more from the close 
of 1841 to the early months of 1844. Tyler, Gilmer, Adams and his 

" N. Y. Tribune, March 19 ; Boston Courier: Nat. Intell., April 2^ ; True Sun: 
N. Y, Tribune. March 2t,\ Clipper, April 23; N. Y. Tribune, March 19; Cincin- 
nati Herald. Feb. 29, 1844. What is rather surprising, no one seems to have 
seen that Walker had misrepresented Madison's position regarding the boimdary 
of Louisiana. His error was probably unintentional. Madison's letter of March 
31, 1804, to Livingston, taken without his earlier one in the same month, is am- 
biguous (Writings, Hunt's ed., vii., 123). 

^ Van Z., No. 114, Feb. 1844. Lib., April 19, 1844. (Effects on slavery) 
E. g., Democ. Review, July, 1845, p. 7. Waddy Thompson (ib., Sept., 1844, p. 
259) approved of annexation partly on the ground that the northern slave States 
would become free. Jefferson and Madison had believed that the way to end 
slavery lay through the diffusion of it: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 255. Tuscaloosa (Ala.) 
Flag: Nashville Union, April 20, 1844. Speaking at Natchez in 1844, S. S. Pren- 
tiss exhibited what he described as two editions of Walker's letter, one written 
for the North and the other for the South (Memoir, ii.. 336.) 



146 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

associates, the legislatures of States, the administration journals, 
Almonte, Webster and Walker, all concurred in giving notice that a 
move in the cause of annexation was likely soon to be made ; and 
however inattentive were the mass of the nation, it is clear enough 
that a large number of the reflecting and influential men perceived 
the indications. If any did not, the fault was their own. 



VIII 

The Annexation Treaty is Negotiated 

On the sixteenth of October, 1843, Van Zandt wrote to Jones, 
the Texan Secretary of State, substantially as follows, and sent the 
despatch by a special messenger : Herewith is Upshur's note, which 
places the question of annexation in a tangible shape. As regards 
the American Senate, I think there has never before been a time so 
favorable. To the southern States Aberdeen's reply to Brougham 
makes the subject one of vital importance. At the same time the 
possibility of England's obtaining (as many believe she may) an 
undue influence in Texas and monopolizing the carrying trade, 
" seems to have touched the secret springs of interest " among the 
Northern manufacturers, and presented the matter in a light hitherto 
unseen in that quarter ; while as the Westerners are intent upon 
securing Oregon, it is believed that we can combine the two ques- 
tions, winning for them the Southern and Southeastern vote, and 
for ourselves Western and some Northern support. Thus far the 
newspapers have treated the subject as non-partisan, and this also 
is auspicious, for the measure has not strength enough in either 
party to carry it. Should the treaty be concluded, provision would 
necessarily be made for the liabilities of the Texan government, 
and this would bring to our aid the holders of them. The influence 
of the United States Bank agents, though the Bank is dead, " would 
prove a host in itself;" and some of the creditors of Texas have 
interested in a pecuniary way a certain Northern Whig Senator. If 
we reject this opportunity we are not likely to have another so 
good.^ 

At about this time the charge's letter of September 18, convey- 
ing the intelligence that Upshur had informally proposed annexa- 
tion, reached his government, and on October 30 it was made known 
to Captain Elliot. Elliot inquired how the administration intended 
to reply, and Houston answered that Van Zandt would be instructed 

^ See General Note, p. i. Van Z., No. 109, Oct. 16, 1843. Evidently Van 
Zandt felt strongly in favor of making a treaty, and one can easily believe what 
Tyler stated afterwards, that had the charge been then empowered to negotiate, 
the treaty would have been made in a week (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 415). 

147 



148 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to say verbally that it was not considered necessary or desirable to 
entertain such a proposition until, by adopting some resolution, the 
American Senate had shown that it was ready to treat on the sub- 
ject. The Captain then examined his instructions carefully, and the 
next day, at a formal conference with the President and the Secre- 
tary of State, he desired to know the views and intentions of the 
Executive for transmission to the Foreign Office, intimating that 
Great Britain might leave Texas to rely upon the United States in 
her efforts to secure recognition from the mother-country, and sug- 
gesting that Mexico would not be likely to facilitate annexation by 
yielding to American mediation in that afifair. Houston replied 
that he was grateful for the past exertions of England and wished 
them to continue ; that the Texan government had no reason to sup- 
pose the professions of the United States were based upon anything 
except their own convenience, could place no reliance on their 
heartily interposing to secure recognition from Mexico, and, how- 
ever this might be, would not be so thankless as to prefer other 
assistance to England's ; that England " might rest assured that 
with the Independence of Texas recognised by Mexico, He would 
never consent to any treaty or other project of annexation to the 
United States, and He had a conviction that the people would sus- 
tain him in that determination." Formerly, it was true, such a plan 
had gained his approval, but the American Union had rejected 
the offer made by the Texans in a time of difficulty, and its later 
conduct had not been calculated to make them " sacrifice their true 
and lasting advantage to the policy of party in that Country." The 
United States had been appealed to for help at the same time as 
England and France, but the latter countries alone had earned a 
title to gratitude by taking an active and decided part. Just now, 
in consequence of the truce and the withdrawal of the annexation 
proposal formerly made by Texas, more interest prevailed at the 
north ; but so far her Executive had not been favored with a word 
in writing as to the purposes and proceedings of that cabinet. 
" They were no doubt kind, but what they were he could not posi- 
tively say."- 

In this interview Elliot was the recipient, but the British minister 
fully understood the still greater blessedness of giving. He believed 
and had assured Houston that the American government felt no 
confidence "in their own power to carry out a project of annexa- 

■ Elliot, secret. Oct. 31, 1843. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 149 

tion," and aimed chiefly to prevent the affairs of Texas from being 
settled in any manner not agreeable to them. He believed also — and 
no doubt had said as much to the President — that the United States 
did not wish the war to end, since its continuance furnished the 
means of rendering Mexico amenable to their demands and increased 
the chances of obtaining the long coveted territory. Such views 
of the American policy, if correct, would have justified Houston in 
looking elsewhere for aid, and apparently they were entertained by 
him as well as by the British minister. Relying perhaps on such 
considerations, Elliot felt satisfied that Houston's sincerity could 
be depended upon implicitly, and the President proceeded to confirm 
this opinion by making no reply whatever to Van Zandt.^ 

On the third of November Upshur received five despatches from 
Murphy. One informed him that no American vessels of any con- 
sequence were then engaged in the Gulf trade, which meant an 
increase of British prestige and influence in that quarter. Another 
stated that Elliot had urged the Beales claim " with great earnist- 
ness." A third accompanied a newspaper which, in Murphy's opin- 
ion, showed that an effort was making " to turn the affections of 
the People of Texas from the U States to England " ; and a fourth 
had a good deal to say about the abolition designs of the British 
government in concert with Andrews and the British Anti-Slavery 
Society, and urged that the United States compel Mexico to end 
the war by recognizing her one-time subjects, because its continu- 
ance injured American commerce in the Gulf and encouraged for- 
eign intrigues in Texas. Much more important, however, was a 
fifth despatch, for it covered a transcript of the correspondence 
that had passed between Elliot and Jones with reference to the 
truce with Alexico. The gist of this, Murphy angrily suggested, 
could be summarized in three points : ( i ) Santa Anna proposes a 
suspension of hostilities, and is willing to make a settlement if Texas 
will acknowledge the sovereignty of his country; (2) Elliot urges 
that his terms be assented to as the only method of obtaining peace ; 
and (3) the government of Texas, concurring in Elliot's opinion 
and acceding to Santa Anna's wishes, agrees to send commissioners 
to end the war ; and the charge further pointed out that an accept- 
ance of the Mexican proposals, destroying slavery between the 
Sabine and the Rio Grande and closing the market for American 

'Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Id. to Doyle, June 21, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. 



150 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



negroes there, would injure Southern interests and consequently be 
detrimental to the Union as a whole.* 

On receiving this despatch, Upshur doubtless felt concerned lest 
Murphy's indignation should cause him to act offensively towards 
the Texan administration, and he replied soothingly that Houston's 
apparent willingness to accept the Mexican terms might be only for 
the purpose of gaining time, so as to obtain the protection of the 
United States or of Great Britain ; but he admitted that the corre- 
spondence revealed " a remarkably good understanding with Eng- 
land, and an obvious leaning towards that power," and he believed, 
as he soon expressed himself to the American minister in Alexico, 
that England was " exerting herself to cause Texas to acknowl- 
edge the sovereignty of Mexico." He recognized, too, that the tone 
of the administration newspapers was " by no means kind towards 
the United States " ; and that many recent events indicated " a dis- 
position on the part of the Executive to alienate the affections of 
the people, from our country." Yet nothing could be gained, he 
urged upon Murphy, by " revolution or violence of any kind " ; and 
he therefore instructed him to avoid every sign of distrust, " culti- 
vate a good understanding with the President," and leave him to be 
" constrained by the popular opinion." At the same time, however, 
"in order that the attention of the people might be brought di- 
rectly " to the subject of annexation, he authorized the charge to 
" express, in private conversations, the views and wishes of this 
government," provided he could do it in such a manner as not to 
" appear to take part . . . with the people against their Executive, 
in case of a difference between them."^ 

The next day after writing this Upshur received an answer 
from London. Everett had had an interview with Aberdeen, and 
the British minister had spoken as follows : The annexation of 

* Murphy, No. lo, Oct. 3; No. 6, Sept. 23; No. 7, Sept. 24, 1843. Id.. Sept. 
24, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 23. Id., No. 4, Sept. 23, 1843. Murphy 
explained that he and Jones, being "sick together," had become very intimate, and, 
on his expressing a strong desire to see the correspondence, Jones had caused a 
copy of it to be made for him during Houston's absence. 

"To Murphy, No. 11, Nov. 21, 1843. To Thompson, Nov. 18, 1843: Sen. Doc. 
341, 28 Cong., I sess., 42. Upshur does not seem to have surmised that the papers 
were given to Murphy in order to play upon the American jealousy of England. 
Perhaps, like the editor of the Madisonian, he feared the purpose was to divert 
suspicion from something not shown (Madis., Dec. i, 1843) ; but at all events he 
can hardly have accepted as adequate Murphy's childlike explanation. In the 
opinion of Anson Jones (Niles, January i, 1848, p. 281), alarm over the fact 
that apparently Texas obtained an armistice with Mexico through British and 
French influence, had a great effect in rousing pro-annexation sentiment in the 
United States. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 15I 

Texas, were that step to be taken, would be " wholly without provo- 
cation " on the part of his government. No doubt England desired 
slavery to cease, but she had no wish to interfere in the internal 
affairs of other nations, had not made and did not intend to make 
abolition " the condition of any treaty arrangement " with Texas, 
and had never alluded to the subject " in that connexion." During 
the summer a deputation of American abolitionists had waited upon 
him and proposed that a loan be made with a view to the emanci- 
pation of the negroes in that country, but the suggestion had been 
rejected at once; though he had, indeed, "informed them that, by 
every proper means of influence, he would encourage the abolition 
of slavery, and that he had recommended the Mexican Government 
to interest itself in the matter," — a recommendation, by the way, 
that had been received with no favor. Brougham's remarks in the 
House of Lords could only have referred to " the negotiations with 
IMexico for the recognition of the independence of Texas, and the 
earnest hope that the abolition of slavery might be effected by such 
an arrangement." Besides, the debates in Parliament were not 
always reported accurately, and too much importance should not be 
attached to them. In short Everett " might be perfectly satisfied 
that England had nothing in view in reference to Texas, which 
ought in the slightest degree to cause uneasiness in the United 
States."^ 

Undeniably the general tone of Aberdeen's remarks was grati- 
fying, but his statements were highly diplomatic. He showed that 
he had been disturbed by seeing the incorporation of Texas recom- 
mended in American newspapers as the means of defeating British 
designs against slavery, and evidently his assurances were framed 
with a view to prevent annexation. The declaration that England 
had no wish to interfere in the aft'airs of other countries was hardly 
equivalent to a promise that she would not interfere. True, aboli- 
tion had not been made the condition of a treaty with Texas, but 
that was only because England had found such a condition unac- 
ceptable, — as it was easy to do without plainly connecting the two 
subjects; and it was solely for this reason, one may infer, that of 
late she had had no intention of proposing it. The statement that 
Aberdeen had promptly rejected the suggestion of a loan as pre- 

' Everett, No. 62, Nov. 3, 1843 (Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 38). Eng- 
land seems to have given Henderson to understand that slavery stood in the way 
of her recognizing Texas, but to have avoided bringing abolition and recognition 
explicitly together. 



152 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



sented by a deputation of Americans could not disprove the fact 
that a similar idea coming from another source had been counte- 
nanced. The assurance that England had nothing in view with 
reference to Texas that should cause the slightest uneasiness in 
the United States was at that moment true, one must suppose, in 
Aberdeen's belief ; but this was because her efforts had thus far 
been unsuccessful; it was soon to be true no longer; and further- 
more this was a matter of opinion, on which our authorities 
might not agree with His Lordship. By no means all the facts, of 
course, were known to Upshur, but he possessed enough of them to 
guard him against implicit reliance, even had he been disposed as 
a general rule to place it, on the assurances of a foreign diplomat; 
and, finally, Aberdeen himself not only asserted the strong abolition 
policy of the Bnitish government, but admitted that a move to 
destroy slavery in Texas by means of an agreement with Alexico 
had been attempted, — a fact which tallied ominously with the proof, 
revealed in the Elliot-Jones correspondence, that negotiations be- 
tween the two countries had now been arranged for, and had been 
arranged for through British agency.'^ 

December lo Upshur received a second despatch from Everett 
in reference to the same subject. It was here mentioned that in 
writing to Ashbel Smith with reference to slavery in his country, 
Aberdeen had disclaimed all intention to interfere improperly in 
her internal affairs, and a report of another interview with the 
British minister was given. At this time His Lordship had said 
that he realized the delicacy and importance of the abolition matter, 
and should certainly not think it right to give just cause of com- 
plaint to the United States. England had, it was true, connected 
the subject of emancipation in Texas with a proposal that Mexico 
acknowledge her independence ; but the idea had not been favorably 
received. Upshur could readily see, however, that the suggestion 
might yet bear fruit ; and Aberdeen's assurances, taken as a whole, 
did not and could not satisfy the American government. He him- 
self, while denying that he wished to interfere unduly in the af- 

' The statements not already proved will be proved later. Cralle, who was 
Chief Clerk of the State department under Calhoun, says (Calhoun, Works, v., 313, 
314) that two deputations waited on Aberdeen; and Everett mentions in his 
despatch of Nov. 3 a deputation of " American abolitionists " and in that of Nov. 
16 one of " British subjects and others." As Aberdeen admitted to Ashbel Smith 
on July 20 that perhaps the British government would in some way compensate 
the Texan owners of slaves, should these be emancipated, it is evident that his as- 
surance to Everett did not cover the whole ground. See also Smith's letters 
printed in Chapter iv. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 153 

fairs of Texas or had given any cause for uneasiness to the United 
States, admitted that an attempt had been made to destroy a domes- 
tic institution of the first country and thereby to affect seriously — 
according to the general view of that matter — the home interests 
of the second ; and this was quite enough to show how liberally he 
could interpret words. In brief, the very best that could be said 
by the British diplomat for the express purpose of soothing the 
United States, and the rosiest complexion that could be given to his 
language by an American minister more in sympathy with him than 
with his own Executive in this regard, were such as inevitably to 
alarm Tyler; and in 1848 the President himself stated that Aber- 
deen's remarks had a decisive effect upon his mind and Upshur's in 
favor of pressing the measure of annexation. Placing side by side 
the weakness of Mexico and Texas, the close intimacy of England 
with both of those governments, her avowed anti-slavery policy, and 
the fact that she had already tried to work that policy in Texas, 
not to mention her agency in actually bringing about negotiations 
between the belligerents, they felt sure that in one way or another 
she would eventually, unless prevented, succeed in freeing the 
Texan slaves.^ 

All the more trying then, was the non-arrival of an answer to 
the overtures of September and October. Upshur felt suspicious 
of Houston, and feared that Van Zandt might not be given power 
to negotiate a treaty, though he trusted that in such a case the charge 
would take the responsibility of acting and appeal to the public for 
support. By this time strong political considerations had presented 
themselves, as will be seen ; and both Tyler and Upshur were de- 
termined to have a treaty if they possibly could. Another line of 
thought also may have stimulated them in the prosecution of their 
policy. The occasion of the break between the British representa- 
tive at Alexico and the government to which he was accredited — 
that affair of the little English flag — appeared altogether too trivial 
a cause for such an effect, as indeed it was, and the public were 

'Everett, No. 64, Nov. 16, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 40. Smith 
Aug., i; Aberdeen, Sept. 11, 1843: Tex. Arch. Tyler to Calhoun, June 5, 1848: 
Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 11 72. Tyler added that the British aim to abolish slavery 
in Texas might be carried out by a treaty between those countries ; that then 
there would be a constant border war between us and Texas over fugitive slaves 
from the southern States ; that ultimately therefore formal war would occur 
between the United States and Texas, Mexico and England ; that a commercial 
treaty would give England absolute control over the Texas trade, and that Eng- 
land would not be dependent upon us for cotton. 



154 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



not aware that Great Britain disapproved of her charge's course. 
Consequently many suspected in the United States that some deep 
game was afoot and the incident of the flag a mere pretext, — a 
ruse, as the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin for example termed 
it. Then came word that a British fleet was on its way to Mexico; 
and as good an observer as Trist, then our consul at Havana and 
later Assistant Secretary of State, concluded that the English gov- 
ernment were using the ostensible quarrel as an excuse for assem- 
bling a naval force near the scene of operations, and intended to 
employ these vessels in one way or another against the policy of 
the United States.® 

Meanwhile, on the other hand, a little encouragement was re- 
ceived from Texas. With a view to the brightening of American 
prestige a small warship, the Flirt, was ordered to Galveston, where 
she arrived about the middle of October. Houston visited her with 
Murphy, and seemed much pleased with the attentions paid him. 
The American charge represented the sending of the vessel as evi- 
dence that the friendship of the United States was more than a 
profession ; and this idea, together with what he described as " the 
curtecy & noble bearing " of the Flirt's officers, tended greatly in 
his opinion to conciliate national sentiment. Doubtless the visit did 
have some influence in that direction, and still more was exerted 
by the strong suspicion of the public that England had been en- 
deavoring to emancipate their slaves. In Murphy's biased judg- 
ment, indeed, the people were so much incensed about the abolition 
movements occurring in Great Britain and the part which they 
supposed Elliot had taken in the Texan anti-slavery campaign, that 
*' a little, yea very little more " would have resulted in violence 
against the government of their own country.^'* 

A few days later fresh stimulus was imparted by a Galveston 
letter addressed to Upshur. "A train has been laid," said the 
writer, through English diplomacy and the " weakness, or wicked- 
ness " of Houston to prevent annexation. England's first step was 
to require all treating with the United States for a union of the 
countries to be suspended. The British minister in Mexico then 
applied for an armistice. Santa Anna agreed to grant this on the 
condition that Mexican supremacy be acknowledged and negotia- 

" Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. lo, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 900. Com. 
Bulletin: Houston Telegraph, Dec. 27, 1843. (Fleet, Trist) John L. Chauncey 
(of U. S. Ship Vandalia), Havana, Jan. 9, 1844: Markoe and Maxcy Papers. 

'"Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Murphy, No. 11, Nov. 7; No. 12, Nov. 13, 1843. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED J 55 

tions be opened on the Robinson basis. Doyle and Elliot recom- 
mended the acceptance of these terms, and it was agreed that a 
commission should be sent by the Texan government with an 
implied recognition of Alexican sovereignty. When annexation 
shall have been defeated, continued the letter, we shall be offered 
peace on the condition of accepting emancipation and the Nueces 
boundary, — our slaves to be paid for, held for life, or apprenticed 
for a term at nominal wages. " I know " that Houston has had 
Elliot's advice in all his moves ; I believe that England wishes to 
occupy the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande [the seat 
of the Beales grant] so as to prosecute designs against California; 
and I am " sure " that the first wish on the part of the British min- 
istry is " to strike a deadly blow at slave labor," since only that 
system enables you to compete with her. Elliot has said to me 
" more than once " that we shall never be recognized by the mother- 
country except on the basis of abolition, and he and Houston agree 
that the United States could not obtain peace for us without going 
to war with Alexico.^^ 

At last, three months after Van Zandt had written of the Amer- 
ican overture, eight weeks after he had sent a special messenger 
with Upshur's formal announcement, and forty-three days after 
Houston had informed the British representative what kind of an 
answer would be returned, the Texan Executive made reply. The 
interposition of European governments, wrote Secretary Jones, to 
which we owe the truce and our prospect of ending the war, has 
been given chiefly with a view to our remaining independent ; and 
it would not be good policy to exchange the expectation of obtaining 
— by the aid of those foreign powers — the peace now apparently 
near at hand for the very uncertain hope of entering the Union, 
however desirable that might be. Should Texas make an annexa- 
tion treaty, it is believed the powers would immediately withdraw 
their good offices ; and then were the treaty to fail, she would be in 
a worse case than at present, yet could not ask help of England 
and France ; while the United States, finding their weak neighbor 
wholly dependent upon them, might become indifferent again, and 
so she would be left entirely without friends. Until, therefore, the 
success of the annexation plan can be considered certain, the pro- 
posal to make a treaty should be declined; but if the American 

"James Low to Upshur, Nov. 20, 1843: State Dept., Misc. Letters. (Beales 
grant) Yoakum, Texas, i., 317. 



1^6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Congress or Senate adopt a resolution authorizing the President to 
offer such an arrangement, the proposition will immediately be sub- 
mitted to the legislative authorities here and promptly be responded 
to by the Executive. It was a cold reply; and Houston's annual 
Message, published at about the same date, made it seem worse 
than cold, for in that paper he gratefully commemorated the friend- 
ship and helpfulness of England, and dwelt at length on certain 
American proceedings that he regarded as outrages. Van Zandt 
felt shocked by the tenor of his instructions; and although he infor- 
mally indicated their character to the American Secretary of State, 
he refrained from communicating their terms and boldly resub- 
mitted the case to the home authorities. ^- 

Upshur also was for persevering, and the ideas now expressed by 
the Texan envoy to his government, after ascertaining the views 
of " many Senators," help us to understand why. First, the charge 
pointed out insurmountable objections to such a resolution as Jones 
desired the American Senate or Congress to adopt. It was not 
customary, he remarked, to authorize the President of the United 
States to open negotiations, unless he had neglected or declined to 
do so ; and in this instance it was known to many leading Congress- 
men at both ends of the Capitol that annexation had been offered 
to Texas. Justice Catron of the American Supreme Court and all 
others consulted on the point agreed that it would not be well to 
instruct the Executive to do what he had already done. Besides, 
were such a move to be proposed, those unfriendly to Texas would 
urge that any steps taken by the American Congress before that 
country had signified her willingness to join the Union would be 
improper ; while those favorable to annexation but anxious to defer 
the matter would concur in voting against the desired resolution. 
In the second place Van Zandt explained that a treaty, even should 
it fail to be ratified, would promote the cause. It would indicate 
precisely and formally the terms that would be accepted by Texas, 

'-To Van Zandt, Dec. 13, 1843. At this time there were pending certain 
complaints of Texas against the United States for alleged trespasses upon her 
territory, and Van Z. notified Upshur (To Jones, No. 112, Jan. 2, 1844) that these 
must be satisfied before Texas could consider annexation. But, as the United 
States manifested the best disposition to adjust the diiificulties fairly, these claims 
really had no bearing on the question. Jones was technically truthful in saying 
the truce was due to foreign aid, in the sense that British agents were the organs 
of communication. Upshur's letter of Jan. 16 to Murphy shows that he knew of 
Jones's despatch declining the American overture ; but Van Zandt made no written 
communication to the State department on the subject (Calhoun to Tyler, May 2, 
1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 68). Message: Journ. Ho. Repres., 8th 
Tex. Cong., 13. Van Z., No. 113, Jan. 20, 1844. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I57 

and these — incorporated in a bill — could then be voted by a simple 
majority of the two Houses, whereas without such a preliminary 
agreement on terms this method would not be feasible. 

Next he argued that now was just the time to carry the great 
measure through. Being supported by Whigs as well as Democrats, 
he said, it will not be a party question. The opinion prevalent here 
that Texas must be annexed or become dependent on England seems 
to me a strong ground for hope. Even Senators from the North — 
and many of them — are influenced by this view. It is believed that 
undue British influence there, commercial or other, would be dan- 
gerous to the prosperity and to the institutions of the United States ; 
that England is employing all possible means to carry out her pur- 
poses ; and that annexation is the only remedy. Many feel sure 
that Henry Clay will be the next President, and some of his par- 
ticular friends wish the step to be postponed so that he may have 
the credit of it; but even these men will support a treaty, if a treaty 
be made now. We can count on every one from the South and 
West, all the Democrats from the North, and perhaps Tallmadge 
of the New York Whigs. A treaty, then, is the proper mode ; public 
sentiment is ready for it ; and such a state of feeling ought not to 
be wasted. Should the treaty fail and an act of Congress be deemed 
constitutional, that plan can then be brought forward and the suc- 
cess of the measure " be placed beyond a shadow of a doubt." 
Finally Van Zandt attacked the corner-stone of Jones's despatch. 
Whatever happens, we shall lose nothing, he urged; England may 
perhaps abandon us for agreeing to join the United States; but the 
making of an annexation treaty would create a party here that 
would never cease to defend us until we should be incorporated in 
the Union. ^^ 

Aside, however, from the ideas thus expressed, Upshur doubt- 
less felt, in view of Houston's proclamation, his Message, his reply 
to Van Zandt, the Brougham-Aberdeen colloquy and Everett's 
despatches, that positive action must be taken at once in order to 
forestall England ; and accordingly on the sixteenth of January, 
1844, he sent a long communication to Murphy, intimating that Mur- 
phy should lay it before Houston. Our proposition to annex Texas, 
he announced, has been *' for the present " declined. This, how- 
ever, is not surprising. Although the United States have sym- 
pathized entirely with that country, " want of power " has prevented 

'*Van Z., No. 113, Jan. 20, 1844. 



158 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

the Executive from assisting her in any effectual manner, and in a 
way she has been compelled to look elsewhere for aid. Probably her 
administration has thus become committed to England in some 
degree, and, regarding the ratification of an annexation treaty as 
not absolutely certain, it shrinks from hazarding the friendship of 
other powers by making a move in this direction. It should not, 
however, be discouraged by the failure to secure union with the 
United States at an earlier period. At that time the subject was 
not understood. Then and always a vast majority of our people 
have believed that at some day Texas must be annexed. The failure 
can have involved nothing more than the national self-respect of her 
people, and to set things right in that particular the American gov- 
ernment have taken the initiative in bringing the matter up again. 
In his recent Message, to be sure, the President of the United 
States was silent regarding the subject; but this was merely because 
he thought it best to wait until a treaty could be submitted. The 
Message clearly proved his friendship for Texas. He said it was 
time for the war between her and Mexico to end, thus announcing 
in effect " his own purpose to put an end to it " by any means which 
he can constitutionally command. His only means is the power to 
make treaties, and this power he now offers. 

England has no disinterested friendship for our neighbor, con- 
tinued the Secretary. Her purpose is to monopolize the commerce 
of the world. She aims to obtain concessions from Texas ; and that 
country, once in her control, will not be able to refuse them. The 
United States — particularly the North — would feel greatly irritated 
were they to find the adjacent republic aiding England to cripple our 
trade and industry, and we should make reprisals; so that if our 
overtures are rejected, " it is inevitable that we shall become the 
bitterest foes." Moreover if Texas remain independent, the " ex- 
tensive preparations " already carried out will fill the land with 
settlers from Europe, and these people will bring with them all their 
old ideas and feelings. Immigration from the United States on the 
other hand will cease, particularly as the Southern people would not 
go with their slaves to a country governed by abolitionists. Texas 
will thus become European ; sympathy between her and us will end ; 
slavery will be uprooted ; clashes and then war will follow ; England 
will have to take part, and other nations will not look idly on. 
What, now, could Texas hope to gain from all this ? She would find 
herself between the upper and the nether mill-stones. A quasi 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I59 

alliance with England she might no doubt have, but " the lamb 
can make no contract with the wolf, which will protect him from 
being devoured." So long as she continues to be independent, she 
must in fact rely on a country not bound to her by sympathies and 
always actuated by mere self-interest. Would it not be better to 
join a nation hardly second to any, a nation rapidly growing, a nation 
whose power in war she could scarcely hope to resist, were it an 
enemy? That she may now do. "There is not, in my opinion, the 
slightest doubt of the ratification of the treaty of annexation, should 
Texas agree to make one." The Senators have been sounded, and 
"a clear constitutional majority of tzvo-thirds are in favor of the 
measure." The negotiations with Mexico need cause no embarrass- 
ment. If that country acknowledge Texas, Texas can do with her- 
self as she pleases; if not, she will need the protection of the United 
States all the more. So wrote Upshur. In September he had sug- 
gested ; in October he had proposed ; and now in January he insisted. 
In truth, portions of this final appeal sounded menacing, and it was 
denounced as a conjuring up of phantoms to bully Texas into acqui- 
escence. But in reality the Secretary was merely predicting what 
any thoughtful man could see was probable, if not certain, should 
the two nations pursue independent courses. Only a few months 
passed before Houston himself wrote that unless his country were 
annexed, the revenues of the American Union would be diminished 
and its very existence endangered ; that a European influence un- 
favorable to the United States would become dominant in Texas; 
that the bond of common origin would lose its power; and that 
instead of friendship there might come to be the "most active and 
powerful animosity " between the two republics.^* 

"To Murphy, No. 14, Jan. 16, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 43. A 
copy of the confidential despatch to Everett was made a part of this communica- 
tion. Houston to Murphy, May 6. 1844: Crane, Houston, 366. Upshur has been 
charged with falsehood for his statements regarding the strength of annexation 
in the Senate at this time; but McDuffie wrote to Calhoun, March 5. 1844, " from 
poor Upshur's count 40 Senators would vote " for the treaty (Jameson, Calhoun 
Corr., 934), and between these three men there can have been no intentional 
misrepresentation in the matter. Besides, as we have seen, the evidence appears 
to warrant Upshur's estimate. In Jan., 1845, the chairman of the House com- 
mittee on foreign affairs stated on the floor that at this time many more than 
two-thirds of the Senate favored the acquisition of Texas by treaty (Cong. 
Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 84) ; and there is much other evidence of such a state 
of things. Jan. 23 Upshur supplemented this despatch with a private and con- 
fidential note to Murphy, in which he argued that since the motive of England 
was self-interest, she would be all the more willing to treat commercially with 
Texas were the project of annexation to be tried and defeated, for then she could 
feel that it would not come up again ; hence Texas need not hesitate on account 
of her relations with that power to make the proposed treaty. Upshur added that 
ratification might " now be regarded as certain " (State Dept., Arch, of Tex. Leg.). 



l60 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Elliot was at this time in New Orleans, and there Henry Clay- 
stated most positively in his presence, two or three times over, that 
no scheme of annexation would be accepted by the Senate of the 
United States. This, coming from the acknowledged ruler of the 
dominant political party in this country, was an important and in 
fact a decisive utterance, and in view of Elliot's anxiety on the sub- 
ject one cannot doubt that it was communicated unofficially to the 
Texan authorities. Some weeks later, indeed, Alurphy was in- 
formed that the charge had written to Jones from New Orleans 
assuring him that the Senate would not vote for Tyler's project. 
At about the same time he represented to Aberdeen that the United 
States, having concluded the new convention with Mexico for the 
adjustment of American claims, would be less interested in Texas ; 
and it seems more than possible that he expressed the same idea 
unofficially to Jones. Did he also receive unofficial replies? It 
would appear so, for he assured his government in February that 
Houston was " steadily determined " to maintain the independence 
of his country.^^ 

Meanwhile, however, the problem of annexation assumed a new 
phase in Texas. Murphy suggested to a member of Congress the 
idea of initiating a move in that body ; and during the latter part of 
December, 1843, several prominent figures in the national legislature 
did propose, on the basis of the popular vote for annexation in 
1836, to introduce bills for the purpose. On the nineteenth such a 
project after being read a second time was duly referred, so that the 
matter was now formally up before the committee on foreign rela- 
tions. At this time Raymond, the secretary of the Texan legation 
in the United States, who had been sent home to obtain instructions 
on the subject and was on his return journey, intimated that the 
despatch conveyed by him was unfavorable to annexation. At 
once the Senate requested Houston to recall the messenger and 
postpone his departure until the matter could be laid before the 
Congress and action be taken by that body ; but Houston denied the 
legality of this demand. Three days later, feeling — as Murphy 
understood — that the President had been trying to mislead Tyler as 
to the sentiment or will of the nation, the Senate called upon him 
to throw light on the negotiations with England, France and the 
United States regarding the independence of the country and her 
relations to Mexico ; but this he positively and brusquely refused to 

"Elliot, private, Dec. 31, 1843. Murphy, private, Feb. 22, 1844. Elliot, 
No. 4, Jan. 15; No. 6, Feb. 17, 1844. See note 33. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED l6l 

do. The already great excitement then rose yet higher; people 
talked fiercely about the " veil of mystery so artfully thrown 
around" the international policy of the government; and five mem- 
bers of the House committee on foreign relations requested Murphy 
to inform them, so far as he was at liberty to do, in reference to the 
state of things existing between Texas, Mexico and his own country, 
explaining that in no other way could the facts required for the dis- 
charge of their duties be obtained. Murphy prudently evaded the 
demand, but he was careful to inform Houston about it. More 
positive still, to counteract any misleading representation that might 
have been made by the Executive, a substantially unanimous declar- 
ation affirming that nine-tenths of the people of Texas desired to 
join the American Union was drawn up by the Congress, and was 
forwarded to Gilmer for the corresponding body of the United 
States. Apparently nothing was needed to stimulate the desire for 
American protection, but now came news that the negotiations with 
Mexico were likely to end in disappointment, and the frail nation to 
be cast adrift once more in the tumult of waters.^'' 

However stubborn he might appear to be, the President was not 
really so. He perceived (as Captain Elliot reported after an interview 
with him) that his Congress were disposed to take from him all con- 
trol over the matter of annexation, and as he himself stated a few 
months later to the British consul at Galveston, that he could not 
maintain his ground against the majority. Had Elliot and Saligny 
been at hand to sustain him by their presence, the Attorney Gen- 
eral told the consul, Houston would have been able to hold his own ; 
but without their support he found it necessary to put in play a 
deeper and subtler policy than mere inaction." 

Accordingly he laid a secret Message before Congress on the 
twentieth of January, in which — giving no personal opinion on the 
advisability of annexation — he pointed out that an unsuccessful 
endeavor to gain that end would mortify the national pride, would 

^* Murphy, conf., [Dec, 1843]. Houston Telegraph, Dec. 27, 1843; Jan. 
3, 24; March 20, 1844. Raymond set out Dec. 18. Nat. Intell., Feb. 10; April 12, 
1844. Murphy, No. 16, Jan. 3, 1844. Members to Murphy, Jan. 13, 1844: State 
Dept., Arch, of Tex. Leg. Murphy to members, Jan. 18, 1844: ib. Id. to Houston, 
Jan. 18, 1844: ib. Houston said later that, but for this declaration, he would 
have frightened the United States into ratifying the treaty (Phila. No. Ainer. 
June II, 1845)! Murphy, No. 17, Jan. 15, 1844. 

"Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. Kennedy, private. May 31, 1844. According to 
Cralle, Chief Clerk of the State Dept. under Calhoun, Van Z. intimated that a 
treaty would probably be signed and — if necessary — submitted directly to the 
people (Calhoun, Works, v., 319). In view of public sentiment this threat, if 
made, must have had great effect on Houston. 



l62 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

diminish the claims of Texas to the confidence of other powers, and 
might affect very unfavorably the attitude of England and France, 
and therefore urged the necessity of observing " the utmost caution 
and secrecy" in the affair. He then suggested that if annexation 
could not immediately be effected, an alliance with the United States 
would secure the country against Mexico; and finally he proposed 
that Congress appropriate $5,000 for a coadjutor to assist Van Zandt 
in dealing with the American government. This was done ; and the 
members of that body, feeling reassured as to the policy of the 
Executive, scattered to their homes, leaving him to carry out the 
programme suggested. Accordingly the charge was instructed to 
open negotiations for a treaty of annexation, should he become satis- 
fied that it could be carried in the Senate. Little enough, however, 
signified this mere permission to begin pourparlers — especially as the 
Secretary of State added that it was proposed to send on a partner 
in the work — though it was something to which Houston could refer 
in self-defence, if charged again with trying to thwart the popular 
will ; but another point in the letter signified much, for, pursuing 
the plan suggested in the secret Message, Jones directed the charge 
to approach the subject of an alliance. Now an alliance was some- 
thing for which the American government had shown no wish. It 
was in fact well known to be inconsistent with the established policy 
of the nation. The sole reason for proposing it must therefore have 
been that it was strongly desired by Houston ; and in fact the Presi- 
dent himself began a despatch to Van Zandt that was entirely similar 
in this regard to the one drawn up by Jones.^^ 

About this time important letters arrived from the United States. 
Catron was deeply interested in the annexation issue, and worked 
with Van Zandt all winter. When the latter found himself checked 
by his instructions, he laid the matter before the Justice ; and Catron, 
after spending a day in making inquiries, wrote to the Hermitage 
that a treaty could be ratified, hoping thus to bring Jackson's influ- 
ence to bear upon Houston. Walker also sent a letter to the ex- 
President, stating that he believed the measure would receive the 
vote of nearly every Democratic Senator and many Whigs, thirty- 

'* Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. Houston's Mess, and action of Cong. Laws 
of 8th Tex. Cong., 86. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 426. To Van Z., Jan. 2T, 1844. 
Houston to Van Z., Jan. 29, 1844: F. O., Texas, xiv. Jones (Memor., 590) states 
that personally he was opposed to the whole policy of negotiating an annexation 
treaty at this time, but that he yielded to public sentiment and " the earnest 
wishes of the Executive." This tends to prove, not that Houston really favored 
annexation, but that under the circumstances he deemed it best to negotiate on the 
subject. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 163 

six members in all, and conjuring Jackson to communicate with the 
Texan Executive by the first mail. Jackson acted with extreme 
promptness, conveying these assurances to the President and en- 
closing two of the confidential letters received from Washington. 
In fact during the month of January, 1844, he addressed Houston 
several times on the subject. Undoubtedly these communications 
appealed strongly to their recipient ; but apparently they had not 
the decisive efirect longed for by their author, for in April Elliot 
reported to his government that Houston had adhered to his own 
policy in spite of " private instances from persons of great weight " 
in the United States, to whom he was " warmly attached. "^'^ 

Moreover other advices were very different from Jackson's. The 
Texan consul at New York wrote that while a strong party favored 
annexation, he had no idea that the measure could be carried, since 
partisan advantage — not the public good — was always the question 
in the United States. On the last day of January letters from 
Senator Choate of Massachusetts and Senator Barrow of Louisiana 
were forwarded to a member of the Texan cabinet. Their contents 
are not precisely known ; but the gentleman to whom they had been 
addressed informed Anson Jones that he would be convinced by 
them of the impossibility of effecting annexation, at least during 
the current year, and such was the conclusion actually formed by 
the Secretary of State.-° 

But now came something of a decisive character. Upshur's 
despatch of January i6, which was laid before Houston about the 
twelfth day of February, produced a sensation and justly so, for 
— even though it was a prediction rather than a menace — it almost 
amounted to an ultimatum. Practically it threw the sword into 
the scales to outweigh the President's policy, while by declaring the 
ratification of a treaty certain, it appeared to annihilate his defence 
against the American overture. Apparently nothing was left him 
except surrender. But the pupil of Cherokee Bowles could not 
easily be outplayed at the game of diplomacy. Two days later his 
Secretary of State wrote to Murphy that the protraction or failure 
of the annexation negotiations might cause Texas very serious diffi- 
culties with Mexico, France and England; yet if he would give an 

'° Catron to Polk, June 8, 1844: Polk Pap. Id. to Jackson, March 9, 1845: 
Jackson Pap. Walker to Jackson, Jan. 10, 1844: ib. Jackson to Blair, Sept. 19; 
July 26, 1844: ib. Houston to Jackson, Feb. 16, 1844: Galv. Civilian, Sept. 21, 
1844. Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. 

'■" Brower to Reily, Jan, 4, 1844 : Jones, Memor., 303. Reily to Jones, Feb. 
I, 1844; ib., 306. Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. 



l64 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

assurance in the name of his government that the United States 
would " assume the attitude of a defensive ally of Texas against 
Mexico " and send adequate military and naval forces to the vicin- 
ity, Houston would appoint a minister to co-operate with Van Zandt 
in negotiating for the project. And then, as if in a casual way, 
Jones remarked : " In the event of a failure of the treaty of annexa- 
tion, it is also necessary that this Government should have assur- 
ance or guaranty of its independence by the United States. "^^ 

At first sight the Secretary's demand to be protected may seem 
reasonable, but after a thought one realizes that Houston under- 
stood how impossible it was for the administration of the United 
States to give such a pledge constitutionally. Even Captain Elliot 
was well aware of this fact, and the ex-Governor of Tennessee can 
hardly have been less familiar than he with our organic law. The 
President cannot legally employ armed forces against a nation with 
which we are at peace, and therefore he cannot engage to do so. 
Moreover Upshur had stated explicitly in his despatch of January 
i6 that the Executive had " no means " of aiding Texas except 
such as he derived " from the treaty-making power." Elliot be- 
lieved Houston understood quite well that the United States " could 
not act upon " the condition proposed, and it seems impossible to 
think otherwise. The inference naturally follows that the demand 
for an illegal pledge of protection was put forward in the expecta- 
tion that it would be refused, or in other words was made — as Tyler 
suspected — to obtain a plausible ground for rejecting the American 
overture.-- 

This view does not seem, however, to be quite correct, for the 
plan of joining the United States was worth conserving both as 
a possible last resort and as a lever upon England meantime. Hous- 
ton appears to have calculated in this way : H Murphy declines to 
grant my apparently reasonable demand, I shall have not only an 
adequate excuse in the eyes of all for any pro-British policy that 
may be adopted but also the means of exciting deep resentment 
against the United States among my countrymen. Probably, how- 
ever, he will not assume the responsibility of thus closing the door 

*' Murphy, conf., Feb. 15 ; priv. and conf., Feb. 19, 1844. Houston to Van Z., 
Feb. 15, 1844: F. O., Texas, xiv. Jones to Murphy, Feb. 14, 1844: Sen. Doc. 
349, 28 Cong., I sess., 4. The possibly near end of the truce made a guaranty of 
protection peculiarly desirable. It is interesting to note that Jones wrote as if 
the Congress had not made an appropriation for the coadjutor and thus virtually 
rendered the appointment obligatory. 

"Elliot, secret. April 7, 1844. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428. Of course the conclu- 
sion of the treaty of annexation changed the situation. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 165 

upon what he and his government so fondly desire. He will pre- 
fer to risk a step beyond his powers, knowing that his act can be dis- 
avowed if necessary. If his pledge is then repudiated by the 
American authorities, I shall have the same excuse and the same 
means of exciting resentment, together with the added effect of 
what many would regard as bad faith — or something like it — on the 
part of that government. Tyler and Upshur will see this ; and a 
majority of their nation, anxious about England's designs and in- 
tensely jealous lest she win the day against them here, will be so 
apprehensive lest our indignation at their conduct should throw us 
into her arms, that they will be ready for a long step. They will 
say, "If we cannot possess Texas, let us at least be the ones to 
protect and dominate her ; so let us make the alliance that she offers." 
These calculations were not without sagacity, and Murphy at once 
justified them as far as they concerned him, not only giving a pledge 
of protection in broad terms, but — while he declined to offer explic- 
itly the further assurance demanded by Jones — giving a promise that 
Houston could have made equal to such an assurance for a long time 
to come. " The United States," he wrote, " having invited that 
negotiation will be a guaranty of their honor that no evil shall 
result to Texas from accepting the invitation."-^ 

The wheels then began to turn. Murphy was informed that in 
view of his pledges the President had decided to despatch Hender- 
son with full powers, to co-operate with Van Zandt in concluding a 
treaty of annexation. Houston completed his letter to the charge 
at Washington begun on January 29. It was determined that his 
private secretary and confidential friend. Miller, should go north to 
act as secretary of the special legation, — for the purpose, one can 
but infer, of making sure that his personal views would be regarded 
by the negotiators and all their proceedings be made known to 
him. And finally Henderson was given instructions. In these he 
was directed to follow until further advised the orders previously 
conveyed to the Texan ministers at the same post, and in particular 

^Murphy to Jones, Feb. 14, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 4. Very 
likely Murphy knew that his pledge did not bind the government, and gave it 
simply because he felt that otherwise the negotiations could not proceed, trusting 
his government to handle the matter as they should see fit (Murphy to Tyler, Feb. 
17, 1844: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 287). Murphy does not appear to have observed how 
his promise (being unlimited as to time) could be used, for he referred Jones 
to the Washington authorities as regarded the proposed guaranty of independence. 
Houston could have held, with an appearance and much reality of justice, that 
any later Mexican attack (for a long time) would grow out of resentment at the 
annexation negotiations. 



l66 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

to obtain from the United States before beginning negotiations " as 
full a guarantee as possible " touching the demands just made upon 
the American representative. This meant that before entering 
upon the discussion of a treaty the Texan minister was to require 
the explicit assurance asked of Murphy: that to say, a pledge that 
should negotiations be opened and the project fail, the United states 
would guarantee the independence of Texas or join with her in a 
defensive alliance against Mexico ; and the President informed 
Elliot that his orders to Henderson were precise and imperative 
to decline all negotiations until he should receive such a promise. 
In other words, Houston returned once more — and this time with 
superlative decision — to that idea of safeguarding Texas as an 
independent nation which had been expressed repeatedly of late by 
Jones and himself.-* 

Here seems to have lain, exactly where one should look for it, 
the very pith of the Texan policy, and one is reminded of the Pres- 
ident's attempt to obtain a truce from Santa Anna on such terms 
that it could have been prolonged indefinitely by the weaker party. 

^ Jones to Murphy, Feb. 15, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 6. Hous- 
ton to Van. Z., Feb. 15, 1844: F, O., Texas, xiv. Jones to Hend., Feb, 15, 1844, 
Feb. 25 further instructions were given him : Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 259. Houston, 
Letter, July 18, 1847: Niles, Sept. 4, 1847. Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. It is 
from Houston himself that we learn of the special instructions given Henderson 
(Letter, July 18, 1847: Niles, Sept. 4, 1847). Houston says in this letter that the 
contingency contemplated was a failure of the American government to carry 
annexation through, but there are ample reasons to believe that the contingency 
specified was the failure of the annexation project from whatever cause, (i) 
Jones's demand upon Murphy, the one precise, official and contemporary state- 
ment of the condition insisted upon by the Texan government, indicates this 
clearly, and Murphy's compliant course was such as to strengthen rather than 
weaken insistence on this point. (2) Murphy wrote to Upshur, Feb. 15, 1844 
(Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 6), that Houston would not negotiate regarding 
annexation unless the United States would undertake to guard Texas from " all 
the evils " likely to assail her in consequence of " complying with the wishes " 
of this country by entering into a treaty ; and even had the treaty been rejected 
by the Senate of Texas on the ground, say. of illiberal terms, her willingness to 
make it would have been likely, by incensing Mexico and weakening the friendship 
of England and France, to bring most serious " evils " upon Texas, and render 
American protection of her independence necessary. In other words, Houston's 
demand, as reported by Murphy, was equivalent to Jones's. (3) Houston's 
language in the letter of 1847 is not really inconsistent with this view, for 
had the treaty been rejected by the Texan Senate on the ground of illiberal terms, 
this failure could have been construed as chargeable to the American govern- 
ment. (4) As Houston's letter was written in self-defence and after the two 
countries had become one, he may well have desired to shade the instructions 
given to Henderson. (5) He was not a precise man and he wrote from memory, 
(6) Elliot (secret, April 7, 1844), reporting an interview with Houston, said that 
the President ordered Henderson to require, before beginning to negotiate, " that 
the Government of the United States should distinctly guarantee to Texas the 
acknowledgment of it's Independence by Mexico, if the project of annexation 
failed [from any cause] of success." This matter becomes of importance only 
in connection with paragraph 26, though the discussion of it is in place here. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 167 

In this affair of annexation, said he to Jones, " We shall have to be 
as sharp-sighted as lynxes, and wary as foxes," and in seeking the 
reason for his peculiar course at this juncture one must cultivate a 
somewhat similar state of mind. Apparently he argued much as 
before, though of course with a broader scope. Various facts and 
in particular the statements of Clay, Choate and Barrow indicate, 
he said to himself, that no annexation treaty can pass the Amer- 
ican Senate at present. Tyler and Upshur, however, believe the 
opposite. Consequently there is a chance of their making the 
agreement I demand, regarding it as a " merry bond " which they 
would never have to pay. Of course they would be extremely re- 
luctant thus to overstep their authority, but jealousy of England, 
fear of Texan resentment and eagerness for annexation might 
bring them to it ; and the same reasons plus a regard for the national 
honor would probably ensure the keeping of the agreement in some 
form, however unconstitutional the President's action might be con- 
sidered by the people. In the meantime England, eager to have 
the annexation scheme fail, will at last adopt a decided policy on the 
condition of our remaining independent, and will not only obtain 
peace with Mexico for us but grant the commercial advantages we 
desire. The treaty will then fail in 'the American Senate; our 
recognition by Mexico, our alliance with the United States and our 
arrangements with England will stand ; the future of Texas will be 
secure ; and I shall be remembered forever as the founder of a 
nation.-^ 

There was to be sure, a chance that an annexation treaty would 
be accepted by the American Senate, but even in that view Houston's 
grand ambition may have seemed not unreasonable. Ratification 
by the Senate of Texas also would have been essential; and had this 
been refused, it would have been incumbent upon the United States 
to defend her nationality for an indefinite period. Now undoubt- 
edly her Congress and people desired security for themselves and 
their property — particularly their slave property — and were willing 
to join the Union in order to obtain it; but with a guaranty of their 
independence in hand they could have taken time to meditate again 
on the advantages of free commercial relations with Europe. There 
were also, it is true, sentimental influences drawing them strongly 

"Houston to Jones, July 8, 1844: Jones, Memor., 371. Jones (JLetter: Niles, 
Jan. 1, 1848) avowed that he did not believe an annexation treaty would be 
ratified by the American Senate, and Elliot (secret. April 7, 1844) thought Hous- 
ton entertained the same opinion. The evidence before them seemed to prove this. 



l68 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

toward the States; but Houston had recently shown how deftly he 
could turn even an angry Senate at his will, and now — had it been 
placed within his power to ensure the realization of the brilliant 
future that he foresaw for Texas and the splendid fame that he 
appears to have coveted for himself by merely bringing about the 
rejection of the treaty — one can hardly doubt how strenuously he 
would have exerted himself. Both lines of thought as regarded the 
American Senate, however bold they be deemed, were shrewd, and 
Houston's proceedings at this time, the supreme crisis of his life, 
appear to support such a view of his policy. Had merely a fore- 
ordained treaty been contemplated, he could have awaited calmly the 
reports of his agents. But in fact he was so intensely anxious that 
he took the matter out of Jones's hands and planted himself at the 
town which bears his name, so as to receive early intelligence from 
the diplomatic seat of war.^*' 

He found time, however, to sit down and compose a reply to 
Jackson's letters. In this he represented annexation as highly advan- 
tageous for the United States but not for Texas ; yet he added that 
he favored the measure as "wisdom growing out of necessity," 
since at his advanced age he desired to live in an orderly commun- 
ity, and war would bring adt^enturers who might gain control of the 
nation at any annual election. " Now, my venerated friend," he 
concluded, " you will perceive that Texas is presented to the United 
States as a bride adorned for her espousals ;" but this is the third 
attempt at annexation, and it is now or never. If the project fail 
' again, we shall seek protection elsewhere.-^ 

A genial, friendly, open-hearted epistle this appeared to be, and 
possibly so it was ; but one remembers the lynx and the fox, and on 
a second look one discovers something below the surface here. 
The " necessity " seems to have been hardly the result of a craving 
on Houston's part for a quiet existence, for neither his character 
nor his later career supports that theory, and he was too large a man 
to decide a great national question on a selfish and paltry basis. On 

-* See remarks in note 24. Any one who chooses may, however, disregard 
this paragraph, since it appears clear that Houston did not expect the treaty to 
pass the American Senate. (Took) Houston to Hend. and Van Z., April 29, 1844: 
Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 274 (cf. Jones, Memor., 55). 

^Houston to Jackson, Feb. 16, 1844: F. O., Texas, x. Houston's feeling 
toward Jackson was undoubtedly warm. Jan. 31, 1843, he wrote to him of " your 
many acts of affectionate kindness to me, under all circumstances, and in every 
vicissitude of life, in which you have known me " : and signed the letter, '' Thy 
Devoted Friend" (Jackson Pap.). This letter of Feb. 16 was forwarded by 

Jackson to lien. Walker (Jackson t) 1-ewis, March 11, 1844: N. Y. Pub. Lib. 

(Lenox)). 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 1 69 

the Other hand the " necessity " suggested by Upshur in his despatch 
of January 16 was highly important, and we know from Hender- 
son and Van Zandt that Houston so regarded it. The letter, then, 
appears to mean substantially this : Although it is for the interest 
of Texas to remain independent, we have had to consider the danger 
that the United States will be disposed to make us trouble if we 
adopt such a course ; but, as we have now seemed to accept annexa- 
tion in deference to their urgency, if the present movement in that 
sense fails they can say nothing hereafter against our pursuing 
our own policy, and, that no unpleasantness may arise, I hereby 
give due notice both of that fact and of the line we shall 
follow. To this it is necessary to add that when Houston said, Now 
or never, he almost certainly believed it would not be Now. Such a 
missive, directed to Jackson, was in efifect a state paper, and thus we 
seem to find the President making another shrewd move to ensure 
and safeguard Texan independence. Of course Murphy was quite 
unable to fathom a mind of that depth, but he did perceive a cool- 
ness on Jones's part and suspected that he hoped annexation would 
not come to pass.-^ 

All this while Van Zandt continued to be sanguine and urgent, 
and the treaty progressed so far that in half a day it could have been 
completed. With reference to the suggested substitute for incor- 
poration in the great republic, he pointed out to his government that 
an alliance, besides being contrary to the settled policy of the United 
States, would give this country every disadvantage and none of the 
benefits to be expected from annexation, and therefore — especially 
after a rejection of the American overture- — -would be very unlikely 
to meet with favor, while the course of Texas in making such an 
arrangement would offend England and France as much as a will- 
ingness to join the Union. Besides, he had been officially informed 
that no such alliance was feasible. Then on the twenty-eighth of 
February the explosion of a new cannon on the Princeton suddenly 
put an end to Upshur's career ; but after a brief delay Nelson stepped 
into the vacant place as temporary incumbent, and as Tyler desired 
to have the treaty finished by him rather than by the proposed new 
Secretary, the completion of the task appeared to be near at hand.-" 

^ Van Z. and Hend. to Calhoun. April 15, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., 
I sess., 13. Houston may also have had in mind his policy of excitinp; American 
jealousy of England to the pitch of making an alliance -with Texas. Murphy, 
No. 21, Feb. 22, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 7. 

^ It has been inferred from Tyler's letter to Calhoun (Jameson, Calh. Corr., 
939) that the negotiation -was not substantially completed -when the Secretaryship 
was offered to Calhoun, but the letter does not really indicate this. Van Z. No. 
114, Feb. 22; No. 115, March 5, 1844. 



I70 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



So far, although special efforts were made to prepare the nation 
for the great issue, the actual negotiations had proceeded with great 
privacy. This was entirely proper, and the first Chief Justice of 
our Supreme Court had expressly recommended the constitution 
because it provided for secrecy in such business. Under the present 
circumstances reserve was for several reasons peculiarly desirable : 
first, in order to forestall an apprehended protest from England and 
France; secondly, to prevent the Mexicans from retorting with an 
invasion of Texas ; in the third place to save that nation, if possible, 
from losing the good-will of its European friends in case the nego- 
tiations should lead to nothing; fourthly, to lessen the danger that 
American politicians would make the annexation project a party 
question ; and finally to avoid giving the abolitionists time enough 
to organize a grand agitation against it. On the side of Texas 
Houston enjoined strictly upon his agents to keep the proceedings 
from the public; and on the other side Jackson recommended that 
course earnestly to Tyler.^° 

March 20, however, Van Zandt reported that Henderson's ap- 
pointment had become known, and that the opposition press in the 
United States was daily pouring vials of wrath upon the idea of 
such a treaty. Further, he was anxious because he heard nothing 
from Jones and received no news from his colleague except that 
he was coming. The friends of Texas at Washington were urging 
that early action, if any, should be taken. The overwhelming defeat 
of Winthrop's attempt to bring before the House a resolution 
against annexing that country was regarded by many as a test, and 
it seemed highly important that so promising an opportunity should 
not be missed. Two days later he announced the receipt of Jones's 
letter of February 25, showing that less than four weeks were 
needed to go from one Washington to the other, yet he could give 
no further news of Henderson; and perhaps he suspected, as we 
may, that some intentional delay had occurred on the part of Texas 
in the hope of favorable news from the commissioners treating with 
Mexico.^^ 

'" (Jay) Federalist (Dawson), 449. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 278, 287. (Abolsts.) 
Lewis to Jackson, Dec. 4, 1843; Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll. (Houston) To 
Hend., Feb. 15, 1844. (Jackson) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 425, note. 

*'Van Z., Nos. 116, 117, March 20, 22, 1844. (Winthrop) Cong. Globe, 28 
Cong., I sess., 392 (March 15). Van Z. naturally expressed surprise that infor- 
mation regarding so secret an affair had leaked out in Texas. Now one can see, 
on the hypothesis of the text, that Houston may have desired to give notice of 
what was afoot so as to ensure a strong opposition in the American Senate ; 
and both the fact of the leakage and the snapping way in which Jones intimated 
that Van Z. accused the administration of it are perhaps worthy to he remembered. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I7I 

As will be discovered, the outcry against the rumored project 
was indeed fierce in the United States, but this did not put a stop 
to the negotiations. March 25 Van Zandt announced that all of 
Jones's points had been satisfactorily arranged, and that a treaty 
was now ready for Henderson to sign. He was still eager for 
action, fearing that a loss of time would ensure success to the great 
effort already under way in favor of laying the matter over to the 
next session of Congress. Disguises, he felt, were now useless, for 
even the secret law of Texas had been published. The outlook 
was still encouraging, too. " This Texas question will ride down 
and ride over every other," Tyler was reported as saying to Con- 
gressmen, and the opinion seemed reasonable. It appeared impos- 
sible that the Democrats would repudiate Jackson, and many of 
the Whigs seemed likely to join them on this question. On the last 
day of Alarch Senator Fulton wrote to Van Buren that the other 
party were in confusion over the matter, and that it would be 
" death for any Southern man to vote against the Treaty ". Accord- 
ing to a letter in the United States Gazette, both sides were now 
disposed to accept the treaty promptly in order to prevent the 
dreaded question from getting into American politics. Apparently 
the measure could and should be rushed through, and the administra- 
tion was for immediate action.^- 

Elliot, meanwhile, had been dangerously ill at New Orleans ; 
but by the middle of March he knew that Henderson and Miller 
had been sent North, and also that the relations between Texas and 
her enemy had taken a turn for the worse. Naturally he inferred 
that she was looking towards the United States ; and on the twenty- 
second of the month he wrote pointedly to Jones, informing him 
that England and France were still at work in the interest of his 
country, but that in view of the recent action of her government 
he desired for his own a full and frank explanation of her policy. 
The two European powers, he said, could not continue to urge upon 
Mexico a settlement upon one basis, while there was any reason to 
surmise that negotiations were " either in actual existence, or in 
contemplation, proposing a combination of a totally different 
nature."?^ 

^'Van Z., No. ii8, March 25, 1844. (Tyler) Lib.. March 29, 1844, Fulton 
to Van B., March 31, 1844: Van B. Pap. U. S. Gazette: Madis., April 25, 1844. 
(Immediate) Sen. Archer: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 693. 

"Elliot, private, March 7; No. 8, March 15, 1844. Id. to Jones, March 22, 
1844: F. O., Texas, ix. According to Yoakum (Texas, ii., 427), Elliot wrote to 
Houston on March 8 and 22 and was answered. 



172 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



At the same time another danger, feared for some time past, 
assumed a definite shape. Hockley and Wilhams, the commissioners 
appointed to negotiate with Mexico, had begun their discussions at 
Sabinas about the first of December, and at Christmas they reported 
an encouraging outlook; but the Mexican representatives, learning 
that annexation schemes were afoot, withdrew the plan of an 
armistice favorable to Texas. This may have been done from spite, 
or because they did not wish to facilitate negotiations with the 
United States by granting a long truce ; but whatever the cause, 
its result was equally unfortunate. What then followed is rather 
mysterious. But it is certain that Hockley was intensely opposed 
to the sacrifice of nationality ; that the armistice finally agreed upon 
by the commissioners cut away the essential preliminary to incor- 
poration in the United States by referring to Texas as a Department 
of Mexico ; that Hockley and Williams returned to Galveston in 
fine spirits as if pleased with their work; and that they were sup- 
posed by many to have consented to this unpatriotic blow at their 
country for the express purpose of damaging the cause of annexa- 
tion. Of course Houston could not accept an armistice that de- 
scribed Texas in such a way ; the hope of securing undisturbed peace 
and legal independence through recognition by the mother-country 
vanished therefore from the horizon; and the fear of invasion took 
its place.^* 

To meet these difficulties the government resorted once more 
to finesse. Jones replied to Elliot by explaining the critical circum- 
stances of the country, pointing out the apparent inability of Great 
Britain to contribute effectual aid, stating that — should the United 
States give the demanded pledges of protection — annexation would 
seem the best policy, and blandly hoping that this explanation would 
prove "entirely satisfactory" to England; and he then directed 
Van Zandt and Henderson to make the treaty as soon as they con- 

^^Memoria de Guerra, read Jan., 1844. Nat. Intell.. Feb. 7, 1844. Texian 
Democrat, May 15, 1844. (Withdrew) Jones to Elliot, March 18, 1844: Jones, 
Memor., 327. (Favorable to Texas) Texian Democrat, May 15, 1844. (Spite, 
etc.) Elliot, No. 8, March 15, 1844- (Hostile) Hockley to Jones. Feb. 28. 1844: 
Jones, Memor., 324. N, Orl. Courier, April i, 1844. Norton to Calhoun, April 29, 
1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 949. Houston said the commissioners were ex- 
cusable for signing because otherwise they might not have been permitted to 
return home (To Van Z. and Hend., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 274). 
This seems hardly reasonable. It is noticeable, too, that Houston had no condem- 
nation for the apparent willingness of the commrs. to discredit their country and 
block annexation, and one suspects that his astute mind may have been at work. 
The commrs. reached Galveston March 26: Nat. lutcIL, April 8. To Van Z., 
July 13, 1844. Houston to Van Z. and Hend., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corr., 
ii., 274. To A. Smith, March 26, 1844. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 1 73 

veniently could on the best terms to be obtained, should they deem 
these " admissible." Apparently the Texan administration had now 
decided finally, in consequence of the break with Mexico, to join the 
United States if possible. A moment's reflection, however, leads 
one to a very different conclusion. It cannot be supposed that 
Houston intended to accept and recommend to the nation whatever 
sort of a treaty his envoys, one of whom had shown himself dis- 
tinctly pro- American, should choose to sign, for he was by no means 
the man to abdicate in favor of subordinates. Besides, the conclu- 
sion of a treaty, it must be remembered, was in his mind a long way 
short of effecting annexation. One perceives, too, that Jones's 
letter to Elliot was well calculated to bring before the English gov- 
ernment the strongest possible inducements to act vigorously with 
Mexico. Two prime motives, then, can be seen for giving these 
instructions, neither of which signified a wish to enter the gate of 
the Union. One of them was in line with Van Zandt's argument 
that by signing the proposed treaty a strong party determined to 
defend Texas could be created in the United States ; and the other 
was a desire to make effectual, by keenly exciting Elliot's fears of 
annexation, the lever applied to him. This view is perhaps confirmed 
by what ensued, for both of these results followed. The American 
administration resolved to employ all its powers in defence of the 
Texans, and Jones was soon boasting confidentially that European 
guaranties were ready to be offered. At the same time a domestic 
reason for the instructions to Henderson and Van Zandt existed. 
It was essential to have evidence — especially should Mexico begin 
hostilities in earnest — that the Executive had obeyed the will of the 
nation with reference to this affair, and one recalls that similar 
orders, given to Van Zandt immediately after the appropriation of 
the $5,000, had no real significance.^^ 

^° Jones to Elliot, March 25, 1844: F. O., Texas, ix. To Van Z., March 26, 
1844. April 3 Elliot replied, arguing against the course pursued by Texas. An 
interview between Houston and Elliot then took place. Houston explained that his 
secret Message and its consequences had been due to the disposition of Congress 
to take out of his hands the question of annexation. Elliot urged him to notify 
Upshur that an armistice — an armistice, it should be remembered, which recog- 
nized Mexican sovereignty — had been made, and that while Texas continued to 
treat with Mexico all negotiations with the United States not actually concluded 
must cease. The interview was unofficial ; both men appear to have talked 
freely ; and Elliot received the impression that Houston neither believed that 
annexation could be carried through nor personally desired that it should be 
(Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844). To Van Z., March 26, 1844. These instructions 
could not reach Washington in time to have any effect. Van Z., No. 113, Jan. 
20, 1844. Jones to Miller, May 3, 1844: Miller Pap. 



174 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



]\Iarcli 2^ or 28 Henderson reached Washington and explained 
that he had been delayed at least ten days by the boats, which was 
apparently a rather lame excuse for being two weeks or more 
slower than a letter at such a juncture. He found the situation 
somewhat different from what he expected. Not only was Upshur 
no more, but Henry A. Wise, in order to ensure — as he believed 
it would do — the success of the annexation project, had urged that 
the Secretaryship be offered to Calhoun. This was by no means 
agreeable to Tyler. He felt more or less at odds with the powerful 
South Carolinian in consequence of what had occurred in 1840. 
He probably dreaded him as a radical, perhaps feared him as one 
stronger than himself,, and possibly suspected him of a willingness 
to appropriate the credit of gaining Texas. Certainly he understood 
well the feud between him and Jackson, whose assistance in this 
business was essential ; and he knew how the Van Buren and Adams 
factions detested him. By sharp practice, however, Wise extorted 
the President's assent, — the prospect that a treaty would be signed 
by the acting Secretary of State before Calhoun could arrive doubt- 
less helping Tyler to make the appointment.^*^ 

The new incumbent, fully determined to obtain Texas if pos- 
sible, reached Washington on the twenty-ninth of March. In De- 
cember, Maxcy had informed him thai an annexation treaty had 
been substantially completed ; and McDufQe, in offering him — at 
Wise's unauthorized request but in the President's name — the post 
of Secretary, had said that within ten days after appearing at the 
capital he could sign this treaty, that forty Senators would support 
it, and that Tyler expressed hopes of securing Mexico's assent. 
Later, indeed, Calhoun stated that on taking up his work he found 
nothing to sustain him, and carried the project through by his own 
" bold unhesitating course," and Miller wrote to Jackson on the 
seventh of April that the prospect in the Senate was rather unfavor- 
able, that the Whig members were inclined to postpone the matter 
lest it should affect Clay's prospects and a majority of the Whig 

^ Wash. Sped., March 29, 1844. Hend. to Jones, March 30, 1844: Jones, 
Memor., 333. N. Y. Jouni. Com., April 2, 1844. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 291-294, 392. 
Wise. Decades, 221 et seq. (By Nelson) Van Z., No. 115, March 5. 1844; Tyler, 
Tyler, ii., 415. Tyler made the offer March 6, and sent Calhoun's name to the 
Senate at once. He was confirmed unanimously; and, while the Madisonian was 
of course mistaken in holding that its action committed that body to the support of 
annexation, yet — as it knew the treaty was under way and also, according to 
Senator Haywood, that Calhoun favored it — this unanimous welcome appears to 
indicate a strong leaning in that direction (Tyler, Tyler, ii,, 290. Madis., May 
2, 1844. Haywood to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap.). 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I75 

editors opposed the measure, that Van Buren's friends in general 
openly favored it but no one could yet be sure what course that 
leader himself would take, and that some of both parties might 
" fear to approach " the matter. But Calhoun may have been in- 
fluenced by an unconscious desire to do himself justice, and Miller 
by a conscious one to stimulate Jackson's exertions for the cause.^^ 

At all events Henderson thought the outlook warranted proceed- 
ing, and he reported to Jones that although all the leading Whigs 
favored delay and a part of the Democrats — feeling that success in 
this important affair would better the Presidential chances of Tyler 
or Calhoun — leaned the same way, he felt satisfied that some would 
vote for the measure, should it be forced upon them at once, who 
would give it the " go-by " later. He felt sure also that every Demo- 
crat was at that time ready to support it, while the " most knowing 
friends " of Texas on the ground believed that enough Clay men 
would do the same to carry it ; and for such reasons it was decided to 
go forward. In consequence perhaps of this bold stand, the well 
informed representative of the Philadelphia Ledger reported on the 
eighth of April that both parties were now anxious to settle the 
business immediately, so as to get it out of the way and prevent 
Tyler from making it an issue, and that while a few Democrats and 
the Webster Whigs would oppose the treaty, one of these groups 
would balance the other, and consequently the relations of the 
parties would not be affected.^^ 

According to the President, Calhoun accepted the treaty sub- 
stantially as it. had been drawn, contributing only a few new ideas, 
whereas the correspondent of the New York Journal of Commerce 
wrote, and after further investigation repeated, that he remodelled 
the whole document; and it seems likely enough that he did recast 
the form of it, though not that radical changes were made. This 
cost a little time of course, but it raised no important problem. 
Another difficulty, however, proved serious. The American Execu- 
tive, instead of confirming Alurphy's pledges, disavowed them as 

*' (Determined) Calhoun to McDuffie, Dec. 4, 1843 : Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 
552; Id. to Gilmer, Dec. 25, 1843: ib., 539. The British minister, who soon had 
an interview with Calhoun, represented him as " determined at all hazards " to 
effect annexation (Pak.. No, 22, April 14, 1844). Madis.. March 30, 1844. 
Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 10, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 903. Wise, Decades, 
222. McDuffie to Calhoun, March 5, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 934. Cal- 
houn to Mrs. Clemson, May 22. 1845: ib., 656. Miller to Jackson, April 7, 
1844: Jackson Pap. 

*■* Hend. to Jones. March 30, 1844: Jones, Memon, 333, Ledger, April 9, 
1844. 



X 



176 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



going beyond his authority, and therefore a deadlock seemed inevi- 
table. Much discussion took place, no doubt. One may be sure 
that all the considerations presented in Upshur's despatch of Janu- 
ary 16 were strongly urged; and finally the Texan envoys, deciding 
to consult the near and urgent interests of their country in prefer- 
ence to those of a grander but uncertain character, disregarded the 
special instructions given to Henderson, carried the negotiations on 
and through, and then satisfied themselves with a letter written by 
Calhoun on the eleventh of April, which merely promised that a 
strong naval force and all the disposable troops should be concen- 
trated near the frontier to " meet any emergency," and that " during 
the pendency of the treaty " the President would " use all the means 
placed within his power by the Constitution to protect Texas from 
all foreign invasion ". Within a week Houston had suggested to 
Jones that should the American Executive fail to confirm Murphy's 
pledge, it would be easy to tell Henderson that his mission was at 
an end; but on the very day, April 12, when Murphy announced 
officially the disavowal of that pledge, the treaty of annexation was 
signed at Washington, and thus like a house of cards fell Houston's 
elaborate scheme. The United States neither wholly refused to 
defend Texas nor gave an illegal and entangling promise ; and the 
action of the Texan representatives made it practically impossible to 
raise an outcry against the American government.^'' 

The terms of the treaty were described by Van Zandt as the 
best for his country that the Senate could be expected to ratify, 
though less liberal than Tyler, the cabinet and the Southern mem- 

^ Tyler, Tyler, ii., 297. Journal Com., April 17, 1844. Nelson to Murphy, 
March 11, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 10. Nelson expressed the 
belief that Texas was in no immediate danger from Mexico. The substance of 
this despatch was communicated to the Texas government by Murphy on April 
12 (Murphy to Jones, April 12, 1844: ib., 12). Calhoun to Van Z. and Hend., 
April II, 1844: ib., II. Calhoun's pledge differed from Murphy's in that it ex- 
pressly limited the President's promise not only to the pendency of the treaty but 
to his constitutional authority. Moreover it was of course to be interpreted in 
the light of Upshur's despatch of Jan. 16 and Nelson's of March 11 regarding the 
bounds of that authority. Murphy's successor defined them in these words : " Mr. 
Calhoun . . . gives the assurance that, should the exigency arise during the 
pendency of the treaty of annexation, the President would deem it his duty to 
use all the means placed within his power by the Constitution to protect Texas 
from invasion" (Howard to Jones, Aug. 6, 1844: Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 
28) ; and Calhoun stated that this definition was regarded as correct by the 
President himself (To Howard, Sept. 10, 1844: ib., 38). How, then, the promise 
could be described (to quote an eminent historian) as " a directly unconstitu- 
tional usurpation" it is hard to see. Houston to Jones, April 6, 1844: Jones, 
Memor., 336. When they find what Henderson's instructions are, said the Presi- 
dent in this letter, they will " see that the game is to be a two-handed one." All 
through this affair one must remember that Houston was a veteran gamester. 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 1 77 

bers would have been willing to give; and even so he thought the 
prospect of ratification had now become doubtful. On the other 
hand, the Ledger's correspondent, writing on the tenth, represented 
favorable action at that session of Congress as every day more prob- 
able. The vote that he predicted was one each from Maine, Con- 
necticut, New York and Michigan, and two each from New Hamp- 
shire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, Illinois and the twelve slave 
States, — thirty-eight in all, — with New Jersey and Indiana doubtful. 
Indeed he believed that the benefits to be derived from annexation 
by New England would appear in such a light that even the Senators 
of Massachusetts might vote " Yea." " I confine myself strictly 
to facts as they have come to my knowledge, from sources to be 
relied upon," he concluded. Calhoun wrote to Murphy within 
twenty-four hours after the treaty was signed : " I entertain little 
doubt of its approval" by the Senate; "the voice of the country, 
so far as it can be heard, is so decidedly in favor of annexation, 
that any hesitancy on the part of the doubtful will probably give 
way to it " ; and he said in particular the next month that opposition 
from Clay and Van Buren had not been anticipated. A little later 
the Madisonian stated that when the treaty was concluded intelli- 
gent and disinterested men believed that within a few weeks the 
administration would be supported by a clear majority of the people, 
and that nobody was able to see how men really in favor of annexa- 
tion could neglect this golden opportunity to win a triumph over 
both foreign and domestic foes. Two days after the signing of the 
treaty the British minister, who was in close touch with a number 
of Senators, admitted that he felt "less sanguine" than previously 
of its rejection. In short, when the agreement was consummated, 
although a two-thirds vote of the Senate was necessary, it seemed 
to have a good fighting chance of success. Yet it was very plain 
that the measure labored under three very serious disadvantages. 
The most urgent grounds for it, those supplied by the Texan 
envoy at London, could not be made public ; at any moment it was 
liable to become a party issue ; and not only politics but the relations 
of certain leading public men were so tense, that only by the extra- 
ordinary good fortune of practically unanimous consent could it 
hope to succeed. *° 

^'Van Z. and Hend., April 12. 1844. Phil. Ledger, April 12, 1844. To 
Murphy, No. 17, April 13. 1844. Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr., 592. Madis., June 10, 1844. Pak., No. 22, April 14, 1844. 

13 



178 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

The treaty was forwarded to Texas by messenger, and Murphy 
went up with the bearer to lay it before Houston. At the interview 
which followed the President expressed " his hearty approbation 
of every part " of the agreement, reported the charge. Murphy 
then communicated to him the substance of a despatch just re- 
ceived from his government with reference to protecting Texas 
during the pendency of the treaty, which amounted of course to no 
more than Calhoun had promised her envoys at Washington; and 
upon this Houston " rose to his feet and gave utterance to his feel- 
ings of gratitude . . . for this distinguished manifestation of the 
generous and noble policy, which ruled in the Councils " of the 
Union. *^ 

Apparently it was a beautiful and ideal scene, marked by a simple 
but lofty spirit and a noble frankness of expression. Yet Houston 
had written to Henderson and Van Zandt within a fortnight that he 
believed England and France would offer to guarantee independence 
and peace if Texas would agree never to join the United States, 
and that " in such an event " they could " not fail to discover what 
would be the proper course of Texas " ; Jones informed Elliot that 
the conclusion of the treaty " was a source of great mortification 
and disappointment to General Houston and himself " ; and before 
long the President "expressed great dissatisfaction" to Murphy's 
successor in strong, passionate and even menacing language with 
reference to that same " generous and noble policy " of the United 
States. If one could feel that perhaps too artful a look has been 
given to his course in this account of it, here could be found suffi- 
cient reassurance ; and if his real attitude in regard to the treaty 
needs explanation, it may probably be found in what he wrote at 
this time to Henderson and Van Zandt : " We cannot go back, and 

*' Murphy to Calhoun, April 29, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. To 
Murphy, No. 17, April 13, 1844. 

^-Houston to Hand, and Van Z., April 16, 1844: Record Book 44, p. 206, 
Tex. State Dept. (Jones) Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844. Howard, conf., Aug. 
7, 1844. Houston to Hend. and Van Z., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 274. 
May I, 1844, the Telegraph and Texas Register of Houston stated, as news from 
the United States, that Clay desired to have the question of annexation submitted 
to the people, which meant that he did not wish any action on the subject taken by 
the Congress then in session. Of course this news arrived some hours at least 
before it appeared in print, and apparently it could have reached Jones by May 2 
or 3. May 3 Jones wrote to Miller, secretary of the special legation at Wash- 
ington, D. C, that he believed the Whigs would have to vote for the treaty, but 
that postponement would be rejection ; and in that case European guaranties of 
Texan independence could easily be obtained (Miller Pap.). Was this written to 
promote the ratification of the treaty? The United States Senate had voted on 
March 25 to adjourn on May 27, and Jones could not have supposed his letter 



THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 179 

therefore we must march forward with decisive steps." The agree- 
ment had been signed; nothing could be gained by taking offence; 
and the only question to consider at present was how to make the 
best of the situation thus created. *- 

would arrive in time to exert any influence, even if he could possibly do so in 
opposition to Clay. Does it prove that he believed the treaty would be ratified ? 
No, for we have a direct statement from him that he never entertained such a 
belief. The object of the letter seems to have been to say: We have made the 
treaty ; we demand that it be ratified at this session of Congress ; we tell you that 
if it is not, we shall turn to Europe ; and now if this come to pass you cannot 
blame us. It was obviously of great importance to prevent the United States 
from having a ground of complaint should Texas pursue an anti-American policy. 
May 6, Houston wrote to Murphy dwelling on the vast possibilities of inde- 
pendent Texas backed by European nations ; and announcing that, should the 
treaty fail, he would require any further negotiations on the subject to take place 
in Texas (Crane, Houston, 366). Upon this letter light is thrown (i) by what 
Jones said regarding European guaranties', and (2) by Murphy's report (dated 
May 8) that the Texan administration had opened the negotiations reluctantly and 
would promptly seize " the first occasion to change its policy," and that Houston 
showed so little faith in the success of the treaty that it was necessary " to keep 
near him " constantly. The remarks made above regarding the purpose of Jones's 
letter seem to apply to Houston's also. Both appear to have been written in pur- 
suance of a deliberate intention to follow an anti-American line of policy yet 
make it impossible for the United States to take offence ; and evidence of this 
design has been seen before. Cf. paragraphs 23-28 of this Chapter. 



IX 

The Annexation Issue is Placed Before the Country 

The opponents of the administration were very fond of assert- 
ing that the annexation issue had been " sprung " upon the country. 
To a considerable extent this was true; but it was owing mainly 
to their own course. Many influential editors would not recognize 
the foreshadowings that we have easily discovered, and kept their 
readers quite in ignorance of the prospect that soon the Texas ques- 
tion might come up again. As early as the first of December, 1843, 
the Madisonian complained sharply that the two great party organs 
at the capital, the National Intelligencer of the Whigs and the Globe 
of the Democrats, were ignoring the subject. Why such a course 
was pursued it is not hard to divine. There was a strong desire to 
fight the impending Presidential contest on issues already before 
the public, because the bearings of these and their influence upon 
the electorate could fairly well be gauged, while Texas — more than 
anything else — was liable to upset all the calculations of the political 
managers. If, as seemed likely, Tyler desired to excite an agitation 
on that subject, a cold silence, implying that such madness was quite 
incredible, was evidently the policy best calculated to discourage 
him ; and this course, as an additional merit, would make it possible 
to cry out, " A Dark Plot ! " should he persist. 

On the tenth of February, 1844, the National Intelligencer took 
from the Houston Telegraph an item of news to the eft'ect that 
Upshur had proposed some weeks before to negotiate regarding 
annexation, and on the twenty-sixth it quoted the New Orleans 
Republican as stating that a substantially unanimous resolution of 
the Texan Congress in favor of that project, passed early in Janu- 
ary, had been laid before the American Senate in a secret session, 
that a vote of forty to nine in the same sense was cast by this body, 
and that a treaty, drawn for the purpose without delay, had been 
forwarded south. About the same time the Philadelphia North 
American cited the Telegraph as announcing that thirty-five United 
States Senators were disposed to ratify such an agreement, and the 
Galveston Civilian as declaring this statement " well founded " ; 

180 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY l8l 

and no doubt the editors of the Intelligencer were accustomed to 
inspect the North American, whose Washington correspondent one 
of them was said to be. At any rate they saw a letter from the 
capital, published in New York on February 23 and subsequently 
mentioned by themselves, which asserted that Tyler and Upshur, 
believing that thirty-eight Senators would vote for annexation, were 
about to conclude a treaty. As will appear in a later chapter. Clay 
wrote from New Orleans to Senator Crittenden about the middle 
of February that such an agreement was under way, and it can 
hardly be doubted that information so thrilling reached the editors 
of the Intelligencer. " For months " before April came to an end, 
said the Democratic Central Committee of Virginia in a formal 
address, " it had been known to the whole country, that the Execu- 
tive of the United States was in treaty with the government of 
Texas, for the purpose of affecting the re-annexation of that 
country to our Union ". But all the rather definite assertions of the 
press, added to all the previous foreshadowings and all that a 
journal so near the heart of affairs could readily ascertain, drew 
no editorial comment from the great Whig newspaper except — with 
reference to the item in the Republican — that it was devised for 
" wanton mischief or interested speculation." The influential Bee 
of New Orleans treated all the talk as idle; the New York Tribune, 
which had recently printed a communication describing the annexa- 
tion plan as " most undeniably dead," did not correct this impres- 
sion; and the Atlas of Boston, which had professed at the very end 
of February to observe no signs of " any serious or well concerted 
efforts " in that direction to be made at the coming session of Con- 
gress, appeared to hold the same opinion still. ^ 

Daniel Webster, however, was for some reason on the alert. 
While in Washington during the winter of 1843-44 he inferred 
from a remark of Upshur's that something was on foot in regard 
to Texas, and on investigating the matter became satisfied of this. 
He proceeded then to write a couple of papers on the subject and 
offer them to the Intelligencer. On his way north he stopped at 
New York and left similar articles with King. ]\Iarch 13 he rc- 

' See General Note, p. i. Telegraph, Jan. 24: Nat. IntclL, Feb. 10, 1844. 
N. Orl. Repub., Feb. 15: Nat. Intell.. Feb. 26, 1844. No. Aiiier.. Feb. 19, 1844. 
(Wash, letter) Nat. Intell., March 18, 1844. See also (e. g.) N. Orl. Picayune. 
Feb. 14, and N. Y. Courier and Eiiq., March 5, 1844. See Chapter xii. (Cent. 
Comm.) Rich. Eiiq.. May lo. 1844. Bee: N. Orl. Courier, March 25, 1844. 
Tribune. March 2, 1844. Atlas, Feb. 28, 1844. 



l82 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

quested Charles Allen of Worcester to have his January letter, 
addressed to citizens of that county, published at once if it had not 
already appeared, dictating what should be said by the editor in 
placing it before his readers and adding, " It is high time to alarm 
the country." And then he went on to Boston, eager to arouse the 
nation against what he termed "an abominable project."^ 

Even that mighty voice, however, was not potent enough to break 
the spell. Gales and Seaton of the Intelligencer were unwilling — 
though finally they consented — to bring out his papers, and the 
Boston Atlas opposed him. Webster's purpose, asserted the Wash- 
ington correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger, was to gain an 
advantage over Clay, and, added his colleague of the New York 
Herald, secure the Whig nomination for the Presidency himself. It 
was from friends of Clay, states Webster's biographer, that the 
opposition to the anti-annexation crusade proceeded ; and so, what- 
ever be true as to the motives of the great New England statesman, 
'we seem to reach fairly clear evidence regarding those who stood 
for silence in his party. Among the Democrats like causes pro- 
duced like effects. What Van Buren's attitude on the question 
would be was unknown ; and the Globe, doubtless anxious to cause 
him no embarrassment, remained as dumb as its neighbor.^ 

But at last silence became impossible. On the fourteenth of 
March the North American gave notice that an annexation treaty 
had been signed. This was improbable, for Henderson had not yet 
reached Washington; but it appears that statements about the sub- 
stantial completion of an agreement were given out by a relative — 
a son, it was intimated — of the President himself. Accordingly two 
days later the Intelligencer published an editorial, in which not a few 
assumed at once to discover Webster's hand, declaring that under the 
existing circumstances the scheme of annexing Texas was opposed 
by a " host of considerations " based upon good faith and expedi- 
ency, and that the " unauthorized and almost clandestine manner " 
in which our government had " gone a-wooing" to Texas humiliated 
the nation.* 

^Curtis, Webster, ii., 231. Webster to Allen, March 13, 1844: Writings, xvi., 
417. Webster, Letter, Jan. 23: No. Amer., March 19, 1844. For some reason, 
however, Webster did not come out boldly and openly. 

'Curtis, Webster, ii., 231. Ledger, April 4, 1844; the Madis., March 17, 
1845. said the same. Herald, April 6, 1844. {Globe) Benton, View, ii., 587. 

*No. Amer., March 14, 1814. N. Y. Tribune, March 18, 19, 1844. Tyler, 
Tyler, ii., 305, says that after the negotiations were substantially completed no 
particular secrecy was enjoined or observed. Nat. IntelL, March 16, 1844. 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 183 

The secret — so long an open one — was now suddenly discovered 
by the opposition press, and its guns awoke. As a frigid silence 
had not discouraged the President, the game was now to frighten 
him from his purpose by raising a tremendous clamor, as devils 
are driven away in certain parts of the globe with shouts and tom- 
toms. Such a proceeding on the part of the " Accident," the " De- 
plorable Accident," the " Shocking Accident " then occupying the 
White House, a mere " President for the time being," was an un- 
paralleled atrocity. The " secrecy and haste " of the negotiations 
were said to prove that Tyler knew the people did not favor his 
plan. So great an extension of territory might be fatal to the 
Union, it was protested. The annexation of Texas would lead to 
war and a bloody career of conquest. The next step would be to 
seize Mexico, and the third to invade Canada. Even should not 
these consequences follow, it would be a dishonest and treacherous 
attack on a friendly neighbor and violate the compact on which the 
Union reposed. It meant disunion or more slavery ; or at least it 
would result in a Southern preponderance that would smother the 
free States. The value of all lands in the Southwest would fall. 
A huge Texan debt would be saddled upon the country. Moreover 
that "pauper republic," that "wilderness," was not worth having, 
and could not give us a title if we wanted it. Shrillest of all per- 
haps rose the voice of the Boston Atlas, denouncing the measure 
as a "mad project," "irrational," "preposterous," "manifestly 
against the provisions of the Constitution," " diametrically at vari- 
ance with the most obvious interests of the Country," the con- 
temptible scheme of a " poor miserable traitor " temporarily acting 
as President, and a scheme, too, that was liable to end in ruin, blood- 
shed, the downfall of the American government and the overthrow 
of Republican principles, " We will resist it," exclaimed the edi- 
tor, " with pen, with tongue, with every nerve and muscle of our 
body . . . with the last drop of our blood." A phalanx of twenty 
newspapers was marshalled by the Intelligencer against the propo- 
sition, upon which, however, the Washington Spectator commented 
that fifteen of the editors were of Yankee birth, two of English and 
the rest of unknown extraction. Full attention was given to the 
political aspects of the subject, and a purpose in Tyler's mind to 
embarrass the parties and embroil the sections, hoping desperately 
to snatch some personal advantage out of the general turmoil, was 
readily discovered. In particular, said the New York Tribune, the 



184 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

objects were to make Clay unpopular with North or with South, 
place the Acting President '' at the head of a local feeling if not of 
a party," increase the strength of the abolitionists by rousing anti- 
slavery sentiment, and thus draw far more votes from the Whigs 
than from the Democrats. ° 

One is a little inclined to suspect a touch of Mexican influence 
in the outcry, especially on finding the measure described as the 
" game of a set of self-exiled adventurers, many of whom would 
not dare to re-enter the territory of the Union, and a cabal of gam- 
blers in Texan loans, who had risked little and who had counted 
upon princely fortunes " in case of success ; and perhaps the sus- 
picion is not wholly destitute of basis. In October, 1842, the Mexican 
minister to the United States reported to his government that in 
order to guide public opinion he had established useful relations 
with the editors of the best periodicals in Boston, New York, Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore and other cities. At New Orleans as late as 
September, 1844, the ^Mexican consul was subsidizing a certain 
paper, and it does not seem extremely difficult to trace the effects 
in its columns. At least seven times during 1844 the Madisonian 
asserted that the Intelligencer was in the pay of Mexico, alleging 
that Thompson, a bearer of despatches to our minister in that 
country, had discovered the fact while on his mission ; and a corre- 
spondent of James K. Polk informed him that Thompson had the 
proofs in his possession. No doubt, however, the passions and 
interests involved in the question of annexation, viewed as a purely 
American affair, were strong enough to explain a vast deal of 
excitement.^ 

Day by day the Madisonian endeavored to make head against 
the storm, though obviously its arguments and appeals were not 
likely to reach any large percentage of the partisan voters. When 
the Intelligencer first announced that annexation was on foot it 
merely replied, " Time will disclose " ; but in a few days it boldly 
predicted that within a month all would stand united for the meas- 
ure, since it appealed alike " to the interests and honor of all." At 
one time it repeated the facts and views of Walker's letter, declar- 

^Nat. IntcU., March 25, 26; April 4, 6, 12, 16, 22, 1844, quotes from many 
newspapers; Detroit Adv., March 28; April 10. 22, 27, 1844; Atlas. March 19, 21, 
30, 1844; Sped., March 25. 1844. Trihune. March 19, 1844. See also the Bait. 
Clipper, March 25; April 15; No. Aiiicr., March 27, 30. 1844. 

"No. Amcr., April 5, 1844. Almonte, No. 26, Oct. 12, 1842. (Mex. Consul) 
Arrangoiz, No. 321, Oct. 25, 1842; No. 99, Sept. 12, 1844. Madis.. July 29; 
Aug. 3, 10; Sept. 25, etc., 1844. Davis to Polk. July 25. 1844: Polk Pap. 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 1 85 

ing that the evils apprehended from annexation were " future and 
contingent," while the promised advantages were '' immediate, im- 
portant and certain " for every section. At another, referring to 
the emphatic action of the Democratic House of New York in favor 
of receiving the petitions against slavery offered in Congress, it 
called upon the "insulted and injured" South to stand united 
against a " great and alarming danger." Again, it asserted that 
annexation would have little effect upon slavery except to trans- 
fer negroes from one part of the country to another, and would 
cause the representation of that interest in Congress to lose 
strength. In one issue it pointed out quite plainly enough for the 
wayfaring man that annexation was an administration measure, 
and that its friends had both the will and the power to reward or 
punish, whereas its enemies would feel no indebtedness to those 
who joined the opposition ; and in another it argued elaborately that 
should Texas be acquired and cotton be raised there by emigrants 
from the United States, the total amount produced would remain 
about the same as before, and the old American plantations could 
be devoted to corn ; whereas were the Texan crop, stimulated by 
British capital, to reach the English manufacturers free of duty, 
and the American crop, dear on account of the exhaustion of our 
soil, to be the exclusive reliance of the American spinner, British 
cottons would be able to pay our tariff and still undersell our own 
goods." 

No less interesting perhaps were certain points of a more special 
kind. "Upon advisement" the Madisonian assured the public 
that Tyler's project was not intended to operate for or against either 
party, explaining that at one period Adams and Clay, at another 
Jackson and Van Buren, had labored to acquire that selfsame 
territory, and thus both sides had committed themselves to the 
plan. "Every man," urged the editor, "may support it, and still 
maintain his position in the ranks of any party " ; and surely no 
one can deny the wisdom of a measure on which, for a long term 
of years, all political creeds have been as one while differing upon 
everything else. No State would change from Clay to Van Buren 
or vice versa, should a treaty be made and ratified ; and certainly 
Clay, the champion of protective duties, would not be thrown over 
by the tariff men for simply espousing the side of Texas. If such 

^ Madis., March 12. 16, 23, 28; April 11, 18, 1844. Of course it is un- 
necessary to present all the arguments, good or bad, employed. Any one desiring 
to examine them will wish to read the documents himself at length. 



1 86 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

an increase of area was not dangerous when for a considerable 
period unwearied efforts were made to buy this territory, it cer- 
tainly cannot be dangerous now. If Tyler's plan is opposed lest he 
gain credit from it, are not his opponents likely to earn discredit? 
If the leaders of both parties have tried to obtain Texas, should 
Texas be refused simply because offered by him? If the President's 
motive is to arouse a whirlwind of popularity, as his enemies allege, 
and be carried into the White House by it, can he be accused also 
of keeping these negotiations secret because in fear of public opinion? 

Peculiarly cheerful was Mr. Jones, the devoted editor of the 
Madisonian, with reference to the charge of negotiating " in the 
dark " and " springing " the issue upon the nation. The question 
has been up, he pointed out, from the period of Madison's adminis- 
tration; eight years have passed since the subject of annexation 
came before the people and their representatives ; Jackson favored 
the measure and was re-elected President ; all the previous efforts 
to obtain that territory were made in secret, and nothing prevented 
the " springing " of a treaty in those days except the failure of the 
negotiations ; Washington and Jefferson negotiated " in the dark " ; 
Webster endeavored to secure a great accession of territory [north- 
ern California] by diplomacy so " clandestine " that probably not a 
thousand persons ever heard of it, and his negotiations leading up 
to the Ashburton treaty were equally kept from the public ; as a 
matter of fact the Texas affair has been so well understood that 
Mexico has openly taken umbrage; and finally no one can deny that 
the Senators are quite familiar with the matter. It is no doubt the 
" honest hope of the President," added the Madisonian, " that the 
country will award his Administration due praise for accomplish- 
ing this most beneficial measure," but can that be termed unpa- 
triotic? Surely not. On the other hand, to work against such a 
manifest national advantage is "hideously" anti-American, and 
fully in line with the still fiercer hostility exhibited in its day against 
the purchase of Louisiana.* 

Between the extremes, a considerable number of journalists — 
particularly on the Democratic side — undertook to pursue a moder- 
ate course. The great objection here in the North, said the New 
York Journal of Commerce, is based upon slavery; but at present 
that institution is legal in the whole of Texas, and in the case of 
annexation we could eliminate it from half of the territory. Should 

* Madis., March 30; April 4, 5, 6, ii, 12, 15, 16, 23, etc., 1844. 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 187 

the incorporatioii of that country lead to war with England, sug- 
gested the New York Herald, we can look to France for aid. " We 
would infinitely rather Texas would remain as she is — an indepen- 
dent nation," remarked the Boston Post, but she is not strong 
enough to stand alone, and even if the arguments against annexation 
seem at the North almost insuperable, all the talk about an " infernal 
plot " is clearly for political effect. The Pcnnsylvanian summed 
up its impressions thus : " That the territory of Texas once formed 
part of the domain of the Union, from which it was severed by a 
most erroneous policy; that its present inhabitants, by a large major- 
ity, indeed almost unanimously, desire to form part of it again ; 
that they are Americans in language, habits, government, institu- 
tutions, and nearly altogether by birth ; that foreign European 
powers, and England especially, are striving by every art to which 
nations secretly and openly resort, to obtain influences and priv- 
ileges there which must be adverse to the United States, and deeply 
injurious to their interests and commerce — these are facts which 
are too palpable to admit of contradiction."'' 

Particularly interesting was the course of the Philadelphia 
Ledger. On the twenty-sixth of March it pronounced the acquisi- 
tion of Texas entirely impracticable for the time being; but three 
days later it conceded that should a European power undertake to 
acquire the country as a colony, " its annexation to the Union would 
be our duty." " Let us suppose," it continued, " that Britain seeks 
a colonization, or offensive and defensive alliance with Texas, and 
then ask what, in such a contingency, is our duty? Our reply is 
annexation ; with the consent of Mexico, if it can be obtained, and 
without such consent, if it be not obtainable." Great Britain, 
argued the editor, desires Texas as a market, as a depot for smug- 
gling goods into the United States and Mexico, as a station for 
naval operations against New Orleans, as a base for working upon 
our slave population, and as a step towards the China trade by 
way of Oregon ; and moreover, having abolished slavery in her 
colonies in order to develop markets there for her manufactures, 
she now desires to protect her colonics against competition by abol- 
ishing slavery everywhere. This was a marked advance, and within 
three weeks the journal was dwelling on the injury to Northern 
manufacturers that would result from a British monopoly of Texas, 

^Journal Com., March 30, 1844. Herald, March 23, 1844. Post, March 25, 
1844. Pcnnsylvanian, March 9, 1844. 



1 88 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

and the losses that would be suffered by Northern ship-owners 
were European goods to be carried to Galveston in English vessels 
and then be smuggled into the United States, instead of coming to 
American ports in American bottoms.^" 

All this while the Washington Globe remained passive. Blair, 
the editor, was ill ; but he saw visitors and could of course have dic- 
tated a line of action. Apparently he did not know what line to 
adopt, though Van Zandt had been assured by a member of Con- 
gress that he would favor the President's policy in this affair. 
Benton, who was in a position to know, states that Walker asked 
Blair to ascertain Van Buren's opinion on the subject, and that 
Blair, not suspecting a trap, wrote to the ex-President but received 
no reply. At length, however, Jackson grew impatient, and on the 
twelfth of April he urgently requested the editor to take up his pen 
in the cause, for which reason or for some other on the evening of 
the fifteenth the Globe spoke. A painful illness, Blair explained, 
has compelled us to be silent up to this time, but we earnestly favor 
the recovery of what was once ours. If IMexico ever had a title to 
Texas, her citizens have won it by successful rebellion. Yet it is 
proper to gain the consent of the former owner of the territory, if 
possible, and to pay her an equivalent. Pakenham has been sent 
to Washington to prevent annexation ; the British press and party 
in the United States are against the measure ; and it is evident that 
England is aiming to distract and divide us. These facts of them- 
selves are enough to point out our path. It is said that Tyler has 
brought up the question for his own political advantage and the 
benefit of the scrip-holders. If so, it does not matter, for every 
great measure designed for the public good is accompanied with 
private and selfish schemes. We feel, however, that a secret treaty 
will not answer. The representatives of both countries must 
approve of the measure ; but if that be done, we see no objection to 
immediate annexation. ^^ 

Doubtless many of the persons interested in Texas lands, bonds 
and scrip exerted themselves to mould public opinion, but it seems 
impossible to form any accurate or even approximate notion as to the 
extent or the eff'ect of such influences. The Washington corre- 

^^ Ledger, March 26, 29, and in the Wash. Globe of April 20, 1844. 

"Van Z., No. iii, Nov. 30, 1843. Benton, View, ii., 588. Jackson to Blair, 
April 12, 1844: Jackson Pap. Wash. Globe, April 15, 1844. Raymond (to Jones, 
April 24. 1844) understood Blair as advocating delay; and certainly the execu- 
tion of his plan would have required time. 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 189 

spondent of the North American pointed out Mercer, at one time 
President of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, Mason, an ex-Governor 
of Michigan, Duff Green and Senator Walker as financially inter- 
ested in such properties ; but Walker promptly denied the allegation, 
— though he did not deny that his father-in-law had settled in the 
Lone Star republic, — and possibly the others were mentioned with 
no more justice than he. The bond-holders and land-scrip-holders 
have great influence, said John P. Kennedy, a Maryland Congress- 
man, in a public letter ; but a statement like that helps us little. " I 
have no doubt," wrote Thomas Clayton from Washington, " that 
great corruption is at the bottom [of the Texas excitement]. The 
lands of Texas are a fine fund of corruption, and the Bonds are 
here, I understand, in considerable amount, and at present worth 
about ten cents in the dollar, but if the admission takes place, will 
be worth one hundred cents for the dollar, for it is admitted that 
the general government is to assume the debts of Texas, and to take 
her public lands encumbered with fraudulent grants for the whole 
of it." Considerable effect should be attributed to such interests, 
but financial motives far more widely distributed weighed on the 
other side; and after all, in a case where the actions of a public 
man were sure to be so closely watched, private considerations of a 
paltry sort could exert but little influence either way," 

Equally intangible but much more easily estimated was the 
influence of Jackson, the Mohammed of the Democratic party, 
March 22 the Richmond Enquirer published his letter of February, 

1843, ^^d it was very widely copied of course. About the same time 
he issued another. This is the golden moment, he insisted ; and if 
Texas be not accepted now, she will necessarily go over to England. 
The opinions of the ex-President, a popular hero and prophet, were 
on a far higher plane than mere editorial dicta however clever or 
emphatic, and the sentiment of the people could not fail to be 
affected.^" 

On the other side as well, efforts were made to rise above the 
style of newspaper polemics. In April Theodore Sedgwick con- 

^-No. Amer.: Newark Adz'., April i, 1844. N. Y. Journal Com., April 13, 

1844. Nat. IntelL, May 21, 1844. T, Clayton to J, M. Clayton. March 25, 1844: 
Clayton Pap. (Motives) Tyler. Tyler, ii., 323. The tariff interest, the fear of 
the migration of planters and slaves to Texas, the fear of the depreciation of 
lands, etc., counted. 

'^ Tyler, Tyler, ii., 305. Benton (View, ii., 587) says the letter was offered 
to Blair, but — from a feeling of good-will towards Van Buren — declined. The 
date was changed, apparently by accident, from 1843 to 1844. l"-'t was soon cor- 
rected. Jackson, March 11, 1844: Madis., April 3, 1844. 



190 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



tributed a series of articles to the New York Evening Post, issued 
later as a pamphlet, in which he replied to Walker's famous Letter. 
Unfortunately he began by proving over-much, — to wit, that under 
the constitution Texas could not legally be acquired by any method 
whatsoever, a conclusion that was very likely to strike the average 
sensible man as a reductio ad absurdum of his argument. Then he 
went on to prove what was not a fact, namely, that secret negotiating 
with foreign powers was a novel and dangerous proceeding; and 
after this achievement he undertook to prove what only a select 
portion of the community were able to believe, — viz., that his 
authority was higher than General Jackson's on the question of 
defending New Orleans against the British. With equal skill, how- 
ever, and better omens numerous other points were urged : the moral 
obligation to observe a treaty, the seriousness of a war, the sound- 
ness of Washington's advice to avoid foreign complications, the 
dishonor of wronging a weak nation, the difficulty of defending 
Texas itself in case of a war with England, the impossibility of 
appropriating all the Gulf territory that could furnish cotton and 
sugar to Great Britain in exchange for her manufactures, and the 
danger of increasing sectional interests and therefore sectional dis- 
sensions by incorporating remote and dissimilar people, — though in 
every case room was left for some difference of opinion as to the 
applicability of the principle. The fact that for six and a half years 
England had not attempted to form even a close alliance with Texas 
was appealed to as proof that she entertained no designs inimical 
to Texan independence or American interests, and the fact that in- 
domitable freemen from our own West had settled beyond the Sabine 
was cited as good evidence that she would never be permitted to 
colonize there. Walker, maintained Sedgwick with truth, had 
greatly exaggerated the value of the markets that annexation would 
throw open to the North, and the harm that smuggling might do 
should not that measure be accepted. Gross errors in the Senator's 
defense of slavery were exposed ; and finally, reaching the heart of 
his message, the writer asserted that as the real aim was to enlist all 
the energies of the national government for the perpetuation of 
slavery, the true issue was upon that question. It was an able, ele- 
vated and forcible presentation of the case, about as correct on the 
whole as the argument it undertook to refute though far less win- 
ning, and no doubt it had effect ; but as a broad and statesmanlike 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY IQI 

view of the international issues involved it was made very lame by 
the author's unavoidable want of knowledge.^* 

Effective, too, was another demonstration on the same side. On 
the evening of April 24 three thousand persons assembled at the 
Tabernacle in New York City, listened attentively to the venerable 
Albert Gallatin, who presided over the meeting, and to other note- 
worthy speakers, and passed certain resolutions brought in by David 
Dudley Field. The gist of these was that since the United States 
had recognized Texas as a part of Mexico and Texas had recently 
described herself as a ^Mexican province, the annexation of that 
territory would flagrantly violate our treaties with a neighboring 
country and would even be equivalent to a declaration of war, — a 
war that would dishonor the nation and launch it upon a career of 
aggrandizement in order to make a worthless acquisition and extend 
the curse of slavery. No one observed that we had formerly recog- 
nized Mexico as a part of Spain yet afterwards acknowledged her 
independence, nor that the recent description of Texas as a Mexican 
Department had proceeded from two men destitute of authority to 
do such an act. The logic of the resolutions appeared unanswerable, 
and they were cordially adopted. ^^ 

Many looked very naturally to Congress for light on the perplex- 
ing subject, but what occured in that body served on the whole to 
excite rather than guide public opinion. Beginning to be numerous 
during the latter part of ]\Iarch, petitions, memorials and resolutions 
against annexation appeared frequently in the House and still more 
often in the Senate. Prompted by Webster, Robert C. Winthrop of 
Massachusetts attempted on the fifteenth of that month to introduce 
a resolution in the lower chamber to the effect that " no proposition 
for the annexation of Texas to the United States ought to be made, 
or assented to, by this government " ; but a hundred and twenty-two 
votes against forty refused to suspend the rules in order to admit it. 
Ten days later, when Hughes of Missouri oft'ered a resolution calling 
for the occupation of Oregon, Black of Georgia proposed, an amend- 
ment looking to the re-annexation of Texas, and the amendment was 
accepted by Hughes ; but the resolution was laid on the table by a 
strong majority. Little guidance could be derived from a com- 
parison of these votes. ^° 

" Sedgwick, Thoughts. 
"N. Y. Tribune, April 25, 1844. 

" See the published Journals from day to day. Curtis, Webster, ii., 231. 
Winthrop : Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 392. Hughes : ib., 434. Pakenham (No. 

4 



192 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



One note, however, seemed to rise clear above the confusion, 
especially in the popular branch of the national legislature, — the 
note of protest against all British interference in the affair. The 
signers of an Illinois petition against Tyler's supposed project ex- 
plained through one of their number that after all they would rather 
take Texas than let England have it; while Ingersoll, chairman of 
the committee on foreign affairs, declared with reference to annexa- 
tion that it was a question between the United States and Great 
Britain, and said in the House : " I would give Great Britain to un- 
derstand that that is exclusively an American question, . . . with 
which England has nothing to do, and with which we would not 
suffer her to have anything to do." But however clear sounded this 
note, it was by no means cooling.^'' 

For some time after the annexation issue came thus before the 
country it did not wear a partisan aspect. It was commonly repre- 
sented as a scheme of Tyler, the man without a party, to advance his 
personal interests. " Tyler and Texas," cried the New York 
Tribune, is the slogan that is expected to rout both Clay and Van 
Buren and continue the reigning dynasty. But about the middle of 
April Botts, a brilliant though erratic Virginia politician, attempted 
in a public address to make capital for the Whig party by identifying 
it with the opposition to Texas. This was ominous, for such an 
idea was like the letting out of waters. Besides threatening ruin 
to the treaty, which could only hope to pass the Senate as a non- 
partisan measure designed for the general good, it foretokened the 
full measure of political arts, prejudices and passions. ^^ 

Some tried to remain cool amid the rising excitement. The 
Charleston Courier for example urged that the question was " one of 
grave interest and important results," and that "its happy adjust- 
ment would need the best minds and hearts of the country " ; but 
only the few listened to such counsels. Reason, statesmanship and 
regard for the common weal were generally forgotten, while prej- 
udice, partisanship, sectionalism, elevated but short-sighted philan- 
thropy, financial self-interest, hatred of Tyler, well founded but un- 
reasoning distrust of England, and everything else that could 

16, March 28, 1844) reported that the vote on Hughes's resolution was due to the 
combined opposition of those who objected to the substance of it and those who 
objected to the time and manner of bringing it forward ; and that really a ma- 
jority of the House favored annexation. 

" (Illinois) House, Jan. 20. (Ingersoll) Wash. Globe, May i, 1844; in House, 
March 18. 

'^Tribune: Nat. Itttcll., April 19. 1844. N. Orl. Com. Dull.. Dec. 28, 1844. 



THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 193 

rouse feeling were keenly remembered. Even a Webster could stoop 
to excite public sentiment against the acquisition of Texas, at a time 
when the railroad and the telegraph were evidently to annihilate 
distance, by arguing that it would be perilous to enlarge the area 
of the Union. The situation was well characterized by the Rich- 
mond Enquirer in the boding remark, The Texas question is " coming 
with rapid strides upon us " ; and for one reason or another, as it 
drew near and still nearer, all sections, all parties, all factions and 
almost all public men felt a vague but profound sense of danger like 
that voiced by Whittier on observing its approach : 

" Up the hillside, down the glen, 
Rouse the sleeping citizen. 
Summon out the might of men. 

Like a lion growling low, 
Like a night-storm rising slow, 
Like the tread of unseen foe; 

It is coming, it is nigh, 

Stand your homes and altars by, 

On your own free threshold die."" 

^° Charleston Courier, March 20, 1844. Enq., April 6, 1844. 



14 



X 
The Administration Changes Front 

After the treaty of annexation was signed Tyler withheld it 
from the Senate for ten days, and in the meantime the government 
appeared to make a striking change of front on two extremely im- 
portant aspects of the subject. 

All along they had regarded the assent of Mexico as unessential. 
Even the urgency of Senator Archer, chairman of the committee on 
foreign relations, had not been able to modify their attitude on 
this point. Upshur said emphatically that the United States consid- 
ered it unnecessary to consult any other nation in dealing with 
Texas; and even Webster took the ground that Mexico, having 
acquiesced practically in the American recognition of that country 
and made no serious efforts to reconquer her, could scarcely claim 
that her incorporation in this republic would create a new state 
of things. What was more, to ask the assent of Mexico would have 
affronted Texas and would have convicted the United States of in- 
sincerity or something more, since that step would have implied 
that we knew Texas was not independent ; and, even could these 
embarrassments have been evaded through the arts of diplomacy, 
it would have been perilous to open negotiations with Mexico on 
the subject. Had she refused to assent, the treaty would have been 
far more offensive to her than if she had not been consulted ; while 
had she not refused, endless discussions and delays and countless 
chances for international complications would have been sure to 
result.^ 

Very possibly it was believed that on finding annexation had 
been determined upon, she would yield a tacit if not a formal con- 
sent. In February, 1844, Upshur had a conversation on the subject 
with Almonte. He stated that the question would almost certainly 
come before the American government, and would have to be set- 
tled; that in all probability Mexico could not defeat the Texans on 
the field, and that unquestionably she could not regain control of 

' See General Note, p. i. (Archer) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 
693. Upsluir to Almonte, Dec. i, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 99. 
Webster to F. Webster, March 11, 1845: Curtis, Webster, ii., 249. 

194 



THE ADMINISTR.\TION CHANGES FRONT I95 

them. Almonte acknowledged the force of these remarks, but inti- 
mated that a point of honor was involved which would determine 
the policy of his nation. Upshur, observing that knight-errantry 
had now been laid aside, urged in reply that Texas would either 
join the Union or achieve her independence under the guaranty and 
protection of England; that for this reason, if for no other, the 
United States would be " under a species of necessity to receive 
her " ; that it would be infinitely better for Mexico to have her form 
a part of this country than to let her become, as otherwise she would, 
" a mere commercial dependency of England," — a view in which 
Almonte fully concurred; that for any injury suffered by Mexico 
as the consequence of annexation the United States would be willing 
to make reparation, he felt sure ; that as we should never be an 
aggressive power, this extension of our territory should excite no 
alarm; and that any increase of American strength in the Gulf 
would really be advantageous to all of the smaller maritime nations, 
since it would tend to promote the freedom of the seas. To these 
opinions also Almonte assented. The conversation, he further said, 
had been very satisfactory to him ; so far as he was concerned, he 
would suffer no useless punctilio to stand in the way of the sub- 
stantial weal of the two countries ; the nations of America ought 
to have a policy of their own, and a good understanding between 
them was necessary for this ; and he would take great pleasure in 
communicating the substance of the conversation to his govern- 
ment, if authorized to do so. This authorization Upshur gave. Up 
to the time the treaty was signed no answer from the Mexican au- 
thorities could have been expected, and Upshur may reasonably have 
inferred from the minister's expressions that a satisfactory arrange- 
ment with his country was by no means out of the question. The 
new Secretary also conferred with Almonte. In April the corre- 
spondent of the New York Journal of Commerce wrote : " I know " 
that the Mexican minister has had " free interviews " with Cal- 
houn, " has been made acquainted with all that has been done," and 
instead of protesting against it, "has expressed a favorable disposi- 
tion towards the wishes of this Government " ; and a despatch of 
the British minister strongly tends to confirm this account. Cer- 
tain related facts also are to be remembered. Our representative at 
Mexico had reported at the beginning of February that he believed 
Santa Anna would like to have the United States compel him to 
end the war with Texas, and that Mexico would rather see her old 



196 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



province connected with any other power on earth than with Eng- 
land, whether pohtically or commercially. It was true also that 
Tornel, who probably had more influence with Santa Anna than 
any one else, recognized that Texas was forever lost ; and, that being 
admitted, it would naturally seem better to let us have it for a liberal 
sum than virtually to give it away to England, and let all northern 
Mexico be flooded with cheap British goods smuggled across the 
border. - 

Finally, a conviction prevailed in the United States that Mexico 
had repeatedly violated the treaty of amity. There had been a 
series of individual " outrages " against American citizens in that 
country; and although she had eventually yielded to the positive 
demands of the American government for redress, the Madisonian 
was not far wrong in maintaining that a tardy and forced recogni- 
tion of our claims was not a fulfillment of the treaty. There had 
also been general "outrages." In violation of the agreement between 
the nations, American merchants residing in Mexico had been for- 
bidden to engage in retail trade. Our citizens had been prohibited 
from crossing the common boundary without special permission. 
Peaceable Americans residing in California had been seized and 
deported, and the promise to indemnify them had not been fulfilled. 
A secret order had even been issued to expel every one of their 
nationality from the northern Departments. Under a military decree 
all of our people captured with arms in their hands on the soil of 
Texas were liable to be shot ; and the profitable trade of American 
merchants with northern Mexico by way of St. Louis and Santa Fe 
had been arbitrarily stopped. Mexico had denounced our national 
authorities before the world in very offensive language for misdeeds 
of which they had not been guilty, and had even gone so far as to 
threaten war through her accredited representative before she could 
bring forward any proof that the subject of receiving Texas was so 
much as to be considered by our government. Under all these 
circumstances, to ask her consent before negotiating a treaty with 
that country would have been an extraordinary course, especially 
as we had not requested the permission of the mother-country to 

=* Notes of a Conversation, Feb. 16, 1844: State Dept., Communications from 
Mexican Leg., i. Journal Com., April 17, 1844. Pak., No. 22, April 14, 1844. 
Thompson, No. 40, Feb. 2, 1844 (for his precise words see p. 418). Id. to Green, 
March 27, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Mexico, xii. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT I97 

deal with IMexico herself before Spain had acknowledged her inde- 
pendence.^ 

But a day came, said Archer to the Senate, when the administra- 
tion " renounced or began to falter in the confidence of a present 
annexation, from the obstruction of those who demanded the con- 
currence of ^Mexico, or [at least] reasonable endeavors to obtain 
that concurrence, and the defeat of these endeavors." Probably, 
too, there was a particular cause for discouragement which Archer, 
a Whig, did not consider it necessary to mention in his speech. Be- 
hind the objections of those who manifested such tenderness for 
the feelings of another country something more substantial appears 
to have been detected. According to Tyler's son, the reason why 
the Senator was taken into the confidence of the Executive was that 
a whisper, intimating that Clay would oppose annexation, began to 
be heard at this time.* 

The whisper represented a voice. Early in the preceding De- 
cember the head of the Whig party had written to Senator Critten- 
den as follows : It is not right that for selfish reasons Tyler should 
add another to the exciting topics already before the country. Con- 
gress could no more annex Texas than it could annex any other in- 
dependent nation, — in fact less, because Mexico asserts a claim 
against her and is endeavoring to enforce it. We could not obtain 
her without a war, and " I suppose nobody would think it wise or 
proper to engage in war with Mexico " for that purpose. Every 
one knows the Senate would not ratify an annexation treaty. The 
only aim, therefore, in presenting one would be to excite discord; 
and should Tyler make such a recommendation, it would be best 
" to pass it over, if it can be done, in absolute silence." " I shall 
regret very much," continued Clay, " should the proposition come 
to a formal question, if the Whig party should, in a body, vote in 
the affirmative," for such a vote would be " utterly destructive of 
it." To these remarks was joined a series of arguments against 
the project of annexation. As the document was marked private 
and confidential, Crittenden of course kept it very much in the 
closet ; but letters received from the same source in February and 

^ Madis., May 7, 1844. The author intends to deal with the Mexican "out- 
rages" in a volume on the causes of our war against Mexico; see e, g.. Tyler, 
Tyler, ii., 336. 

* Tyler is said to have believed until after the treaty was signed that Clay 
and Van Buren would favor it (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 306). Cong. Globe. 28 Cong., 
I sess., App., 693. Archer's statement is confirmed by Pakenham's report of 
what Senators said to him (No. 22, April 14, 1844). Tyler, Tyler, ii.. 298. 



198 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



March indicated that Clay was distinctly anxious on the subject, 
and Crittenden himself became so before the latter month ended. 
It is natural, therefore, to suppose that the wishes of the chief 
were made known to his partisans at about this time ; and no doubt 
Henderson, a Whig Senator from Mississippi, shared in the councils 
of the party. March 29 a Clay organ in Boston, the Atlas, an- 
nounced in a leader that it had reason to believe the Senators of the 
party had combined against annexation, — an announcement confirmed 
substantially in succeeding issues, — and Henderson must have been 
equally well informed. As his vote on the question, when it came 
before the Senate, showed that he was more loyal to Texas than to 
his party, it is very likely that he gave his colleague. Walker, a hint 
of the situation; and if he did so, the information soon reached the 
President. Now Clay's opposition and a combination of the Whig 
Senators in furtherance of his desire, should nothing occur to 
mollify them, evidently meant the rejection of the agreement with 
Texas; and the administration found it necessary to plan ac- 
cordingly.^ 

Were the treaty to fail, it was highly important not to have it 
knocked unceremoniously and ignominiously on the head at once as 
Clay wished. It was also very expedient to hold the subject before 
the country for some time in order to make the people think about 
it and realize, as the administration believed they would realize, 
the benefits of acquiring this additional territory; and no doubt it 
seemed extremely desirable to Tyler to keep himself in view as 
the champion of the annexation cause until after the Democratic 
convention should nominate a candidate for the Presidency. Under 
these circumstances, apparently, Archer's advice was asked, and he 
recommended afresh to secure the assent of Mexico. Tyler, how- 
ever, did not change his mind on that point. The assent of ]\Iexico 
he would not and could not ask. But still here was a way to gain 
time, for he could send a messenger south and endeavor to make 
some arrangement with that country. This move, then, was de- 
cided upon at once; and in consideration of it the chairman of the 
Senate committee on foreign relations promised that he would try 
to delay action in that body for the probable time required to obtain 
an answer from Santa Anna, which was estimated as about forty- 
five days. Moreover, by adopting this plan a number of undecided 

"Clay to Crit., Dec. s. 1843; Feb. 15; March 24, 1844: Crit. Pap. Crit. to 
Ewing, March 30, 1844: ib. Atlas, March 29; April 6, 16, 1844. 



THE ADMINISTR.\TION CHANGES FRONT I99 

Senators were doubtless conciliated by the administration, and per- 
haps became its friends, not only against the immediate rejection 
of the treaty, but with reference to the subject of annexation in 
general. Possibly, too, in view of the Mexican threats, it was 
thought that a message from the United States on this subject might 
produce an ebullition of anti-American feeling that would rouse the 
public here. It is absurd to summon a nation to answer at the word, 
exclaimed the Washington Globe; but perhaps the editor had not 
considered all the aspects of the affair.^ 

A messenger was therefore despatched to Mexico with instruc- 
tions to the American representative at that capital, and also, it 
would seem, with orders to conduct certain negotiations himself, — 
all of which will appear later. The newspapers had it that the 
United States proposed to pay Mexico six million dollars for recog- 
nizing Texas — a step which would have removed all ground for 
asking her assent to the treaty of annexation — and ceding to the 
United States the port of San Francisco ; and Raymond, secretary 
of the Texan legation, considered this report of sufficient authen- 
ticity to be made known to his government. For some reason a 
good deal of mystery clouded the departure of Thompson, the mes- 
senger. The correspondent of the New York Journal of Commerce 
asserted positively that he set out the fourteenth of April. Benton 
said he went on the nineteenth ; while Raymond stated that he left 
on the twenty-second, as he understood. Evidently it was well to 
have it appear that Tyler did not wait to' be driven into this action, 
yet the later Thompson's departure from Washington, the later 
also would be his return to that point. '^ 

But there was another and more striking change of front. 
Tyler, Upshur and their organs had recommended annexation as 
a measure calculated to promote the general welfare of the United 

"Clay to Crit., Dec. s, 1843; April 21, 1844: Crit. Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 
Cong., I sess., App., 693. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 298. A letter from B. F. Butler to 
Van Buren, April 29, 1844, (Van B. Pap.) seems to indicate that Jackson was 
among those who deemed the assent of Mexico essential, but his letter to Moore, 
June 25, 1844, (Wash. Globe, July 20, 1844) expresses the opposite view. He 
may have been converted by Judge Bibb meanwhile. Pakenham (No. 22, April 
14, 1844) wrote: "a great deal is said by the advocates of the measure about 
granting satisfaction to Mexico, for the sake no doubt of gaining over the votes 
of those Senators with whom a regard, whether real or pretended, for the rights 
of Mexico, forms a principal objection to the project." Nat. In tell.. May 21, 
1844. Wash. Globe, May 2, 1844. 

'Phil. Ledger, April 24, 1844. Raymond to Jones. April 24, 1844: Jones, 
Memor., 343. Journal Com., April 17, 1844. (Benton) Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 
1844. 



200 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

States. A near connection of the President's wrote a little later to 
Mrs. Tyler that in conversing at this period, the President "con- 
stantly dwelt upon the subject as of pervading national importance." 
Senator Walker, his chief ally, had devoted himself very notably 
to proving that the North would reap great advantages from this 
acquisition, should it be made. One would therefore have expected 
the President to request his new Secretary of State, whatever might 
be that gentleman's personal inclinations, to adopt the same policy; 
his biographer states that he did so; and Tyler himself intimated 
as much three years later. Yet we find Calhoun striking out, dur- 
ing this interval between the signing and the presentation of the 
treaty, along a widely divergent path.^ 

Near the end of December, 1843, Aberdeen had sent a despatch 
to Pakenham, in which he said that since no little agitation appeared 
to have prevailed of late in the United States respecting the sup- 
posed designs of Great Britain with reference to Texas, Her 
Majesty's government deemed it expedient to take measures for 
stopping at once the misrepresentations which had been circulated 
and the errors into which the administration of the Union appeared 
to have fallen in this regard ; that England had no selfish interest 
in that quarter except such as attached to the normal extension of 
her commercial dealings abroad ; that she had urged Mexico to 
recognize Texas from the belief that such action would benefit both 
countries; that she desired and was "constantly exerting herself to 
procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout the world," 
and wished therefore to see it discarded by Texas ; but that she 
proceeded in the matter only by open means and should not " inter- 
fere unduly, or with an improper assumption of authority," in order 
to ensure the adoption of such a course, — would counsel, but should 
not " seek to compel, or unduly control, either party." " So far as 
Great Britain is concerned," His Lordship continued, " provided 
other States act with equal forbearance, those Governments will be 
fully at liberty to make their own unfettered arrangements with 
each other, both in regard to the abolition of slavery and to all 
other points." England has " no thought or intention of seeking 
to act directly or indirectly, in a political sense, on the United States 
through Texas " ; and " we shall neither openly nor secretly resort 
to any measures which can tend to disturb their internal tranquility, 
or thereby to affect the prosperity of the American Union." Just 

* Tyler, Tyler, ii., 299, 421, 422, 426. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 201 

how Aberdeen reached the conckision that such a statement would 
satisfy the American government of British harmlessness, unless on 
the principle of throwing a bone to a dog, is not easy to see ; but 
he sent it over to Pakenham, and the minister, after a delay which 
did honor to his good sense, placed a copy of it in Upshur's hands 
two days before the latter's tragic death. ^ 

Calhoun found the despatch on his desk. It required no answer 
except an acknowledgment, but he proceeded to reply at length, 
devoting to the task his intellectual lights and his intellectual 
shadows with impartial zeal. The President, he said, " regards with 
deep concern the avowal, for the first time made to this Govern- 
ment," that England desires and is laboring for universal emancipa- 
tion. By so doing, " she makes it the duty of all other countries, 
whose prosperity or safety may be endangered by her policy, to 
adopt such measures as they may deem necessary for their pro- 
tection." With still deeper concern, he continued, the President 
notes the desire of England to see slavery uprooted in Texas, and 
the efifort which he infers she is exerting through her diplomacy 
to have this change made " one of the conditions on which Mexico 
should acknowledge " that country. He has therefore examined the 
question, and is convinced that it will be difficult for the Tcxans to 
resist the desire of England, even if she does no more than Lord 
Aberdeen suggests, and that consent on their part would endanger 
the prosperity and safety of the United States. The abolition of 
slavery in Texas would produce friction between that country and 
this, and consequently, by compelling her to seek a protector, would 
place her under the control of England. This would expose our 
weakest frontier to inroads, and would give Great Britain " the most 
efficient means" of bringing about in the adjacent States that 
emancipation of the blacks which she desires to efifect everywhere. 
Against such evils it is the President's duty to provide. Hence 
an annexation treaty has been negotiated with Texas as " the most 
effectual, if not the only means of guarding against the threatened 
danger," and securing the permanent peace and welfare of the 
United States. Calhoun then proceeded, though Aberdeen's letter 
gave him no good reason for so doing, to discuss the question of 
slavery. That institution he defended at considerable length as 
wise and humane, and therefore one which ought not to be attacked ; 
and he declared it the duty of the federal government of the United 

° To Pak., No, 9, Dec. 26, 1843: Sen, Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess,, 48. Pak, to 
Upshur, Feb. 26, 1844: ib. 



202 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

States to protect each member of the Union in whatever policy it 
might adopt with reference to the matter.^° 

The general impression given by the tone as well as the sub- 
stance of this communication was, that our Executive desired 
to annex Texas mainly for the preservation of slavery and the 
Southern political power based largely upon it, and believed that the 
country as a whole was bound to take up arms in this cause ; and 
the fact that for such a purpose Texas was to be acquired, appeared 
to indicate that the President was ready to go beyond our bound- 
aries and incur the risk of a war in furtherance of the object. 
Such a representation was admirably adapted to cast a dark and 
sinister hue upon the project of annexation in the mind of every 
stalwart Northern man, and make the benefits which it had been 
said to promise that section appear to him like a very dangerous 
and even dishonest bait. Calhoun's letter seemed to many, there- 
fore, like an effort to intensify sectionalism, repel those Northern 
votes without which Texas could never become a part of the Union, 
and promote some deep, ulterior design. 

Suspicion regarding the letter was encouraged by its evident art- 
fulness. The fact that the abolition views of the British had now 
been announced for the first time to the American government, 
which Calhoun made the basis of his entire paper, was of no sig- 
nificance, for those views had long been known to the world, and 
indeed had been officially reported by Everett in November; and 
Calhoun's evident purpose to convey an impression that only now 
had the United States become aware of them was plainly disin- 
genuous. To intimate that the treaty with Texas had resulted from 
this announcement was a real misrepresentation, for Upshur had 
proposed annexation several months before Aberdeen's declaration 
reached our State department ; and the surprise at such a misrep- 
resentation was deepened by the fact that as early as 1836 Calhoun 
himself had maintained that Texas must be annexed for the sake of 
the slave States. Then, too, the census reports upon which the Sec- 
retary unreservedly based his defense of slavery were pronounced 
by George Bancroft and by many others " fictitious." It was hard 
to believe that a paper so far from straightforward had been 
framed for an honest purpose. ^^ 

'"Calhoun to Pak., April 18, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 50. Pak. 
replied on April 19 (ib.), and Calhoun rejoined on April 27 (ib.) ; but these letters 
added nothing material. Pak. merely acknowledged Calhoun's of April 2T. 
Meaning of C.'s letter; Webster, Writings, iii., 291. 

"Bancroft to Van B., May 2, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 sen, ii., 425. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 2O3 

Still Other facts counted. In the first place, Calhoun offered 
no explanation of his policy that appeared satisfactory. Indeed 
the explanation that he did give was not at all credible. He in- 
formed Wharton that his letter was intended as the beginning of a 
long correspondence with England covering her entire course 
towards the United States regarding slavery, and that he felt disap- 
pointed because her minister did not follow up the matter. But 
Pakenham did reply; and Calhoun's rejoinder, facing towards the 
past instead of the future, seems designed to clinch what had 
already been said by him and so close the debate. Moreover how 
could the Secretary of State suppose for a moment that a foreign 
official accredited to this government would be so wanting in the 
sense of propriety and so extremely foolish as to engage in a dis- 
cussion with him of the delicate and embittered subject of slavery 
in the United States, about which he could not possibly think him- 
self as well informed as his antagonist, knowing perfectly that de- 
feat in the controversy would disgrace him, while victory might 
render him persona noii grata to the American Executive and thus 
compromise his professional career? It would have been absurd 
for the head of the cabinet to make a move of such importance, 
relying for the success of it upon an event so improbable as the 
British minister's falling into that sort of a trap; and it would have 
been the more absurd because Pakenham had endeavored, only a 
few days before, to discourage the Secretary from making any 
written communication at all to him on the subject. Furthermore, 
Calhoun's presenting this letter to the Senate before the corre- 
spondence had come to an end suggests plainly that it was written 
for immediate use, and not merely for some eventual effect upon the 
public opinion of the w^rld ; and finally it included weighty matters 
not germane to such a discussion as he mentioned to Wharton. 
Jackson explained the puzzle by exclaiming, " How many men of 
talents want good common sense," and expressed the opinion that 
the letter, introducing non-pertinent subjects and well calculated to 
set the eastern States against annexation, was the product of weak- 
ness and folly. No doubt there was some basis for this opinion, 
since evidently Calhoun did not fully anticipate the impression his 
course was to make. Yet Jackson's explanation does not cover the 
ground. The Secretary was doubtless unwise sometimes, but he 



204 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



was not weak. He must have had reasons for his action, and it be- 
comes our duty to look for them.^- 

There was a strong movement in the South at this period which 
took for its watchword, " Texas or Disunion." James Love of 
Galveston, viewing the matter dispassionately as an outsider, ex- 
pressed the opinion to Judge Nicholas of Louisville that annexation 
could occur only in case of a disruption of the United States, and 
that slavery could not be saved except by dissolving the Union ; and 
it was natural enough that men in the southern States, heated by 
controversy and pecuniarily interested to a large extent, should 
have held equally radical views. Many doubtless reasoned as fol- 
lows: If Texas is now rejected and falls — as in that case no doubt 
she will — under the control of England, the extension of our slave 
territory will be impossible, and the inevitable development of the 
non-slaveholding section will undeniably give that side of the ques- 
tion a great preponderance. The failure of the annexation project 
would have been caused by hostility against our peculiar institu- 
tion; and therefore an increase of the anti-slavery strength would 
signify an increase of danger to the labor system of the South. 
Indeed abolition sentiment is evidently growing fast ; and some 
day, should it find in its hands the power to do so, the North would 
almost certainly hamper and perhaps would undertake to destroy our 
fundamental institution. In that case the only way to save it would 
be to leave the Union; and it will be much better — if Texas be re- 
jected and so the intention of the North declared — to go now, while 
we can add to our new confederacy the vast resources of that re- 
public and, by securing a monopoly of the production of cotton, 
force England to be our friend, than to wait until Texas shall not 
only be lost by us but shall come under the control of an anti- 
slavery nation, and very likely be used by Great Britain as the 
means of bringing about abolition here in the United States. In 
such an event we should find ourselves between the upper and the 

"Calhoun to Wharton, Nov. 20, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 629 (see 
also Id. to Hammond. May 17, 1844: ib., 588). Pak., No. 22, April 14. 1844. 
Pakenham received the impression that Calhoun desired to have a correspondence 
with him for the sake of making an advantageous reply (for effect upon the 
people) to the British objections against the annexation of Texas, — quite a dif- 
ferent matter from the design mentioned by Calhoun to Wharton. Jackson to 
Blair, May 11, 1844: Jackson Pap. W. B. Lewis thought Calhoun's course showed 
a great want of tact and judgment (to Jackson, April 26, 1844: Jackson Pap., 
Knoxville Coll.). May 15, 1844, Calhoun wrote a letter declining to defend him- 
self against the charge of injecting slavery into the affair in order to defeat the 
treaty (Wash. Globe, June 5, 1845). 



THE ADMINISTR.\TION CHANGES FRONT 205 

nether millstones, — between an anti-slavery North and an anti-slavery 
Texas dominated by England. Let us therefore settle the matter 
now ; and if we must go, let us go at once.^^ 

Of this movement Calhoun's high-spirited commonwealth was 
the centre. To our section, declared the South Carolinian, the pres- 
ent issue is a question "of absolute self-preservation; so much so, 
that it were infinitely better for us to abandon the Union than to 
give up Texas to become a colony of Great Britain." In the course 
of the spring and the summer of 1844 several counties and districts 
of the State passed resolutions of the same tenor. At the Fourth 
of July celebrations a considerable number of the toasts, hailed with 
repeated cheers, expressed the idea in pointed language. The forty- 
third regiment declared that it would be for the interest of the 
southern and southwestern States to " stand out of the Union with 
Texas " rather than in it without her ; and the Charleston Mercury 
affirmed that in the other regiments the feeling on the subject was 
equally strong. General Hamilton, a well-known citizen, wrote that 
if Texan slaveholders were not fit for admission into the Union, he 
and his fellow-citizens were " not fit to be there." Holmes, a prom- 
inent Representative in Congress, intimated plainly that he was 
prepared for a civil war even, and was re-elected without opposi- 
tion. Another South Carolina member of the House was Rhett. 
Rhett addressed Calhoun as " my political father." He was con- 
nected editorially with the Washington Spectator, which was chosen 
as the " Central Organ of the Calhoun portion of the Democratic 
party " ; and the Spectator declared, " In the Union, or out of 
the Union, Texas shall be ours." Senator IMcDuffie used more 
caution ; but a speech of his was described by the Richmond 
Whig as an endeavor to show, while pretending to desire the con- 
tinuance of the Union, that none but slaves could wish it to last for 
a single moment longer. Pickens inferred from the indications 
that he favored secession, and Botts of Virginia stated that he had 
declared on the floor of the Senate for a division of the country." 

"Love to Nicholas, Feb. i, 1844: Crit. Pap. "Disunion as a consequence of 
non-annexation was proclaimed in hundreds of resolutions," — Benton (Wash. 
Globe, Aug. 28, 1844). 

^* South Carolinian: Wash, Sped., April g, 1844. N. Y. Express. June 19, 
1844. Nat. IntelL. June 20; Aug. 15. 1844. Southron. July 24, 1844. Ga. 
Chronicle: Nat. IntelL. July 24, 1844. Mercury: Savannah Rcpub., June 14, 1844. 
(Hamilton) Wash. Globe, May 4, 1844. Charleston Patriot, July 26. 1844. Nat. 
IntelL, Jan. 15, 1845. Rhett to Calhoun, Dec. 8; [Oct. 7], 1843: Jameson, Cal- 
houn Corn, 898, 885. (Selected) Confidential Circular: Markoe and M'axcy Pap. 
Spect.: Wash. Globe. May 16, 1844. (Caution) Wash. Globe. Aug. 28. 1844. 
Whig: Bait. Amer., July i, 1844. Pickens to Calhoun, Nov. 6, 1844: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corn, 990. (Botts) Nat. IntelL, Jan. 15, 1845. 



206 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

In Georgia the feeling was less pronounced, but it existed. At a 
Democratic meeting held at the capital in August, 1844, one of the 
speakers asserted that the party were " determined upon the imme- 
diate annexation of Texas regardless of all consequences." A gath- 
ering at Eatonton applauded enthusiastically the sentiment that either 
that country must be acquired or the Union dissolved. Wilson 
Lumpkin wrote to his " old friend," James K. Polk, that Texas and 
the slave States must be " one & indivisable." Colquitt, speaking in 
the national Senate on the subject of annexation, said: "When 
political martyrdom and sacrifice are the reward " for the fidelity of 
her champions, "then will the whole South with multiplied wrongs 
sitting heavy on her heart, take the necessary steps for safety and 
defence ;" and Governor Troup, addressing the people of the State, 
declared that if the American government failed to confirm the an- 
nexation treaty — which on the whole he thought it was better to 
accept than to occupy Texas by force — the failure would be " vir- 
tually an alliance with England in her crusade " against the South, — 
perhaps the strongest plea for withdrawal that could have been 
framed. ^^ 

Lewis, a Representative from Alabama, wrote to Calhoun that 
should the treaty be rejected, he should "consider the Union at an 
end," and then went on to say that "the interests and sympathies of 
a large portion " of the country " must be stronger in favour of an 
Union with Texas, than with a confederacy, which in the midst of 
unceasing plunder by Taxation, was waging a relentless war against 
their Institutions." David Hubbard, a Presidential Elector from 
the same State, said he was " fully prepared to see this Union rent 
asunder unless the Northern portion of the Confederacy would 
consent" to let the South have Texas. A resolution adopted in 
Lawrence county described the possession of that territory as " in- 
finitely more important " to the slaveholding section than " a longer 
connexion or friendship with the Northeastern States." The citi- 
zens of Russell county passed unanimously a series of resolutions, 
the preamble of which took the stand that the unwillingness to 
annex that country "must be principally traced to an innate and 
uncontrollable hostility to the South and her institutions, — where- 
fore a Southern Convention should be held"; and the object of the 

"Augusta Chronicle, Aug. 7. 1844. Savannah Rcpub.. June 22, 1844. 
Lumpkin to Polk, Sept. 22,, 1844: Polk Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App., 
256. Charleston Mercury. June 21, 1844. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 207 

proposal, as explained by a meeting at St. Helena, South Carolina, 
was to make sure of Texas regardless of the North,^^ 

In conservative North Carolina this crusade moved more slowly ; 
yet a convention in Lawrence county adopted the view that annexa- 
tion was " infinitely more important " to that section than a longer 
association with the New England States. If we must give up 
either, said the Resolution, it " shall not be Texas." Likewise in 
Virginia the Union sentiment, as in i86i, was strong. An examina- 
tion of the proceedings of thirty-four Democratic meetings and 
political banquets held during the summer of 1844, reveals a strong 
vv'ish to acquire Texas yet no disunion language. But the Demo- 
cratic Legislative Convention, sitting at Richmond early in Febru- 
ary, 1845, asserted that the South had a " right to require " the 
admission of that country " as due to its own protection and the pres- 
ervation of the Union." The Richmond Enquirer said repeatedly 
that a final defeat of annexation would produce an excitement in the 
South dangerous to the republic. The Madisonian, practically a 
Virginia paper, took the ground in December, 1843, that the defense 
of slavery required either secession or the incorporation of Texas. 
Governor Gilmer implied distinctly in his letter of January, 1843, 
that only by consenting to the measure of annexation could the 
free States ensure the continuance of the government; and Judge 
Upshur, a very prominent son of the Old Dominion, with all the 
responsibility of premiership in the American cabinet upon him, 
said in the strictest confidence : " The salvation of our Union depends 
on its success," — an assurance not at all required by any lack of 
zeal for annexation on the part of his correspondent, Charge 
Murphy.i^ 

In the Southwest Jackson boasted that no danger of secession 
existed. " We in the South & West will attend to the Federal 
Union, it must be preserved," said the hero of the Nullification epi- 
sode ; but Rhett's paper furnished a comment on this declaration. 
No call for dissolution has yet been heard in the Southwest, it said, 
but if the interests of that quarter are sacrificed, the cry will be 
raised, " In the Union, or out of Union, Texas shall be ours." 
Senator Walker stated in his famous Letter that unless Texas were 

''Lewis to Calhoun, March 6, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 935. Southron, 
July 24, 1844. Charleston Mercury, July 3, 1844. 

" Savannah Repub., Aug. 6, 1844. Richmond Enq., Feb. i. 1845, etc. 
Madis., Dec. 22, 1843. (Convention) Madis., Feb. 28, 1845. Rich. Enq.. Jan. 26, 
1843. Upshur to [Murphy], private and conf., Jan. 23, 1844: State Dept., 
Arch. Tex. Leg. 



208 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

obtained, one of three events was certain to occur, and the first of 
these was that the South and Southwest would unite with that 
country. Even in Tennessee a Presidential Elector announced that 
were trouble over the Texas question to arise, he would be found 
fighting against the Union. When one considers how small a per- 
centage of the utterances of such a nature is likely to be found 
by an investigator who can give but a fraction of his labor to that 
particular line of inquiry, and how many men who shared in the 
sentiments thought it advisable not to express them at the time, 
these indications are decidedly significant; and finally Jackson him- 
self wrote that if Texas could not be acquired by negotiation, the 
people of the Mississippi valley would take it by force, — a proceed- 
ing that would have split the Union. "Mark this," he added to 
show how seriously he believed his prediction ; and now one recalls 
Upshur's mysterious remark to Murphy that men in Congress, " im- 
patient to move " for the acquisition of Texas, were " with difficulty 
restrained, in expectation that the object would be effected by nego- 
tiation."^^ 

But were not all these intimations, like most of the Massachu- 
setts talk about considering the Union at an end should the obnox- 
ious measure be carried, intended mainly for effect? Such was the 
opinion of some at the time. It is all for the purpose of intimidation, 
maintained the Cincinnati Herald, an abolition journal ; and it seems 
very possible, indeed probable, that some of it sprang from that 
motive. But it should be borne in mind that not many years passed 
before the south did secede, and a terrible war occurred. One 
would not expect such a movement to come to pass without prelimi- 
naries, and the preliminaries are found. In 1850 a newspaper called 
The Southern Press was established at Washington. Its basis was 
an Address representing 63 Southern members of Congress, who 
said their section must secure its rights, and should do so " if pos- 
sible " constitutionally. A disunion convention held at Nashville 
proposed a sectional Congress. South Carolina and Mississippi 
passed laws to carry this proposition into effect ; and it has been 
thought that only the coolness of Georgia prevented the execution of 
the scheme. Georgia herself declared that year in a State conven- 
tion that she would resist, even to secession, such enactments as the 

"Jackson to Blair, July 26; Sept. 19, 1844: Jackson Pap. Sped., April 3, 
1844. Nash. Banner, Aug, 20, 1844. Jackson to W. B. Lewis, Dec. 15, 1843: 
N. Y. Pub. Lib. (Lenox). Upshur to Murphy, No. 14, Jan. 16, 1844: Sen. Doc. 
341, 28 Cong., I sess., 43. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 209 

abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia or the Territories, 
or the extinction of the interstate slave trade. After an incubation 
of two years, a strong movement showed itself in Mississippi in 
185 1 to have the State pronounce for secession. In 1849 Calhoun, 
waiting to Judge Tarpley of that State, showed plainly that a dissolu- 
tion of the Union would please him better than " submission " to the 
adverse policy of the North ; and even two years earlier he en- 
deavored to have a Southern convention called for the purpose of 
excluding Northern vessels from the ports of the South and pro- 
hibiting railroad commerce with the offending section, — a practical 
severing of the very cord which had brought the States together in 
1787. In 1847, too, the Virginia legislature declared unanimously 
that if the national government should pursue an unfriendly policy 
with reference to slave property in the Territories, it should be 
" resisted at every hazard." Finding secession at the door so soon 
in spite of the South's victory in the Texas affair, why should one 
doubt that it was ready to present itself in 1844, should so vital an 
issue turn the other way? In June of that year the Mexican min- 
ister to the United States felt satisfied that the slave section was de- 
termined to get possession of Texas even if the North W'Ould not 
support the step.^^ 

In the next place, Calhoun's attitude toward the disunion talk 
appears to indicate that it was serious. Had it been intended merely 
for effect, as a counterstroke to the Northern menaces of dissolu- 
tion, he would probably have thought it a harmless and possibly a 
useful retort. On the other hand he repressed it, — not as wrong, 
however, but as premature. Our people are like a " stifled volcano," 
testified James Gadsden of Charleston, but Calhoun wishes things 
kept quiet until after the results of the election are known : that is to 
say, until the country should have rendered its decision concerning 
the annexation of Texas. McDuftie pursued a similar course. 
According to the correspondent of the Charleston Mercury, he said 
publicly at Edgefield that he regretted the noise made by Rhett 
though he approved of his principles most cordially. " She is ready 
to act," said Calhoun of his fiery State with apparent satisfaction. 
And there is more than inference regarding Calhoun's real attitude. 
Annexation, he wrote, is the most important question for the South 

^^ Herald, July 29, 1844. So. Press, June 18, 1850. Alex. Johnston in Lalor's 
Cyclop., iii., 697, 11 16. Miss. Hist. Soc. Pub., iv., 90, 102. Calhoun to Tarpley, 
July 9. 1849 : South. Hist. Soc. Pub., vi., 416. Foote (Remin., 79) says that 
long before Calhoun died he " ceased to feel the least confidence in the perma- 
nency of our Federal Union." Almonte, No. 72, priv., June 19, 1844. 

IS 



210 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

" and the Union " ever agitated since the adoption of the constitu- 
tion.-« 

When it was proposed to have a Southern convention, Richmond 
was the city first considered as the place of meeting; and then, as 
the suggestion proved distinctly unacceptable to the Virginians, 
Nashville was pitched upon. No cordiality was manifested there, 
however; and Benton was probably right in saying that these suc- 
cessive repulses paralyzed the leaders of the disunion movement 
for a time. But the very fact that the assembling of such a body 
was dreaded, is evidence that something serious was believed to be 
in the wind, for an innocent gathering of notables would undoubted- 
ly have been regarded as complimentary and profitable. This sub- 
ject, wrote Senator Silas Wright to Van Buren three weeks before 
Tyler presented the treaty to the Senate, "begins to assume an 
importance beyond excitement . . . and to point at the Union 
rather than at the Presidential election " ; and a fortnight later he 
added that he understood the Calhoun clique said the nation could 
not stand, should the treaty be rejected. Wright belonged of course 
to the northern wing of the Democratic party, but he was distin- 
guished for judgment and fairness. It was noted, too, at this time 
that many Southerners, previously much interested in the new 
tariff bill, cheerfully saw it laid upon the table, as if not anxious to 
lessen the resentment felt by their section against the North.-^ 

Moreover the plan of establishing a new confederacy, to include 
the slave States and Texas, had long been under consideration. In 
1 83 1 the Mexican minister reported from Washington that some 
public men in the southern part of the United States, feeling they 
ought not to be united with the North, reasoned that by getting 
a portion of INIexico they could form a powerful nation. In June, 
1836, a public dinner was given to the Sumpter Volunteers, just 
returned from the Florida campaign, at Swimming Penns, South 
Carolina ; and the two following toasts were given and drunk with 
marked approbation : " The Western, South Atlantic States and 
Texas combined (independent of the Northern States) would form 

-"Gadsden to Jackson, Aug. i, 1844: Jackson Pap. Nat. IntelL, Oct. 3, 1844. 
Calhoun to Clemson, Dec. 13, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 633. Id. to Mrs. 
Clemson, May 10, 1844: ib., 585. (The context seems to make it clear that 
Calhoun was thinking of the permanence, not of the greater or less prosperity, 
of the Union.) 

^Niles. Ixvi., 346, 391, 406. Bait. Amer., July 17, 1844. Benton, View, 
ii., 616. Wright to Van B., April i, 14, 1844: Van B. Pap. Wash. Globe. May 
10, 1844. The treaty was rejected and the South made no move; but the circum- 
stances were such as to give hope of an early victory. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 211 

the most splendid and flourishing repubhc the world ever saw " ; 
"The Republic of Texas, the South Atlantic, and Southwestern 
States — may John C. Calhoun be the first President." The next 
year the Texan envoy to the United States informed his chief that 
such a confederacy, taking possession of Mexico, could in his opin- 
ion become a very great nation ; and a few months later he predicted 
that should the project of annexation fail, the slave States would 
secede and " instantly annex themselves to Texas," which clearly 
implied that such a scheme had been somewhat thoroughly canvassed. 
In 1841 the New Orleans Courier mentioned editorially the plan 
" to erect a Southern Confederacy of States between the Roanoke 
and the Rio Del Norte " ; and now it was only necessary to take up 
this long cherished plan and carry it into execution. — 

Indeed, as facts already made known have prepared us to 
expect, such a confederation was now distinctly talked of. The 
Beaufort preamble, according to Rhett's paper, " presented the aspect 
in which this great question was destined to work on the Southern 
mind, with power and effect," and what it proposed was to call a 
Southern convention in case the treaty should be rejected, indicating 
that union with Texas would be its object. In the middle of April, 
1844, the Washington Globe argued that should the project of 
annexation be defeated, the Lone Star republic might form the 
nucleus of such a confederacy, and charged Calhoun explicitly with 
entertaining that design. Governor Hammond of South Carolina 
wrote to the Secretary : " With Texas the slave states would form a 
territory large enough for a first rate pozver and one that under a 
free trade system would flourish beyond any on the Globe^ — -imme- 
diately and forever. . . . The North and the South cannot exist 
united " ; in reply to which Calhoun said nothing to discourage these 
views, but a good deal to stimulate them. McDuffie appeared, while 
professing great solicitude for the adoption of the Texans, to urge 
them not to accept our overture. " For himself," he said, according 
to the report of a speech given in the Baltimore American, "if he 
were a citizen of Texas he would not come into the Union at all " ; 
and apparently his aim was to promote the cause of a new nation 
including Texas but not the free States. Benton and the Bentonites 
accused their opponents loudly of entertaining this design, and they 
convinced many. Said the St. Louis Nezv Era : " We suspect that 

^ Pizarro to Relac, No. 152, Oct. 17, 1831 : Arch. Relac. N. Orl, Courier, 
Aug. 18, 1836; May 18, 1841. Hunt to Hend., No. i, April 15, 1837; Tex. Dipl. 
Com, i., 208. Id. to Irion, No, 24, Aug. 4, 1837: ib., 245. 



212 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

. . . preparations are making to form a new Southern Confederacy." 
But perhaps the most striking sign was the fact that Jarnagin of 
Tennessee made a formal argument in the Senate of the United 
States against the expediency of breaking up the Union and estab- 
hshing such a republic.-^ 

Another fact was perhaps more than a sign. In September, 
1844, Duff Green was appointed American Consul at Galveston. 
Green was not a genius ; but he had cut a rather large figure in Amer- 
ican affairs, was a person of activity and had an extensive acquaint- 
ance with men and things. No salary attached to this office, and the 
amount of business done there was insignificant. His official corre- 
spondence, filed in the archives of the government, consists of an 
announcement after a service of three months that he was about to 
resign, and later an account of the fees received. He was closely 
united with Calhoun not only by personal friendship but by marriage, 
a son of one having wedded a daughter of the other. Calhoun was 
head of the State department when he was appointed ; and for some 
reason this man of affairs and citizen of the world consented to be 
exiled by his relative and friend to the wilderness of Texas, without 
the comfort of salary, substantial fees or important official occupa- 
tion, — with nothing, in short, except a certain stamp of Executive 
endorsement.-'* 

He appeared at the capital of that country early in December, 
1844, and addressed himself to the members of Congress and the 
President. One of his projects was to obtain a charter for the 
'' Del Norte Company ", which had in view as part of its mission the 
conquest and occupation of the Californias and other portions of 
northern Mexico in behalf of Texas. So much in earnest was he 
in pursuit of his aims that when President Jones refused to enter 

^Spect., June 19, 1844. The Beaufort programme was to unite with Texas 
and leave the North to do as it pleased about remaining in the new Union. 
See also the Nat. In tell., June 19, 1844. Globe. April 15; May 2, 1844. Ham- 
mond to Calhoun, May 10, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 953. Calhoun to 
Hammond, May 17, 1844: ib., 588. Blair to Jackson, July 7, 1844: Jackson Pap. 
Amer.: Wash. Globe, July 6, 1844. Benton, View, ii., 590. New Era: Nat. 
Intell., June 7, 1844. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 682. The Texan 
authorities understood well the scheme of the new confederacy. May 20. 1838, 
the Secretary of State, Irion, wrote to the charge in Europe that the annexation 
proposition would never be brought up again by that country unless the United 
States should break apart and an opportunity be thus offered to join the slave 
States alone (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 860). 

-* Green had been editor of the U. S. Telegraph and official printer to Cong- 
ress (Kendall, Autobiog., 373). Calhoun to Tyler, Feb. 6, 1845 : Sen. Doc. 83, 28 
Cong., 2 sess. D. Green to State Dept., Jan. 21; Apr. 16, 1845: Letters from 
Consuls, Galveston, ii. From Oct. 20 to Dec. 31, 1844, the total tonnage with 
which he had to do was 3,053 : ib. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 213 

into them he threatened to revolutionize the country, and it was 
intimated both by Jones and the American minister that his designs 
were somehow connected with annexation. Now it seems hardly 
probable that such an interest would have been felt by Southern 
politicians in extending the area of Texas unless they were deter- 
mined to get her, whatever might be the attitude of the North in 
that matter ; this extraordinary eagerness to widen her boundaries 
and in particular to obtain San Francisco harbor, upon which Cal- 
houn was dpubtless aware that the United States had fixed their 
eyes, suggested the plan of establishing a new confederacy, anxious 
to outdo its rival ; and the scheme to absorb other portions of Mexico, 
which there was good reason to believe the free States would be 
stubbornly unwilling to annex, points obviously toward the long 
since proposed method of building up that confederacy, and by no 
means toward the incorporation of Texas in the existing Union.-^ 
Benton, Blair and many others, then, pursuing this line though 
not acquainted with all of the facts, accused the Secretary of writ- 
ing to Pakenham for the express purpose of defeating the treaty, 
rendering secession inevitable, and ensuring the formation of the 
projected new republic ; and Blair informed Jackson that some of the 
most impartial members of the House of Representatives considered 
it perfectly evident that Calhoun's friends desired to promote this 
scheme by causing the failure of the new tariff bill. Even Silas 
Wright believed that the Secretary's Pakenham letters were designed 
to prevent Northern men from supporting the treaty. There is, 
however, an insurmountable objection to this theory. Calhoun's 
correspondence at the time and various other circumstances that 
have come to the reader's notice, afford satisfactory evidence that he 
desired earnestly to carry the measure in the Senate. He even went 
so far as to discuss the subject with members of the opposite party, 
and exert himself to prevent the Whig leader from taking a hostile 
stand. ^^ 

^ Don., No. 4, Dec. 5, 1844. Jones to Don., Jan. 4. 1844 [1845]: State 
Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. (Green's operations) Elliot, No. 15, Dec. 
10, 1844. Don. to Calhoun. Jan. 27, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun Com, 1019. D. 
Green's explanation of the affair (Facts and Suggestions, 85) is vitiated by the 
fact that he attributes his defeat to action of Elliot's which occurred months 
later and had no connection with it. It may be objected that Green did not 
begin his operations imtil after Polk's election; but (i) his appointment was 
considerably earlier, (2) Polk's election did not ensure annexation, and (3) he 
probably began before he knew of that election. 

^ Wash. Globe, May 4; Aug. 28, 1844. Blair to Jackson, July 7; May 2, 
1844: Jackson Pap. Writing to Van Buren, March 18, 1844, Blair suggested that 
Calhoun might introduce some treaty features calculated to make it a distinctively 



214 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Calhoun wished the United States to continue. This very year 
he exclaimed to a correspondent : " The charge of being unfriendly 
to the Union is so utterly unfounded, and so obviously circulated 
for mere electioneering purposes, that I cannot think it worthy of 
serious refutation on my part. The whole tenor of my long public 
life contradicts it;" and almost all concede that in making such 
statements he was sincere. The sincerity was full, however, of 
the sophistication and self-deception that belonged to his character. 
Calhoun loved the Union, but not the Union as it then was, and still 
less the Union as apparently it was to be. In October, 1844, he 
declared that no State was more devoted to it than was South Caro- 
lina, — ■" I mean," he explained, " the Federal Union, as it came from 
the hands of its f ramers ; " and in a similar way must be under- 
stood his own devotion. He desired its continuance, but only on 
his own terms. As we have observed, he could and did contemplate 
secession as what he called the " extreme remedy." Besides, he was 
more faithful to slavery than to the constitution. Surely language 
could not be more explicit than this : " We love and cherish the 
Union ; we remember with the kindest feelings our common origin, 
with pride our common achievements, and fondly anticipate the 
common greatness and glory that seem to await us : but origin, 
achievements, and anticipation of common greatness are to us as 
nothing, compared with this question [of slavery]." Under such 
circumstances he doubtless wished, as had been his desire in 1835 
and was again his desire when David Wilmot offered his proviso, 
" to force the issue on the North," as he remarked in addressing a 
member of the Alabama legislature. He hoped and probably felt 
nearly convinced that the North would yield rather than have the 
nation break apart. Still, it might not ; and in that case action would 
be necessary. As he said confidentially, he believed that were Texas 
rejected the South would be "lost, if some prompt and decisive 
measure" were not adopted. What that action, what that measure 
would have to be one can easily infer. To Francis Wharton he 
wrote at this time that now, when the very safety of the slave-hold- 
ing section was at stake, most of the enlightened portions of the 
North held back or opposed, which was " not a little ominous to the 
duration of our system." It was necessary to prepare for such a 
contingency, and Southern unity was therefore the first thing to 

Southern measure, useful to unite the South upon and to employ four years later 
(Van B. Pap.). Wright to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Calhoun, Letter, 
May IS, 1845: Wash. Globe, June 5, 1845. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 215 

achieve. Another faikire Hke that of NulHfication he did not desire.- ' 
Now annexation seemed to him a subject capable not only of 
rousing the South against the North but of obliterating divisions at 
home, for he regarded it as "a question of life and death" to that 
section. In December, 1843, Virgil JMaxcy had written to him that 
the immediate bringing up of the Texas issue might unite the slave 
States, and later in the month had reported that in Upshur's opinion 
this was " the only matter that would take sufficient hold of the 
feelings of the South, to rally it [as a whole] on a southern candi- 
date " for the Presidency ; and all Calhoun's friends, added Maxcy, 
held a similar view. Dixon H. Lewis wrote to Calhoun's disciple, 
Cralle, that the annexation campaign would " unite the hitherto 
divided South." When the treaty was about to be submitted, the 
Nashville Union expressed the opinion that should it not be ratified 
at the session of Congress then proceeding, it would become an issue 
before the country, and that " as soon as the question was made, 
so soon would the South and West stand united to a man." The 
idea was natural and was commonly entertained ; and apparently, in 
framing his letter to Pakenham, Calhoun proposed to make use of 
the subject with this end in view. At the same time he undertook 
to bring the North to what he considered its constitutional duty by 
pointing out that the " rights and duties " of the general govern- 
ment, so far as slavery was concerned, were " limited to protecting, 
under the guarantees of the Constitution, each member of this Union 
in whatever policy it might adopt," and that abolition in Texas — only 
to be prevented by annexation — would be a menace to the peculiar 
institution. At any rate he hoped to secure Northern co-operation 
by holding up the danger of a British attack on the southwestern 
frontier, should Texas remain independent and therefore fall under 
the control of England; and very possibly — since the abolitionists 
opposed annexation — he believed that he could in this way, to quote 
Lewis's phraseology, " Make Abolition (t Treason synonymous & 
thus destroy it in the North." In brief, Calhoun thought he now 
saw how by one magnificent stroke to render the South perfectly 
secure within the Union, yet at the same time prepare her to with- 
draw triumphantly from it, should that calculation be disappointed, 
into a new and more promising connection. Substantially this 

^Calhoun to Reynolds, Aug. i, 1844: Madis.. Aug. 7, 1844. Id. to Houk, 
Oct. 14, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 624. (Secession) Calhoun. Letter: Von 
Hoist, Calhoun, 303. (Slavery) ib., 131 ; (issue) 301. (Lost) Id. to Mrs. Clemson, 
May 10, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 585. Id. to Wharton, May 28, 1844: ib., 
592. 



2i6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

appears to be one real object of his extraordinary reply to 
Pakenham.'^® 

From the course he pursued there were also further advantages 
to be derived. The administration, while it seems to have expected 
and hoped that Van Buren's record would prevent him from oppos- 
ing the acquisition of Texas, had been troubled of late by a fear 
that he might come out strongly in favor of that measure and so 
endeavor to steal Tyler's capital. Blair of the Washington Globe 
stated that he was daily importuned early in April by persons in 
the confidence of Calhoun to announce the position of his journal 
on the subject, which — particularly as he was known to have con- 
sulted Van Buren — it was supposed by many would represent that 
leader's view. On the twelfth he was informed that the treaty 
would go to the Senate the next day, and was advised that his 
paper should immediately take a stand, so as not to appear sub- 
servient to Tyler in case it should support annexation. On the 
fifteenth a positive assurance was given him that the treaty would 
be laid before the Senate that very day ; and though nothing had in 
fact been received from Kinderhook, he at once printed the edi- 
torial favorable to the project of absorbing Texas. Shortly after 
this Rives, his partner, heard members of Congress not friendly 
to Van Buren remark, that something had been or would be 
appended to the treaty which would prevent Northern men from 
supporting it. At this time Calhoun's letter to Pakenham had not 
been published ; and Blair seems fully to have believed that it was 
written in order to prevent Van Buren from declaring for annexa- 
tion. Indeed, in view of it the New York statesman might well be 
apprehensive of alienating Northern support should he take that 
position ; and a certain strength is given to Blair's apparently some- 
what imaginative and somewhat conceited idea by the fact that as 
soon as the Globe announced its views, the Madisonian threatened 
that it would denounce any attempt of the Locofocos to appropriate 
the administration measure in order to influence the convention or 
the voters. In short it may safely be presumed that Calhoun thought 
of this bearing of his letter as a minor yet important consideration. 
On the other hand should Van Buren fail to endorse annexation, 
his nomination or at all events his election would now be prevented 

^Calhoun to Hammond, May 17, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 588. 
Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 3, 10, 1843: ib., 896, 900. Lewis to Cralle. March 19, 
1844: Campbell Pap. Union, April 6, 1844. Calhoun to Pak., April 18, 1844: 
Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 50. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 217 

by a solidified South, and Calhoun was determined, as will be seen, 
that he should not become President. From this point of view it is 
noticeable that in reply to the Globe's charge that the Secretary of 
State wrote as he did in order to embarrass the New York leader, 
the Madisonian offered but a very ineffective answer.-" 

By making annexation a sectional affair the Whig chief also 
could be placed in a difficult position. Indeed in the opinion of 
Clay himself, as he plainly intimated to Captain Elliot, the entire 
object of bringing up the issue was to disrupt his party, and he 
regarded Calhoun's letters to Pakenham as a part of the campaign. 
Nor was the purpose in this regard merely destructive. During the 
previous December Maxcy had written to Calhoun that should the 
Texas cjuestion be revived and Clay be weakened by this means, a 
distinctively Southern candidate might obtain enough votes to pre- 
vent a popular election, and would then stand with Clay and Van 
Buren before the House of Representatives, where — it was thought 
— the influence of the administration, exerting all its power of 
patronage, might decide the issue. These considerations also lay, 
no doubt, in Calhoun's mind.^" 

And there were still others, one may believe. Calhoun had re- 
tired from the Presidential race of 1844, but had retired unwillingly. 
In fact his name was not withdrawn by himself, as is commonly 
said, but by the Central Committee of South Carolina, to whose 
action he yielded an unavoidable yet reluctant consent. Even if his 
Presidential aspirations had been struck a staggering blow by this 
disappointment, they probably had not expired; and the year 1848 
lay well in view. If Benton could plan for that, as all believed he 
was doing, so could others ; and Calhoun in particular prided himself 
on his long range of political vision. At all events he was supposed 
to be scheming for the next campaign, and in that the support of a 
solid South would be a most valuable asset. In truth, so would it 
be in any case. By making himself, then, the acknowledged leader 
and champion of the united slave States he could gain immensely in 
power and prestige. ^^ 

^ Tyler to Mrs. Jones, April 20, 1844: Probably Clay will oppose annexa- 
tion ; then V. B. " will seek to come in on Texas and my vetoes " (Tyler, Tyler, 
ii., 307). Globe, May 6, 27. 1844. Blair to Jackson, May 2, 1844: Jackson Pap. 
Madis.. April i6; May 20, 1844. 

^Elliot, July 10, 1844. Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 3. 1843: Jameson, Calhoun 
Corn, 896. 

^'Calhoun to J. E. Calhoun. Feb. 7, 1844: Jameson. Calhoun Corr., 566. 
(Not expired) Hunt, Calhoun, 278. (Supposed) Preston to Crit., May 4, 1844: 
Crit. Pap.; Blair to Jackson, Sept. 9, 1844: Jackson Pap. 



2l8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Finally — and of all the considerations that seem to have been 
present in Calhoun's mind this is perhaps the most certain — a solidi- 
fication of the South, such as his Pakenhani letter was calculated 
to produce, would gain the undivided support of that section, he 
doubtless hoped, for the treaty. In November, 1843. the Richmond 
Compiler remarked that nothing had yet shown that the great ma- 
joritv. still less that all, of the slaveholders favored early annexa- 
tion : and private letters and the newspapers clearly reveal the truth 
of this assertion. Clay was probably mistaken in his estimate of the 
feeling, yet his opinion shows that people were not by any means 
decidedly pronounced everywhere in the South for the prompt 
acquisition of Texas ; and even the returns of the election the fol- 
lowing November proved as much. Now this division of sentiment 
boded no good to the treaty. On the eighteenth day of April Tyler 
admitted that the action of the Senate could not be foretold. This 
probably meant that as matters were shaping themselves, he fore- 
saw defeat. Something positive needed to be done ; and on that 
day the Secretary's first and principal letter to Pakenham was 
dated.s- 

But why did the President permit so marked a change of front? 
In answer to this question several reasons present themselves. Cal- 
houn possessed of course the stronger personality ; and moreover 
the Executive, already entirely out with the Whigs and the northern 
wing of the Democrats, could ill afford to break with that gentle- 
man's following. It is easy to believe that he was influenced by 
the promised advantages to the cause of annexation and in par- 
ticular to the cause of the treaty : and there was probably, too, 
a strong personal argument. Calhoun denied that he had any under- 
standing with him about the Presidency, and one can readily believe 
that no desire to further his aspirations existed in the Secretary's 
mind. Tyler, however, could think for himself, and he could readily 
perceive that a solidification of the slave States would perhaps be 
greatly to his advantage. Maxcy, in explaining that Upshur thought 
the Texas issue might rally the South on a sectional candidate, 
added that Tyler entertained hopes of being the fortunate indi- 
vidual ; and after that his chances had theoretically improved not a 
little, since Calhoun, the only other prominent competitor for the 

^Compiler: Wash. Globe. Nov. 24. 1843. Clay to Crit., March 24, 1844: 
Crit. Pap. Tyler to Jackson. April 18. 1844: Jackson Pap. In this letter Tyler 
gave reasons why the transmission of the treaty to the Senate was delayed, the 
first of which was that it was necessary to reply to Pakenham. 



THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 219 

honor, had retired from the field. At this very time an influential 
journal, the Savannah Republican, was preparing to say that should 
the Virginian be run by the South and the New Yorker by the North, 
the former might receive the support of all the Southern Demo- 
crats, and find himself one of three before the House of Repre- 
sentatives."'' 

In the previous August the formation of a Tyler Central Com- 
mittee had been announced by the Madisonian; and precisely now, 
during the interval between the signing and the transmission of the 
treaty, this body published an address. The President, it was 
argued, has tendered "to the South the only security which can be 
offered against the torch and knife of the fanatic, the re-annexa- 
tion OF TEXAS, of which his predecessors had suffered us to be 
despoiled. . . . Do they [the Democrats] not owe it to themselves, 
to their principles, to the cause of justice, to continue him in a sta- 
tion, the power of which has been employed solely for the glory 
and welfare of the people, the vindication and re-establishment of 
the Republican faith?" In this tone could the appeal be urged, 
should Calhoun's plan bring victory in the Senate.^* 

On the other hand, should the plan work badly so far as the 
treaty was concerned, it could still be made. to count for Tyler. 
When the prospects grew dark, the editor of the Madisonian de- 
manded : If ratification be refused, will the friends of annexation 
permit England to carry her point ? They will have to " rally round 
the standard of John Tyler or all may be lost." " What power has 
any other to deal with that question, after the treaty shall have 
been rejected by the Senate? . . . Who can counteract the move- 
ments of other countries upon Texas, but the President? . . . Who 
can open new negotiations, or in any manner keep the subject before 
the country ? " Finally, Tyler may have been keen enough to per- 
ceive that the Pakenham correspondence, if it should stimulate the 
abolitionists, — which was far more probable than the contrary effect, 
— would take many more votes from the Whigs than from his own 
party. A temporary change of front — for which the Secretary would 
have to bear the main responsibility — seemed, then, a shrewd 
manoeuvre, and the change was made.'' 

^ That this change of front was due to Calhoun is shown not only by the 
circumstances but by the fact that he claimed the credit for it in his speech of 
Feb. 12, 1847 (Works, iv., 334). Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr., 592. Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 10, 1843: ib., 900. Repub., May 
8, 1844. 

^ Madis., Aug. 2, 1843; April 13, 1844. Wash. Globe, May 21, 1844. 

^ Madis., May 14, 20, 1844. 



220 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

The next day after Calhoun replied to Pakenham Tyler received 
a " private & confidential " letter from Murphy, in which the charge, 
writing immediately after an interview with Houston, said he was 
informed that the British minister in Mdxico was to arrange a 
" New Policy " with that country, that the affairs of Texas were to 
have " a conspicuous part " in the scheme, and that as one result of 
this plan the negotiations which had led to the abortive armistice 
were to be resumed. Calhoun read the letter, of course. Then 
he probably reflected contemptuously once more on Tyler's weak 
and simple-minded programme, — the programme of merely pointing 
out how the acquisition of Texas would block the designs of Great 
Britain and promote the general welfare of the country and then 
expecting the Senators to ratify his treaty in an equally weak and 
simple-minded fashion ; and no doubt he congratulated himself 
earnestly that at last something effective had been done for the 
cause of annexation.^" 

At this point let us halt for a moment, and let us recall the three 
general ways in which Texas has been found a menace to the 
United States. Had she remained independent and acquired north- 
ern Mexico, including California, she would have been a serious 
rival and probably the cause of numerous complications. Had she 
remained independent and fallen in line with the designs of England, 
as apparently she would almost certainly have done, she would not 
only have exerted in these directions all the power she herself 
possessed, but would have been supported and guided by a great 
nation that had aims believed to be inconsistent with the prosperous 
development of the United States. While, had the project of 
annexation been definitively rejected by the votes of the North, she 
would perhaps have caused the dismemberment of the American 
Union and the formation of a new confederacy, including herself, 
the southern States and a large portion of Mexico, that might not 
only have rivalled but have overshadowed the wreck of the old 
republic. 

^^ Murphy to Tyler, April 8, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. 



XI 

The Negotiations are made Public 

On the twenty-second of April, 1844, John Onincy Adams made 
this note in his diary: "The treaty for the annexation of Texas to 
this Union was this day sent in to the Senate; and with it went the 
freedom of the human race." " Clear the track for Tyler and 
Texas! " was the outburst of the Madisonian on the same date. 

The President's Message accompanying the treaty was a digni- 
fied paper. In substance he spoke as follows : It is believed that 
Texas was a part of Louisiana, and therefore belonged at one time 
to the United States. As a member of the Union, having been 
settled principally by people from this country, it would be devoted 
to our system and to our principles of civil liberty. From the agri- 
cultural and commercial points of view the territory is of incalculable 
value. By acquiring it a new impulse would be given to our ship- 
ping business, whicl\, would be chiefly beneficial to the people of 
the eastern and middle States. Their carrying trade, thus extended, 
would become at no distant day greater than could easily be com- 
puted, and the expansion of the home markets resulting from 
annexation would give great opportunities to their skill and industry 
in mining, manufacturing and the mechanical arts. The West would 
obtain a great sale for its beef, pork, horses, mules and breadstufTs. 
The southern States would gain security against domestic and for- 
eign efforts to disturb them, and the Union as a whole would there- 
fore acquire new solidity. But these are secondary considerations. 
Texas is depressed and is looking for support. Years ago without 
the exertion of any sinister influence on our part her citizens voted 
to join us, and such is her will at present. Should we close the door 
against her, she would seek aid elsewhere, and perhaps in order to 
obtain it she would establish duties unfavorable to us. The result 
would be a loss of the carrying trade and the markets, and also — as 
the consequence of smuggling — a diminution of our revenue. The 
illicit importation of merchandise would also lead to frequent col- 
lisions between the two republics, in which the Indians would be 
likely to take part. The military forces of the United States would 



222 ■> THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

have to be increased at a heavy expense in order to guard the 
frontier; and foreign nations, reaping a profit from the unlawful 
trade, would take the side of Texas in any conflict with us. The 
United States are already almost surrounded by the possessions of 
European states, and that country, falling under their control, 
"would complete the circle." 

Texas, continued the President, is independent. We have a per- 
fect right to accept her, and should a threat of foreign interference 
be made, we ought not to be influenced , by it. Both interest and 
honor forbid; and there is in fact no excuse for such interposition. 
With equal or even greater propriety might we demand that other 
nations surrender the acquisitions of territory they have made. 
Toward Mexico the United States are disposed to pursue a concilia- 
tory course. We are actuated by no "spirit of unjust aggrandize- 
ment," but look merely to our own security ; and we shall be ready 
to settle any fair claims on the most liberal terms. Mexico, how- 
ever, cannot ask us to neglect our vital interests. Though certainly 
Texas could not be reconquered, we know that she has been ex- 
hausted by the long war. We know that other powers have been 
anxious to bring about a reconciliation between the belligerents on 
terms that would affect the domestic institutions of Texas, " would 
operate most injuriously" on those of our own people, and "might 
most seriously threaten " the very existence of the Union. We 
know that the principal nation of Europe has openly declared its 
hostility to the most important feature of our interstate relations, 
and admitted its purpose to secure the obliteration of it in Texas by 
means of negotiations between that country and Mexico ; and we 
are perfectly well aware that " formidable associations of persons, 
the subjects of foreign powers," are "directing their utmost efforts 
to the accomplishment of this object." Documents laid before the 
Senate establish ah these points. 

In brief, then, continued the Message, " the Executive saw Texas 
in a state of almost hopeless exhaustion, and the question was 
narrowed down to the simple proposition whether the United States 
should accept the boon of annexation upon fair and even liberal 
terms, or, by refusing to do so, force Texas to seek refuge in the 
arms of some other power, either through a treaty of alliance, 
offensive and defensive, or the adoption of some other expedient 
which might virtually make her tributary to such power and de- 
pendent upon it for all future time. The Executive has full reason 



THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 223 

to believe that such would have been the result without its inter- 
position, and that such will be the result in the event cither of 
unnecessary delay in the ratification or of the rejection of the pro- 
posed treaty." No nation would be injured by our acquiring that 
country, and the resulting development of commerce would make 
the whole world richer. As for ourselves, the enlargement of our 
territory would not involve danger. No one would relinquish 
Oregon, and Texas is immensely nearer, — even " at our very 
doors."^ 

The treaty itself declared in the preamble that the Texans had 
expressed by an almost unanimous vote, at the time of adopting 
their constitution, a desire to be welded into the American Union, 
and still entertained that desire with similar unanimity ; while the 
United States were actuated in the matter solely by a wish to pro- 
mote their own security and welfare, and to meet the views of the 
government and citizens of the sister republic. By the terms of the 
agreement, Texas made herself over to the United States with her 
sovereignty and all her public property, and became annexed to this 
country as a Territory, under the agreement that her citizens should 
be " incorporated into the Union," maintained and protected in the 
free enjoyment of their liberty and possessions, and admitted, as 
soon as should be consistent with the principles of the federal con- 
stitution, "to the enjoyment of all the rights, privileges, and im- 
munities of citizens of the United States." Such titles and claims 
to real estate as were valid under her own laws were to be so 
regarded by the American courts ; and the unsettled land claims 
were speedily to be adjusted. The United States on their part 
assumed the public debts and liabilities, estimated not to exceed 
$10,000,000, of the republic, against which they were to receive the 
public lands and about $350,000 in Texan securities ; and provisions 
were made for carrying out in detail the general agreements of 
the compact.- 

Henderson and Van Zandt, in sending the treaty to their govern- 
ment, explained that on the whole it seemed advisable to come into 
the Union as a Territory, — very likely because that method of ap- 
proach would make the anti-slavery issue less acute. They conceded 
that neither boundaries nor the peculiar institution had been men- 
tioned; but they stated that it was impossible to bring them in. and 

' See General Note, p. i. Richardson, Messages, iv., 307. 
^ Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 10. 



224 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



called attention to the fact that the Texans would be entitled to 
demand the preservation of all their property as secured to them 
by their own laws — that is to say, slaves — and eventually to claim 
admission to the Union as a State. The language of the treaty, 
they said, had followed as far as possible the phraseology of the 
Florida and Louisiana agreements in order to gain the advantage 
of those precedents, and they admitted that concessions had been 
necessary in order to conciliate the feeling of the Senate. The time 
allowed for ratification was six months. This, explained the envoys, 
would make it impossible to put the treaty over until the winter 
session, as many of the Senators would have been glad to do. A 
shorter period would have been no less effective, one might say; 
but possibly, as the New Orleans Courier suggested, that stipula- 
tion was adopted with a view also to having a protracted educa- 
tional discussion on the subject in the United States, and so keep- 
ing it before the people till it should be understood.^ 

Certain documents accompanied the Message and treaty. Promi- 
nent among them of course was Upshur's letter of August 8, which 
based the desire to annex Texas upon information contained in a 
private letter from a citizen of Maryland sojourning in London. 
Murphy's reports of September 23 and 24 were presented, though 
not entire. The correspondence between Upshur and Everett in the 
autumn of 1843, '^^ which the Secretary pointed out in great detail 
the suspected designs of Great Britain, came next in order. The 
American overture of October 16 was given, and, still more im- 
portant, Upshur's despatch of January 16, 1844; and Aberdeen's 
declaration, Calhoun's first letter to Pakenham and the instructions 
carried to our charge in Mexico by Thompson concluded the series. 
In general, the documents appeared to aim primarily to show that 
annexation was necessary in order to prevent Great Britain from 
extinguishing slavery in Texas, and from thus endangering the 
peculiar institution in the United States. 

On the whole it must be recognized that they made rather a sorry 
appearance, as — without the information sent over by Ashbel Smith 
— was inevitable. The corner-stone of the whole affair was a mud- 
dled allegation of British designs contributed by a private and 
anonymous correspondent of Upshur's. The American proposal of 
annexation seemed therefore precipitate and uncalled for, and the 
despatch of January 16 considerably worse. With Calhoun's letter 

^ Hend. and Van Z., April 12, 1844. Courier, April 22. 1844. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 225 

to Pakenham for a capstone, the edifice had indeed a certain con- 
sistency; but it seemed too much the consistency of schemers aiming 
to prop a baleful institution and secure fresh power for the slave 
States, not only by taking disputed territory, but by extending to it 
the system of Congressional representation which galled and scan- 
dalized the North, Well informed members of the Senate and 
House doubtless knew much that was not presented in the docu- 
ments, but it was easy to see how selfish ends could be promoted by 
ignoring whatever could not be stated publicly. 

Cave Johnson of Tennessee, one of the leaders in the lower 
branch of Congress, expressed the opinion that while the treaty 
was well enough in itself, the papers that accompanied it were 
"horrible — beg[g]ing, entreating, coaxing, threatening, lying as all 
say here — & placing the ground for annexation on the slavery ques- 
tion.'' Benton, Van Buren's friend, maintained on the other hand 
that the treaty, when carefully examined, appeared even more 
damnable than the correspondence ; and Crittenden, the confidant of 
Clay, rendered this verdict : " Whatever we may think of annexa- 
tion when properly presented, under the circumstances I think when 
this Treaty & documents are read & understood there will be felt a 
general sense of condemnation and shame at the proceedings of our 
executive Government." In order to hold up the papers to public 
indignation. Senator Tappan violated the confidence of the august 
body to which he belonged, and forwarded them to the New York 
Evening Post; and they appeared in the columns of that journal 
only five days after the Senate had received them. It can hardly 
be said that such action or such comments indicated a disposition 
to view the subject in a fair and statesmanlike manner; but the 
" renegade " Tyler, suspected of trying to blow up with one bomb 
the two political headmen of the country, should have expected 
nothing better.* 

Of course the newspapers were greatly exercised over the Mes- 
sage and its accompanying literature, and the language of the oppo- 
sition journals can be inferred readily enough from that employed 
when the negotiations were merely suspected. The New York 
Evening Post described the affair as presenting all the appearances 
of a "plot," To the Tribune of that city it appeared to be an " un- 

* Johnson to Polk, May 3, s (Benton), 1844: Polk Pap, Crit. to Coleman, 
May 16, 1844: Crit. Pap. Post, April 27, 1844, Tappan was severely censured 
by his colleagues and narrowly escaped expulsion {Cong. Globe, 28 Cong,, i sess,, 
619; Sen, Ex. Journal, vi., 272, 273). 

16 



226 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

precedented and unwarrantable outrage," a cheap, selfish specula- 
tion growing out of bonds and scrip, and out of land claims which 
would be " dubloons or dimes " according to the result. The Balti- 
more Clipper declared that it was merely a question whether we 
should violate a solemn treaty and embark on a career of aggres- 
sion that would bring us into conflict with other powers. The 
National Intelligencer expressed a similar view, professing to be 
" amazed " at the opening of negotiations with nothing to base them 
upon, and assuring the people that four-fifths, if not nine-tenths, 
of them were opposed to annexation as now presented. The Glohe 
urged the view that the purpose of all the correspondence, as well 
as of Calhoun's letter to Pakenham, was to arouse a fatal opposi- 
tion in the Senate ; while the Liberator not only pronounced the 
treaty "impudent, hypocritical, mendacious, and infernal," but dis- 
covered in the accompanying letters " an amount of hypocrisy and 
villainy, of treachery and oppression, unexampled in the criminal 
history of any nation, either in ancient or modern times." " Truly, 
monsters rule over us," was Garrison's conclusion. On the other 
hand the Madisonian retorted by saying: Here we have the British 
minister, the abolitionists, Benton, Clay, Van Buren and Webster, 
all agreeing to oppose annexation while differing on everything else ; 
it is another coalition ; but four-fifths of each House are firm for the 
treaty ; that agreement will be ratified ; and " No Southern or West- 
ern Whig will dare risk his presence at home who votes against it " ; 
while the Boston Post, a moderate Democratic journal, took the 
middle ground that the Message and treaty were good, but the 
correspondence weak ; that slavery, a local matter, should not have 
been dragged in ; that England had nothing to do with the affair ; 
and that people should separate the question itself from the manner 
in which it had been brought up, annexation being desired by a 
great number of persons and likely to become practicable ere long 
without war, dishonor or internal strife.^ 

In the information submitted to the Senate there was no refer- 
ence to the defense of Texas; but the Senators were decidedly in 
an inquisitive mood, and the New York Aurora mentioned that 
troops had been ordered to the Southwest. This hint was enough ; 

^ Eve. Post, May 8; Tribune, April 29, May 11 ; Clipper, May 7; Nat. Intell., 
May 16, 20; Globe, May i; Lib., May 3; Madis.. May 4; Post. May 3, 1844. 
Tyler denied emphatically that the speculators in Texas securities had any in- 
fluence on his course or even knew — until a late stage of the negotiations — what 
he was aliout ; and there seems to be no evidence to the contrary (Tyler, Tyler, 
ii., 423). 



THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 227 

and as soon as the treaty came up for consideration, Crittenden 
submitted a resolution demanding a full account of all preparations 
for war, and all movements of military or naval forces " made or 
ordered " with a view to hostilities, since the negotiations had be- 
gun. Here there seemed to be a chance of proving that Texas was 
not really an independent, self-sustaining power, and also perhaps 
that the President had been exceeding his constitutional authority.* 
But Tyler was ready with an answer. In consequence of 
Mexico's threat, he explained, that the annexation of her ancient 
province would be equivalent to a declaration of war and the ex- 
pectation of the Executive that the treaty would speedily be rati- 
fied, it had seemed a duty to concentrate vessels and troops in the 
Southwest by way of precaution. By the treaty, it was added, the 
United States " acquired a title to Texas " which needed " only the 
action of the Senate to perfect it " ; and therefore " no other Power 
could be permitted to invade, and, by force of arms, to possess itself 
of any portion " of her territory pending the deliberations upon the 
treaty. Annexation, however, concluded the President, would give 
Mexico no just cause for war, and he did not believe that hostilities 
would ensue. With the Message were copies of the orders issued 
to the commanders of the military and naval forces, from which it 
appeared that General Taylor was not authorized to cross the frontier 
— even should the danger of a Alexican advance appear to be immi- 
nent — without further instructions, and that Commodore Conner, 
should an armed force threaten Texas during the pendency of the 
treaty, was to remonstrate with the commanding ofificer, and assure 
him that the President would regard invasion under the existing 
circumstances as " evincing a most unfriendly spirit against the 
United States," which "in the event of the treaty's ratification, 
must lead to actual hostilities." Both Taylor and Conner were to 
transmit to the American government full information regarding 
any danger that might appear to threaten the neighboring republic ; 
and the Commodore was expressly informed that the purpose was 
to communicate this information to Congress. In view of these 
orders IMcDufiie found no difficulty in maintaining that the Execu- 
tive, knowing the character of the Mexicans, had only done his 
precise duty in sending forces to the Southwest with orders to ob- 

^ Aurora: Nat. InieU., May i, 1844. Sen. Ex. Journ., vi.. 274. Crittenden's 
resolution was offered May 10 and adopted May 13. 



228 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

serve their proceedings and report these to the President for the 
information of the legislative branch.' 

Much more difficult would it have been to explain how the 
unratified treaty gave the United States a claim of any description 
to Texas, and how the concurrence of the American Senate could 
have perfected the title. The corresponding body in the other 
country would still have had to act, and several further steps — 
mainly or entirely formal to be sure, yet essential — to be taken, 
before that consummation would be reached. Substantially of 
course the President was right. The Texan Congress had recently 
declared most emphatically for annexation. No one could deny 
that a ratification of the treaty by the American Senate would be 
followed in all probability by every needful act on the part of that 
nation. Its imperilled situation was a powerful assurance of this. 
Now the law has its fictions, — bold " short cuts " through difficulties 
to substantial justice, — and perhaps Tyler looked upon the view 
expounded in his Message as of such a character. But whether it 
was wise to embarrass a troublesome question by asserting what 
could be described as palpably contrary to the facts may well be 
doubted. 

Van Buren's champion was no less alert than Clay's. Three 
days after the treaty came up for consideration, Benton moved to 
call upon the President for information whether a messenger had 
been ordered to Mexico for the purpose of obtaining her assent to 
the treaty; if so, what despatches and instructions had been given 
to him; and within what time he was expected to return. Archer 
proposed to add the words, " if not incompatible with the public 
interest"; but the Senate showed its temper by rejecting the sug- 
gested qualification, and Benton's resolution was adopted. Doubt- 
less the intention was to prove that the President did not really 
consider Texas independent, but he was not so easily to be caught. 
No messenger has been ordered to Mexico to obtain her assent, he 

'Sen. Doc, 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 74. Jones to Taylor, April 2^, 1844; 
Mason to Conner, April 15, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., j(>, 78. (Mc- 
Duffie) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 451. McDuffie, however, repre- 
sented these forces as sent to protect American citizens, whereas in reality no 
doubt they went principally in order to defend Texas by the moral effect of 
their presence. The communication that Commodore Conner was to make to the 
Mexican commander, it will be noted, would hardly have given the latter any 
new information. It seems likely that this feature of the instructions was 
mainly designed for effect upon the Texan athorities, to whom it appears to 
have been communicated (Murphy to Calhoun, April 29, 1844: State Dept., Arch. 
Tex. Leg.). The information from Taylor was to be for the benefit of the 
general-in-chief and " the higher authorities." 



THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 229 

replied, for the Executive does not regard the assent of any third 
party as necessary ; but a despatch, already laid before the Senate, 
has been forwarded to our representative there, and the purpose 
of it was " to preserve the peace of the two countries by denying 
to Mexico all pretext for assuming a belligerent attitude to the 
United States, as she had threatened to do in the event of the 
annexation of Texas to the United States." The messenger, he 
added, was expected back before the fifteenth of June.^ 

The Senate now took an unusual step, — apparently in order to 
discredit the President and the treaty, and perhaps with a direct 
look toward the Democratic national convention shortly to assemble. 
Almost as soon as it was known that the treaty and documents had 
been printed at New York City, Crittenden had moved that they be 
made public by the Senate itself; but this motion had dragged along, 
receiving consideration from time to time, yet not passing. After 
these Messages came in, however, the proposition, amended by its 
author so as to include the later papers that have now been men- 
tioned, was adopted, — the extraordinary character of this action 
being indicated by an express provision that it should not be con- 
sidered a precedent. In consequence the country was made aware 
of the President's military and naval orders ; and, as was doubtless 
foreseen by his enemies in the Senate, a great commotion arose. 
By some it was held that his course amounted to declaring war 
upon Mexico. The Baltimore Clipper insisted that he merited the 
severest rebuke, if not impeachment; the New York Tribune stood 
firmly for the latter alternative ; and Chancellor Kent pronounced 
it "an imperative duty." The stalwart Boston Atlas described the 
course of the Executive as " presumptuous and high-handed vil- 
lainy " and " treason " ; while the Philadelphia North American 
demanded that the *' presumptuous demagogue " should be impeached 
" instantly." Even as far away as France, the Revue de Paris de- 
clared it a new principle of international law, that because the 
United States had proposed annexation, Mexico must not wage war 
upon her revolted province. Jackson, on the other hand, believed 
that as soon as the treaty was laid before the Senate, the United 
States would be bound in honor to defend that country; many 
agreed with him ; and certainly it would have been a most extra- 
ordinary and shameful proceeding, had this country drawn upon 
Texas knowingly the bitterest resentment of a passionate nation by 

* Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 276. Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 82. 



230 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



obtaining her signature to tlie treaty, and then left her, without so 
much as an appearance of protection, to bear the burden and pay 
the penalty alone. Tyler's action, if illegal at all, was illegal only 
in the sense that nothing in the constitution bore upon the matter. 
As the framers of that instrument had not dreamed of such a case, 
the oracle was silent. Example also was lacking. The duty of the 
Executive was therefore to create, not follow, a precedent; and the 
acquiescence of both parties in the course of a President whom 
neither loved, is proof enough that his action — whether technically 
authorized or not — was essentially just and wise.® 

Tyler now sent in a Message that had not been called for. This 
was intended to support the view expressed in his first communica- 
tion to the Senate, that probably Texas would be lost — and worse 
than lost — if not annexed immediately; and it was accompanied 
with several documents calculated to justify that opinion. One of 
these, to which the President invited particular attention, was Hous- 
ton's letter of February i6 to Jackson, which has already been cited. 
Another was from Jackson himself who, said Tyler, after having an 
opportunity to confer in the fullest and freest manner with Hous- 
ton's private secretary. Miller, declared that Texas must be received 
now or could never be acquired. Most of the other communications 
were anonymous, but Calhoun vouched for the writers as persons 
" of high respectability," whose statements were " believed to be 
fully entitled to credit ;" and these documents, like one that had a 
signature, were calculated to show that a rejection of the treaty 
would cause Texas to side with England, and to make a free trade 
arrangement with that country in return for a guaranty of her in- 
dependence. One of the letters pointed out also that extensive 
British colonization would follow, presumably with a view to the 
execution of designs upon California; and the danger of smuggling 
was repeatedly mentioned. The shame of another rejection would 
render the people "bitterly hostile" to the United States, it was 
urged, and British influence would be everywhere dominant. In 
spite, however, of Calhoun's assurance that all this came from 
highly trustworthy persons, and the President's remark that in such 
a case reference must be had to private sources of information, since 
the Texan government could not be expected under the existing 

"Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 264, 267, 268, 270, 277, 281. Phil. A^o. Aincr., May 
17, 1844. Clipper, May 17, 1844, Tribune, May 18, 1844. (Kent) Nilcs, Ixvi., 
226. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 322. Atlas, May 20, 1844, with quotation from No. Anier. 
Revue, Jan. 9, 1845. Jackson to Blair, April 12, 1844: Jackson Pap. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 23 1 

circumstances to announce publicly their ulterior line of policy, the 
rather small number of these communications, their anonymity, and 
the ease with which statements of that sort could be manufactured, 
were their manufacture necessary, rendered the correspondence — 
except a few of the letters — rather unsatisfactory, no doubt; yet the 
Senate appears to have dreaded the effect of these documents upon 
the public, and it adopted the ungenerous policy of attempting to 
prevent their publication. ^° 

Though Tyler had replied to the inquiry about military and 
naval operations, Benton did not feel satisfied ; and after pondering 
on the Message for a week, he moved to call upon the Executive 
for full information regarding any engagement between him and 
the President of Texas with reference to aiding the latter country 
in the event of her agreeing to annex herself to the United States. 
This motion was agreed to by the Senate but drew no immediate 
response from the White House; and on the first day of June 
Benton himself proceeded to supply the information. Tyler has 
kept out of sight, he asserted truthfully, that the use of the military 
and naval forces of the United States was a sine qua noii insisted 
upon by Texas before making the treaty ; he had no right to expect 
that agreement to be ratified speedily, since to do so was to prejudge 
the decision of the Senate ; he did not in reality so expect, for he 
desired no action taken until his messenger should return from 
Mexico ; he had no ground for saying that only the concurrence of 
the Senate was necessary to give the United States a sound title to 
Texas ; in short, the army and navy were loaned to Houston because 
there was no other way to obtain the Texas bombshell for the Balti- 
more convention, and blow up the other Presidential candidates. 
At this point the orator was interrupted by a Message from the 
President in response to his resolution. " Enough," he exclaimed 
after listening to that and the accompanying documents ; " Enough, 
I say no more. The devil is now pulled from under the blanket." 
For at last, by what Benton described as " a perfect tooth-pulling 
business," the negotiations between Jones and Murphy, Calhoun, 

'"Richardson, Messages, iv., 318. The Message was dated May 16. Docu- 
ments and Calhoun to Tyler, May 16, 1844: Madis., July 17, 1844. The Senate's 
"injunction of secrecy" was not removed from these papers until June 12. two 
days after Tyler had sent them to the House of Representatives. Tyler said he 
had " strong reasons to believe " that the Texan government had given instruc- 
tions to propose to England, on the failure of the annexation treaty, a com- 
mercial treaty and an offensive and defensive alliance. These documents are 
referred to in at least one history as accompanying the treaty, which is not quite 
correct. 



232 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Van Zandt and Henderson regarding the protection of Texas had 
been extorted. Benton was perhaps not aware how strongly Tyler 
had wished to conclude the negotiations months earlier. Very 
possibly he did not know that when the promise to defend Texas 
was given, a speedy ratification of the treaty was desired and 
probably was expected by the President. Perhaps he did not 
observe how far Nelson's despatch to Murphy and Calhoun's pledge 
to the Texan envoys fell short of Houston's demand ; and he neither 
saw nor cared to see the justice of the pledge actually given by the 
Executive or the propriety of any action that might result from it. 
In short, as was usual in the Texas affair, his address was the 
clever stump speech of a partisan and imperfectly informed orator, 
occupying a position where a statesman should have been.^^ 

On the fifth of June came another Message that had not been 
called for. In itself it was of no importance, but it covered a de- 
spatch from Everett describing a conversation that had occurred in 
the House of Lords about the middle of May. Brougham had 
said at this time that his colloquy with Aberdeen in the same high 
place during the preceding August had not been intended to counsel 
any interference with slavery as it existed in the United States, to 
which Aberdeen had replied in a " very reserved " manner that the 
proposed annexation of Texas raised an unexampled question, which 
would receive the earliest and most serious attention of the British 
government ; that he hoped and believed the treaty would not be 
ratified ; but that he could not speak with confidence on such a 
point. This report Everett supplemented by mentioning that the 
London Times of the morning after had contained a hostile and 
acrimonious deliverance on the subject. From all these facts Tyler 
doubtless intended to have it inferred that Great Britain was greatly 
disturbed over the prospect of the annexation of Texas, because that 
step would upset her plans. ^- 

The Senate had thus obtained from the Executive a large amount 
of information besides that originally vouchsafed by him ; but on 
one matter it was unsuccessful. Benton felt sure that Dufif Green 
counted for much in the affair, and in particular that he was the 
author of the anonymous letter used by Upshur in his despatch of 

" Sen. Ex. Journ.. vi.. 291, Benton's motion was offered and adopted on May 
22. He forgot or did not know that the despatch of the messenger was no part 
of Tyler's original design. (June i) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 497. 
Richardson, Messages, iv., 321. Benton, St. Louis speech: Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 
1844. 

"^Everett, May 18, 1844: Sen. Doc. 367, 28 Cong., i sess., i. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 233 

August 8 ; and he was determined to " smoke him out." For nearly 
four weeks he kept at this task but without success. It was only 
learned that the files of the State department contained no such 
document as that from which Upshur made his citation, no evidence 
that it had ever reposed there, and no data indicating the name of the 
writer; that apparently it was a private letter; and that probably it 
was lying now among the other personal papers of the late 
Secretary.^^ 

^^ Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 276, 294, 310. Richardson, Messages, iv., 322. Sen. Ex. 
Journ., vi., 289, 290, 264, 312. Certain other Messages were sent in by the 
President in response to calls by the Senate : e. g., April 26 (the boundaries of 
Texas ; April 29 and May i (conclusion of the Calhoun-Pakenham corr.) ; May 3 
(previous corr. with the U. S. agents in Mexico and Texas with reference to the 
relations between those countries) ; May 17 (the alleged armistice between 
Mexico and Texas) ; May 2;^ (expenses incurred for sending military and naval 
forces to the vicinity of Texas). May 18 Benton asked that the injunction of 
secrecy be removed from his own speech on the treaty as far as delivered. Two 
days later this measure was adopted with reference to all speeches on the sub- 
ject as soon as made and to all resolutions ; and, when the treaty had been 
voted upon, publicity was given — as Allen had tried five weeks earlier to have 
it given — to the proceedings of the Senate in the matter. The whole subject was 
then openly before the country. 



XII 

The Annexation Question is Thrown into Politics 

In the Whig party there was but one voice regarding their Pres- 
idential candidate for the campaign of 1844: the eloquent, the 
winning, the imperious Henry Clay must be their standard-bearer. 
Very different was the situation of the Democrats. They had been 
greatly surprised as well as greatly chagrined by the election of 
1840; they could not view it as the sober decision of the people; and 
they were eager to try the issue again. Almost immediately after 
Harrison's victory preparations for the next campaign had begun; 
and Van Buren had very soon, though informally, been set up as the 
candidate. During the three years that followed, conventions in 
twenty- four of the twenty-six States pronounced for him ; and more 
than three-quarters of them instructed the delegations to vote that 
way at the coming national convention of the party. This apparent 
unanimity, however, was far from being real.^ 

Tyler, finding that even the Massachusetts Whigs were against 
him despite Webster's great influence, turned necessarily towards the 
Democrats for support in conducting the government, as we have 
seen ; but the Northern wing of that party, often termed Locofocos, 
feared that his return to it would injure Van Buren's prospects, and 
showed a particular coolness toward him. Moreover, as a dyed-in- 
the-wool State-rights man, upholder of slavery and foe of the tariff, 
he stood naturally opposed to the New York leader; and the bitter 
opposition of the Washington Globe, which had been keenly felt by 
him, was doubtless charged, like Benton's unfriendly course, to an 
influence from that direction. For these and perhaps for some other 
reasons, the head of the government felt decidedly opposed to the 
ex-President, and Governor Letcher assured Crittenden that he was 
"as deadly hostile to Van Buren as any man could be."^ 

This meant, according to close though prejudiced observers that 
the appointing power of the Executive was used to injure Inm. So 
the Washington Globe complained. Cave Johnson, a rather fair- 
minded Representative, declared that the whole patronage of the 

' See General Note, p. i. Stanwood, Presidency, 206. 

* (Locofocos) Tyler, Tyler, ii., 303. Letcher to Crit., Jan. 6, 1844: Crit. Pap. 

234 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 235 

government was being thrown in favor of annexation and against 
Van Buren. Senator Silas Wright behaved that the process had 
begun as far back as the last session of the twenty-seventh Congress, 
and had been diligently and shrewdly continued through all grades of 
the public service, until the smaller men took courage from the 
example of greater ones in yielding to this influence, and all became 
bold against the Locofoco chief. Blair wrote to Jackson that the 
Executive had promised everything in his efforts to prevent the ex- 
President's nomination ; and after making all allowances for the 
bias of these witnesses it is impossible not to believe — especially in 
view of Tyler's obvious motives for doing as they charged — that 
much alleged by them was true.^ 

Calhoun had reasons no less powerful than his for working in the 
same line, and a temper far more aggressive and determined. He, 
too, believed in State-rights and slavery, and he hated the tariff 
with a bitterness of which Tyler was incapable. The Locofocos he 
looked upon as worse than Whigs, and he wrote in December, 1843, 
that he considered them more hostile to his faction than to the 
opposite party. To increase the strength of these convictions, a 
long-standing feud existed between him and the New York states- 
man. He had suspected Van Buren of causing the fatal enmity of 
Jackson against him for the purpose of supplanting him in the 
President's favor ; and in return he had cast the deciding vote in the 
negative when the nomination of his fortunate rival as minister to 
England came before the Senate. As early as December, 1842, 
Dixon H. Lewis wrote that Van Buren's partisans, beginning to 
fear and hate Calhoun, were straining every nerve against him. 
The object of this unfriendly notice was well aware of their opposi- 
tion, and admitted that he reciprocated it with vigor. Near the close 
of 1843 ^^^ declared that his section of the country had nothing to 
hope from the New Yorker ; and he maintained that " a run between 
Mr. Clay and Mr. V. B., on the issue which would be made up 
between them, would utterly demoralize the South, to be followed 
by the final loss of the good old State rights doctrines." An added 
reason for taking this position was the intense personal antagonism 
between himself and Benton, for it was felt that the ambitious Mis- 
sourian would receive a large portion of the benefit, should Van 
Buren become President again ; and so bitter was the feeling between 

^ Globe, May 6, 1844. Johnson to Polk, May s, 1844: Polk Pap. Wright 
to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Blair to Jackson, May 19, 1844: Jack- 
son Pap. 



236 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

these rivals that in the opinion of Cave Johnson and many others 
it nearly produced a split in the party. Calhoun even determined 
not to recognize the Democratic national convention of 1844. His 
excuse for so doing was, that as the delegates were elected by State 
conventions, which consisted in many cases — particularly at the 
North — of the representatives of a few political leaders, they could 
not be expected to express the will of the people; but his real reason 
for taking this stand was probably not so much devotion to the ab- 
stract principles of pure democracy as a much more practical con- 
sideration. The method of constituting the convention insisted on 
by Van Buren's friends, he wrote to McDufifie, was intended to give 
and would give the control of both convention and government to 
the central States. He was thus at swords' points with the former 
President and his supporters all along the line.* 

Besides Tyler and Calhoun, Cass, R. M. Johnson and — up to a 
certain stage — Buchanan were Presidential aspirants, and as such 
had a keen eye upon the leading candidate. Benton has given us a 
highly effective picture of a secret committee toiling at Washington 
by day and still more after dark to undermine the accepted chief of 
their party. Great allowances must of course be made for his 
imagination and his prejudices; but undoubtedly there was consider- 
able basis for the representation. Each of the aspirants labored in 
his own interest, but all labored against Van Buren. As early as 
May, 1843, Clay compared the process then going on in the Demo- 
cratic party with that which had prevented his own nomination in 
1840. All the other candidates, he said, were " pushing " against the 
man who seemed to block their way ; and he suspected already that 
Van Buren's only chance of success would lie in the difficulty of 
agreeing upon any one else. Even then, he found, Calhoun men 
in the South and Southwest were avowing that they would vote for 
the Whig candidate rather than for him ; and all through the winter 
of 1843-44, Cave Johnson reported, the friends of the South Caro- 
linian toiled " like moles " to prevent the approaching convention 
from uniting upon his New York rival. Moreover the competitors 
not only worked singly for this common end, but worked in concert. 
No later than October, 1843, Niles wrote that Tyler's friends were 
deliberately co-operating with those of Calhoun, Cass and Johnson 

* Calhoun to Armistead, Dec. 23, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 557. (Sus- 
pected, etc.) Young, Amer. Statesman, 539, 553. Lewis to Cralle, Dec. 28, 1842: 
Campbell Pap. Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 
592. Id. to Hunter, Dec. 22, 1843: ib., 555. Johnson to Polk, May 5. 8, 1844: 
Polk Pap. Calhoun to McDuffie, Dec, 4, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 552. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 237 

" in their efforts to save the country from the countless evils of a 
restoration," and he stated with great satisfaction, ' We are rapidly 
bringing public opinion here [in New York] to see the folly of 
attempting to run ]\Ir. Van Buren."^ 

The main thing alleged against the ex-President was that he 
could not be elected. For instance a correspondent of W. B. Lewis, 
after surveying the situation in Pennsylvania for a month and a 
half, wrote that he was "doomed to inevitable defeat" in that 
quarter. On this point his enemies never wearied of enlarging. 
In 1840, it was urged, he had opposed a Whig party that had become 
rather out of tune in consequence of Clay's failure to obtain the 
nomination, and had had on his side all the influence and prestige of 
the government, whereas now these conditions would be reversed. 
Experienced politicians might understand the temporary causes that 
had produced the upheaval of that year, and they had formed certain 
associations, direct and indirect, with the former head of the 
government which influenced them ; but the rank and file were not 
so much affected by these considerations, and they did not relish 
the idea of following a beaten leader. Governor Letcher, for exam- 
ple, wrote that while Van Buren was the choice of the party leaders 
in Kentucky, he would never regain his original strength anywhere 
in the West. The real managers, whatever their personal prefer- 
ences, could not fail to see this condition of things ; and besides, as 
Alexander Johnston has pointed out, the defeat of 1840 led them 
to prefer as a settled policy that minor figures, rather than their 
foremost men, should be nominated for the Presidency. Such a 
feeling, as far as it now existed, counted of course against Van 
Buren." 

There were other arguments, too. His partisans were charged 
with desiring to monopolize the ofiices. R. M. T. Hunter com- 
plained in December, 1843, that they had the Speaker, the clerk, the 
printer and even the doorkeeper of the House of Representatives. 
They were also accused, and justly so, of an overbearing attitude. 
Amos Kendall, whose political judgment was certainly of value, 
wrote later to Jackson that Van Buren was defeated by a com- 
bination of the smaller interests ; that his friends, instead of treat- 

" Tyler, Tyler, ii., 303. Benton, View, ii., 584-585. Clay to Clayton. May 
27, 1843: Clayton Pap. Johnson to Polk, May 3, 1844: Polk Pap. Niles to 
Markoe, Oct. 28, 1843: Markoe and Maxcy Pap. 

"Reynolds to Lewis, April 24, 1844: Jackson Pap.. Knoxville Coll. Madis., 
Dec. 19, 1843. Letcher to Webster, Feb. 13, 1843: Webster Pap. Lalor's Cyclop., 
i., 777' 



238 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

ing these with courtesy and forbearance, had pursued the opposite 
policy; and that his enemies, though not strong enough to accom- 
pHsh very much individually, had been able "through numberless 
channels" to weaken him, and create "extensive distrust in refer- 
ence to his political strength," whereas a mild course, particularly 
towards Calhoun and Tyler, would have rendered the mischief- 
makers powerless. Justice Catron of the Supreme Court declared 
that most of the party loathed the brutal assaults made by the 
Globe upon the other factions during the winter of 1843. Benton 
was so haughty, supercilious and morose at times that even his 
friends hesitated to approach him. Under such circumstances men 
were glad to take up very weak pretexts against that side. For 
instance, the New York Assembly passed resolutions unfavorable to 
slavery; and as Van Buren happened to be in Albany at the time, 
it was immediately charged by the Madisonian that he was in 
league with the abolitionists.'^ 

Another point also, a very important one, has to be considered. 
There were many ambitious young men among the Democrats, and 
they wanted their chance. Duff Green voiced their sentiments when 
he insisted that the old party leaders must be thrown overboard. 
In June, 1844, Catron stated that for two sessions the Democrats in 
the House of Representatives had ardently and almost unanimously 
desired to clear the quarter-deck in such a manner. According to 
Buchanan this feeling thoroughly pervaded the Democratic ranks. 
Van Buren does not own the party, why should he strive to main- 
tain a hold upon it forever? demanded the Madisonian; why not 
permit the Democrats " to enjoy the novelty, the freshness, the en- 
thusiasm of a new leader?" A plea like this could not be loudly 
proclaimed in public, but it counted powerfully ; and all the other 
arguments that could be employed, there is good reason to believe, 
were studiously used as well. According to the Globe a systematic 
plan was adopted of sending letters throughout the country to stir 
up opposition, for the express purpose of having that opposition 
make itself felt at Washington on Congressmen who were to be 
members of the nominating convention; and nothing improbable can 
be seen in the allegation. Putting all these influences together, one 
realizes that their force was immense. Penn, editor of the St. 
Louis Reporter, concluded while at the capital during the winter that 

'Hunter to Calhoun, Dec. 19, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 906. Kendall 
to Jackson, Aug. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844]: Polk 
Pap. Johnson to Id., April 28; May 5, 1844: ib. Madis., March 21, 1844. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 239 

Van Bnren would have to be dropped ; and the same causes must 
have produced the same effect in many other cases.^ 

Henry Clay watched the emergence of the annexation issue with 
very close attention. Believing, as we have observed, that Tyler's 
object in bringing up the question was to disrupt the Whig party, he 
was very much on his guard. His letter to Crittenden written early 
in December, 1843, shows how carefully he had already studied the 
matter. Later he made a journey through the South; and at New 
Orleans he learned about the middle of February that negotiations 
had been opened with Texas, and that a treaty was likely to be 
the result soon. No doubt he talked on the subject with many of 
his political friends in that section ; and partly perhaps because they 
looked upon him as committed to the cause of Texas by his previous 
efforts to acquire the territory and thought it unnecessary to express 
any urgency, and partly, one may presume, because many of the 
southern Whigs — particularly in Louisiana — opposed or at any 
rate did not strongly favor annexation, he concluded that the Texas 
feeling in that quarter had been exaggerated. Near the end of 
March he wrote from Savannah : " There is no such anxiety for 
the annexation here at the South as you might have been disposed 
to imagine." L^ndoubtedly he was asking himself all the while how 
to shape the matter so that the party could stand together. In all 
probability, also, the course of a rival made some action upon his 
part seem highly desirable. Webster, he must have had some ink- 
ling, had been stirring up sentiment against annexation all the way 
from the office of the National Intelligencer to his own chambers in 
Boston ; and in all probability he thought, as others were saying, that 
the New England statesman was actuated in so doing by a desire 
to win the party's nomination for the Presidency. He knew, too, 
that should the nomination be given to himself there was still an 
election to consider, and that a great number of Whigs in the North 
had shown themselves intensely hostile to the incorporation of 
Texas. Putting together, then, the indifference which he thought he 
discovered at the South, the inevitable opposition at the North, 
Webster's apparent aim and Tyler's imputed purpose, and adding to 
all these considerations opinions of his own regarding the expediency 

* Green to Cralle, Dec. 30. 1843: South. Hist. Ass, Pub., vii., 419. Catron to 
Polk, June 8, [1844]: Polk Pap. Buchanan to Polk, Nov. 4, 1844: Polk Pap., 
Chicago. Madis.. Dec. 10, 1843. Wash. Globe. May 6, 1844. The nominating 
convention was largely composed of members of Congress. Penn to Jackson, 
Sept. 10, 1844: Jackson Pap. Jackson (to Blair, May 11. 1844: ib.) said that, 
but for Van B.'s position regarding Texas, no one else would have been thought 
of by the Democrats for the Presidency, but this was plainly incorrect. 



240 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



of the measure, he made up his mind what position to take; and at 
Raleigh, North CaroHna, on the seventeenth of April, he put his 
hand to a statement upon the subject, forwarding it at once to Crit- 
tenden for publication. Two days later he wrote from Petersburg 
that he felt " perfectly confident in the ground " therein taken, and 
could not " consent to suppress or unnecessarily delay " the appear- 
ance of his letter. Two days more, and he sent word from Norfolk 
that his declaration must be issued at once. " I am perfectly sure," 
he added, " that the degree of favor which prevails at the South 
towards annexation is far less than is believed at Washington ;" and 
then he gave a particular reason for urgency. Van Buren, he said, 
is against the measure, so that we stand on common ground, " and his 
present attitude renders it necessary that I should break silence " ; if 
he then comes out on the other side, " so much the worse for him." 
In this way he believed the matter would be entirely disposed of, 
deeming the interest in the Presidential question so strong that 
Texas could not get much notice.'^ 

At Washington, meanwhile, when it had become known that a 
letter from Henry Clay on the deep and burning subject might soon 
appear, his deliverance, as a correspondent of the Richmond 
Enquirer phrased it, was " anticipated with all the eagerness with 
which the children of Israel awaited the coming of a Messiah"; 
and at length on the morning of April 27 the National Intelligencer 
issued his communication. In substance it ran as follows : I did not 
think it proper to introduce a new and exciting question in the pres- 
ent campaign. At New Orleans I heard that the government had 
made overtures for the annexation of Texas, and that between 
thirty-five and forty-two senators were said to be ready to sanction 
a treaty, and I knew that the holders of and speculators in Texan 
lands and scrip were active in that cause; but I did not beheve that 
the Executive would move without any general public expression in 
favor of the plan, and even against vigorous manifestations of the 
people's desire. He has done so, however, and therefore I feel 
bound to speak. 

By the treaty of 1803, continued Clay, the United States obtained 
a title covering all the territory to the Rio Grande; but in 1819 we 
gave up the region beyond the Sabine. In the House of Represen- 
tatives I expressed the opinion that by this agreement we sacrificed 

'Elliot, priv., July 10, 1844. Clay to Crit., Dec. 5, 1843: Crit. Pap. Id. to Id., 
Feb. is; March 24; April 17, 19, 21, 1844: ib. On the effect of Webster's 
course: Madis., April 27, 1844. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 24I 

Texas for the sake of Florida ; but the treaty was ratified, and at 
present it is idle, if not dishonorable, to lay claim to what we sur- 
rendered. Our recognition of Texas did not afifect her relations to 
the mother-country, and the latter still asserts her ownership of the 
territory. Consequently, " annexation and war with Mexico are 
identical." Now a conflict with that republic for an extension of 
area would be discreditable to us, and her privateers and alliances 
might do us great harm. We are already looked upon abroad as 
ambitious and encroaching, and France or England might be ready 
to help check us. Moreover it is not certain that the treaty-making 
power has authority to plunge us into war ; and what is more, 
even should Mexico assent to our acquiring Texas, a large portion of 
the American people would be unwilling to do so, and that fact of 
itself should settle the matter. Far better can we exert ourselves to 
promote the harmony and welfare of the population we now have. 

To demand annexation as a means of balancing the two sections 
of the United States is extremely dangerous, for the same principle 
might be urged tomorrow as an argument for the acquisition of 
Canada, and the world would see in it the proclamation of " an in- 
satiable thirst " for what is not ours. It would also tend toward 
a dissolution of the Union, for the part now weakest would find 
itself growing still weaker in comparison. Nor would annexation 
strengthen slavery. The territory it is proposed to gain would make 
five States, and only two of those would be adapted to negro labor, 
since the western and northern portions are merely fit for grazing. 
If we do absorb Texas we must necessarily, whatever the treaty 
stipulates, become responsible for her debt, which I understand is at / 
least $13,000,000. No doubt, should any Efiropean nation try to 
get possession of that country, the United States ought to oppose its 
design even to the extent of declaring war ; but it remains for the 
President, if he is aware of such aims, to make them known. So 
far as Great Britain is concerned, she has formally disavowed the 
intention to interfere, and says that she desires our neighbor to 
remain independent. In short, " I consider the annexation of Texas, 
at this time, without the assent of Mexico, as a measure compromis- 
ing the national character; involving us certainly in war with 
Alexico, probably with other foreign Powers ; dangerous to the 
integrity of the Union ; inexpedient in the present financial condition 
of the country ; and not called for by any general expression of 
public opinion." 

17 



242 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



This letter was distinctly opposed to immediate annexation, and 
therefore could not fail to be denounced. Clay was charged with 
sacrificing the interests of the South to gain votes in the opposite 
quarter. He was attacked for apparently going back on his past 
as regarded the acquisition of Texas. He was accused of pro- 
British sentiment, a partiality for Mexico and a fear of European 
arms; and any one could see that from these points of view his 
position appeared rather weak, and was not likely to suit the popular 
taste. But Henry Clay was a privileged character, said the corre- 
spondent of the Philadelphia Ledger. He was a Southern man, 
too, and therefore his attitude could be the more easily pardoned 
by those whom it was likely to ofifend. Besides, he arrived in Wash- 
ington just before his letter appeared, and there he stood at the 
centre of political radiation with all his commanding presence, all 
his gift of persuasion and all his extraordinary personal magnetism, 
to meet and quench opposition.^** 

Van Buren also had been studying the new issue. In fact it had 
been forced upon his attention. Repeated warnings had come to 
his ear that he must speak out and speak for Texas. In October, 
1843, a correspondent expressed the opinion to him that the Cal- 
hounites were intending to make a profit out of that question. In 
March, 1844, Blair sent him a copy of Jackson's famous letter to 
Brown, informed him that Tyler had made a treaty with a view to 
its influence in the Presidential contest, and pointed out that Jack- 
son's opinion would have " mighty weight " with the party ; and 
George Bancroft wrote that the current of Democratic opinion was 
favorable to annexation. During April several very pointed admoni- 
tions arrived at Kinderhook, and he was told plainly by influential 
persons at Washington and elsewhere that the annexation issue 
was to be used against him at Baltimore. Cave Johnson went so 
far as to assure him that no person opposed to the acquisition of 
Texas could get votes in the South for any office connected with the 
execution of the treaty, and expressed the belief that this question 
would override all others. However strongly Van Buren had relied 
upon the endorsements of the State conventions, he was fully 
sagacious enough to see that here was a new factor which made his 
grip on the party uncertain. ^^ 

'"Richmond Enq.^ May 7, 1844. Madis., April 29, 1844. Nat. Intel!., April 
27, 1844. Rich. Enq.: Madis., May i, 1844. Curtis, Webster, ii., 242. Ledger, 
April 29, 30, 1844. J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, xii., 19. 

"Roane to Van B.. Oct. 17, 1843: Van B. Pap. Blair to Van B., March 18, 
1844: ib. Bancroft to Id., March 28, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., 3 ser., 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 243 

He decided to speak out, and the Washington Globe printed 
his letter in the evening of the same day on which Clay's appeared. 
It was a very long document and extremely involved in style; but 
the main points of it can be summarized within tolerable limits. 
First, said he, I hold that the treaty-making power may acquire 
foreign territory, for precedents and the acquiescence of the people 
have so decided; and Congress has authority to admit new States 
from such territory, since the language of the constitution is ex- 
plicit, and a proposition to limit this authority to the area within 
the original limits of the United States was rejected by the con- 
vention of 1787. The question of expediency, however, is another 
affair. When I was President the subject came up, the administra- 
tion decided adversely, its attitude proved satisfactory to the people, 
and both Houses of Congress laid the matter on the table. Our 
recognition of Texas had no bearing upon her relations to Mexico. 
We merely recognized the de facto government, as was necessary 
in order to have diplomatic or commercial dealings with that coun- 
try ; and her revolutionary war still continues. Mexico has declared 
that our incorporation of her former province would be regarded 
as a hostile act. It is not expedient to incur the evils of a war and 
all the possible entanglements with European powers for the sake 
of acquiring that territory, and — what is far more important — honor 
requires us to remain neutral. Time and circumstances might 
obviate the necessity of formal recognition by Mexico, but as yet 
they have not done so. I do not believe that if we fail to receive Texas 
now, her people will sell their liberties to a European power ; nor 
do I believe that a European power which had not already resolved 
upon war with the United States would try to make her virtually 
its colony. Should such a thing be attempted, we could rightfully 
adopt measures for our defence. Indeed, were the alternative that 
our neighbor should become a British dependency, the American 
people would be substantially a unit for taking her. A precipitate 
incorporation of that country, therefore, must be regarded as both 
unnecessary and inexpedient. It is, however, my view that " the 
present condition of the relations between Mexico and Texas may 

ii., 421. Quinn to Id., April 9, 1844: Van B. Pap. Tucker to Id., April 12, 1844: 
ib. Selden to Id., April 13, 1844: ib. Johnson to Id., April 13. 20, 1844: ib. The 
Van B. papers include other warnings also, from Oct., 1843, on. It hardly seems 
correct to say that Van B. felt so confident of winning the nomination that he 
did not hesitate to speak out ; and the extreme carefulness with which he wrote 
shows that he realized the danger. 



244 ^'^^ ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

soon be so far changed as to weaken, and perhaps obviate entirely, 
the objections against the immediate annexation of the latter to 
the United States, which I have here set forth, and to place the 
question on different grounds. . . . Mexico may carry her per- 
sistence in refusing to acknowledge the independence of Texas, and 
in destructive but fruitless efforts to re-conquer that State, so far 
as to produce, in connection with other circumstances, a decided 
conviction on the part of a majority of the people of the United 
States, that the permanent welfare, if not absolute safety of all, 
makes it necessary that the proposed annexation should be effected, 
be the consequences what they may." Were a move for annexation 
to be inaugurated under such circumstances, I should be guided by 
the will of the people as expressed in Congress, a " large portion " 
of the Senate and all the Representatives having been chosen after 
the question had been brought before the people for mature con- 
sideration. ^- 

The original draft of this paper — full of interlineations and 
erasures — proves that its wording had been very carefully studied. 
Its tone was statesmanlike, and in fairness one must suppose that 
in part it sprang from principle and a sense of duty. On the other 
hand it cannot be doubted that its author had in full view the North- 
ern opposition to the Texas project. Jackson felt sure that ex- 
pediency had been at the bottom of his mind, and that his muse had 
been Thomas H. Benton. In the opinion of the British minister 
the real purpose was merely to postpone the matter. The Balti- 
more American like many other papers declared that the writer 
said to the North, I always have been and still am opposed to an- 
nexation ; and to the South, This plan of Tyler's is undigested and 
inexpedient and I am against it, but if I become President and the 
people really desire Texas, the matter can be arranged. The United 
States Gazette compared the letter to certain street signs that bore 
various readings according to the point of view, but all for the 
benefit of the advertiser. This was harsh ; and probably the cir- 
cumlocutions of the writer — which made it very difficult for plain 
men to be sure they understood him, and therefore gave a certain 
impression of an unmanly fear of consequences and a design to 
conceal his real opinions — were in large part at least caused by a 

'^Van B. sent the letter (in reply to one from Hammett) to Silas Wright, 
who read it and then submitted it to Benton and other friends. All approved of 
it, and it was put in type without delay (Wright to Van B.. April 29, 1844: Van 
B. Pap.). 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 245 

desire to treat a very difficult subject with prudent guardedness. 
The American's digest seems fairly near the truth; and a position 
of readiness to carry out the deliberately expressed will of the 
nation, even against a personal preference, was one becoming to the 
chief magistrate of a free people. Certainly Van Buren took no 
positive stand against annexation; and the Globe declared in view 
of his letter that while he refused to support the treaty, since that 
would mean war, his plan ensured the acquisition of Texas within 
two years. The moderate friends of the cause had therefore little 
to complain of ; the eager friends, while they might think the letter 
cool, could hardly blame a Presidential candidate for reserve or for 
wishing to defer so great a step until a majority of the people should 
evidently desire it ; and the reasonable enemies could not deny that 
the deliberate will of the nation ought to be obeyed by its Execu- 
tive. In a word, said Amos Kendall, those who censured the paper 
could not exactly say why.^^ 

This fact, however, did not prevent the censure. Naturally all 
who were passionately bent upon the immediate acquisition of Texas 
— particularly those expecting financial profits from it — objected to 
the dangers and uncertainties of delay; and of course, as Cave John- 
son observed, the letter was promptly found of assistance by Van 
Buren's political opponents. Every covert enemy of yours is coming 
out, Kendall reported to him within two days. All the Presidential 
aspirants laid on the shelf by the Locofoco statesman, said the 
Advocate of Charlottesville, Virginia, hope now to reach the White 
House on the Texas hobby. The House of Representatives was 
soon too hot for comfort; and after eight days had passed Silas 
Wright described the state of things at Washington as so bad it 
could not have been worse. Some were eager to destroy Van Buren, 
some to push themselves ahead of him, some to do both. The 
letter, said Calhoun, has " completely prostrated him " and brought 
forward a host of candidates in his place ; while the Southern men, 
as was natural, abused him without stint, and showed more openly 
and more positively than before their determination to drop him. 
Probably, as Wright explained, there was a deliberate scheme to 
create an excitement about the paper before it could be read and 
understood. Somewhat by design, therefore, and somewhat from 
causes beyond their control, the Democratic politicians seemed 

"(Draft) Van B. Pap. Jackson to Blair, June 7, 25, 1844: Jackson Pap. 
Pak., No. 36, April 28, 1844. Amcr.. May 2, 1844. Gazette: Nat. IntclL, May 
8, 1844. Globe, May 6, 1844. Kendall to Van B., April 29, 1844: Van B. Pap. 



246 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

almost beside themselves. " They are all going mad, and are setting 
all others mad," exclaimed the New York Herald. Passion rules 
the hour, reported Kendall. " The Seething of the Caldron," was 
the National Intelligencer's heading of an article on the situation, 
published the seventh of May.^* 

In the midst of the storm B. F. Butler of New York set out for 
the Hermitage. The Philadelphia Ledger announced that his mis- 
sion was to bring Jackson round to Van Buren's position on the 
great subject; and about the middle of May the Old Hero addressed 
a communication to the Nashville Union. This, however, said much 
for annexation and little for the ex-President. His letter, Jackson 
explained, was quite sound on the basis of circumstances as they 
had existed at the close of his administration ; but this excuse 
amounted to the damaging charge that he had not kept up with the 
times. Moreover, in an indirect way it injured him still more 
seriously. Van Buren's popularity in the South — such as he had 
enjoyed there — had mainly been due to the understanding that 
Jackson backed him, and now the effect of his unpalatable views 
was powerfully reinforced by this unmistakable evidence that a 
radical divergence of opinion on a vital issue existed between them. 
Nor did it appear that Van Buren's arguments, any more than 
Clay's, were to exert any great influence on public opinion. The 
simultaneousness of their letters and the similarity of their views 
readily prompted the insinuation that they had written by a pre- 
concerted arrangement for the purpose of eliminating an ugly sub- 
ject from the impending canvass. They "run and hunt in couples," 
exclaimed the Madisonian; and whatever be thought of this accusa- 
tion, it is clear that they fared alike in the poor success of the chase. 
At Harrodsburg, Kentucky, a large meeting of both parties, which 
had the two letters before it, pronounced almost solidly for an- 
nexation.^' 

The national convention of the Whig party met at Baltimore on 
the first day of May. The delegates went unitedly to their task, and 
quickly they performed it. Henry Clay was unanimously nominated 

"Johnson to Polk, April 28, 1844: Polk Pap. Kendall to Van B. April 29, 
1844: Van B. Pap. Advocate: Nat. Intel!., May 23, 1844. Wright to Van B., 
May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Calhoun to Mrs. Clemson, May 10, 1844: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr., 585. W. Smith to Polk, April 29, 1844: Polk Pap. Ledger, May 
I, 1844. Herald, May 18, 1844. Kendall to Van B., May 13, 1844 : Van B. Pap. 

"^Ledger, May 2, 1844. Jackson to Nash. Union, May 13, 1844: Van B. 
Pap. Madis.. April 29, 1844. (Harrodsburg) Kendall to Van B., May 13, 1844: 
Van B. Pap. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 247 

for the Presidency, and in accordance with his wish — not to say 
order — no declaration at all was made regarding Texas. Annexa- 
tion sentiment there must have been ; but it was not powerful enough 
to override loyalty to the chief and the desire for Whig harmony; 
and a Texan official present on the occasion cried out bitterly, that 
in all the immense concourse of people " not one " person would 
raise his voice for that country. Indeed, by nominating the author 
of the Raleigh letter the delegates gave a kind of party sanction 
to its views. ^"^ 

JMay 27 a Tyler convention met in the same city. The Presi- 
dent had done everything in his power, it would seem, to obtain the 
Democratic nomination. A week before, the Madisonian had con- 
jured the Texas men among the delegates to "pause." Only Tyler 
can deal with the annexation question if the treaty is rejected, it 
urged once more, and " is it not too much to ask of any man that 
he shall incur the greatest responsibilities for the benefit of some 
other ? " In the next issue it declared that he alone could save the 
party, and two days later an urgent final appeal was uttered. But 
all this was in vain. The state of public sentiment was indicated 
by the action of a meeting held in the very city of Baltimore less 
than a week before the assembling of the convention. Friends of 
the President had originated the gathering. It was intended as a 
demonstration in his favor; resolutions endorsing him had been 
drawn ; yet his partisans were not allowed to offer the resolutions, 
and everything like Tylerism was rigidly excluded. It became very 
clear that nothing could be expected of the Democrats' convention, 
and so the Madisonian admitted a few days later.^'^ 

Full preparations, however, had been made for this contingency. 
Soon after the letters of Clay and Van Buren appeared, the Tyler 
Central Committee addressed a call to those who would listen : " We 
appeal then to the true friends of the United States, of Texas, and 
of Mexico, to rally. We recommend to them at once to come — come 
one, come all — from all parts of the nation — North, South, East and 
West — come up to Baltimore on the 27th inst. ; there, in the Monu- 
mental city — high as the statue of Washington stands, to erect the 
liberty pole of American freedom and independence, and from its 
pinnacle unfurl the banner of our country, inscribed with the motto 

" It is worthy of remark that the Whig convention said nothing about a 
national bank, for opposing which Tyler had been read out of the party. W. J. 
Brown to Van B., April 29, 1844: Van B. Pap. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 430. 
" Madis., May 20, 21, 23, 27, 1844. Bait. Clipper, May 27, 1844. 



248 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

of ' Tyler and Texas ' ! ! ! " Later the President explained that 
as he could not accept the risk of Van Buren's nomination and the 
consequent failure of his great project, he called a convention of his 
own so as to leave to the Democrats merely an option between a 
Texas man and defeat, — in other words, forced them to see that 
unless they should nominate an annexationist, enough partisans of 
that cause would vote for Tyler to ensure the defeat of their candi- 
date; but one cannot doubt that he had hopes of either compelling 
the Democrats to make him their choice or gaining enough support 
to become one of three in the House of Representatives.^® 

By his reckoning a thousand delegates, representing every State 
in the Union, answered the call of his committee, while according 
to others there were some two hundred on the floor. At all events 
there was no lack of harmony or of enthusiasm. At the top of the 
hall two banners were displayed. One bore the words, " Tyler and 
Texas " ; the other " Re-Annexation of Texas, — Postponement is 
Rejection"; and in the spirit of these mottoes the convention soon 
did its work. With no less alacrity Tyler accepted its invitation, 
" I do not feel myself at liberty," he said in his letter, " to decline 
the nomination tendered me under such circumstances. There is 
much in the present condition of the country which would forbid 
my doing so. My name has been inseparably connected with the 
great question of the annexation of Texas to the Union. In orig- 
inating and concluding that negotiation, I had anticipated the cordial 
co-operation of two gentlemen, both of whom were most prominent 
in the public mind as candidates for the Presidency. That co- 
operation would have been attended with the immediate withdrawal 
of my name from the question of the succession." But now I am 
attacked for my action regarding Texas, and annexation is " sternly ". 
opposed by the very men whose support I had expected. For these 
reasons " I can waive no responsibility."^^ 

On the same day as Tyler's convention the Democratic host as- 
sembled at Baltimore, but a long battle instead of a brief love-feast 
lay before it. Van Buren was strong there of course, because so 
large a number of the delegates had been instructed to vote for him, 
but that argument was met in two ways : by saying that his delegates 
had been chosen in such a manner that they did not represent the 

^^ Madis., May 6, 1844. Tyler to Wise (no date): Tyler, Tyler, ii., 317. 

"Tyler, Tyler, ii., 317. N. Y. Evening Post, June i, 1844. (Tyler's letter) 
Nat. Intell., May 31, 1844. Tyler stated that Calhoun had nothing to do with his 
convention (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 414). 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 249 

people; and by insisting that since their instructions had been given, 
the situation had been radically changed by the publication of his 
letter. The first of these replies must have fallen on many deaf 
ears, however just it may have been, for the gentlemen could hardly 
be expected to undermine their own position ; but the second, whether 
sound or not, could be made to appear plausible, and in particular 
could be accepted as conclusive by men who desired for some other 
reason to break away. New instructions, formal or informal, had 
been given in some instances ; and any one who chose could assert 
that his own constituents, were they to assemble now, would lay upon 
him different commands. -° 

From another point of view, also, Van Buren was strong. Butler 
wrote to Jackson that should the New York leader be rejected, no 
new man could carry a single northern State ; so that it would ensure 
the election of Clay to put up another candidate, and with Clay 
the South would have a national bank, besides many other things 
it abominated, with no Texas ; whereas Van Buren, should he be 
made President, would both effect annexation and avert the threat- 
ened ills. In reply to this view it was urged, no doubt, that the 
nomination of Van Buren would certainly be followed by the ap- 
pearance of a Southern candidate and the disruption of the party ; 
and the Northerners were asked whether they cared to accept that 
responsibility, and what their favorite would gain. The attitude 
of the Tyler men, too, probably injured Van Buren, for they ap- 
peared to wish that he should be nominated ; and it was inferred that 
they desired a chance to run their man against him, on a platform 
of " Tyler and Texas," in the expectation of capturing the South.-^ 

The preliminary yet decisive battle was fought on the question 
of adopting the rule of earlier conventions that a two-thirds vote, 
and not a bare majority, should be requisite for a choice. Here 
again lay a convenient opportunity for those who desired Van 
Buren's defeat to oppose him without appearing openly to be his 
enemies, while his friends dared not confess weakness by shrinking 
from a principle which had previously been used in his favor, and 
his out-and-out opponents threatened flatly to secede should the 
precedents be ignored. A vote of 148 to 118 adopted the rule, 
nearly all of the Southern delegates voting for it and nearly all 

^ (New) Stanwood, Presidency, 211. 

^Butler to Jackson, May 10, 1844: Jackson Pap. (So. Cand.) Lewis to 
Jackson, May 22, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll. Johnson to Polk, May 8, 
12, 2T, 1844: Polk Pap. 



250 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



from the other section against it. On the first ballot for a candi- 
date Van Buren had a majority of twenty-six, but not the required 
two-thirds. Of 105 Southerners only twelve stood by him, while 
out of 151 northerners only seventeen failed to do so. Then his 
strength gradually declined, until on the seventh ballot he had but 
99 out of the 266 delegates, while Cass rose from 83 to 123. Cass, 
however, it was felt by many, could not possibly be elected. In par- 
ticular, said one of Polk's chief supporters, the Van Buren men 
were determined not to have him; and therefore a dire prospect 
seemed to await the party. As an earnest of it, reported the same 
delegate, the convention itself " well-nigh got into a general pel- 
mell fight."" 

But meanwhile Gideon J. Pillow had been at work day and night, 
and others had assisted him. While Van Buren, like the proverbial 
great tree with a hollow trunk, had an imposing appearance of 
strength without the reality, James K. Polk, almost unthought of 
as a Presidential candidate, possessed many elements of a " dark 
horse." He had been Governor of Tennessee in 1839, but had since 
been defeated twice as a candidate for that office ; and he now 
limited his aspirations to the Vice-Presidency. The party leaders 
had been very much afraid that should he gain some national suc- 
cess, he would wish to " set up for chief " ; but all winter Justice 
Catron had been working for him at Washington, traversing the 
city night after night, and pledging himself " to the contrary of this 
opinion." Polk had written a letter pronouncing for the immediate 
acquisition of Texas under its peculiarly captivating aspect of " re- 
annexation." He was a Southern man, and his canvass for the Vice- 
Presidency had shown great strength in the South and Southwest. 
To those sections Pillow turned, but he took pains at the same time 
not to offend the Van Buren men, who were full of resentment 
against all the principal aspirants because the friends of these 
rival candidates had defeated their favorite by combining for the 
two-thirds rule; and the mood of the ex-President's partisans not 
only disposed them to look with favor on the inoffensive and con- 
ciliatory Polk, but aided him immensely by rendering the selec- 
tion of a new man as the standard-bearer practically unavoidable. 
To point out the logic of the situation. Cave Johnson had repeatedly 

•^ Stanwood, Presidency, 212. Blaine. Twenty Years, i., 32. (Threatened) 
G. Bancroft to Van B., May 24, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 sen, ii,, 430. 
(Cass) Schouler, U. S., iv., 468, note. (Van B. men) Pillow to Polk, May 28, 
1844: Polk Pap. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 25I 

argued since the publication of Van Buren's letter that perhaps, 
as the Calhounites were much concerned over the possibility that 
he might be nominated after all, the Locofocos had better save their 
party and their principles by accepting a compromise candidate. 
Finally — to bring the matter to the point of crystallization — Pillow 
discovered before the convention opened that Polk's friends were 
quite willing to support him for the higher office, came to the con- 
clusion that he should be the compromise candidate, and perceived 
that the move in this direction must appear to come from the North. 
He then studied zealously how to make the best use of the circum- 
stances ; and at length, working almost all night in the midst of the 
crisis, he found an opportunity to strike, as he said, a fatal though 
secret blow.-^ 

Precisely what this was he did not explain in his report; but 
another of Polk's friends gave a more definite account of himself. 
R. M. Johnson's delegates and the doubtful men were ready to join 
Cass on the next ballot. This would have made his vote 157, only 
21 short of the required number, and after that it would have 
seemed factious to resist. The idea then " flashed " into the mind of 
George Bancroft, — so he informed Polk without mentioning whether 
or no the flash came from Pillow's direction, — of rallying upon the 
ex-Governor of Tennessee. He suggested this to Carroll of New 
Hampshire, and found him cordially sympathetic. Governor Hub- 
bard of the same State concurred heartily, and so that delegation 
was fixed. Next Bancroft opened the matter to Governor Morton, 
a leading Massachusetts member, and he also agreed to the plan. 
Pillow and A. J. Donelson, Jackson's nephew and former secretary, 
were then consulted; and they said that if New England would lead 
off, a number of southern States would follow ; so with fresh cheer 
Polk's friends worked on. When the Granite State was called in 
the next ballot, her vote went that way; and this example was fol- 
lowed by Tennessee, Alabama, seven of the Massachusetts men and 
certain others. The consequence was that Cass fell off instead of 
gaining, and the " dark horse," with a vote of 44, appeared at last 
in the running.-* 

^Pillow to Polk May 25, 1844: Polk Pap. (Defeated) Garrison, Extension, 
131. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 30, 1843: Polk Pap. Catron to Id., June 8, [1844]: 
ib. Polk to Chase and Heaton, April, [1844]: ib. Nat. IiitclL, Nov. 22, 1844. 
Johnson to Polk, May 8, 1844: Polk Pap. Pillow to Id., May 28, 30, 1844: ib. 

=" Bancroft to Polk, July 6, 1844: Bancroft Pap. In McMaster, U. S., vii., 
354, is given information written by Bancroft in 1887. which differs somewhat 
from this account, but of course the preference belongs to the contemporary 



252 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Naturally much depended upon the men from New York. Don- 
elson had brought a letter addressed by his uncle to B. F. Butler, 
chairman of that delegation, in which Jackson said : 

" You might as well, it appears to me, attempt to turn the current 
of the Mississippi as to turn the democracy from the annexation of 
Texas to the United States. Had Mr. V. B. & Benton taken a view of 
the population of Texas, where from, and the places of the birth of the 
Texan prisoner [s] at perote in Mexico, the[y] might have judged of 
the feelings of the south & west. If they had taken into view the ex- 
posed situation of New Orleans, with Texas in the hands of Great 
Britain, added to the danger of British influence upon our Western 
Indians, on the event of war, & the dreadful scenes apprehended from a 
servile war, with the Indians combined upon our south & west, the feel- 
ings of the west might have been well judged upon this subject." 

I have it from the highest authority in Texas, continued Jack- 
son, that if her offer is now rejected she is lost to us forever; and 
why should we hesitate to annex that country, when we negotiated 
with Mexico without the consent of Spain for the purchase of it? 
This was effective, and it was clinched by a most appealing personal 
touch : I am so feeble, said the Old Hero, that I can scarcely wield 
the pen. In the next ballot, when New York was reached Butler 
asked leave to retire for consultation ; and one can scarcely doubt 
that this epistle was read aloud in the committee-room and deeply 
pondered. There was also present the consideration that evidently 
Van Buren could not be nominated by a united Democracy, that a 
break in the party would almost certainly mean his defeat, and that 
by taking a stand for some new man he and his friends could not 
only prevent his enemies from dictating the candidate, but retain 
a large measure of influence. At all events, on returning to the 
convention hall Butler withdrew Van Buren's name, reading a letter 
from Kinderhook, written before the assembling of the delegates, 
which authorized this move to be made if it would conduce to har- 
mony. Then ensued a stampede. Delegation after delegation changed 
its vote, and Polk was given a unanimous nomination.-^ 

In view of all these circumstances, it seems clearly an error to 

letter. Bancroft added in 1887 that he labored with the N. Y. delegates, which 
it is easy to believe, and intimated that he was the first to bring the idea of 
nominating Polk for President before the delegation from Tenn., which seems 
highly improbable. That his memory was not perfect after the lapse of forty- 
three years is far from surprising. Stanwood, Presidency, 213. 

== Jackson to Butler, May 14, 1844: Van B. Pap. A considerable number of 
delegates had asked to be passed over when called upon to vote and now came out 
for Polk : McMaster, vii., 354. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 253 

hold that Van Buren was defeated and Poh-c accepted merely or 
even mainly because the former opposed, and the latter favored, the 
immediate acquisition of Texas. Pillow himself explained the mat- 
ter far more truly. I held you up, he reported, as the " Olive Branch 
of peace," and all parties ran to you as to " an ark of safety." Polk 
was selected because, aspiring only to the second place, he had been 
able to win support without exciting enmity ; because he was not 
Van Buren nor allied with Benton, and therefore the Calhounites 
did not object to him ; because he was on good terms with the Loco- 
focos, and therefore the Northerners were willing to give him their 
votes ; because he was a friend of Texas, and therefore the annexa- 
tionists felt satisfied ; because it was believed he could be elected ; 
and because, as he was a new man, all thought they would get a 
fair chance at the spoils, whereas each of the other candidates had 
his group of retainers, among whom the fruits of victory would be 
divided. Under these circumstances it was possible to unite upon 
him. Besides, his case had been most adroitly managed, while the 
other side had grossly blundered ; and finally, as Catron wrote ex- 
ultantly to him, " ]\Ir. Van Buren was out of luck — we again have 
it." The annexation matter, though more convenient than anything 
else as a handle, was only one of the factors.-*' 

It even seems clear that the cry for Texas had been made so 
prominent, after the publication of Van Buren's letter, mainly 
as a pretext. The circumstances already mentioned in connection 
with the appearance of that paper suggest this opinion distinctly, 
and many other facts tend strongly to confirm it. As early as 
December, 1843, Cave Johnson had predicted that the Texas and 
the tariff issues would be used against Van Buren if possible. 
Benton and the Globe maintained persistently that such was the 
game. Their chief journalistic opponent, the National Intelligencer, 
declared in a thoughtful article upon the proceedings at Baltimore 
that the annexation question was used there as a mere device to 
beat the ex-President. The Baltimore American, a sober and well 
informed paper, concurred in that view. Journals farther from the 

^Pillow to Polk, May 29, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago. Benton, View, ii., 594. 
(New man) Byrdsall to Calhoun, Aug. 25, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 965. 
(Spoils) Nat. Intell., Nov. 22. 1844. Van Buren's prospects were greatly injured 
by the defection of Ritchie (Richmond Eiiq.). probably the leading editor of the 
party. As one consequence of the election of Polk, Ritchie and Heiss (of the 
Nashville Union) became the printers of Congress. Ritchie could easily foresee 
that should Van B. be elected, Blair and Rives would probably continue to hold 
that lucrative appointment (see Mackenzie, Van B., 292). This is a single illustra- 
tion. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844] : Polk Pap. 



254 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



scene of strife and looking upon events with more coolness perhaps, 
like the Detroit Advertiser, expressed the same opinion. Silas 
Wright, a man of excellent judgment and fully informed, believed 
that the Texas matter was " a mere pretense " for setting aside one 
whom it was desired to overthrow. Amos Kendall informed Jack- 
son that Van Buren's course regarding annexation only " furnished 
an opportunity to give him a finishing blow " ; and Pillow wrote 
in the thick of it at Washington, two days before the convention 
opened, that the annexation measure had been used, by men who 
cared little about Texas, to kill the New York leader and to kill 
Benton as the heir apparent. Shortly before the delegates met, a 
compromise plan by which Wright — who concurred entirely with 
Van Buren on the subject — was to be the Presidential candidate, 
received considerable favor. Nor should it be forgotten that many 
joined heartily in accepting Polk who certainly had not committed 
themselves to the project of immediate annexation nor even — in all 
probability — studied the subject.-^ 

No doubt the delegates went wild over the nominee; but this 
was due to their intense anxiety regarding the situation and the 
tremendous excitement of the struggle. Francis Wharton explained 
the matter clearly to Calhoun, when he said that at first the con- 
vention was delighted with the result, not because Polk was nomi- 
nated, but " that any nomination was made at all." It was over- 
joyed to find that party chaos and party destruction had been 
averted ; and at Washington, a little out of the whirl, when the news 
arrived by wire, it was received with " speechless amazement." So 
it was received in many other places. And yet even Silas Wright 
desired to have the world understand that Van Buren had been 
defeated because of his expressions on the Texas question. The 
refusal of the South to support him, he explained, should its true 
reasons become public at the North, would be so damaging to har- 
mony and the party prospects, that it was necessary to offer some 
excuse which would not appear so much like treacherous defection, 
and therefore would cause less resentment. It was also important 
that such a view prevail in order to ensure for the ticket what Catron 

^Johnson to Polk, Dec. 30. 1843: Polk Pap. Nat. Intell., May 7; Nov. 22, 
1844. Benton to Van Antwerp: Nat. Intell., July i, 1844. Globe, passim. Bait. 
Amer.: Savannah Repiib., June 5, 1844. Adv., May 15, 1844. Wright to Polk, 
June 2, 1844: Polk Pap. Kendall to Jackson, Aug. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. 
Pillow to Polk, May 25, 1844: Polk Pap. (Concurred) Wright to Polk, June 2, 
1844: ib. (Compromise plan) Johnson to Polk, May 25, 1844: ib. No doubt 
Van B.'s letter was most genuinely offensive to many in the South : e. g., Turner 
Essays, 218. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 255 

termed the " vast & controlling power " of the Calhoun faction in 
the slave States ; and thus the policy of Van Buren's friends joined 
hands with the policy of his enemies to obscure the truth of the 
matter.^* 

This view is confirmed to a certain extent by the action of the 
convention regarding the Vice-Presidency. After pretending to 
reject Van Buren because of his Texas opinions, the delegates 
nominated Wright for the second office by an almost unanimous 
vote. Wright's prompt declination of the honor was partly due, 
it must be supposed, to a sense of personal loyalty to his defeated 
friend ; but privately he gave as the reason for his course the opinion 
that his presence on the ticket would have proved the falsity of the 
theory that Van Buren had been rejected on account of his position 
regarding annexation ; and this of itself is a sufficient reply, if we 
are told that his nomination did not discredit in any way the as- 
sumed annexation zeal of the majority, — since as a matter of fact 
he was actually put up. After he declined, the convention chose 
Dallas in his place. Dallas was certainly for annexation, and no 
doubt his views on that subject pleased many of the delegates; but 
he came from Pennsylvania, a State that it was highly important 
to secure, and Mcllvaine, a Pennsylvanian, asserted on the floor of 
the House of Representatives later that he was nominated on ac- 
count of his supposed local influence.-'' 

It may be argued, however, that the convention adopted a plank 
strongly favorable to annexation ; and this it did adopt in the follow- 
ing terms : 

"Resolved, that our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is 
clear and unquestionable ; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded 
to England or any other power; and that the re-occupation of Oregon 
and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period are 
great American measures, which this convention recommends to the 
cordial support of the Democracy of the Union." 

^Wharton to Calhoun, May 31, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 962. Nat, 
Intel!., May 30, 1844. The DcDiocratic Review (June, 1844) threatened that 
should Van B. be defeated at Baltimore, the northern wing of the party would 
abjure all connection with the southern. Wright to Polk, June 2, 1844: Polk Pap. 
Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844] : ib. 

■■^ The qualification " to a certain extent " is used because, as Von Hoist 
argues (U. S., ii., 671), the Vice-Presidency was considered unimportant and 
Wright's views were thought likely to help the ticket in New York ; but if prompt 
annexation was so conspicuously a Democratic measure that Van B.'s opposition to 
it disqualified him for the ticket, Wright also was a heretic and therefore unfit 
to represent the party as candidate for the second place in the nation, ^^'right to 
Polk, June 2, 1844: Polk Pap. Stanwood, Presidency, 214, Cong. Globe, 28 
Cong., 2 sess., 190. 



256 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

But tlTe Baltimore convention felt no more compunction than other 
such bodies have felt about professing what it did not believe. 
Another resolution of the platform asserted that the delegates came 
together " in a spirit of concord." There were grounds enough 
aside from zeal for the pronouncement regarding Texas. For 
a variety of reasons Polk had been nominated, and Polk had com- 
mitted himxself to that cause. Jackson, the idol of the party, was 
ardent for immediate annexation. The fact that coolness on the 
subject had been made the excuse for discarding \'an Buren, drove 
the party logically to the position announced. It was highly de- 
sirable to " head off " Tyler and bring his followers to the Demo- 
cratic standard, and Texas was the rallying-cry to which they had 
been trained to respond. All had to admit that a very large por- 
tion of the party were zealously and insistently for prompt annexa- 
tion. It was clear that the arguments in favor of the measure had 
already considerable influence in the country, and were admirably 
suited to catch the masses ; and it was doubtless observed that the 
Whigs, by their silence as a party and through the utterances of 
their chief, had rendered it possible to make this promising issue a 
Democratic asset. ^"^ 

There were also inducements of other kinds. The convention 
coupled Texas with Oregon, and this suggests that the resolution 
was carried by a combination of forces. In February the Wash- 
ington correspondent of the New York Herald had written : The 
West is determined to get Oregon and the South to get Texas ; 
neither can succeed alone ; " Now, then, suppose they harmonise — 
vulgatim, log-roll?" According to the New York Tribune, the 
idea was taken up and the Calhounites enforced this ultimatum: 
No Texas, no Oregon. This assertion, of course, was journalistic, 
— more or less correct; but the probability and the assertion accord 
so well with the language of the plank, that one believes almost 
inevitably it was largely true. Finally, Pillow stated to Polk that 
the Northern delegates conceded the point regarding Texas because 
they were alarmed by the clamor of the South. So then we have 
the genesis of this declaration: The South demanded it; the North 
acquiesced in order to preserve harmony ; the West concurred to get 
support for Oregon ; and all recognized certain strong reasons for 
adopting such a position. In conclusion, it should be observed that 
the plank declared only for annexation '' at the earliest practicable 

"^ (Resolution) Stanwood, Presidency, 215. 



THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 257 

period." Between this and "immediate" annexation there ^ight 
seem to exist only a distinction ; but so loud and urgent was the 
demand of many in the convention for instant action, that the adop- 
tion of a phraseology implying some deliberation, some delay, really 
signified much more than it said.^^ 

It is thus fairly evident how one of the great parties came to 
present itself in the campaign of 1844 with a candidate outspoken 
for the immediate acquisition of Texas and a platform calling for 
the acquisition of that country at the earliest practicable period, 
though the genuine strength of sentiment in that sense was far less 
controlling than would be inferred from the action of its national 
delegates, and indeed was perhaps not very much greater than 
among the representatives of the opposing party, which took no 
stand at all upon the subject. In other words, annexation became 
an issue between Whigs and Democrats (so far as it did become an 
issue) in consequence of circumstances rather than owing to a 
fundamental difference of opinion ; and we must form a lower 
estimate than has been accepted by many regarding the force of the 
Texas feeling behind the nomination of Polk. As yet, so far as 
great numbers of the Democrats were concerned, this question had 
not profoundly stirred the political consciousness. Texas was 
Botany Bay still. It was still remote and superfluous ; and to many 
the designs of England looked rather unsubstantial after all. 

^Herald, Feb. 17, 1844. Tribune: Detroit Adv., March 13, 1844. Pillow to 
Polk, May 29, 1844: Polk Pap. 



18 



XIII 

The Fate of the Treaty 

April 22 the annexation treaty was read twice, ordered printed 
in confidence for the use of the Senators, and referred to the com- 
mittee on foreign relations. In the room of this committee it then 
Hngered for nearly three weeks; but finally on May 10 it was re- 
ported. Three days later Benton offered certain resolutions upon 
the subject: that the annexation of Texas would be an assumption 
of the war between that country and Mexico ; that the treaty-making 
power has no right to create a war " either by declaration or adop- 
tion"; and that the territory abandoned in 1819 "ought to be 
reunited with the American Union as soon as it can be done with the 
consent of the majority of the people of the United States and of 
Texas, and when Alexico shall either consent to the same or 
acknowledge the independence of Texas, or cease to prosecute the 
war against her (the armistice having expired) on a scale com- 
mensurate with the conquest of the country." On the following 
day the Senators felt prepared to attack their arduous problem ; and 
although Buchanan wished the subject postponed until the first of 
June, they voted to discuss it daily, beginning on May 16. Allen 
of Ohio moved that a departure be made from the course usual in 
such cases and the matter be considered with open doors, but this 
proposition was not adopted.^ 

A number of circumstances besides the confidential nature of the 
main evidence regarding British designs were unfavorable to the 
ratification of the treaty. One of these was the extraordinary 
predicament in which Benton found himself. As a Southerner, a 
Westerner, a Jacksonian and an old-time friend of Texas, he had 
seemed predestined to lead on the affirmative side of the contest. 
But his close affiliations with Van Buren, his imputed ambition to 
succeed that gentleman four years later in the Presidency, his 
detestation of Tyler — the prime leader in the annexation movement, 
and his hatred of Calhoun — its principal agent, drove him to the 
other side. Embarrassed by previous action, by present convictions 

' See General Note, p. i. Sen. Ex. Journ,, vi., 257, 262, 271, 277 (Ben- 
ton's resols.), 278, 310 (Benton's resols, tabled, j'une 8), 279, 264 (Allen). 

258 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 259 

and by party bonds his opposition was necessarily doomed to be 
awkward and inconsistent, but he assumed the role of antagonist 
with abounding energy and abounding passion. To deepen his 
feeling on the subject he believed, as Blair informed Jackson, that 
the Whig majority of the Senate would certainly defeat the treaty, 
and that its failure would not only injure the cause of annexation 
but bring war upon Texas ; and to embitter it still more, he saw in 
the opposing ranks men who had intentionally blasted the hopes of 
Van Buren and himself by helping to bring up the issue at this 
period. In this resentment the ex-President must have shared; 
and no doubt he exerted all his influence from the first against the 
ratification of a treaty that not only ran counter to his expressed 
opinion and preference, but was the darling project — and, if con- 
firmed, might become the high stepping-stone — of his ancient 
enemy, Calhoun. - 

Raymond, secretary of the regular Texan legation at Washington, 
reported that Calhoun's letter to Pakenham had a strongly unfavor- 
able influence at the North, and even drove the Ohio Senators over 
to the opposition. It also repelled those from the South who did 
not think it wise to make slavery a national question ; and his 
despatch to the American charge at Mexico caused further embar- 
assment, since it appeared to some like a quasi acknowledgment 
of the ^Mexican claim upon Texas, and therefore cast a doubt upon 
her independence. Raymond felt also that Tyler himself had 
greatly injured the cause by hoisting the motto "Tyler and Texas" 
as a Presidential candidate, since now ratification could not fail to 
appear more or less like an endorsement of him and his political 
aspirations.^ 

The prejudicial effect of Clay's and Van Buren's letters was of 
course immense. An address of the Democratic Central Committee 
of Virginia stated that before they came out the people seemed unan- 
imous for annexation, and that after the treaty was laid before the 
Senate rumors were current for a time that it would be ratified 
without dissent ; but " to the astonishment of the whole nation " the 
two foremost party leaders of the country declared against the 
measure, and then politicians who had been loud for it held public 
meetings to demand its rejection, and the Senators cancelled their 
pledges of support. Clay's letter will kill the treaty, announced 
the Spectator as soon as it appeared, and his control of the Senate 

^ Blair to Jackson. Sept. 9, 1844: Jackson Pap. Phil. Ledger, May 13, 1844. 
'Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 343. 



260 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

majority evidently warranted the opinion. Until that voice was 
heard, said a Georgia Representative on the floor of the House, only 
Adams and a few others dared avow hostility to annexation. The 
Democrats, indeed, took a firm stand at Baltimore for the acquisi- 
tion of Texas ; but as they said nothing for a treaty which every 
delegate knew was pending at the time, Van Buren seemed in this 
regard to have the support of his party.* 

A great number of adverse resolutions, petitions and memorials 
poured into the Senate and House, and the strength — or at least 
the number of these — could not fail to have some effect. The 
Connecticut legislature, for example, resolved that annexation 
would violate our treaty with Mexico and virtually declare war 
upon her; while the legislature of Massachusetts protested that the 
State would " submit to undelegated powers in no body of men on 
earth," and that "the project of the annexation of Texas, unless 
arrested on the threshold, might tend to drive " that and other 
commonwealths " into a dissolution of the Union." The Houston 
Telegraph understood that the Massachusetts Senators had been 
expected to vote for ratification, but were prevented from doing so 
by these resolutions."' 

Several other influences counted on the same side. Uncertainty 
as to the future political complexion of Texas must have had some 
weight. Her envoys probably endeavored to create the impression 
in each party that it would be given her vote, for we know that 
Henderson was awake to the importance of " cultivating " the 
Whigs ; but both of these men were labeled as " determined Demo- 
crats ", and no doubt the Whig politicians could think for them- 
selves on the subject. Disconcerting news arrived from Mexico. 
It became known that the official journal of that city represented 
the government as determined to recover the lost province, and a 

* (Committee) Richmond Enq.. May lo, 1844. See also the address of the 
Miss. Dem, Cent. Com. : Mississippian, Aug. 9, 1844. Sped., April 27, 1844. 
(Haralson) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 180. 

"Sen. Docs. 402, 219, 61, 28 Cong., i sess. Senate: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 
I sess., 17s, 346, 428, 450, 457, etc. House: ib., 55, 56, 168, 174, 243, 291, 337, 
415, 467, 538, etc. Telegraph, March 20, 1844. C. J. Ingersoll. chairman of the 
House committee on foreign affairs, stated on the first day of May, 1844, that the 
protests and petitions relating to the subject of annexation which had been 
referred to his committee during the session numbered over ninety. Me., N. H., 
R. Id., N. J., Del.. Md., Va., No. Car., Ga., Ala., Ark., Mo., Tenn., and Ky. were 
not represented among them, and Pa. and Mich, to but a small extent. Thirty- 
five of the petitions were presented by one member of the house, and ten by an- 
other. Half of them were little or nothing more than a protest against slavery. 
Many were signed by women. The most general and earnest opposition to an- 
nexation (according to Ingersoll, a friend of Texas, the only such opposition) 
showed itself in Massachusetts. 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 26l 

man who set out for New York near the end of April said that 
a disposition to resist annexation uncompromisingly was evident 
there. Still more harm was done by the truce and proposed armis- 
tice between the belligerents. The New York Tribune and other 
journals took the view — though its inaccuracy must have been 
understood — that Texas had actually acknowledged herself to be a 
Mexican Department, and Van Zandt recognized the efifect of 
Hockley and Williams's act as damaging. Henderson felt satisfied 
that the Whigs had consulted with Pakenham in reference to the 
treaty; Raymond understood that the British minister had used his 
influence with Senators against ratification ; and the reports of this 
gentleman to the Foreign Office confirmed both of these opinions; 
while the French minister, so the Washington correspondent of the 
Philadelphia Ledger stated, though he dared not protest formally 
against annexation lest such a proceeding should react and injure 
Guizot's cabinet, stopped important gentlemen on the street, and 
gravely though politely intimated that France might have some- 
thing to say about the matter. In fact we have Pakenham's word 
for it, that Pageot co-operated with him by " making known in influ- 
ential quarters, the dissatisfaction with which His Government would 
in common with Her Majesty's Government view any attempt on the 
part of the United States to carry the proposed annexation into 
efifect ;" and Almonte assisted by withdrawing from Washington, so 
as to counteract the impression that he was negotiating on the 
subject, and strengthen the apprehension that Mexico would not 
accept peaceably the incorporation of what had been hers in the 
American Union.^ 

On the other hand certain outside influences co-operated more or 
less with the arguments and sentiments now familiar to us. A 
desire to obtain the Texas trade had recently shown itself in Con- 
gress, and in February citizens of New York had begged the 
Senators to ratify the treaty of navigation and commerce which had 
been arranged with that country. In truth it seemed high time to 
do something about this matter, for a letter from the Texan 
consul at New York, accompanying their memorial, stated that the 
exports to Texas, which had been $1,687,082 in 1839, had diminished 
by 1843 to $190,604. A petition from ]\laine, signed by members 

" Hend. to Jones, March 30, 1844: Jones, Memor., 333. Reily to Jones, Feb. 
19, 1844: ib,, 318. Newark Adv.. May 21, 1844. Tribune, April 22. 1844. 
Van Z., No. 120, May 11, 1844. Hend. to Miller, June 12, 1844: Miller Pap. 
Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones. Memor., 343. Ledger. May 10, 1844. 
(Pak., Pageot and Almonte) Pak., Nos. 16, 22, 36, March 28; April 14, 28, 1844. 



262 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

of both parties, argued that the extension of Texas as an indepen- 
dent nation would be troublesome if not dangerous; that in time 
she might become unfriendly and even ally herself with countries 
at war against the United States; that in peace our interests would 
suffer from her unequal competition and the diversion of her trade 
to other channels ; and that annexation, improving our boundaries, 
adding to our security and strength in the case of war, increasing 
our commerce and shipping business in times of peace, enlarging 
the market for our manufactures, promoting our internal trade, 
and opening a general field for the enterprise of our citizens, would 
confer benefits like those derived from the acquisition of Louisiana, 
which no one had ever regretted. Still more emphatic though less 
argumentative were the resolutions of the Mississippi legislature, 
which urged the immediate incorporation of the territory in ques- 
tion, and maintained that any attempt of a foreign power to obtain 
it or to establish " a commanding influence " there, should be con- 
sidered by the United States a " sufficient cause for war."^ 

Benton asserted that during the debates on the treaty the State 
department, the White House, the lobbies of the Senate, and all 
other public places were crowded with speculators in Texas land and 
scrip and in claims against Mexico, all working for ratification ;.. 
but a broad allowance must be made for his vivid imagination, 
inflamed now by his incandescent feelings. It is very improbable 
that such speculators wore badges, or could be distinguished in any 
other way from ordinary politicians, office-hunters and the like ; 
and it is difficult to see why speculators in claims against Mexico 
should have favored annexation, an event likely to make her far 
less willing than before to settle the American demands. Tyler 
and Calhoun themselves, it was admitted, were not interested in 
Texas lands or scrip. ^ 

Letters from Murphy, dwelling upon the vital importance of 
the measure and the danger of delay, were probably shown to 
Senators. Especially useful may have been a despatch dated on 
Washington's birthday. Elliot, he understood, had written to 
Jones that an annexation treaty could not be ratified ; and he re- 
(juestcd that the Senators be informed of this fresh interference 
of the British envoy. The almost unanimous declaration of the 

'Sen. Doc. 138, 28 Cong., i sess. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 542, 408. 

* Benton, View, ii., 623, 631. The point has been urged that it was no worse 
to speculate in Texas properties with an eye to annexation than to manipulate 
the tariff, river and harbor bills, etc. for private advantage as did some of the 
Northerners (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 323). 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 263 

Texan Congress in favor of joining the United States proved 
injurious perhaps, for it suggested that Texas could be had at any 
time; but Alurphy provided certain antidotes. One of these gave 
an account of a pubHc meeting convened at Houston on the fourth 
of Alarch, which demanded that the government reach a speedy un- 
derstanding with the United States, and, should annexation be found 
impossible, secure at once the protection of England on some such 
"basis of mutual benefit" as that country had recently proposed. 
Another represented it as likely that recognition could be obtained 
from Mexico by surrendering the region between the Nueces and 
the Rio Grande to England. A third told how British agents and 
British gold were producing a " sudden and extraordinary " change 
of sentiment among the people; and another, an editorial in the 
Houston Telegraph, pointed out that should the country remain 
independent, the tariff ought to discriminate severely against Amer- 
ican manufactures and favor the British, for then the Texans 
would be able to purchase wares at a low price, and, since their 
cotton would be admitted by England on good terms, the American 
planters, unable to compete with them, would soon be flocking 
across the Sabine." 

On the Democratic side of the Chamber great influence was 
exerted in favor of the treaty by Jackson. Several of his letters 
have already been mentioned-, and certainly they were strong; but 
in April he wrote one that sounded to politicians of his party like 
the last trump. " Men who would endanger, by a postponement, 
such great benefits to our country, for political objects," he thun- 
dered. " have no patriotism or love of country, and ought to be 
publicly exposed — ^the people of the South and West will withdraw 
all confidence from them, and send them to their own native dung- 
hills, there to rest forever." Tell Walker, he commanded, to 
" have this matter pushed — let the Treaty be made and laid before 
the Senate. H the Senate will not pass it this session, it can be 
laid upon the table until the next — This will prevent Mexico from 
invading Texas, and be a barrier against the intrigues of Great 
Britain. . . . Say to him from me, and if you choose to the Pres- 
ident, that delays are dangerous. Houston and the people of 
Texas are now united in favor of annexation — the next President 
may not be so. British influence may reach him, and what may 

° Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 7. Murphy, conf., March 4, 1844. Baker 
to Murphy, March 15, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Murphy 
to Tyler, March 16, 1844: ib. Murphy, Jan. 25, 1844. Telegraph, Jan. 17, 1844. 



264 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



now be got from Texas freely and peacably, may evade our grasp 
and cost us oceans of blood and millions of money to obtain — and 
obtain it the U. States must — peacably if we can, but forcibly if 
we must." We have placed our Indians on the Southwestern 
border, continued Jackson. New Orleans is vulnerable. The 
frontier is weak. Were British influence to control Texas, the 
slaves of the Mississippi valley would be worthless, for they could 
cross the line and be free. If the treaty is put before the Senate, 
the Senators will not dare to vote against it. Three-fourths of 
"all the people" are for the measure. "The subject has carried 
me on," concluded the broken but unflinching warrior, " until I am 
gasping for breath whilst using my pen. . . . The perpetuation of 
our republican system, and of our glorious Union" is involved. 
This letter, said Cave Johnson, made a sensation; and its echoes 
doubtless haunted the Democratic wing of the Senate Chamber as 
long as the subject was under consideration.^" 

The speeches on the treaty are rather tedious reading. Aluch 
said by the statesmen was really addressed, one infers, to their con- 
stituents, and much was for partisan effect upon the country at 
large. Many errors of fact, many exploded fallacies, and many 
fallacies that deserved to be exploded were solemnly exhibited. No 
Httle ability, however, of one kind or another found vent, and some 
of the addresses were distinctly striking. Benton made one of 
these. With great force, though reckless in the use of history 
and logic and altogether too much in his characteristic vein of Big 
Bully Bottom, he attacked the arguments brought forward to sup- 
port annexation, and maintained that Tyler's real purpose was to 
destroy the other aspirants for the chief magistracy, bring on a 
war with Mexico, and so — in imitation of Jackson — appear before 
the nation as a " Texas candidate anointed with gunpowder, for 
the presidential chair."^^ In reply to him McDuffie contended 

'"Jackson to Lewis, April 8, 1844: Jackson Pap. Johnson to Polk. May 16, 
1844: Polk Pap. 

" Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 474. Benton spoke promptly, calling 
up his three resolutions as the basis of his argument. By this treaty, he said, 
it is proposed to annex all the territory claimed by Texas, including portions of 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Tamaulipas and New Mexico. — the last of which is un- 
questionably under Mexican jurisdiction. This means war ; and so the Secre- 
tary of State virtually admits in his letter to our charge at Mexico, written seven 
days after the treaty was signed. Aside from this feature, however, that instru- 
ment as a whole — if we ratify it — means war, for war now exists between Mexico 
and Texas. Tyler in his last annual Message recognizes the existence of the 
war, and other recent official documents both American and Texan have done the 
same. The fact of war is also proved by the armistice ; and, finally, Mexico 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 265 

frankly that slavery in the United States was threatened, that the 
Southerners had a constitutional right to demand protection, and 

holds 2,000 miles of the frontier claimed by Texas, so that a conflict could not well 
be avoided. 

Moreover, it is the design of our President to force the United States into 
a war with Mexico. His Message of April 22 announces the purpose of protect- 
ing Texas by receiving her into the Union and thereby adopting her war because 
she is in need of defence and seeks it from us. Upshur's letter despatched to 
Murphy Jan. 16, 1844, reveals a determination to use the treaty-making power 
to adopt her war with Mexico. Calhoun's letter of April 19 to the American 
charge at Mexico declares that the United States desired to maintain peace but 
had signed the treaty in full view of all possible consequences, — that is to say, 
were ready for war ; and Almonte had already given us notice that a conflict 
would be the result of annexation. In reality the war has actually begun, for 
an " army of observation " has been dispatched to the Mexican frontier, and 
what is that but an army " in the field for war " ? 

Such a war would be unconstitutional, for hostilities cannot be declared by 
the treaty-making power. It would be an unjust war, too, upon a peaceable 
nation in violation of our neutrality and our treaties, in violation of the armistice 
between Mexico and Texas, to the instant injury of our commerce, and on a 
weak and groundless pretext. Some allege, no doubt, that Mexico would not 
dare to fight us. Were this true, the case would still be bad in morals ; and it 
would still be bad in policy to offend without excuse an amicable neighbor with 
whom we have a large trade. But the ratification would not merely be a cause of 
war, leading possibly to no conflict ; it would be war itself, abrogating our treaties 
with Mexico. And all this we are asked to bring upon the country instead of 
obtaining the consent of Mexico or waiting " a few months for the events which 
would supersede the necessity of Mexican consent." 

For thus injuring and then insulting our neighbor the " imaginary designs " 
of a third power are no excuse. The unreality of these alleged schemes is shown 
in the very documents laid before us by the President, for when the matter was 
brought to the attention of Mr. Everett he obtained from Lord Aberdeen assur- 
ances which entirely dissipated all grounds of apprehension. Further confirma- 
tion was contained in Aberdeen's " noble despatch " of Dec. 26. Yet the govern- 
ment instead of accepting, refuting or taking time to investigate these disavowals 
signs the treaty, submits it to us, and hurries a messenger off to Mexico. Why 
was this course adopted ? Because the time necessary for the messenger to 
return would be long enough " for the ' Texas bomb ' to burst and scatter its 
fragments all over the Union, blowing up candidates for the presidency, blowing 
up the tongue-tied senate itself for not ratifying the treaty, and furnishing a new 
Texas candidate, anointed with gunpowder, for the presidential chair." England 
simply desires to see the Texan slaves, like all others, emancipated, and is ready 
to offer counsel to that end if it will be acceptable. This is all ; and we — especi- 
ally as we have joined with England to suppress the slave trade — cannot fight 
her for entertaining such a wish. That nation errs by arrogance, not duplicity, 
and I accept her assurances. The simple fact is that Tyler aspires to be Presi- 
dent ; therefore he wishes to play the part of Jackson ; and to that end he de- 
sires a war. 

But, we are assured, it is norv or never. At first it was England that had 
designs on Texas ; but now that " razv-head and bloody-bones " has been dropped, 
and it is Texas that has designs upon England. Repulsed by us she will throw 
herself into the arms of Great Britain. But this is a libel, for the Texans are 
Americans and republicans. It is represented, too, that Santa Anna would 
welcome annexation as a way of escape from his embarrassing situation. But 
Mexico has threatened to declare war in the case of annexation ; her minister 
withdrew from our seat of government as soon as he knew the treaty had been 
signed ; we have thought it necessary to send a messenger to Mexico in order 
to prevent her from assuming a belligerent attitude ; and we have despatched 
soldiers to protect our citizens. No doubt, indeed, the wise men of Mexico have 
long since perceived that the loss of Texas was inevitable, and by treating that 



266 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

that it was the constitutional duty of the federal government to 
extend it.^- Jarnagin, a Tenessee Whig, was especially truculent, 
perhaps because — living so near the Hermitage — he was sinning 
against great light. The whole annexation business was described 

country with respect we could have arranged the matter amicably; but the Texas 
bomb was thought more valuable than honor, justice and the acquisition of the 
region beyond the Sabine. 

In spite of everything that country will yet be ours. The question is na- 
tional, — more western than southern and as much free as slave, for only half of 
Texas is adapted to slave labor. The mass of our people wish that acquisition 
made, though in no great haste to see it done. The few who from selfish and 
sectional motives clamor for it are really the only enemies of annexation, and in 
spite of them this great measure will be carried. Personally I favor it now, as 
I have always favored it, and I consider this the most important question upon 
which I have ever been called to vote ; but I could not support the treaty even 
though opposing it were to end my political career. [Benton tried, by a highly 
original view of the facts, to show that (without the knowledge of either country 
concerned, the United States or the powers of Europe) Spain recognized Mexico 
in 1821, and that the Mexican revolution was a civil war. His purpose in this 
was to destroy the analogy between Mexico's situation from 1821 to 1836 and that 
of Texas in 1844. Equally curious was his idea that sending the troops to the 
frontier produced a state of war. He asserted, what Archer denied and the facts 
disproved, that Archer had promised not to let the treaty be considered for forty 
days. As Pak. (No. 53, May 29, 1844) reminded the British government, Benton 
had previously been " distinguished for the intensity of His anti-English feelings," 
and the minister explained his extraordinary change as due to a wish " to make 
out the strongest possible case " against Tyler, Calhoun and the treaty and in 
justification of Van B.'s course.] 

'^^Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 451. McDuffie said in substance: 
It was the right and duty of the President to make this treaty, and it is the 
right and duty of the Senate to confirm it. There is nothing in Benton's argu- 
ment that in annexing Texas we should be annexing parts of Mexico, for the 
treaty conveys to us only the territory that really belongs to Texas. Indeed the 
whole question of boundary is left open to be adjusted with Mexico. It is as- 
serted that by carrying out this measure we should be violating our engage- 
ments with Mexico; but no one questions the right of France to aid us in 1778. 
Only in case we had guaranteed the territory of Mexico would the annexation of 
Texas be a violation of good faith. After admitting that country to the family of 
nations by recognizing her, can we pretend that she lacks the most essential ele- 
ment of sovereignty ? Is she a star shorn of its beams ? No. Her sovereignty 
has been acknowledged by five powers, and her stability as a nation is firmer 
than that of Mexico. She is therefore the owner of her territory, and ownership 
involves the power to sell. In 1836 I believed that the adoption of Texas would 
be the adoption of a war ; but time has passed, and that is no longer true. 
Webster has correctly said that " the foot of an invader has not rested on the 
soil of Texas since the battle of San Jacinto." When Adams and Clay proposed 
to buy the province, Mexico was at war with Spain, and four years later Spain 
was to drive the commerce of Mexico from the seas and land an army on her 
coast, yet Adams and Clay did not think it necessary to consult the mother- 
country. More noteworthy still, when Jackson and Van Buren tried to effect the 
purchase, that Spanish army was actually on Mexican soil. 

What, then, is our duty in the premises? Is Great Britain to be permitted 
to " obtain the control of Texas " by a treaty guaranteeing her independence and 
stipulating for exclusive commercial privileges, without an effort on our part to 
prevent it? If she succeeds, she will injure the interests of every section of the 
United States, and she will be able to throw her whole military force into our 
rear. So far as cotton is concerned, it is Massachusetts — not South Carolina 
— that would profit from the annexation of Texas ; but my section has at stake 
its entire property and its political existence. Benton thinks that England's dis- 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 267 

by him as a ridiculous " fraud," with which John Tyler intended if 
he could to *' bamboozle the American people in the approaching 
Presidential election. "^^ Buchanan spoke on the other side, and 

claimers ought to satisfy us ; but all that she denies is the employment of " im- 
proper " means to secure the abolition of slavery in Texas ; and it is not her 
armed forces, but her influence, her counsels, her diplomacy, which are best cal- 
culated to produce the results we dread, and against which our government is 
bound to exert itself. W'ere Aberdeen's wishes fulfilled in South Carolina, I 
would rather leave my native State for the most barren mountain of Switzerland 
than remain there among the emancipated negroes ; and the South and South- 
west are convinced that British control in Texas would menace the institution of 
slavery in the United States. 

The responsibility for the existence of that institution rests upon those very 
states, old and New England, which are now engaged in a crusade against us 
for having it, and the South merely demands protection for a system that was 
forced upon her and has now become ineradicable. To demand it is our consti- 
tutional right, and the constitutional duty of the federal government is to extend 
it to us. Jackson, who is in the confidence of Houston, tells us that annexation 
must come now or not at all, and so I fully believe. Even Van Buren declares 
that if a foreign power gains a foothold on the Gulf, a war to expel it will be 
worth while. How much better to prevent the mischief, as now we can, without 
a war. 

^* Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 682. Jarunagin pursued this line of 
thought : There is no power in the constitution to annex Texas, for that instru- 
ment is a compact and a change of the parties would terminate the agreement. 

The whole affair is outrageous. At one time we are told that Texas is 
independent and sovereign, at another that she is ready to fall a prey to the 
first comer ; now that she is at peace with Mexico, and now that she urgently 
needs our protection. The treaty itself is a humbug. Made without authority, 
it conveys to us a war under the pretence of ceding territory ; and the Senate is 
asked to undertake hostilities which the treaty-making power has no right to 
declare. 

Of what is Texas in danger? Nothing worse on the side of England than 
a free trade treaty, and nothing worse at home than abolition. But where only 
one man in seven owns slaves, emancipation could do no great harm, and in 
reality the Texans themselves appear to be quite calm ; while as regards the other 
peril, England cannot expect to reduce Texas to vassalage by a commercial 
agreement. If she attempted to oppress that people — or to impose monarchical 
institutions upon them — by virtue of such a treaty, how long would the treaty 
stand? Even in the best of Americans England has no confidence; and how then 
must she feel about placing her trust on those offscourings ? And would she im- 
peril her trade with these United States to get the trade of less than 200,000 
Texans? "The truth is, this whole business is a fraud, a plan with which John 
Tyler intends, if he can, to bamboozle the American people in the approaching 
Presidential election." The government of Texas had no more power to hand 
that country over to us than our government has to hand the United States over 
to Texas. If that government can sell the sovereignty of the nation, each of 
our States could do the same ; and the central government, buying them up, 
could totally change the nature of this confederation. An examination of the 
treaty, article by article, clearly shows its false, delusive and ridiculous character. 
'■ Its moving cause was a desperate Presidential speculation ; " and " its main 
agents were the gamblers and brokers of the bankrupt finances and fraudulent 
land grants of Texas." The documents are like it, and the President's Message 
itself is no lietter. His talk about the independence and sovereignty of that 
country is refuted by the mere continuance of the war, by his own argument that 
unless we accept her she will have to throw herself into the arms of England, and 
finally by Upshur's despatch of August 8, which represents her as entirely unable 
to defend herself against Mexico. 

The London story of English abolition designs was so inconsistent that 
Upshur himself confessed he could not believe it ; yet instead of rejecting or 



268 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

from the Northern point of view made a more effective argument 
than any one else. John Quincy Adams described him once as 
"the shadow of a shade," and few of us are inchned to protest; 
but the nature of his intellect, compelling him to take rather simple 
views of things, kept him fairly near the plane of common sense 
except when some exigency of the case required him to urge a 
worse against a better reason. It was bootless, he said, to discuss 
Tyler's motives, his Message, or even the documents, for the real 
question was on the treaty itself; and he then proceeded to argue 
that it was proper, expedient and in fact needful to ratify the 
agreement, that no injustice would be done to Mexico or the Texans, 
and that eventually this measure would work to the disadvantage 
of slavery.^* The debate was closed by Archer with a speech in 

even investigating it, he made it the corner-stone of this whole business. The 
entire official history of the reasons for this affair was intended to mislead. Its 
real origin was explained by Professor Beverly Tucker of William and Mary 
College at a recent meeting in Williamsburg. Tucker said he had a large tract 
of land in Texas and a joint interest in about sixty slaves. In 1843 his partner 
in Texas wrote to him, proposing the annexation of that country. Tucker seized 
upon the idea and communicated it to his intimate friend, Upshur, who im- 
mediately took it up. saying that he believed he could win over the Yankees by 
appealing to their self-interest but would go in for it anyway, and that he was 
ready to bring North and South to a direct issue at the next session of Congress. 
In a word, then, " the entire plan is a complication of rapine, of impolicy, and 
of imposture." The time may come when we can annex Texas without danger 
and without disgrace ; but vote for this present treaty I cannot. 

"J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, xi., 352. Buchanan; Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 
App., 720. Silas Wright said that Buchanan was brought over to Tyler's side by 
his passionate desire for the vacant place in the Supreme Court (to Van B., 
May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap.). He spoke substantially as follows: 

It is needless to discuss Tyler's motives or the character of the Message 
and documents, for the subject before the Senate is the treaty itself. Texas 
became ours by the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. In 1819 we dismembered the 
Mississippi valley, and brought a foreign nation close to our weakest frontier. 
Now that territory, no longer a wilderness, is offered to us. Are we to refuse it? 
That is the question, The people of Texas have voted to join the United States 
and are known to be substantially unanimous for annexation at present, and there- 
fore it is bootless to argue that under their constitution the treaty-making power 
had no authority to make this agreement or that the agreement was obtained from 
them under false pretences [as to the probability of our ratifying it]. As General 
Jackson has shown, we need that country for our military security. Annexa- 
tion is expedient, also, because it would certainly extend the markets for our 
manufactures, promote our internal commerce and bind the Union more closely 
together; whereas if we reject it, England will secure the finest cotton country 
in the world, and our interests will permanently suffer. With Texas in our 
possession, the slave States will enjoy greater security and the Northeast receive 
immense pecuniary benefits. The latter section opposed the acquisition of Louisi- 
ana, but what would they be now without it? Sugar and iron are the interests 
that most need tariff protection ; hence by admitting Texas we strengthen the 
tariff ; while if we reject Texas, she will form a commercial alliance with Eng- 
land as dangerous and injurious to us as if she were to become a British colony. 
Cotton is essential to England, and if we take Texas, we shall keep England 
permanently dependent upon us, which will be a greater defence than a hundred 
thousand soldiers. Let Texas remain independent, and it will be for mutual 
interest that she send her cotton to England and purchase English manufactures. 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 269 

opposition. He endeavored to show that it lay beyond the power 
of either Executive to make such a treaty, and that endorsement of it 

Bear in mind also that Texas extends north to 42 degrees and can produce the 
staples of the middle and western States. As a separate nation therefore she 
would be our jealous and hostile rival all along the line. She would adopt free 
trade or impose a very low tariff on English goods, cutting down our revenue 
and injuring our manufacturers by extensive smuggling into this country. 

Those hostile to slavery should not oppose this treaty. Annexation would 
draw the negroes from the northern slave States because they would be more 
profitable in Texas ; and eventually slavery might pass the Del Norte for good and 
all. Annexation would not increase the power of the slave section in our 
government, for more than half of Texas is not fitted for negro labor. It is, 
however, necessary to draw a line there beyond which slavery shall not go, else 
we shall have another Missouri question. 

The history of the constitutional convention of 1787, the purchase of Lou- 
isiana and Florida, and the admissions from beyond the Mississippi prove that 
States may be formed from territory not belonging originally to the United 
States. It is absurd to argue that because Texas is a sovereign nation we can- 
not accept a deed of it given by the people themselves, though we could accept a 
cession of Louisiana made without the consent of the people. Vattel recognizes 
that a nation has power to incorporate itself with another by treaty. 

The main objection to the proposed measure is that it would involve the viola- 
tion of a treaty and cause an unjust war, since Mexico is now on terms of hos- 
tility with Texas. As for the treaty of amity with Mexico, nearly all modern wars 
have occurred between nations bound together by such agreements. Self-preser- 
vation is an adequate ground for disregarding obligations of that nature. One 
who believes that Texas will become a dependency of England unless we take it, 
and that through English influence a servile war in our southern States would 
result, would be justified in voting for annexation even had we guaranteed the 
integrity of Mexican territory. So says Vattel. Nay more ; Vattel and other 
authorities deem it commendable to succor the weak when they are oppressed by 
the strong (Book iii., chap. 7, sect. 83); and therefore it is not only our right 
but our duty to take the part of Texas. Nor is this all. Texas has never owed 
allegiance to the present government of Mexico. From the moment Santa Anna 
overthrew the constitution under which the colonists went to Texas, that state 
became free and sovereign. Were a President of the United States to set himself 
up as a despot, annul the federal and State constitutions, drive out the legis- 
latures by armed force and win the support of a subservient Congress, would the 
States resisting him owe allegiance to his government ? Waiving, however, this 
consideration, even had we espoused the cause of Texas in 1835, we should only 
have been in the position that France took in 1778; and who will maintain that 
France violated her faith with England by coming to our rescue? The treaty 
of 1763, then in force between those countries, contained a stronger stipulation of 
peace and friendship than does our treaty with Mexico. The idea of broken 
faith in the present case is therefore a mere " phantom." 

It is said that annexation would be unjust to Texas. — would be like the parti- 
tion of Poland ; but we know that the people of that country desire ardently to 
join us. E(iually fallacious is the argument that the war still continues and we 
ought to wait longer, for a war sufficient to bar annexation must be a war com- 
mensurate with the task of subjugating the country, and that does not exist. 
Next we are adjured to obtain first the consent of Mexico. But that is impossible, 
for England has influence enough to prevent it ; and if we decide to wait for that 
consent, we allow England to interfere and practically encroach upon our inde- 
pendence without being able to hold her responsible for so doing. Much is heard, 
too, of the good faith and kindness of Mexico towards us, as an additional reason 
for treating her with tender consideration ; but the record shows that we have had 
many occasions to make complaint. Then the alleged armistice is held up as 
proof that a war exists ; and it is urged that Mexico should be allowed a reason- 
able time after the expiration of the armistice to subjugate her revolted province. 
But there is no armistice. Each side tried to obtain one on its own terms ; each 



270 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



by the Senate, in addition to being constitutionally improper, would 
wrong Mexico, involve the United States in a war, and stamp us in 
the eyes of the world as an aggressive and faith-breaking nation ; and 
his argument, while not convincing, was undoubtedly strong.^^ 

failed ; and Mexico has done nothing since towards invading Texas. But what 
if a war does exist ? We made repeated attempts to purchase Texas — without 
the consent of the inhabitants — before Mexico had been acknowledged by Spain, 
yet nobody took the ground that we violated our faith with the latter nation. 
Why, then, object now to the acquisition of the same territory, especially since 
now we have the consent of the population ? 

It is objected that Texas does not own to the Rio Grande. But we could 
not expect her to proclaim to the world that the boundaries solemnly asserted by 
her were fictitious. We must receive her as she is or not at all ; and when we 
have acquired the territory, we can adjust the boundary with Mexico ourselves. 
Objection is made also to our assuming the debt of Texas. But we could not 
take her lands without so doing. With the exception of $350,000 the debt will 
be paid from the sale of her lands ; but were this not so, the value of the acquisi- 
tion is far greater than the total burden. It is further represented that the power 
to declare war belongs to Congress, and that the President and Senate have no 
right to adopt a war by making this treaty. The answer is easy. The friends 
of the measure do not expect it to be executed without " a previous act of Cong- 
ress for this purpose." 

It is for the interest of Mexico herself that we annex Texas. The Ameri- 
cans of Texas would never accept the political institutions and methods of Mexico. 
She never can subdue them, and an attempt to do so, drawing thousands of our 
citizens to the standard of the Lone Star, might end in another battle of San 
Jacinto under the walls of the Mexican capital. Ratify the treaty we must. Our 
refusal to do so would irritate the Texans ; they might take counsel of their 
interests instead of their inclinations ; and that course might lead to a commercial 
alliance with England. There is the more danger of resentment because the 
Senate, adopting the unusual course of publishing the correspondence, has be- 
trayed the policy and desires of their country. The denunciations of the treaty 
in this Chamber and the attempts to excite indignation against its authors will 
apparently authorize Mexico and England to exert their full strength against the 
project of annexation, and the danger of losing Texas is so much the greater. 
If we let this treaty slip, the advantage of a favorable opportunity will be lost 
forever. By making the agreement we arrested British success in Texas ; but 
if we reject it, England will renew her efforts there with higher hopes than 
before. 

^^ Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 310. (Archer) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 
693. His argument ran as follows : 

The desirability of securing Texas for political, commercial and social 
reasons is no doubt very great, but that fact has no more place in the present dis- 
cussion than the value of Belgium. The most important question is whether a 
valid transfer of Texas to the United States can be made. Our recognition of 
that country did not affirm her sovereignty, but was rather a refusal to pass judg- 
ment upon that point. It was merely an acknowledgment of the fact of pos- 
session — to last no longer than possession should continue — in order that inter- 
course and trade might be carried on meanwhile. That such was the character 
of our action is shown by the obvious fact that should Mexico reconquer the 
country, it would be unnecessary to rescind the recognition. 

Aside, however, from this the government of Texas, no matter what its basis, 
had no power to dissolve the institutions it was elected to administer, and trans- 
fer the territory and population to another power. The people alone could do 
or authorize this. Buchanan, it is true, has maintained that the Texans have 
already given authority for such a transfer ; but that was seven or eight years 
ago, when they numbered only 7,000 or 8,000 persons. They may — I believe they 
do — desire to join us; but it is indispensable that they give a formal expression 
of their will. As for our own part, the treaty-making power cannot acquire 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 27 1 

The prospects of the treaty, though brightening occasionally, 
went on the whole from bad to worse. April 24 Raymond ex- 
pressed the opinion that Calhoun's placing annexation on the sole 
ground of protecting slavery, Tyler's coming out for the Presidency 
as the apostle of the measure, and the course of the Washington 
Globe in opposing immediate action and belittling Tyler's claims to 
credit would probably be fatal. By April 2j the correspondent of the 
Philadelphia Ledger thought the treaty might succeed when all the 
circumstances — particularly the designs of England, which were to 

Texas, for instead of being mere territory it is a sovereign state, acknowledged 
as such by ourselves. Nor can the territory be transferred in any way at present ; 
for though a nation at war may make a valid cession to a neutral, it cannot cede 
the very subject of dispute. Otherwise, just claims on the eve of enforcement 
might be eluded. Besides, our treaty of amity with Mexico forbids us to annex 
Texas. We are told, indeed, that France broke a treaty of amity with England 
and came to our aid. But the cases are not parallel, for France did not appro- 
priate the colonies which she helped to wrest from England. France aimed to 
nourish the independence of a weak nation, while we aim to destroy it. 

The ■' storm of debate," however, has raged around Benton's proposition that 
annexation would be the adoption of a war, and it has been maintained that 
Mexico has made only incursions into Texas since April, 1836. But does the 
magnitude of military operation determine their character? The momentous 
battle of Trenton was merely an incursion ; and were the Texas war to become 
active now, the incursions of the past years, which have kept the flame of hos- 
tilities alight, would be recognized at once as parts of it. The real question 
is the public state or condition between Mexico and Texas, and that is un- 
questionably one of hostilities, as our proper sources of information on such a 
subject — the President and the Secretary of State — have officially informed us, 
supported officially by the representatives of Mexico and Texas. All recognize 
that the existence of war ought to be decisive regarding our action on the 
treaty, and a person demanding better evidence than this would not be convinced 
though one rose from the dead to testify. The state of war, then, exists, and 
nothing prevents active operations except the knowledge on the part of Mexico 
that an invasion of Texas would be the signal for a rush of Americans to meet 
her armies. 

Abstractly the treaty-making power is legally competent to make a treaty 
which would result in hostilities, for we might deem it wise' to ally ourselves with 
a nation already in a conflict. But it was the plain intent of the constitution to 
confer upon Congress the general authority to declare war, and we are bound to 
recognize that intent. Moreover, even had we the full right to adopt the war 
and even were there no war to adopt, the annexation of Texas would seem an 
unwarranted act of aggrandizement, and would injure us in the eyes of the 
world. And what reasons are alleged to justify such a move ? A mere anonymous 
charge of abolition designs on the part of England, which England has officially 
denied. If under such circumstances we still believe .in the alleged designs and 
act upon that belief, how can we have intercourse with the other nations of the 
world,- — intercourse implying, as it does, confidence? Besides, the Texans are 
peculiarly wedded to slavery, and slavery is in their national constitution. No 
danger of their discarding it exists. Yet Calhoun would have us do precisely what 
he protests against England's doing [interfere abroad], or rather have us carry 
our views into effect in order to offset a mere expression of hers. Finally, the 
treaty is objectionable also because it was not willingly conceded by Texas. She 
repelled the proposition, and a wholly unauthorized surrender of our military and 
naval forces to her finally became necessary to win her consent. She will not in 
any event go over to England ; but were the choice truly, as it is alleged to be, 
now or never, I would say never, rather than secure this territory at the expense 
of violated faith and the just imputation of self-aggrandizement. 



272 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



be proved by clear documentary evidence — had been made know^n. 
Only the next day, however, the special secretary of the Texan 
legation expressed the opinion to Jones that both parties were 
against the treaty, and it would not receive ten votes/*^ 

May 3 the National Intelligencer declared that 'the annexation 
measure, if not already dead, was past praying for, and in two days 
Cave Johnson informed Polk that it was not only past praying for 
but defunct. On the eleventh Van Zandt reported that the excite- 
ment in the United States on the subject was great, and public sen- 
timent might sweep away the opposition. A week later Calhoun 
wrote that probably the treaty would be rejected; but he still hoped 
not, especially because "perfectly conclusive" evidence had been 
given to the Senate that Texas would be lost if not received at 
once. Another week, and the New York Tribune headed an editor- 
ial with these words, " The Texas Treaty Dead." One chance 
remained, however. After the Democrats made their declaration 
at Baltimore, there was a possibility that Clay would endeavor to 
take the wind out of their sails by directing his majority in the 
Senate to ratify the treaty. Jackson believed he would so do. But 
Justice Catron understood that his partisans in that body, having 
committed themselves the other way as their leader had wished, 
were unwilling to stultify themselves unless he would recant first. 
That Lord Harry would not, and the treaty was now unmistakably 
dead." 

The question of burial, however, remained, and it caused no 
little perplexity. Only one day before final action was taken Hen- 
derson informed his government that the Senators did not know 
what to do; and he said further to Miller that no one could tell 
whether they would " reject, postpone or propose some amendments 
to the Treaty to give themselves an excuse for delay." Rives intro- 
duced a resolution to lay it on the table and advise the President to 
obtain an extension of the time allowed for ratification, so as to 
let the people have an opportunity to express their views and afford 
an interval for agreeing with IMexico about the boundary. This 
resolution was submitted to Henderson, who remarked that he 
doubted whether Tyler would assent to it and that certainly Houston 

"Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 343. Ledger, April 29, 
1844. Miller to Jones, April 28, 1844: Jones, Memor., 345. 

"Nat. IntelL, May 3, 1844. Johnson to Polk, May 5, 1844: Polk Pap. Van 
Z., No. 120, May 11, 1844. Calhoun to Hammond, May 17, 1844: Jameson, Cal- 
houn Corn, 588. Tribune, May 25, 1844. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844] : 
Polk Pap. 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 273 

would regard it as no better than rejection; and in consequence of 
this opinion or for some other reason it was laid on the table. 
Finally, on the eighth of June, a decision was reached. Every 
Senator except Hannegan of Indiana, who was supposed to favor 
the measure, went on record. Fifteen States threw their entire 
strength against the treaty; while Alabama, Arkansas, Illinjois, 
Pennsylvania, Mississippi and South Carolina were solid in its 
favor; New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia and Missouri 
divided their vote; and the one representative of Indiana stood for 
the negative. The affirmative strength consisted of fifteen Demo- 
crats and one Whig, Henderson of Mississippi, and the negative of 
twenty-eight Whigs and seven Democrats. Woodbury of New 
Hampshire was the only New Englander who voted for ratification.^^ 
In looking for the causes of this result, we seem to discover in 
the foreground a very handsome desire to be fair and kindly towards 
Mexico and loyal to that spirit of friendship which the treaty of 
amity, commerce and navigation, made with her in 1831, expressed 
so laudably. Governor Hammond, for example, in a Message to 
the legislature of South Carolina, said that the excuse given for 
rejecting Texas was that she could not be received without a viola- 
tion of the treaty. This view he pronounced " romantic, if not 
ridiculous ;" and one must admit, bearing in mind the slight signifi- 
cance usually given to the terms of friendship in international agree- 
ments and the rather conventional meaning which, as nations are 
related to one another at present, they necessarily must convey, 
that his adjectives were not wholly vmreasonable. This is the more 
obvious because the treaty, instead of requiring an eternal con- 
dition of brotherly love to exist between the two nations, expressly 
contemplated even a state of war. Evidently the words " amity " 
and " friendship " were employed there merely in their customary 
international and conventional sense; and the course pursued by 
Mexico toward citizens of the United States had appeared to show 
clearly, that either she regarded the stipulation of a firm friend- 
ship as virtually abrogated — in which case it could not bind the 
other party to the contract — or believed that it did not require any 
special tenderness. In other words, the United States were under 
no obligation to consider the mere susceptibilities of Mexico, par- 

^^ Hend. to Jones, June 7, 1844: Jones, Memor., 364. Id. to Miller, June 7, 
1844: Miller Pap. Sen. Ex. Journal, vi., 311, 312. Rives offered his resolution 
on June 8. Evidently it had been shown to Henderson previously. Boston 
Atlas, June 12, 1844. Nat. IntelL, June 10, 1844. Van Z.. [No. 122], June 10, 
1844. Garrison, Extension, 120-121. 

19 



274 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



ticularly in a case that involved very serious interests of our own; 
and as we had offered to pay Hberally for any real damage inflicted 
upon her by receiving Texas, the treaty in question was adequately 
observed.^* 

There was, however, a second agreement between the two coun- 
tries, for which Senators manifested a delicate regard. This was a 
treaty of limits, by which the United States recognized the Sabine 
as the boundary between our territory and that of Mexico. But 
men who took this line of march soon found themselves in a verit- 
able thicket of difficulties. At once the question arose whether this 
instrument had not been rendered obsolete, like many a previous 
treaty, by the coming into existence of a new state of things. 
Mexico had permitted an apparently independent nation to spring 
up between herself and us; and the treaty, antedating that event, 
could not be cited as proof regarding its character. Then, too, 
it was a manifest absurdity to hold that the United States, whose 
own existence was based on the right of revolution, were com- 
pelled to deny that right to the citizens of every part of every nation 
with which a boundary agreement might happen to be made. More- 
over, if the treaty of limits with Mexico placed us under an obliga- 
tion to recognize all territory beyond the Sabine as forever hers, 
then the treaty made with Spain in 1819 compelled us to regard that 
very region and all other lands down to Central America as for- 
ever Spanish, so that in the eyes of the United States Mexico could 
not legally exist, and this treaty of limits itself was null and void. 

A still longer shadow was cast in the Senate by the war between 
Texas and Mexico. It was urged with great force that the rati- 
fication of the annexation treaty would make this country a party to 
the conflict, and — since the authority to declare war belongs to 
Congress — would be an act of usurpation on the part of the treaty- 
making power. This was one of Benton's tall stalking horses ; but 
Archer, though he opposed the treaty, could not let it pass. He 
pointed out with entire clearness that it might be for the interest of 
the nation to ally itself with a power engaged in war, and that the 
necessary agreement — which would at once involve us in hostilities 
— would have to be effected by the treaty-making power. 

It was also contended that such a war, unprovoked by our 
neighbor, would be unjust and shameful. This was a point of 
capital importance with the opponents of the treaty, and no one can 

'" (Hammond) N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 2, 1844. Treaties in Force, 389. 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 275 

deny that it carried very great weight. In reply it was explained 
that in the event of annexation Texas would unquestionably share 
in our foreign relations. Were the United States to have a war 
with England, for example, that part of the country would be 
exposed to invasion. But it would be absurd to hold that two sets 
of foreign relations — those of the annexing nation and those of the 
nation annexed — could co-exist, since they might be inconsistent. 
Therefore it could only be supposed that the second and very minor 
set lapsed. The United States would not, then, become logically 
and necessarily a party to the war. Mexico could merely claim 
damages for an alleged injury; and as this country offered to meet 
any such claim generously, a conflict — should it follow — could only 
be due to an unreasonable attitude on her part, and consequently 
she would be the real aggressor.-- 

Another point, also, had a bearing upon this aspect of the matter. 
It was argued often that as annexation is the strongest kind of 
alliance, the United States would be dragged into the war by accept- 
ing the treaty even more surely and rightfully than if we formed 
an alliance with Texas. -^ But here again something was overlooked. 
An alliance entered into with a belligerent is fundamentally different 
from an act of annexation. Not being of an essentially permanent 
character, it appears to be made with direct reference to the exist- 
ing state of hostilities, and we therefore regard it properly as in- 
volving a participation in the war. The acquisition of territory, 
on the other hand, is primarily a domestic affair of a commercial 
and political nature. It contemplates, not a temporary state of 
things, but a future of indefinite duration ; and war is implied only 
as an incidental consequence. To a certain extent the one case is 
that of a man who retains a court lawyer, and the other that of a 
man who enters into a partnership with some person. In the first 
instance a legal contest is directly and primarily in view ; but in the 
latter, while trouble of that nature may some day follow, it is by no 
means the end contemplated. 

^Treaties in Force, 389. Wash. Globe, April 7,1844. See also Deiiioc. Reviezv, 
May, 1845. As will appear later, when the prospect of annexation seemed to have 
become a certainty, England and France notified Texas that they should expect her 
treaties with them to be observed. Such a notification would have been uncalled 
for had it been certain that by law she would carry her foreign relations with her 
into the Union ; and the evident purpose was to make sure, if possible, by a sug- 
gestion of opposing annexation otherwise, that such should be the case in these 
specific instances. Texas merely replied that the matter in question would rest 
with the United States, which would no doubt be disposed to pursue an accept- 
able course ; and England and France did not question this view of the case. 

'^ E. g., Jay, Mexican War, 105. 



276 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Akin to these arguments against the treaty was the demand 
that Mexico's assent be obtained. Insurmountable objections to 
asking her concurrence have ah'eady been pointed out, and Buchanan 
suggested still another difficulty. England is opposed to our pos- 
sessing Texas, he^said, and her influence with the IMexican govern- 
ment is very powerful. Therefore that government, even were they 
disposed to acquiesce, would be prevented from doing so; and to 
request their assent would be to invite Great Britain not only to 
interfere in our affairs, but to interfere in such a manner that we 
could not hold her responsible. Aside from the danger of English 
influence, however, every man could see for himself that Mexican 
consent could not be obtained, if at all, without long bargaining and 
many sorts of complications. 

In reality there was one complete and simple reply to all the 
objections growing out of the relations then existing between Texas 
and Mexico. Theoretically the state of hostilities continued still; 
and to be free from the danger of costly annoyances as well as 
obtain a legal title to her possessions, Texas was intensely anxious 
to have it in due form terminated. But actually that country was 
independent, and her revolutionary struggle had ended. Pin- 
pricking is not war, and for eight years nothing that could be called 
by the latter name had been waged on her soil. Not only the Amer- 
ican, but the English, French and Mexican governments had long 
since become satisfied that she would never be a part of the mother- 
country again. No thoughtful man anywhere dreamed of such an 
event. Every one could perceiye that even if her own strength 
seemed comparatively small, the apparent superiority of her enemies 
was unsubstantial, that she had friends who would not idly see her 
crushed, and that she possessed the means of purchasing — at a 
heavy cost perhaps — whatever aid might be needful. She occupied 
essentially the same position as Mexico had occupied for a period 
of fifteen years, during which she had been regarded by herself 
and by all other nations except Spain as sovereign. 

So far as the war continued, it did so merely because the Mexi- 
cans refused to accept formally the patent facts ; and logically, since 
they declared over and over again with full sincerity that never, 
never should the ungrateful rebels be acknowledged, Texas could 
not possibly obtain peace except by annihilating Mexico, in which 
case there would be the absurdity of a non-existent nation destroying 
one that existed, and the still more ludicrous corollary that now, 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 277 

having extinguished the only possible source of an indispensable 
recognition, Texas never could become a nation. Such was the 
destination of those who preferred theory to fact. Benton and 
others, to be sure, who argued that a war still existed, endeavored 
to escape by admitting that a period might come before long when 
it could be said — regardless of formalities — to have ended. But 
if eight years of actual independence, the concurrent opinion of the 
best informed cabinets, and the unanimous judgment of impartial 
observers could prove nothing, what could a few more months or 
even a couple of years demonstrate? Benton's and Van Buren's 
view that although such a time might soon come, it had not yet 
arrived, was evidently dictated by the necessities of their position ; 
and it was the duty of the American Senate to hold, as the courts 
hold, that even rights can be outlawed, and that when this stage 
has been reached, assertions cannot revive a claim ; and then to 
conclude that as Texas was now evidently independent, her revo- 
lutionary war must have come to an end in law as it had in fact.-- 

Doubtless it is just, as well as charitable, to believe that many 
of the Senators failed to perceive the strong points they denied or 
ignored ; but some considerations were too plain to be overlooked. 
In both parties reigned a marked unwillingness to allow John Tyler 
— especially John Tyler as a Presidential candidate — to have the 
credit of acquiring Texas ; and his term had so nearly elapsed that 
his power of patronage counted but feebly on the other side. The 
treaty was technically Calhoun's, and the Whigs and Van Buren men 
feared that a ratification of it might give its ostensible author a 
dangerous prestige. Northern anti-slavery sentiment, which Cal- 
houn's Pakenham letter made specially potent, signified a great deal, 
and it was represented by Governor Hammond and many others as 
the real cause of the adverse decision. Closely allied to this feeling 
was a dread of increasing the political power of the South, and 
enabling that section to control the government, enjoy the offices 
and destroy the tarifif. The treaty had, moreover, become a strictly 
party question, owing primarily — as Henderson reported and as we 
have observed — to the attitude of the Whigs. In June Clay would 

— To this line of argument it was objected that the independence of Texas, 
resting largely upon foreign support, was not real. But England would not have 
acknowledged the United States in 1783 had we not been supported by France 
and Spain. The same thing has been true in numerous instances ; and perhaps 
Belgium, Holland, and Denmark are nations only because any attempt to absorb 
them would be resisted by other couutries as well as by themselves. Of course 
only the principal points of the debate can be taken up here. Many tedious 
pages would be required merely to state all of them. 



^78 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

not have penned his Raleigh letter, Henderson believed; but that 
letter had been written, the Whig convention had been silent on the 
topic, the Democratic platform had been strong for Texas, and it 
was impossible — politically speaking — for the Whig Senators to 
disavow their captain and follow the banner of the opposing party. 
Doubts existed also as to the expediency of extending the area of 
the United States, increasing the national debt and incorporating 
such people as the Texans were by many thought to be. In the 
opinion of not a few, the fact that a disputed region was claimed 
by Texas made the danger of trouble with Mexico peculiarly real ; 
and there was some practical fear that war might result from an- 
nexation. It cannot be doubted that a very natural objection existed 
in the Northeast, as in the case of buying Louisiana, against an 
extension of territory that would lessen the importance and political 
influence of that section. There was a general distaste for Tyler's 
method of bringing about the treaty, — mainly due to his unpopu- 
larity; there was a repugnance to his use of the military and naval 
forces of the United States in the interest of Texas ; and some 
objections to the terms of the treaty were felt. Cave Johnson wrote 
about the middle of May that he understood the Democratic Sena- 
tors favored annexation, but for substantially these last reasons 
opposed the treaty ; and Ingersoll, chairman of the committee on 
foreign affairs, stated in the House of Representatives that in the 
way it was brought about lay the true cause of its rejection. Alex- 
ander H. Stephens and six other Congressmen from his section 
exerted themselves against it on the ground that it did not secure 
the right of all States formed in Texas below the Missouri Compro- 
mise line to enter the Union with slavery. Finally, in the opinion 
of the British minister at Washington, " One thing that greatly con- 
tributed " to its failure was " the absence of all interference, at 
least open interference, in opposition to it on the part of England 
and France." Had ratification been seen to be possible, no doubt 
many friends of annexation would have given up their objections; 
but with a practical certainty on the other side they allowed their 
likes and their dislikes to have full sway.-^ 

^Calhoun, speaking in the Senate on Feb. 12, 1847, said that the treaty 
" shared the fate that might almost have been expected from the weakness of the 
administration" (Works, iv., 334). (Feared) Jackson to Lewis, April 8, 1844 
(conveying information received from Walker) : Ford Coll. (Hammond) N. Y. 
Tribune, Dec. 2, 1844. (Party question) Van Z., [No. 122], June 10, 1844. Hend. 
to Jones, June 2, 1844: Jones, Memor., 356. Johnson to Polk, May 16, 1844: 
Polk Pap. Ingersoll, Jan. 3, 1845: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 84. (Stephens) 



THE FATE OF THE TREATY 279 

In the above analysis, it will be noted, real opposition to the ac- 
ceptance of Texas makes but a very small showing. The concomi- 
tants rather than the essentials of the treaty caused its rejection. 
This was highly significant. Van Zandt reported to his government 
two days after the Senate voted, that a majority of those in the 
negative desired to see the step taken at some future day; while 
the [Mexican consul at New Orleans, who had excellent means of 
informing himself as to the situation at Washington and kept a 
very close watch upon the matter, assured his chief that both 
parties really favored annexation, each of them desiring the credit 
of effecting it. Indeed, on learning the treaty had failed, he pre- 
dicted that it would be submitted to Congress and be ratified; and 
Pakenham concurred with his Mexican colleague in believing that 
the action of the Senate had not settled the question.-^ 

For Texas the result was on the whole rather fortunate. The 
treaty accepted her merely as a Territory, and appeared, since the 
American people did not seem to have decided in favor of annexa- 
tion, to receive her, as it were, through a back door. Moreover 
under it this country might have partitioned her area at its will, and 
perhaps have made the abolition of slavery a prerequisite for admis- 
sion to statehood. So far as the American Union was concerned, 
however, there was less opportunity for congratulation. Some of 
the reasons for the Senate's action were certainly far enough from 
patriotic, and it is not easy to see how any of them could stand 
against the value of that territory, the dangers arising from British 
and French exertions, and the likelihood — or at least the strong 
possibility — that if not annexed at this time Texas would remain 
permanently independent, and prove a cause of serious injury to 
us. It was not hard, perhaps, to believe the United States would 
be able to protect themselves against all mischances, and to hold 
that our weak neighbor could be brought within the pale at any 

Amer. Hist. Rev., viii., 93. Pak., No. 76, June 2T, 1844. A well-known historian 
says the Senators felt that Tyler and Calhoun had shown a lack of consideration 
for them by presenting the treaty as a jait accompli. If so, they were unreason- 
able, for (i) the administration had taken pains to prepare the public for the 
treaty, (2) the Senators knew well enough some time in advance what was afoot, 
(3) an avoidance of publicity was highly important, and (4) the administration 
had full authority under the constitution to negotiate in secret (which the critic 
admits). The same author says that the Executive put pressure upon the Senate 
by saying, " Now or never " ; but if such was the President's opinion (as no doubt 
it was), growing out of circumstances known to him, be owed it to the country 
to state as much. 

"Van Z., [No. 122], June 10, 1844. Mex. consul, N. Orl., No. 36, May 23; 
No. 58, June 11, 1844. Pak., No. 76, June 27, 1844. 



280 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

moment, and one must hope that such views partially explained the 
course of Clay and most of those on his side of the question ; but 
considerations of this order were fitter for the platform and the 
daily press than for the Senate, and they could not excuse public 
men for playing party and personal games with a great issue. In 
all probability had Clay and Calhoun, Benton, Van Buren and Web- 
ster acted as patriots and statesmen, the treaty could have been 
amended until fairly satisfactory to the North and then promptly 
ratified, without giving Tyler an undue political advantage or seri- 
ously affecting the balance of the parties ; and the conscientious 
anti-slavery men, for their part, might have seen that the absorption 
of Texas was not only just and expedient but inevitable, and after 
making the best fight possible for their convictions, might have 
arranged on good terms with the eager annexationists. 

The rejection of the treaty, it cannot bc'denied, assisted those 
Texans who desired to pursue a career of national independence, 
gave England and France an opportunity for deeper intrigues with 
Texas and Mexico, and exposed the United States, as we shall see, 
to a very imminent danger of having to choose between humilia- 
tion and misfortune on the one hand and a conflict with those 
powers and Mexico on the other. It also favored the Democratic 
party and the South, since it made annexation a prominent and 
somewhat influential issue and a terrible stumbling-block to Henry 
Clay in the Presidential campaign; and perhaps the opposition that 
caused the failure of the treaty was responsible for the war that 
soon came upon us, — first, because it encouraged Mexico to refuse 
our offer of accommodation ; and secondly, because the action of 
the Senate postponed a settlement of the difficulty with her until 
she had far more reason than at this time to count on the support 
of England against us. But for a while, at least, the victors felt 
highly pleased, and John Quincy Adams remarked in his diary that 
the repudiation of the treaty had delivered the United States, " by 
the special interposition of Almighty God," from " a conspiracy 
comparable to that of Lucius Sergius Catalina.'"-^ 

^ Adams, Memoirs, xii., 49. Mexico lost heavily, perhaps, for W. B. Lewis, 
after conferring with Tyler, understood that the intention was to leave her the 
Santa Fe valley and her settlements on the Rio Grande (to Jackson. April 18, 
1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll.). From this point of view the rejection of 
the treaty benefited the United States, though at the expense of a war. (Offer of 
accom.) Chapter xiv. 



XIV 
The Issue is Re-shaped 

One of the first things reported by Henderson after his arrival 
at Washington was an assurance on the part of the American gov- 
ernment that, in case of necessity, the project of annexation could 
and would be carried through — Texas assenting — by a legislative 
act. On the day the treaty was signed Van Zandt wrote that the 
President had promised, should it not be ratified, to urge imme- 
diately upon Congress the passage of an equivalent law, based upon 
that provision of the constitution which empowers the two Houses 
jointly to admit new States. The prospect of such action on the 
part of the Executive was made known in the daily papers, possibly 
with a hope of influencing the Senate, in the interval between the 
signing of the treaty and its presentation to that body, and after 
its rejection was virtually certain the Madisonian put forth a defi- 
nite announcement of the same nature. Blair, while in great distress 
over the censures that greeted Van Buren's letter, thought its effect 
might be counteracted by having the ex-President's friends offer 
an annexation bill in Congress, and endeavored to bring this about. 
Thus the expedient of acquiring Texas by a joint resolution, al- 
though opponents of annexation asserted it had never been dreamed 
of until the one method which they considered proper had been 
rejected by the Senate, was unquestionably in reserve all the time. 
During the first fortnight of May, Van Zandt became afraid that 
should the treaty fail, not enough of the session would be left for 
the passage of a bill on the subject; but by the middle of the month 
the Philadelphia Ledger represented the advocates of annexation as 
full of spirit, expecting to hear by the tenth of June that Mexico had 
assented and the cession of San Francisco was probable, and count- 
ing upon this news as forcible enough to drive a joint resolution 
through Congress during the remaining week.^ 

Tyler for his part, though perhaps temporarily depressed by the 

^ See General Note, p. i. Hend. to Jones, March 30. 1844: Jones. Memor., 
333. Hend. and Van Z., April 12, 1844. Nat. InteU., April 19, 1844. Phil. 
Ledger, April 20, 1844. Madis.. May 24, 1844, Blair to Jackson, Sept. 28 1S44: 
Jackson Pap. Van Z., No. 120, May 11, 1844. Ledger, May 15, 1844. 



282 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

fate of the treaty, did not lose faith in the project. It appeared to 
him, as he told Jackson, " so mighty a question as ultimately to look 
down all opposition." In other language, he doubtless believed that 
enough Whigs to ensure success would sooner or later be compelled 
by the popular sentiment of their States, as had been the case with 
Henderson, to support it. Accordingly, two days after the Senate 
rejected the fruit of his negotiations, he sent a Message to the 
House of Representatives, together with the treaty and all the docu- 
ments relating to it that had been transmitted to the Senate. - 

While this matter was before the other branch of the national 
legislature, he explained, I did not think it proper to consult you 
regarding it. But Congress has power by " some other form of 
proceeding to accomplish everything that a formal ratification of 
the treaty could have accomplished " ; and I feel it my duty to lay 
before you all the facts in my possession that would assist you " to 
act with full light," if you desire to take any steps. In my judg- 
ment the question is one of "vast magnitude" and "enduring char- 
acter." Within no long period Texas is capable of almost or quite 
doubling the exports of this country, thereby making an " almost 
incalculable " addition to our carrying-trade, and giving " a new 
impulse of immense importance to the commercial, manufacturing, 
agricultural, and shipping interests of the Union." At the same 
time, the acquisition of that country would afford protection to an 
exposed frontier, and place the United States as a whole " in a 
condition of security and repose." The matter is therefore in no 
way sectional or local, but has " addressed itself to the interests of 
every part of the country and made its appeal to the glory of the 
American name." 

" I have carefully reconsidered the objections which have been 
urged to immediate action upon the subject," continued the Presi- 
dent, " without in any degree having been struck by their force." 
We could not have asked the assent of Mexico, for such a course 
not only might have failed but might have been regarded as " oft'en- 
sive " to her and " insulting " to Texas ; and a negotiation to that 
end would have implied that our recognition of the latter country 
" was fraudulent, delusive, or void." Only after acquiring the terri- 
tory could we have any discussion with Mexico as to its boundary ; 

= Tyler to Jackson, April i8, 1844: Jackson Pap. Richardson, Messages, iv.,* 
323. The accompanying documents included those which the Senate had seemed 
determined to suppress. The Message was dated June 10 and received in Congress 
June II. 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 283 

and the question of. limits was purposely left open, with a view to 
securing a friendly and pacific settlement with that power. As for 
our treaty with her, it is merely commercial ; and it would no more 
be violated by our receiving Texas than would our compacts with 
most of the nations of the earth. The argument against the exten- 
sion of our territory was urged with great zeal against the purchase 
of Louisiana, and its futility was long since " fully demonstrated." 
Moreover since that day the use of the steam-engine has brought the 
region beyond the Sabine, for all practical purposes, much nearer 
to the seat of government than was Louisiana in 1803. 

After discussing these objections Tyler brought up certain points 
of special urgency. Annexation, he said, " is to encounter a great, 
if not certain, hazard of final defeat if something be not nozv done 
to prevent it." Upon this point your serious attention is invited 
to my Message of ]\Iay i6 and the accompanying documents, not 
yet made public by the Senate. The letters bearing no signature 
are from " persons of the first respectability and citizens of Texas," 
who have " such means of obtaining information as to entitle their 
statements to full credit." Nor has anything occurred to weaken, 
but on the contrary much has occurred to support, my confidence 
in the belief of General Jackson and in my own belief, expressed at 
the close of that Message, '"that instructions have already been 
given by the Texan Government to propose to the Government of 
Great Britain, forthwith on the failure [of the treaty], to enter into 
a treaty of commerce and an alliance offensive and defensive.' " 
Particular attention is also invited to the recent conversation between 
Brougham and Aberdeen in the House of Lords on the subject of 
annexation. " That a Kingdom which is made what it is now by 
repeated acts of annexation . . . should perceive any principle 
either novel or serious in the late proceedings of the American 
Executive in regard to Texas is well calculated to excite surprise." 
It may be presumed that Great Britain would be the last power in 
the world to maintain that a nation has no right to part with its 
sovereignty. Certainly " the commercial and political relations of 
many of the countries of Europe have undergone repeated changes 
by voluntary treaties, by conquest, and by partitions of their terri- 
tories without any question as to the right under the public law " ; 
and it cannot be pretended that the agreements which Texas has 
made abroad forbid her to join the American Union. We leave the 
European powers exclusive control over matters affecting their conti- 



284 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



nent, and we expect a like exemption from interference. If annexa- 
tion occur, it will result from the " free and unfettered action of the 
people of the two countries ; and it seems altogether becoming in 
me to say that the honor of the country, the dignity of the American 
name, and the permanent interests of the United States would for- 
bid acquiescence " in any foreign interposition. The great issue 
now is not as to the manner of accomplishing annexation, con- 
cluded the President, but " whether it shall be accomplished or not " ; 
and " the responsibility of deciding this question is now devolved 
upon you." The Message was characterized by the New York 
Herald as " a very clear, forcible, and manly exposition " of the 
matter ; and it would be hard indeed to give a different verdict.^ 

On the same day Benton asked leave of the Senate to bring in a 
bill providing for the annexation of Texas, and spoke in substance 
as follows : I have had this matter in mind for a quarter of a cen- 
tury. Now that the treaty is out of the way, it is proper for the 
true friends of the cause, of whom I am the eldest, to resume their 
task. The consent of Congress is necessary for the admission of 
new States, and this consent — when there is time to obtain it — 
should precede the negotiations, for otherwise how can the treaty- 
making power promise admission to the Union? Individual opin- 
ions are not an adequate basis for such a pledge ; and besides how 
could they be solicited by the President without compromising the 
independence of Congressmen, and opening the door to collusion 
between the executive and the legislative departments? The con- 
sent of Mexico is necessary at present, but may cease to be so ; and it 
is for Congress to decide regarding that point. To break off the 
subsisting armistice and thus frustrate the efforts of Texas to ob- 
tain peace would be a " hideous crime " ; hence we must await its 
expiration. Further, it is good policy for us to remain on friendly 
terms with Mexico, so as to conserve our trade there ; and it is for 
her interest to give her assent. If on the other hand she affects to 
contemplate re-conquest and keeps up a desultory war. Congress 
will determine what course to take. Should its decision involve a 
conflict, this would at any rate have been brought about in a con- 
stitutional manner. Such was Benton's argument. The bill itself 
provided that the boundaries of Texas, as annexed, should not in- 
clude the territory to which her claim was disputed; that a majority 
of her people should give their consent to the surrender of sover- 

^ Herald. June 15, 1844. 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 285 

eignty ; that a " State of Texas," of a size to be fixed by itself but 
not larger than the largest existing member of the Union, should be 
admitted ; that the rest of the acquired area should form the " South- 
west Territory"; that slavery should be prohibited in one-half of 
this Territory; and that the assent of Mexico should be obtained, 
but could be " dispensed with when the Congress of the United 
States might deem said assent to be unnecessary."* 

It hardly needs to be said that such a bill could not please the 
ultra friends of Texas. The New York Aurora called it a " stupid, 
anti-republican project." In the eyes of the Richmond Enquirer 
it was a " disgraceful trick and humbug." Jackson declared that 
its provision for asking the consent of Mexico was degrading to our 
national character, which, after our official assertions that Texas 
had become an independent nation, it really seemed to be. As the 
Globe admitted later, the bill contained elements that precluded its 
passage ; but it was taken up and argued again by its author on the 
thirteenth, and then by a strict party vote of twenty-five to twenty — 
except that one Whig and one Democrat changed sides — was laid on 
the table.^ 

Meanwhile a joint resolution, moved by McDuffie about three 
weeks earlier in an executive session, had come before the Senate 
in due course on June 11. This provided in substance that the treaty 
of annexation should be ratified by Congress, as "a. fundamental 
law entered into between the United States and Texas." as soon 
as the supreme executive and legislative departments of the latter 
country should accept and confirm the compact ; and four days 
later AIcDuffie rose to advocate his plan. A joint resolution passed 
by the whole Congress and signed by the President, he said, would 
be a legitimate act and still more solemn than a treaty. The Execu- 
tive was guilty of no disrespect to the Senate, as some have charged, 
in proposing such a measure after our vote on the subject, for this 
body has no exclusive authority in public affairs. The question of 
annexation has not been disposed of by our action. We have killed 
the treatv, but " a ghost is sometimes more terrible than a living 
man." Murdered Caesar appeared to the leading conspirator 
against him and said, "I will meet you, again, at Philippi." If the 
ghost of this treaty — if the ghost of Texas — should present itself here 

*Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 653 ; Benton, Abr. Debates, xv., 142. Properly 
speaking, there was of course no " armistice." 

'^Aurora and Rich. Enq. : Nat. Intell.. Jan. 17, 1844. Jackson to Blair, June 7, 
1844: Jackson Pap. Globe, March 26, 1845. 



286 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

to haunt the midnight couch of any Senator, to whom could it 
exclaim with more propriety than to the gentleman from Missouri, 
"Et tu, Brute?" Benton's assumption that he is the true friend of 
Texas would be offensive, could it be taken seriously. He thinks 
that all the rest of us should go to school to him in statesmanship ; 
but the truth is that he occupies a very awkward position, and is 
going to find himself in very strange company, for he opposes the 
candidate of his own party on this question. He denounces the 
President for making public certain documents [accompanying his 
message of May i6] from which the Senate had not removed the 
injunction of secrecy; but the Executive had a perfect right to 
prevent the suppression of papers which the people are entitled to 
see. He denounces Texas for negotiating with the United States 
during the armistice; but an armistice is merely an agreement not 
to make war for a specified time. He thinks it absurd to suppose 
that Great Britain would enter into an offensive and defensive 
alliance with a small nation like Texas ; but while it would of course 
be ridiculous for her to expect aid from that republic in her Euro- 
pean conflicts, it would be very natural to make such a treaty for 
the purpose of guaranteeing the independence of Texas in return 
for commercial and other advantages. He inveighs against the plan 
of annexing that country without the concurrence of Mexico ; but 
his own bill proposes to do this whenever Congress shall see fit.*' 

Yes, retorted Benton, but my bill refers the question of war to 
Congress, where it belongs, whereas the negotiators of the treaty 
made war themselves — unconstitutionally, perfidiously, clandestinely 
and piratically — upon a friendly nation. My bill gives Mexico an 
opportunity to do what it is for her interest to do, — that is, to assent. 
The President's Message to the House of Representatives, like 
Genet's proclamation, is an attempt to excite insurrection against a 
part of the government. McDuffie pretends to answer me; but re- 
garding the vital objections to the treaty he says nothing. He 
charges me with making anti-annexation speeches, but what I have 
done is to make anti-treaty speeches ; and the treaty was not drawn 
for the purpose of obtaining Texas, but, by bringing that country in 
as a Territory with a view to laying it out in slave States, to prepare 
openly for another Missouri question, and pave the way for a disso- 
lution of the Union. Troops have been concentrated in the South 
on an unconstitutional pretext ; our ships and soldiers have been 

' Co)ig. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 661. 688; App., 588. 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 287 

placed under the authority of a foreign President; and an excuse is 
found in a letter of Aberdeen's for an agreement previously made. 
The slavery correspondence with Pakenham was designed to pre- 
vent annexation and thus ensure disunion. It is against these things 
— not against the acquisition of Texas — that I have spoken. Mc- 
Duffie thinks I shall find myself in strange company. Well, so will 
he. He will find himself in the company of Jackson; and when the 
Old Hero discovers his treasonable intentions, let him beware ! 
"The tiger will not be toothless." And here, Mr. President, I 
must speak out. The country is in danger. Disunion is at the 
bottom of this long concealed Texas machination. Political intrigue 
and financial speculation co-operate, but disunion lies at the bottom 
of it ; and " I denounce it to the American people." A new con- 
federacy, stretching from the Atlantic to California, is " the 
cherished vision of disappointed ambition." The Senator threatens 
me with a ghost (upon' this Benton approached McDuffie and ad- 
dressed him personally) ; but let me tell him that if I find myself 
at Philippi, I shall not, like Brutus, fall upon my sword, but I shall 
save it for another purpose, — " for the hearts of the traitors who 
appear in arms against their country." At this he struck a heavy 
blow on McDufiie's desk ; but the latter, now sick and emaciated, 
though he met the gaze of his powerful antagonist with a flashing 
look, made no answer to the charge of treason.'^ 

jNIcDufiie's joint resolution represented of course the wishes of 
the administration, since it merely embodied a new method of carry- 
ing the old treaty ; but for that very reason it entered the lists 
under unfavorable auspices. Moreover it conceded nothing to the 
opposition. They were invited to accept under another name the 
particular thing which they had just rejected. At first it was said 
that Benton had intimated an intention to endorse the plan ; but this 
was a little before the meeting of the Democratic convention, and 
many suspected that his design was to mislead the annexationists 
as to the attitude of Van Buren and himself. At all events he did 
not support the measure, and it was laid on the table by a vote of 
twenty-seven to nineteen, — certainly a verdict sufficiently unfavor- 
able, but noticeably less emphatic than the treaty had just received.^ 

' Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App.. 607. It will be noted that Benton offers 
a new theory here as to the disunion plan of his opponents. His assertion that 
our troops had been placed under Houston was only a figure of speech. Blair to 
Jackson, July 7, 1844: Jackson Pap. Rich. Whig, June 18, 1844. Nilcs, Ixvi., 295. 

*Van Z. and Hend., No. 121. May 25, 1844. Cong. Globe. 28 Cong., i sess., 
661. McDuffie's bill was laid on the table June 11, but was taken up again on the 
iSth in order to give him an opportunity to reply to Benton. 



288 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

The session of Congress was now almost at an end. Not only 
the friends but the enemies of annexation felt anxious. The Wash- 
ington correspondent of the New York Evening Post had written 
some time before that according to the general opinion the President 
would occupy Texas after the adjournment of the legislative branch, 
and so bring on a war. Louisiana talked of making a treaty of her 
own with that country. Tyler was thinking, it was commonly sup- 
posed, of having an extra session of Congress in September, and 
recommending the passage of a joint annexation resolution. The 
friends of Texas felt determined to press the subject unless she 
herself should decline, believing that a very large majority of both 
Houses favored the measure, but finally, counting probably on the 
election of Polk, they thought it better to wait for the next regular 
session; and some enemies of the cause, particularly those repre- 
sented by the Evening Post, expected or pretended to expect, that 
the matter " would all quietly evaporate in talking and scribbling." 
So ended the first session of the Twenty-eighth Congress.** 

Meanwhile Thompson had proceeded on his way to Mexico, 
bearing with him a despatch from Calhoun to Duff Green's son, 
who was now acting as charge at that post. In this document, dated 
April 19, the Secretary of State announced that the treaty for 
annexation would be laid before the Senate without delay, and 
directed Green, in making this fact known to the Mexican govern- 
ment, to give " the strongest assurance " that we had no feeling of 
" disrespect or indifference to the honor or dignity "of that country, 
and should greatly regret it were our action to be interpreted other- 
wise; that our step was a measure of self-defence, forced upon us 
by the policy of England regarding abolition in Texas ; that Eng- 
land had the power to carry her point there, and not only the 
neighboring States but the Union as a whole would thus be endan- 
gered ; that as the only way to fend off this peril the American 
administration had negotiated the treaty, acting thus " in full view 
of all possible consequences, but not without a desire and hope that 
a full and fair disclosure of the causes which induced it to do so 
would prevent the disturbance of the harmony subsisting between 
the two countries," which the American government were truly 
anxious to preserve ; that the President wished to " settle all ques- 
tions between the two countries which might grow out of this treaty, 

"Post: Nat. liitclL, May 24, 1844. Nat. IntclL. May 22. 1844. (Thinking) 
Raymond to Jones, June 5. 1844: Jones, Memor., 359. Van Z., No. 123, June 13, 
1844. Post: Nat. IntclL, June 17, 1844. 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 289 

or any other cause, on the most hberal and satisfactory terms, in- 
cluding that of boundary;" that the United States would have been 
glad to proceed in the matter with the concurrence of Mexico, but 
with all their respect for her and an " anxious desire that the two 
countries should continue on friendly terms," they could not make 
what they " believed might involve the safety of the Union itself 
depend on the contingency of obtaining the previous consent " of a 
foreign power; and that they had done all they could to render the 
terms of the treaty " as little objectionable to Mexico as possible," — 
for instance, had left the boundary question open, " to be fairly and 
fully discussed and settled according to the rights of each [nation], 
and the mutual interest and security of the two countries." To 
support the despatch, Calhoun enclosed copies of Aberdeen's letter 
and his own reply to Pakenham.^" 

Thompson, however, did not proceed at once to his destination. 
Though studiously described by the American government as a 
bearer of despatches, he was not simply a messenger, for his letter 
of introduction to Green directed the latter to take him into consul- 
tation; and the British minister in Mexico reported that as soon as 
possible, after landing at Vera Cruz on the fourteenth of May, he 
turned his steps toward Santa Anna's country-house at the National 
Bridge, not very far from the coast. The truth appears to be that 
Almonte, while declining to negotiate on the subject himself, had 
encouraged Calhoun to believe that his government, looking upon 
Texas as irretrievably lost, would accept a pecuniary consideration 
from the American Union in order to lessen the misfortune, and had 
actually transmitted to them a suggestion of this kind. His pur- 
pose, the British minister concluded after talking with him more 
than once, was " to gain time, and perhaps to obtain some advan- 
tage for His Government, in the acknowledgment which such an 
offer on the part of the United States would convey, of a still exist- 
ing right in Mexico over Texas." Thompson was therefore directed 
— according to the best information Pakenham could obtain — to 
offer ]\Iexico $6,000,000 or even, if California could be had. $10,- 
000.000 for her complaisance. This amount, however, was not to be 
paid in cash, but was to be an offset against the pending American 
claims ; and any one acquainted with Santa Anna's fondness for the 
ring of solid gold and the confidence that he felt in his own ability 

"*To Green, No. i, April 19, 1844: Sen, Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 53. 
As Mexico stood for the abolition of slavery, Calhoun's line of thought was 
peculiarly infelicitous ; but this was a very subordinate matter and unavoidable. 

20 



290 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to evade obligations, could easily predict how such a proposal would 
strike him.^^ 

• Definite information on the point is contained in a letter which 
that personage addressed without delay to the Mexican Secretary of 
Foreign Relations. According to him, Thompson informed the 
Comandante General of Vera Cruz that he had been particularly 
instructed to obtain a personal interview with Santa Anna, and 
on arriving at the country-house with his interpreter spoke sub- 
stantially in these terms : The President of the United States 
recently made a treaty with commissioners on the part of Texas for 
the annexation of that territory to the Union, and submitted the 
treaty to the Senate; but when the subject came to be considered 
in that body, it was regarded as indispensably due to the most 
rigorous justice to make no final decision without first having 
opened negotiations with Mexico, as required by the relations of 
amity existing between the two nations. The American govern- 
ment were impelled to sign the treaty by the law of self-preserva- 
tion, in view of the intrigues set on foot by England to acquire a 
preponderance in Texas. They were further impelled to do so by 
the commercial interests of the United States, which have suffered 
enormously in consequence of the illicit introduction of European 
g jods across the southwestern frontier, amounting the past year — 
according to definite information — to at least $2,000,000. But it is 
net the intention of the President, nor does the Senate purpose, to 
act definitively upon a subject of such grave importance without 
first asking the consent of this Republic [sin, como se ha indicado, 
contar con la voluntad de esta Reptiblica], and in case it be obtained 
indemnifying her amply for the territory acquired [y en tal caso 
ofreccrle etc.]. Indeed under the circumstances all friends of 
justice and all persons of foresight and judgment agree, that the 
first step to be taken is to secure the consent of ^Mexico; and 
although, for the reasons already suggested and for others, public 
sentiment in the United States is strongly favorable to annexation, 
— so strongly that even the opposition have felt compelled to give 
way, — yet this is not the case in such a degree as to render the 
government unmindful of what is required by the national honor 
and by equity. It is thought to be for the interest of Mexico herself, 
as well as the United States, to proceed at once to determine the 
common boundaries, even though in so doing she should be obliged 

" Madis., July 23, 1844. Green, No. 5, May 30, 1844. Bankhead, Xo. 34, 
May 30, 1844. Pak., Nos. 22, 36, 46, April 14, 28; May 13, 1844. 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 29I 

to give up a portion of the territory over which she possesses rights 
of ownership [tcrritorio sobrc cl cual ticne dcrcchos por scr dc su 
pcrtoicncia], in which case a corresponding indemnity would cer- 
tainly be paid to her; and the boundary thus finally adjusted would 
be placed under the guaranty of the United States, or even (should 
it be thought necessary) under that of some of the European powers, 
so that there might be established a settled state of things, free from 
all foreign influence and from the pernicious eiTects of the smug- 
gling already mentioned, to promote which there is reason to fear 
that all the chief seaports of Texas will eventually — should she 
remain independent — be declared free cities, in order that the vessels 
of every nation may enter without the least hindrance. 

The population of Texas, continued Thompson in Santa Anna's 
narrative, has undergone a remarkable change, so that for one 
North American it now contains five natives of other countries. 
The rights of Mexico over that territory cannot possibly be denied, 
— an important basis for the proposed negotiation. In this view 
of the subject, it would be highly important to lay aside, as though 
it had never existed, the immediate Texas question, properly so 
called, and proceed at once to the settlement of boundaries without 
regard to the character of the population. In conclusion, for all 
these reasons combined the Executive of the United States has 
thought this a favorable juncture to bring the matter before the 
authorities of Mexico, and to arrange the preliminaries of a con- 
vention wdiich, with all due regard to equity and justice, might 
smooth over the difficulties found in their way by the American 
government, consulting at the same time the mutual and reciprocal 
interests of both republics, and having always in view one great 
object common to both, — to wit, the interests of this hemisphere, 
which ought to be maintained by the firmest union and most incor- 
ruptible good faith against the machinations, arts and ambitious 
views of every European power to which these may be attributed.^^ 

To all this reasoning Santa Anna represented himself in his 
letter as replying in the following manner: If the clandestine traffic 
carried on through Texas is prejudicial to the interests of the 
United States, they have only themselves to blame, since they af- 
forded protection to the adventurers gathered in that quarter, even 
to the point of recognizing them as an independent nation. The 

" Calhoun told W. B. Lewis that S. An. received Thompson " rather kindly " 
(Lewis to Jackson, July 19, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll.). S. An. to Bo- 
canegra, May 17, 1844: Diario, June 8, 1844. 



292 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



President of the United States, in my opinion, has not acted very 
discreetly in negotiating for the annexation of the territory with 
those who are just now in possession of it, since — being mostly a 
portion of the American people, though they have assumed the name 
of Texans — they had no authority to treat for the disposal of a 
country not belonging to them. As Mexico, deeming her rights 
unquestionable, has resolved to maintain and never to relinquish 
them, she deems inadmissible the proposition of the United States, 
as well as every other idea of ceding territory to them. In fact she 
is determined to undertake afresh, and to prosecute with vigor, 
the war against Texas. ... If, then, the American government 
desire in good faith to put an end to the disorders which reign 
there and cause the United States so much concern, the best method 
would be to induce that rebellious province to recognize the suprem- 
acy of the mother-country. In the maintenance of her rights Mex- 
ico will wage war to the last ; and since nations never die, the right 
of re-conquering Texas will be transmitted to posterity. Such is 
the sentiment of her government and of her people. As for a settle- 
ment of the boundaries of the two countries, they have been dis- 
tinctly ascertained and established on former occasions . . . ; and 
Mexico will never consent to the annexation of the territory in 
question to the United States. 

Just how much of this account should be accepted is of course 
an interesting question. The mere fact that Santa Anna made such 
a statement counts practically for nothing. One familiar with his 
methods, with the state of politics in Mexico down to that moment, 
and with the lines of thought on the subject followed by public 
men there, finds clear enough evidence that a considerable portion 
of the ideas attributed to his visitor emanated from a Mexican 
rather than from an American mind. On the other hand, a person 
who has read the correspondence between our State department and 
our representatives in that country from the beginning until June, 
1844, readily detects a number of familiar considerations. Thomp- 
son's report of the interview seems to have been entirely verbal. 
He did, however, in consequence of the publication of this narra- 
tive, address a letter to the National Intelligencer, declaring that 
Santa Anna's account of the affair was erroneous in many particu- 
lars; that he did not represent himself as a diplomatic agent; that 
when asked whether he had any specific instructions, he referred 
the inquirer to his despatches; that he said "nothing inconsistent 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 293 

with the contents of the despatch addressed to Mr. Green . . . and 
nothing but what was consistent with the message of the President 
of the United States, in reply to the resolution of the Senate of the 
thirteenth of Alay last," in which Tyler had stated that no one had 
been sent off to secure the assent of Mexico to the annexation treaty. 
In commenting on this statement, the editors of the paper observed 
that by implication Thompson admitted the substantial accuracy of 
Santa Anna's account. This is probably going too far ; but it 
seems quite likely that the bearer of despatches made propositions 
regarding the surrender of Texas — and probably the surrender of 
northern California also — in consideration of certain financial off- 
sets and a certain linking of United States and Mexican policies for 
mutual advantage against the old world, while it is practically 
incredible that the claims of ]\Iexico were acknowledged in such a 
manner as Santa Anna described. Farther than this it would not 
be safe to go. To accept the Mexican President's version of the 
matter, one would have to believe that Calhoun sent a message by 
Thompson astonishingly at variance with his despatch to the charge, 
with his attitude before the American people, and with his position 
regarding Texas, — a message that would have given aid to his 
enemies at home and abroad, thrown confusion among his friends, 
and mortally offended the Texans ; while on the other hand it was 
plainly for the interest of Santa Anna to represent Thompson's 
language as he did, and he was perfectly capable of invention.^^ 
The bearer of despatches reached the city of Mexico on the 
twenty-second of May. The next day Green had an interview with 
Bocanegra, the Minister of Foreign Relations, and proposed that 
the Mexican representative at Washington should be authorized to 
receive proposals and open negotiations regarding the boundary 
between the two countries. Out of this grew a conference between 
the Acting President on the one side and Green, supported by 
Thompson, on the other. The full account of this interview was 
made orally by the latter on his return to the United States ; but 
the charge transmitted a brief protocol, from which it would appear 
that each man attempted to grapple his opponent advantageously ; 

" The account reads as if Santa Anna had first written down what Thompson 
said and then had inserted changes and interpolations. Thompson to Gales and 
Seaton, Aug. 7, 1844: Nat. Intell., Aug. 12, 1844. According to Van Zandt (No. 
125, June 18, 1844) Thompson stated that he submitted no definite proposition to 
the Mexican government ; and it is easy to believe that Santa Anna's attitude 
gave him no encouragement to do so. Of course the subject of ceding territory 
could be disguised under that of adjusting the boundary. 



294 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



that is to say, Green endeavored to commit the other side to the 
idea of negotiation, and the Acting President undertook to force 
Green to either recognize the existing treaty of Hmits or distinctly 
repudiate it. Mexico undoubtedly had not the least intention of 
acceding to the wishes of the United States, and under such circum- 
stances the interview was inevitably fruitless.^* 

The course of the Mexican government, our charge said, was 
" entirely owing to the fact " that they believed the treaty for the 
annexation of Texas would be rejected by the Senate, and counted 
on " our internal dissension growing out of the question of slavery." 
There were, however, concurrent motives of a domestic sort. Santa 
Anna still needed a strong army to support him, still found the Texas 
difficulty an opportune excuse for the necessary expenditures and 
convenient peculations of the war department, and had good reason 
to think that any step of his toward favoring the wishes of the 
American government would be seized upon by his enemies as the 
pretext for a revolution. Evading responsibility, he left the min- 
isters to say how the American proposition should be met, but ad- 
monished them to settle the matter without delay ; and they, what- 
ever their opinion as to the true interests of the country and what- 
ever their hesitation about incurring unpopular expenses, doubtless 
understood the will of their master and saw as well as he the 
danger of "truckling" to the United States. In view of Santa 
Anna's order and an official communication from our charge trans- 
mitting the substance of Calhoun's despatch the cabinet met, and its 
decision of course was to reject the American overture. ^^ 

In reply to Green, the IMinister of Foreign Relations now drew 
up a letter which declared that in taking steps to annex Texas 
the United States had not followed the principles of " reason, polit- 
ical truth, and justice " ; and that Mexico had been injured in her 
rights and outraged in her honor and dignity. Further he asserted 
that the language used by Calhoun and Green expressly recognized 
the claims of his country; and instead of consenting to cede any- 
thing belonging to her, he repeated the protest of August 23, 1843, 
that the incorporation of Texas in the American Union would be 
regarded as equivalent to a declaration of war. Before sending his 
letter, Bocanegra asked the British representative whether Mexico 

" Green to Calhoun, No. 5. May 30, 1844. 

'"Green to Calhoun, No. 5, May 30, 1844. (S. An.'s action) Bank., No. 34, 
May 30, 1844. Green to Bocanegra, May 23, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 
2 sess., 52. Bank., No. 85, Sept. 29, 1844. D. Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28, 1844: 
Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 975. 



THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 295 

would have to stand alone in this position. Bankhead replied that 
he thought she could count upon the sympathy of England, but that 
he had no authority to answer the question. Not discouraged, 
however, by this rather cold comfort, Bocanegra took the plunge and 
then laid the matter otificially before the foreign diplomatic corps, 
evidently to gain support. About the same time the newspapers, 
which had been maintaining some reserve in reference to the United 
States, took their cue from an article that appeared in a journal 
under Santa Anna's direct influence, and broke forth — to quote 
Bankhead — " in the most violent strain of invective against the con- 
templated annexation"; while Green and Bocanegra increased the 
tension by engaging in a duel of correspondence, each endeavoring 
to gain points for his country and himself. During the progress of 
the fight, Santa Anna came up to the capital and assumed the reins 
of government, thus associating himself with Bocanegra's policy; 
and he soon proceeded to call upon Congress for 30,000 more soldiers 
and four millions of money." 

Thompson had been expected to be in Washington again within 
forty or at most forty-five days from the time of his departure. 
This was perhaps impossible; but at all events, whether it was 
possible or not, he only reached the capital on the seventeenth of 
June. That was the day when Congress adjourned, and by accident 
or design he did not present himself until after the hour of dispersal. 
Rumors were afloat very soon that Mexico had gladly given her 
assent, but through one of Calhoun's confidential friends a hint of 
opposition leaked out. From Vera Cruz information rather more 
substantial than hints to that efifect arrived almost immediately; 
and it was evident enough before long that the special mission had 
been a failure. Indeed a Spanish newspaper in New York soon 
published a despatch from the Mexican government to Almonte, 
dated May 30, 1844, directing him to "persist" in his protests 
against annexation, "and especially in that of the twenty-third of 
August, 1843." 

In two significant respects, then, the annexation question had 
now been re-shaped. It was no longer a diplomatic subject in the 
keeping of the treaty-making power, but had been placed formally 

^'Bocanegra to Green, May 30, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 53, 
Bank., No. 35, May 30, 1844. Bocanegra, circular, May 31, 1844: Sria. Relac. 
Bank., No. 34, May 30, 1844. Green to Calhoun, June 7, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 
28 Cong., 2 sess., 57. Corr. of Green and Bocanegra: ib., 58 et seq. Bank., 
Nos. 39, 41, 43, June 29, 1844. 



296 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

by the President before the popular branch of Congress and thus 
indirectly before the people. At the same time it had become clear 
that opposition and not concurrence on the part of Mexico was to 
be expected. ^^ 

"Nat. Intell., June 19, 1844. Niles, June 22, 1844. Wash. Globe, June 18, 
1844. (From V. Cr.) N. Orl. Picayune, June 11, 1844. Pak., No. 74, June 27, 
1844, with the despatch to Almonte. 



XV 

The Annexation Question in the Presidential Campaign 

It now becomes necessary to study the question of annexation 
as it presented itself to the people, so far as one can judge of that 
from the indications of a Presidential contest. Under any circum- 
stances the wide induction which an inquiry like this requires would 
be very difificult ; and in the present case it is peculiarly so, because 
the obtainable information is very incomplete and more or less 
prejudiced; but some conclusions can probably be drawn with a 
fair degree of accuracy. 

In spite of the way in which it came about and in spite also of 
much confusing talk, a rather definite issue regarding annexation 
existed between the two great parties. " It is either Polk and 
Texas or neither Polk nor Texas," declared Webster. Among the 
reasons given by the Massachusetts Whig convention for support- 
ing the party candidate was this: "If Clay is elected President, 
Texas never will be annexed to the United States — whilst if Polk 
is elected, it will be annexed immediately." Cassius >M. Clay defined 
the issues of the day as, " On one side, Polk, slavery, and Texas, 
and on the other, Clay, Union and liberty." These were campaign 
distortions; but any intelligent person could see that the Whigs 
represented more or less delay, with all the uncertainties it involved, 
while the Democrats represented active pressure toward annexation, 
with a reasonable prospect of soon reaching it should they be given 
control of the government. And the question was not only an issue 
but a prominent one. According to Greeley's paper, the New York 
Tribune, Polk's claims were distinctly urged, not only in the South 
but as a rule in the North, on this ground, and in processions and 
meetings the flag of the Lone Star was " blazoned on high " 
beside the Stars and Stripes. "If there is any one question which 
is more popular than the rest with the united democracy, south and 
north," said the Register of New Haven, Connecticut, with natural 
exaggeration yet considerable truth, " it is the annexation of Texas 
' at the earliest practicable period ' " ; while at the same time, in the 
North at least, the Whigs also devoted nmcli altention to it and, 

207 



298 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

said the Portland American, "made their most constant and inflam- 
matory appeals on this question."^ 

Probably, however, annexation was somewhat more prominent 
than important in men's thoughts. There were particular reasons 
for making it conspicuous. The Texas question should not be over- 
looked, wrote a campaigner to Polk ; the battles, murders and the 
like excite the people, and I never before handled a subject so valu- 
able for the purpose. The banner of the single star doubled the 
amount of bunting that could properly be displayed at the head of 
a column. In the State of New York and perhaps elsewhere Texas 
was represented in the Whig processions by a flag draped in black 
and a girl dressed in mourning, and the orators of the day painted 
sable pictures of the evils that would result from annexation, while 
in the Democratic parades the fairest maiden of the village, decked 
out in white and flowers, personated the Sister Republic, and the 
topic of uniting the two nations was discussed in glowing periods; 
and precisely because the matter was novel and could be treated 
so picturesquely, it was sure to be put forward. Fervid appeals to 
the love of liberty, the hatred of mercenary troops, the distrust of 
England and the inborn predilection for humanity, benevolence and 
brotherhood could be made on this theme to almost any extent. 
Less thrilling but no less effective allusions to the sale of Northern 
manufactures in Texas and the employment of Northern vessels to 
transport them were equally available. All capable of reflecting, 
however, saw that very different and very important matters were 
also at stake. The Nashville Whig, for instance, declared that a 
majority of the people of Tennessee did not think Tyler's pet scheme 
should absorb all other issues. The real themes of the campaign, 
said the New York Herald, are the National Bank and annexation, 
putting Texas in the second place. The Democratic Central Com- 
mittee of Virginia in making an appeal to the voters in behalf of 
annexation added, " We do not desire, much less design to sink the 
other great questions of Bank, Tariff, and Distribution, for the 
sake even of acquiring Texas " ; and Webster, who stumped New 
York and Pennsylvania, devoted little or no attention to this matter 
in his speeches.^ 

^ See General Note, p. i. Webster, Speech at Boston, Sept. 19, 1844: N. Y. 
Joiirn. Com., Sept. 21, 1844. (Mass. Com.) Mobile Com. Reg., Nov. 5. 1844. 
(C. M. C.) Wash. Globe, Sept. 6, 1844. Tribune, Nov. 18, 1844. Reg-: Wash. 
Globe, Aug. 3, 1844. Amer,, Dec. 9, 1844. 

"Fitzgerald to Polk (in substance), June 8, 1844: Polk Pap. (N. Y.) Dickin- 
son: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App., 321. Whig: Nat. Intell., June 17, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 299 

No doubt there was much real sentiment in favor of the meas- 
ure. The New York Evening Post was said to be about the only- 
journal of its party that did not support it. "The South is up; 
the cause of Texas is flying like wild-fire over that whole region," 
exclaimed the Richmond Enquirer in June. Yet one must surely 
doubt, not only the accuracy of such a campaign outburst as this, 
but the genuineness, in some cases, of the zeal that really could be 
observed. Not only did party needs call for it, but special ma- 
chinery for exciting enthusiasm existed and was deliberately set in 
motion. About the time Congress adjourned a paper was signed 
by members of the House of Representatives from eighteen States, 
including three in New England, in which they promised to go home 
and " use the most active means to bring the question directly before 
the people to elicit an expression of their opinions in its favour." In 
view of this, Tyler felt confident that the Democrats of all the States 
would " cause their voices plainly to be heard upon the question " ; 
and one such piece of machinery, driven by the influence of the 
executive department, was quite able to produce a noise. The 
Louisville Journal asserted that great efforts were put forth to get 
up meetings, and characterized the movement as entirely artificial. 
]\Iuch of the talk on this issue at the South, said the New York 
Evening Post, was due to ofiice-holders who desired to please the 
President or to the speculators in Texas properties. About the 
middle of May, reported the National Intelligencer, an annexation 
meeting was held at Augusta, Georgia, which — though it had been 
called a week in advance — only seventy persons by actual count 
attended. In Alabama also there was coolness regarding the great 
Southern issue, and the Mobile Advertiser of July 23 even an- 
nounced a reaction. Louisiana, as we shall discover, was by no 
means eager. Mississippi on the other hand appeared to be strongly 
for the cause, and the fact that no duels occurred would seem to 
imply that only one opinion existed ; yet the eloquent Prentiss lifted 
his voice in opposition, and multitudes crowded to hear him. Al- 
monte thought in September that " even the most ignorant classes " 
were beginning to turn away from the policy of the government ; 
and within a week the London Times informed its readers that the 
subject had now only " some little interest " in the United States.^ 

Herald. Aug. 31, 1844. (Va. Com.) Richmond Enq., May 10, 1844. Webster, 
Writings, iii., 217, 253. 

^ (Post) Boston Atlas, March 21, 1845. Enq., June 4. 1844. Tyler to 
Howard, June 18, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. Journal: Nat. Inlell., June 



300 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

In general, of course, the arguments employed in the press and 
on the platform were those already well known to us ; but they did 
not always count with the masses precisely as they counted with 
persons of superior intelligence and wider experience. The cock- 
sure opinion of a popular orator was likely to have more influence 
than the hesitating judgment of a thinker. Legal considerations 
did not weigh very much, while the kinship of the Texans probably 
signified a great deal. The fact that not very long since the United 
States had been in much the same position as Texas — fighting 
against " oppressors " — affected the heart of the people mightily, 
and it blinded many eyes to certain points of a more abstract sort. 
Our recognition of that country, no matter how often the real sig- 
nificance of it was explained by statesmen, appeared to the common 
mind as fairly good proof that she was a sovereign state ; and the 
plausible term " re-annexation " had no little efifect. " It is a con- 
stant fact in acoustics, that if a given sound be repeated many times 
with a sharp percussion, the effect on the tympanum will be such 
as to obliterate all previous impressions," remarked the Newark 
Advertiser, and then it continued, " Let the experiment be tried with 
the word rc-anncxation. In a short time it will be the universal 
belief, that the whole of what is to be re-annexed once belonged 
to us." A nation founded on revolution was inclined to regard the 
assertion that the Texan revolt had been a robbery of Mexico as 
"mere twaddle," to use the language of the Poinsylvanian; and not 
a few were quick to ask like that journal, " Are the United States 
less independent because we had the aid of foreign citizens?"* 

As the immense demand for Walker's letter North as well as 
South indicated, the material advantages of possessing Texas were 
highly appreciated. The British consul at Galveston thought it im- 
possible that the people of the United States would not realize the 
advantages of acquiring that country, and he was a sensible man. 
Here is an extraordinary spectacle, exclaimed the Washington 
Spectator: a rich province, once lost, may now be had for nothing, 
yet some are unwilling to take it ; and such an appeal seemed almost 
irresistible to many a thrifty, acquisitive person. It is in line with 
the instincts of human nature, remarked the New York Herald, to 
favor the acquisition of any country, by which the power, splendor 

7, 1844. Post: ib., July 25, 1844. (Augusta) lb., May 24, 1844. Adv.. July 23, 
1844. Miss. Hist. Soc. Pub., ix., 180, 191, 193, 195, Almonte, No. 123, priv., 
Sept. 20. 1844. Times, Sept. 16, 1844. 

* Newark (N. J.) Adv., May 27, 1844. Pciin., Aug. 5, 1845. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3OI 

and wealth of the Union could be increased ; and even a rough sort 
of piety was called upon to sanction the feeling. " Nature has given 
it to us, and we must have it," remarked a young American to John 
Ouincy Adams with reference to the St. Lawrence River; and the 
same principle was often applied to Texas.' 

Interests of a more special sort also had a voice. Long-headed 
business men in various quarters could see that personal or local 
advantages would result from adding Texas to the national domain. 
Not a few in the Pine Tree State, for example, welcomed the offer 
of a promising market for lumber and farm products, and it was 
realized that her ships could find work to do between New Orleans 
and Galveston and between Galveston and Europe, especially in 
winter when nothing could be done at home. In Maryland, on the 
other hand, many felt that a very brisk demand for negroes would 
spring up in the event of annexation, the planters would sell them 
or migrate themselves, population would decrease, and the value of 
land would suffer; and these fears weighed more or less not only 
in the other States of the middle tier but even farther South. All 
through the slave section a great number continued to believe that 
annexation would stimulate very much the production of cotton in 
Texas, that cotton would tend to become unprofitable on the old 
plantations, that negro labor would cease to pay, that slavery would 
be discarded as it had been in the North, and that in consequence the 
South would become financially and politically weaker. During the 
campaign Waddy Thompson of South Carolina, formerly our min- 
ister at Mexico, stated this view of the matter with remarkable 
clearness and force." 

Anti-foreign — 'that is to say, anti-British — sentiment was much 
in evidence. This was by no means a merely journalistic point of 
view. At every stage of elevation the atmosphere was full of it. 
How Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee on for- 
eign affairs, talked on the floor of the national House we have seen. 
In April, 1844, Belser declared in the same place that Great Britain 
might use Texas against the United States, and that he was ready 
to vote for taking it in order to protect the rights, property and lives 
of the Southern citizens and the interests of all. Early in May 

"(Demand) Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844: Polk Pap. Kennedy, May 31, 
1844. Sped., May 7, 1844. Herald, June 15, 1844. Adams. Speech: N. Y. 
Tribune, Jan. 27, 1845. 

'Portland Amer.. Nov. 13, 1844. Augusta Age, May 23, 1844. Bait. Clipper, 
May 18, 1844. Columbia (S. C.) Chronicle: Charleston Conner. May 28, 1844. 
Thompson, Letter (pamphlet). 



302 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Thomasson of Kentucky stated that he had opposed annexation, and 
would continue to do so if that step would lead to a conflict with 
Mexico; but if the question were to be with any nation besides 
Mexico, he was for it even at the cost of war. Other declarations 
of similar import from men in high official positions will be recalled. 
Winthrop retorted that like the painter who could do nothing well 
except a red lion and therefore was always dragging that into his 
pictures, the Democrats were forever bringing up Great Britain to 
alarm the nation ; but the sentiment against the country with which 
the United States had had two wars, and which seemed to insist 
contemptuously that we should take from her our manufactures, 
commercial facilities, manners, literature and ideas, was very much 
too deep to be quenched with a sarcasm.'^ 

It was in the press, however, that this feeling chiefly manifested 
itself, and there it assumed all forms. In every quarter of the 
land sounded a continuous drumbeat of resentment and defiance 
against foreign interposition. Sometimes the popular notions were 
quite in error. When news came that Santa Anna threatened to 
invade Texas, England was accused of providing him with funds 
for that enterprise, though in reality she counselled Mexico em- 
phatically against this " wild undertaking " and this " deliberate 
challenge " to the United States. The New York correspondent of 
the London Times described the people as in such a mood that 
should Great Britain be really caught intriguing for the abolition of 
slavery in Texas, "the project of annexation would be promptly 
carried into execution by an overwhelming majority," and if neces- 
sary supported by " an appeal to arms." " Every native-born Amer- 
ican who drives a cart," he continued, believes the object would be 
to break up the Union ; and every man, young and old, would rally 
to defend the constitution. " Be not mistaken," he warned the 
British public ; " I tell you solemn truths " ; and in substance this 
representation was officially confirmed by Pakenham and Pageot. 
To a very large number of editors and their subscribers the Texas 
question was primarily an issue between the United States and Great 
Britain, arising out of England's jealousy of a powerful and grow- 
ing republic that had once been her colony.® 

''Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 401, 539, 575, 402. 

* A few citations would be of little value, and there is not space for an ade- 
quate number. Rich. Euq., Sept. 15, 1844. To Bank,, No. 30, Sept. 30, 1844. 
Times, Oct. 17, 1844. Pak., No. 76, June 27, 1844. N. Orl. Com. Bull., Aug. 5, 
1844. N. Y. Bull.: London Times, July 15, 1844. N. Y. Herald, July 6, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTI.\L CAMPAIGN 3O3 

This mood of the American press and pubhc was powerfully 
stimulated by the language of English journalists. "John Bull will 
now toss his horns grandly, or we are no prophet," exclaimed the 
Boston Post soon after the treaty of annexation became public; and 
so it proved. Little indeed in American life and character escaped 
the sweep of those redoubtable weapons. For Webster the London 
Titiics professed to entertain more respect perhaps than for any 
other living statesman of this country ; yet it pronounced a letter 
from his pen " a string of intolerable prose," going on " with about 
the meaning and variety of a mill wheel," through " an unrelieved 
series of platitudes, ... a harangue of the most commonplace con- 
ceivable kind, . . . trash." '' Human nature itself has been lowered 
by the depravity of the American people," this journal lamented; 
and it described the Democratic leaders as " reduced to simulate 
political crimes which they had not the resolution to attempt." In 
its eyes "the extraordinary injustice" of annexation was "if pos- 
sible " surpassed by " the matchless impudence of the arguments 
used in defence of it." It was " the vanity which in America sup- 
plies the place of pride," that had prompted Tyler to stretch out for 
Texas and so crown his reign " with notoriety if not with fame " 
before returning to " the herd " from which he had sprung. Should 
the Senate ratify the treaty, threatened the Times, the President and 
Secretary of State would " probably find their embarrassments rather 
increased than diminished by the execution of it," for as the country 
it was proposed to annex had been acknowledged by foreign powers, 
she possessed no right to join the United States.^ 

What made such language particularly exciting was the fact 
that some authority greater than an editor's appeared to be dictating 
it. In April, for example, the Britannia of London observed with 
reference to Texas that England " would neither suffer nor gain, 
whether the swampy shores of the Gulf of Florida belonged to 
Indians or Yankees, or whether man or mosquitoes drove the travel- 
ler from the unfriendly shore " ; but only five weeks later this peri- 
odical described the proposed absorption of that region as " one of 
the most flagrant offences ever committed by a nation professing a 
respect for human rights." What except a strong hint from the 
government, one could well ask, had force enough to change an 
important journal so completely within so short a space of time? 
That the cabinet had their eyes upon the matter seemed evident also 

"Post, May 9, 1844. Times, Feb. 27; May 15, 18; June 10, 1844. 



304 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



from Lord Aberdeen's remark on Alay ly when Brougham took up 
the subject of annexation. Should the American Senate ratify the 
treaty, he said, " he should be prepared to state his opinion to the 
House, and to do that which was consistent with his duty as a Min- 
ister of the Crown, and what the public service might require," — a 
scarcely veiled threat. And the tone of the English press was 
even more insulting than its language, pointing already to what the 
Atlas of London put into words a year later: "America, in all the 
length and breadth of its continent, the LTnited States inclusive, 
must be content to submit to British surveillance, and, when neces- 
sary, to British controul."^'' 

Just here the great influence of Jackson exerted all its force. 
Danger from England was his tocsin, and he rang it with an activity 
equal to the strength of his convictions. Within four months and a 
half Blair received twenty long communications from him on the 
subject of obtaining Texas; and there is no reason to suppose that 
Blair alone was favored in this way. A number of letters from his 
pen were spread broadcast by the newspapers. In particular, he 
dwelt as before upon the strategic need of ensuring the southwestern 
frontier against a British attack. It was replied that in 1820 he had 
represented the acquisition of Elorida as enough to make that part 
of the country invulnerable; but this was met by pointing out how 
the situation had changed, and that now there were several roads 
from Texas where formerly impassable swamxps and forests had cut 
ofif all approach. The Tribune argued that it would be easier to 
concentrate half a million men, armed and provisioned, at New 
Orleans than a hundred thousand at Austin or Nacogdoches ; but the 
public were much better satisfied to rely upon the opinion of the 
man who had routed the British in 181 5 than upon the dictum of 
an anonymous newspaper fellow in a New York attic. Besides, 
Jackson's opinion was supported by English writers. One of these 
frankly remarked in the Liverpool Mercury that the possession of 
Texas was " almost indispensable " to the United States as a cover 
to their Southern frontier in the event of a war with any European 
power; and when it was urged that England already had a better 
base of operations in Canada, it was easy to show from articles in 
the British press than many in England itself thought the hardest 
blow possible against this country would be to attack the South and 

^"Britannia, April 13; May 18, 1844. London Times, May 18, 1844. Atlas, 
Dec. 27, 1845. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3O5 

arm the slaves. It would be very easy, said the .-Itlas, to excite a 
servile insurrection there. Yet after all, despite the fuming, as 
British designs and intrigues in Texas had not publicly been proved, 
no call for immediate action was clearly seen, and the Whigs could 
believe their programme quite as likely to prevent foreign inter- 
ference as the other.^^ 

"Blair to Van B., Sept. 13, 1844: Van B. Pap. Jackson to Nashville Union, 
May 13, 1844: Wash. Globe. May 23, 1844. Id. to Moore, June 25, 1844: ib., July 
20, 1844. Id. to Dawson, Aug. 28, 1844: N. Y. Herald, Sept. 17, 1844. Tribune, 
May 21, 1844. Mercury, April 19, 1844. E. g., London Atlas. Jan. 4, 1845. In 
two thoughtful articles on the subject (May and June, 1844, pp. 324, 383) the 
Southern Literary Messenger reached the conclusion that annexing Texas would 
give the South military security and prevent slavery from being placed between 
two fires. Senator Barrow of La., however, who opposed annexation, asserted 
{Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App,, 390) that a desire for greater political 
power was really the main argument with the South, and one can easily believe 
that this idea had more weight than it seemed wise to avow. 

The Newark (N. J.) Adz'., May 27. 1844, thus summed up the arguments 
against annexation : It is unconstitutional to acquire new territory, especially 
when so doing would involve war ; to take Texas, which is now in conflict with 
Mexico, would violate our treaty obligations, which is wrong and dishonorable, 
and would involve us in a war which, — being unjust — could not be waged with 
union, spirit and success ; the scheme is now urged for personal and sectional 
aims; the subject has not been fully considered and passed upon by the people; 
the whole course of the negotiation has been undignified and degrading ; the 
covmtry has just emerged from troubles over currency and commerce and is not 
ready for fresh agitations ; annexing Texas would weaken our position against 
the acquiring of Cuba by England ; it would be an act of cowardice and oppres- 
sion against a weak nation, Mexico ; we have more land already than can be 
properly cultivated ; annexation would extend slavery and give it undue preponder- 
ance in the Union ; in a sparsely settled country with a shifting population, patrio- 
tism is weak, education difficult, agriculture backward, and improvement in all ways 
tardy, and therefore we should not extend our bounds ; the United States would 
have to assume — for the benefit of foreigners — a debt of $10,000,000 or $20,000,000 
which we would not do for one of our own States ; the increase in the area of 
the public lands would diminish the value of those we now hold ; our government 
is already unwieldy enough, and sectional difficulties are already sufficiently bad, 
and annexation would add to both embarrassments, lead to dissensions, and per- 
haps sow the seed of civil war ; the Sabine was fixed as the boundary, in prefer- 
ence to the Rio Grande, by Crawford, Calhoun, Wirt and Monroe for reasons 
deemed sufficient, and therefore it should continue to mark the frontier. 

Over against this may be placed the answer of the St. Clairsville (Ala.) 
Gazette to the question. Why annex Texas ? " Because the Father of Democracy, 
the patriotic Jefferson, bought it of France and paid the money of the nation for it. 
Because, in the treaty of 1803, we forever guaranteed the civil, social, political, 
and religious rights of the Texans. Because, Clay said we had no right to transfer 
it to Spain in 1819. Because Mexico never had a title to it; but she violated the 
Constitution of 1824, and left Texas free to act for herself. Because Texas de- 
feated the army of the murderer, Santa Anna, and he, when taken prisoner, 
solemnly signed a treaty for the independence of Texas. Because Texas has been 
recognized by us as free and sovereign, and desires us to fulfil our pledges to her. 
Because Clay says it is a better country than Florida, having a delicious climate, 
fertile soil, live oak for our navy, and the finest harbors on the Globe. Because 
it makes the slave trade, now privately carried on, piracy, and annexation would 
suppress it. Because it will protect Texas from the rapacity of Mexico, which is 
aided by England. Because it will make a home market for our fabrics and 
produce, and prevent smuggling on our frontiers. Because it will prevent British 
invasion by land, save us Oregon, and protect our commerce in the Gulf. Be- 



306 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Circumstances as well as arguments had a share in the cam- 
paign, and under this head the Liberty party must probably be given 
the first place. That organization, composed of the less radical 
abolitionists, had held a national convention in August, 1843. O"^ 
hundred and forty-eight delegates representing tweive States were 
present; and they nominated Birney of New York as their candi- 
date for the Presidency. At the date of the convention there seemed 
to be no occasion for taking a stand regarding Texas ; but the exten- 
sion of slave territory was denounced, and the platform as a whole 
could be summed up in a word, as it was by the Cincinnati Herald: 
" Slavery is the paramount issue." In some respects the Liberty 
men had more in common with the Whigs than with the Democrats ; 
but for this very reason they drew more strength from the former 
than from the latter, and therefore the Whigs were peculiarly hostile 
to them. The Liberty Standard said that while Polk's followers 
merely let them alone, the other party tried to destroy their organi- 
zation, and therefore it had to be fought; and that as the Whigs 
endeavored to seduce abolitionists by pretending their own candi- 
date opposed slavery, it was indispensable to prove he did not. 
The advocates of the perpetuation of that curse in the United States, 
said the New York Tribune, " have no truer, more devoted or more 
efficient friends than the Political Abolitionists of New York and 
the New England States " ; and such language was bitterly resented 
by those to whom it applied. Garrison printed a series of extracts 
from the Liberty journals, which revealed a deep hatred against the 
Whigs and scarcely any ill-will toward the other great party. ^- 

Throughout the northern States, except Rhode Island and New 
Jersey, the Liberty strength was now very large in comparison with 
1840, but in most cases it had no decisive influence. Alichigan, 
however, would have cast her electoral vote for Clay, had the abo- 

cause it will give us the trade of all the great rivers of the far West, that run to 
the Mississippi and Gulf. Because it gives us a hundred and thirty-six million 
acres of land, for which England would pay ten times the sum and then destroy 
our commerce, manufactures, planting and mechanic interests. Because it would 
extend our free institutions, the principles of human rights, and the glad tidings 
of salvation. Because Clay and Adams wanted to buy it in 1827, and Gen. Jackson 
in 1829 to prevent foreign nations from destroying our peace and prosperity. 
Because Gt. Britain '.vants Texas, as she does all creation, to enslave the millions. 
Because our British-Whig-ahettors aid England and Mexico and oppose ' Union 
and Liberty.' Because annexation will prevent consolidation and perpetuate State 
Rights." Such a jumble of right and wrong, truth and error, sense and folly 
probably represented the Texas opinions of half a million voters. 

" The extreme abolitionists would have nothing to do with politics or the 
government. Stanwood, Presidency, 215. Gin. Herald, July 27, 1844. Standard: 
Madis., Nov. 20, 1844. Tribune, Oct. 11, 1844. Lib., Nov. 22, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 307 

litionists concluded to support him. In Ohio, on the other hand, 
enough of them appear to have done so to carry the State. There 
the Whigs made special efforts to win them over; and at Cincin- 
nati, for instance, they held an anti-annexation meeting for that 
express purpose. Harris, one of Polk's correspondents, reported 
after visiting the ground that he thought the Liberty men numbered 
15,000 or 20,000 and, should they stand firmly by their ticket, the 
State would go Democratic. Their actual vote was 8,000, and the 
Whigs had a margin of about 6,000, substantially all of whom, if 
Harris was right, would seem to have come from the ranks of the 
anti-slavery party.^^ 

After the letters of Clay and Van Burcn had been read, the New 
York Herald predicted that both men would occupy the same posi- 
tion on the subject of annexation: "That is to say, they will now 
be a little on this side and now a little on the other side of the Sa- 
bine — sometimes Texas, and sometimes anti-Texas — balancing and 
re-balancing, until after the Ides of November " ; but this prophecy 
did not entirely come true. When an attempt was made to draw 
from Van Buren some modification of his views, he informed Amos 
Kendall that his position had been taken deliberately and could not 
be changed. Very differently acted Henry Clay. At the time he 
drafted his Raleigh letter he expected to be opposed by a candidate 
occupying substantially the same ground as himself on the new 
issue; and the nomination of an avowed annexationist by the Demo- 
crats changed the situation essentially. In comparison with Polk 
he appeared cold, timid and anti-Southern. To aggravate the diffi- 
culty, his argument that the opposition of a large number of the 
American people against annexation ought to be decisive, was viewed 
by many as referring, not to the free States in general, but to the 
abolitionists. "Lash Clay on his rejecting Texas for the abolition 
votes severely," wrote Jackson to Polk, and the idea took. Signs 
of disaffection appeared in his ranks, and his friends entreated him 
to save the cause. Not adapted by nature or experience for a 
defensive campaign he felt annoyed, became excited, lost his head, 
yielded to the pressure — not exactly like the cock that runs away 
but like the one on the housetop that turns round — and modified his 
attitude without considering all the probable effects of so doing. 

" Stanwood, Presidency, 203, 223. Parry to Van B., March 29, 1844: Van 
B. Pap. Harris to Polk, July 18, 1844: Polk Pap. The Wash. Globe, Nov. 18, 
1844, charged that the Whigs carried the State because many of the abolitionists 
— mainly in consequence of a well-known forged letter — deserted their leader. 



308 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Even now he did not come out squarely in favor of immediate 
annexation or indeed of annexation at any time; but he discovered 
by the first of July that he had no personal objection to the acqui- 
sition of Texas, and by the twenty-seventh that he " should be glad 
to see it, without dishonor, without war, w^ith the common consent 
of the Union, and upon just and fair terms." In fact he now 
thought it " would be unwise to refuse a permanent acquisition, 
which will exist as long as the globe remains, on account of a tem- 
porary institution " like slavery, which really ought not to " affect 
the question, one way or the other " ; and he intimated that should 
he win the Presidential chair, he would be governed by public 
opinion and the state of the facts. ^'^ 

" You would be amazed," wrote F. B. Stevenson of Cincinnati 
to Senator Crittenden, " at the extent of the resentment felt in Whig 
quarters towards Mr. Clay, for his Texas letters written after they 
had taken position under his Raleigh letter." Cramer, editor of the 
Albany Argus, expressed the opinion to Polk that for this reason 
Webster, Choate, Seward, Granger, Fillmore and Corwin felt deeply 
indignant in their hearts, adding that the Whig papers were thrown 
upon the defensive, and had to spend half the time in explaining 
what their candidate really meant. In particular, the view that the 
slavery issue ought not to be considered in reference to the question 
of annexation shocked most profoundly those to whom that issue 
was a matter of conscience; and they concluded, said Greeley, that 
Clay's opposition to the Texas project, having no root in principle, 
could not be relied upon. Then came Birney, preaching that the 
Whig candidate was actually more dangerous than the Democratic, 
because he was abler ; and finally Clay's Northern enemies, pitching 
upon the unlucky words " glad to see it " in his letter, stripped them 
of their context, and bandied the phrase about as a fatal admission. 
Clay also disavowed the sentiments of his relative, Cassius M. Clay, 
who had been trying to convey the impression that Henry was op- 
posed to slavery, which in Cramer's judgment put an impassable 
gulf between him and the abolitionists. All this was done of course 
to placate the South; yet many of those who favored annexation 
there and considered it the vital issue of the campaign on account 
of its bearing upon the security of Southern interests, felt entirely 

^* Herald, May 4, 1844. Van B. to Kendall, June 12, 1844: Van B. Pap. 
Blaine, Twenty Years, i., 34-37. (Abolsts.) Tuscaloosa (Ala.) Monitor in N. 
Orl. Com. Bull., July 25, 1844. Jackson to Polk, July 23, 1844: Polk Pap., 
Chicago. (Letters) Schurz, Clay, ii,, 260: Madis., Aug. 29, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3O9 

dissatisfied still, since the Whig leader seemed to be only passively 
favorable to their cause. " What a perfect devill Clay has made of 
himself in his different letters," exclaimed Old Hickory.^" 

The Democrats as well, however, had an enfant terrible. This 
was Benton, who attacked the administration furiously in his cam- 
paign speeches for its Texas proceedings, denounced the treaty, 
denied the reality of English intrigues against the peculiar institu- 
tion, opposed with all his vigor the programme of the radical annexa- 
tionists, and maintained that had a different course been pursued 
Texas would have been sure to enter the Union " as naturally as 
the ripe pear falls to the earth and without dissension at home or 
abroad." Energetic in tone, piquant in phraseology, plausible in 
argument. Benton's addresses had notable elements of popularity. 
One of Polk's correspondents expressed the opinion that he had 
deprived the party of 100,000 votes ; and Jackson felt that his 
speeches had done more harm than all the Whigs put together. 
Such estimates, however, were clearly the fruit of irritation. Tyler 
and Calhoun, not Polk, were the targets of Benton's wrath; and if 
he could still support the Democratic ticket, so could his followers.^'' 

The President remained for some time a disturbing factor ; but 
it became evident before very long that he was not likely to receive 
the Southern vote. Party allegiance counted heavily against him 
of course ; and no doubt many believed, as James Gadsen did, that 
a majority in that section looked upon him as not equal to the crisis. 
It was clear, too, that his remaining in the field would divide the 
pro-annexation vote. Consequently, whether or not entirely sincere 
in stating that he organized a party in order to throw its weight for 
the public good in the election, the President had now an opportunity 
to exhibit altruism, and he was given assistance in that matter. 
Walker, for example, discussed the subject with him; and then the 
Senator notified Polk that Tyler, not expecting to be elected, desired 
the success of the Democrats, and that if his followers, who con- 
sidered themselves proscribed in consequence of the attacks of the 
Globe and other papers, could be assured of a reception as brothers 
and equals, he would withdraw from the canvass, and they would 
merge themselves in the Democratic party. Walker then intimated 

''Stevenson to Crit., undated: Crit. Pap. Cramer to Polk, Sept. 17. 18^44: 
Polk Pap. Greeley. Amer. Conflict, i.. 166-168. Weed. Autobiog., 585. (Bandied^ 
Schouler, U. S., iv., 477. Clay to Wickliffe. Sept. 2, 1844: Wash. Globe, Sept. 
10, 1844. Jackson to Blair, Oct. 17, 1844: Jackson Pap. 

'" (Benton's St. Louis speech) Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 1844. Yoakum to Polk, 
Nov. 22. 1844: Polk Pap. Jackson to Blair, Aug. 15, 1844: Jackson Pap. 



3IO 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to Polk that some one in a position to do it should write a letter 
signifying the acceptance of Tyler's conditions. Here is something, 
added the Senator, that may decide the election.^^ 

This was on the tenth of July. On the twenty-third Polk sent 
General Pillow to Jackson, and suggested that Blair be induced to 
stop attacking the President; and three days later Jackson was 
saying to the editor of the Globe, " Support the cause of Polk & 
Dallas & let Tiler alone — leave Calhoun to himself." This was fol- 
lowed up on the first day of August with a letter to Major Lewis, 
in which Jackson expressed his views as to the proper course for 
the President, arguing that unless he should withdraw, he would 
be charged with taking up the annexation issue merely to obtain a 
re-election and with remaining in the field in order to defeat Polk; 
and Tyler soon wrote back to him that this advice had determined 
him to retire. He claimed to have a controlling power in Pennsyl- 
vania, Virginia and New Jersey, and to hold in his hand 40,000 
Ohio votes, — in all 150,000; and he only demanded in return for his 
withdrawal an immediate change in the attitude of Benton and the 
Globe towards himself, and a fully open door for all of his follow- 
ers who should wish to join the Democrats. As he added that most 
of those who had followed him in 1840 had previously voted for 
Jackson, this appeal was calculated to be particularly effective ; and 
again Jackson gave orders to Blair in accordance with the Presi- 
dent's wishes, adding that his withdrawal would ensure victory. 
Doubtless other communications passed, for according to Tyler him- 
self the Democratic leaders promised that his friends should be 
theirs ; and on the twentieth of August his letter of withdrawal was 
written. How many votes this arrangement carried to Polk it is 
of course impossible to say. No doubt the President over-estimated 
his strength ; but had no olive branch been held out to his followers, 
they could hardly have been expected to assist the Democrats. Re- 
sentment and desperation, as well as hope, are recognized motives 
of action.^® 

Another disturbing factor was Nativism. In November, 1843, 

'^Gadsden to Calhoun, May 3, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 952. Tyler to 
Gardiner, July 11, 1846: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 341. Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844: 
Polk Pap. 

"Polk to Jackson, July 23, 1844: Jackson Pap. Jackson to Blair, July 26, 
1844: ib. Id. to Lewis, Aug. i. 1844: Ford Coll. Tyler to Jackson, Aug. 18, 1844: 
Jackson Pap. (150,000) Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844: Polk Pap. Jackson to 
Blair, Aug. 29, 1844: Jackson Pap. Tyler to Gardiner, July 11, 1846: Tyler, 
Tyler, ii., 341. (Letter) Wash. Globe, Aug. 21, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3II 

at the election of a State Senator in New Yorl< City, dislike and 
distrust of the foreign-born citizens, particularly as ofifice-holders, 
manifested themselves in a large vote for the American Republican 
candidate, and in the following April a Native administration was 
given control of the city. Soon the movement spread to New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania ; and in Philadelphia serious riots occurred. This 
diversion operated against the Whigs in two ways. The new party 
drew its converts mainly from them ; and the foreign-born, feeling 
themselves menaced, naturally gathered on the Democratic side, 
where the majority of them belonged. Such a result was promoted 
by the fact that most of these voters were Catholic, since the Whigs 
had been unfriendly to that sect ; and although the movement was of 
no general consequence at this period, it appeared at such a time 
and in such a place as to do Clay considerable harm.^^ 

Personal factors also had an influence. On the one hand Clay 
was extremely popular with many persons ; but on the other he was 
denounced as a toper, duellist, gambler and supporter of slavery. 
How the two sides of the account balanced no one can say; but it 
seems probable that outside of Kentucky and its vicinage the per- 
sonal element was less likely to seduce Democrats from their party 
allegiance than to discourage conscientious Whigs from giving him 
their votes, — especially as the stories told against him could reach 
immensely farther, and in many cases could strike much deeper, 
than his own influence. Even at home, indeed, his popularity had 
no such effect as might have been expected. In Kentucky the Whigs 
cast about 3,000 more votes than in 1840; but in Tennessee they 
lost some of their former strength, and the Democrats gained nearly 
20,000 and 12,000 in the two States respectively. Clay's partner on 
the ticket also was opposed for personal reasons. According to the 
Albany Cithen, Catholics were urged to vote against Frelinghuysen 
on the ground that he belonged to some of the leading religious 
societies of the Protestants; and the Citizen stated that many good 
churchmen gave ear to the appeal.-'' 

New York, Pennsylvania and Louisiana deserve particular men- 
tion. In the Empire State the situation was very peculiar. The 
Democrats were at a disadvantage in the manufacturing districts on 
the tariff question, and in the lake cities because their creed opposed 
the improvement of harbors; and the anti-slavery sentiment among 

"• Lalor, Cyclopaedia, i., 85. Von Hoist, U. S., ii., 522. The author has made 
no thorough investigation of this matter, since it is quite incidental. 

^ Stanwood, Presidency, 203, 223. Citizen: Phila. No. Amcr., Nov. 16, 1844. 



312 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



them was very strong. A legislature in which that party controlled 
the lower House by a two-thirds majority had pronounced firmly, 
as we have seen, for the reception in Congress of petitions against ne- 
gro bondage. " To devote their energies for the extension of Slavery 
must be odious to a free People," said the editor of a leading Demo- 
cratic paper; and this was the issue which the Whigs of the State 
endeavored to fasten upon the voters. Nor did the party like to be 
" sunk five fathoms deep," as Cramer phrased it, by the cry of Texas 
or Disunion, or enjoy being stabbed under the fifth rib, as they said 
at Albany, by AIcDuffie's description of the tariff States as pirates 
and robbers. Another feature of the canvass that occasioned them 
great uneasiness was the publication by the Central Committee at 
Washington of Walker's pamphlet entitled, " The South in Danger," 
which recommended annexation exclusively on the ground of ex- 
tending and perpetuating the peculiar institution. " This in a free 
State is a sharp sword," remarked the editor of the Argus. Cassius 
M. Clay's " terrible." denunciations of slavery and his ingenious 
pictures of breeding negroes for Texas also caused a good deal of 
annoyance. From all these troubles, however, the Democratic lead- 
ers found a way of escape, — rather narrow, to be sure, but far better 
than none. Silas Wright was nominated for Governor, and he was 
pointed to as proof that the Democratic party did not stand com- 
mitted to the extreme annexation views of certain members of it, 
prominent though they might be, and still less to Calhoun's advocacy 
of African servitude. In other words, men were asked to vote for 
the representative of a national programme they detested, on the 
ground that an opponent of that programme was the party candi- 
date for a local office ; and many did so.-^ 

Bryant's paper, the scrupulous New York Evening Post, found 
itself in a particularly difficult position, opposed to annexation yet 
anxious to preserve its Democratic standing. A confidential circu- 
lar was issued over the signatures of George P. Barker, William 
Cullen Bryant, David Dudley Field, Theodore Sedgwick and 
others, which argued that the Texas resolution adopted at Baltimore 
was obnoxious to a great majority of the Northern freemen; that 
since the delegates had not been instructed on the subject, they pos- 
sessed no authority to incorporate such a plank in the platform; 

=» (Disadvantage) Cramer to Polk, Nov. 13, 1844: Polk Pap. Modis.. March 
12, 1844. Cramer to Polk, Oct. 4, 1844: Polk Pap. Madis., Nov. 18, 1844. 
Cramer to Polk, July 21, 1844: Polk Pap. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3I3 

that it would be well to publish a joint letter, proclaiming an in- 
tention to support the nominees but reject the resolution ; and that 
efforts ought to be made to elect Congressmen on that basis. 
Before long the circular became known to the public, and the Post 
then maintained openly that only this policy could save the party 
from defeat in the State, since annexation could not safely be made 
an issue there. The editors endeavored also to evade the diffi- 
culty by dividing the question. It has two parts, they said ; first, is 
annexation intrinsically desirable? and secondly, should the measure 
be adopted without regard to the circumstances? In other words 
if annexation would mean a rupture with Mexico, assumption of 
the Texan debt, the extension and perpetuation of slavery, and an 
increase of the power of the South in the national government, 
these incidental questions might be so important as to require settle- 
ment before the essential issue could be considered ; and such a 
course of procedure, too, would be quite proper, for while the party 
felt satisfied that Texas must be received, it had not decided that 
she must come in " without terms or conditions." In these ways the 
Post endeavored to help its conscientious readers vote for Polk 
yet still consider themselves highly moral as regarded slavery and 
the inviolability of treaties.-- 

- (Circular) Madis.. June 25, 1844. Post: Bait. Amer., July 2-j, 1844. Post, 
June 26, 1844. Whether defections among the anti-slavery readers of the Post 
were thus prevented, observers did not agree. Cramer wrote to Polk (Nov. 13, 
1844: Polk Pap.) that his majority was as large as Van Buren's would have been, 
though it was about 5,000 less than Wright's; and Wright (to Polk, Dec. 20, 1844: 
Polk Pap., Chicago) maintained that Polk received even more Democratic votes 
than he, explaining that he was aided by the ballots of personal friends and by 
those of many wealthy Whigs who desired to have the State's financial system 
continue as it was. But William C. Bouck of Albany (to Polk, Nov. 15, 1844: 
Polk Pap.) expressed the opinion that the voters represented by the Post, while 
they supported the ticket, were willing that Polk should fall behind Wright, and 
the Mcidisonian (Dec. 18, 1844) did what it could to confirm this view, pointing 
out that Wright was given only 208 more votes than the Democratic candidate 
for Lieutenant Governor, who enjoyed no special popularity, and therefore, since 
Polk received about 5,000 less votes than the regular Democratic majority, the 
difTerence must have been due to defections. A letter from western New York 
(Bait. Amcr.. July 27, 1844) stated that substantial Democrats in that section 
would vote for Birney or not vote at all ; and this, so far as it went, pointed in 
the same direction. Indeed it is hard to believe that theories like those of the 
Post could wholly overcome the strong repugnance of many New York Democrats 
to everything that savored strongly of slavery and Southern domination. Before 
the election (Sept. 24) the Tribune was jubilant in view of the prospect which it 
held up that, whereas previously the Liberty party in New York had always borne 
wholly against the Whigs, it would this year take votes from the other side as 
well; and after the election the Albany Argus (Wash. Globe, Nov. 18, 1844) 
maintained that "the great body of the abolitionists" who adhered to their party 
organization had been "originally Democrats." According to Greeley {Tribune, 
Dec. 2^, 1844) the Democrats paid abolitionist speakers, however, as if expecting 
their converts would be mainly from the Whigs. At all events the Liberty 



314 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Pennsylvania was normally Democratic. In July Buchanan 
stated privately that the party led there " by at least 20,000." Even 
in 1840, he added, it had been defeated by only 343 votes, and since 
that time it had carried the State elections "by large majorities." 
Not satisfied with such an advantage, however. Walker took pains to 
secure another. "You must not destroy us," he wrote to Polk; 
we need Pennsylvania, and you must go as far as your principles 
will permit for incidental protection. If we can only steer clear 
of the tariff, remarked the Senator, the election is safe. In the 
judgment of competent observers, Walker was not mistaken in laying 
so much stress upon this point. Cramer of Albany and Henry 
Horn of Philadelphia agreed that it was the decisive question in 
Pennsylvania, and Polk himself doubtless held the same opinion. In 
a letter on the subject he made the flexible announcement that he 
stood for " reasonable incidental protection," and the Sunbury 
American stated after the election that the people, who were almost 
unanimous for a tariff that would help the manufacturing establish- 
ments, had voted for him " with a firm belief that he would foster 
these interests, as they had been assured by himself and his friends." 
This assertion appears to be correct. " We have succeeded in fixing 
the belief that you ' are as good a tariff man as Clay,' " the wily 
Simon Cameron informed the candidate himself. On the other 
hand, the Pennsyhmiian stated that in Philadelphia the abolitionists 
voted almost unanimously as Whigs.^^ 

LxDuisiana also presented an interesting situation. In July the 
National Intelligencer published a letter, said to have been written 
by a distinguished citizen of the State, which asserted that " a com- 
plete intermission of the Texas fever " could be observed there ; and 
the Whigs triumphed in the summer election. This condition of 
things was largely due to the fact that the sugar planters opposed 
annexation almost solidly, believing that should Texas become a 
part of the Union, their business would be ruined by her competi- 
tion, and the value of their lands greatly diminished. At New 
Orleans, however, the sentiment was different. The local corre- 

orators were represented as urging that Clay favored the annexation of Texas no 
less really than Polk and adjuring their listeners to keep their souls unstained 
from the guilt of slavery by voting for neither. Birney stumped the State and 
there declared his preference for Polk (Nat. IntelL, Nov. 19, 1844). 

^Buchanan to Letcher, July 27, 1844: Coleman, Crit., i., 221. Walker to 
Polk, May 20, 1844: Polk Pap. Cramer to Id., Oct. 4, 1844: ib. Horn to Id., 
Nov. 2, 1844: ib. Polk to Kane, June 19, 1844: Niles, Ixvi., 295. Amer.: Nat. 
IntelL, Nov. 21, 1844. Cameron to Polk, Oct. 18, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago. 
Penn., Nov. 18, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3I5 

spondent of the New York Commercial Advertiser divided the 
population of the city into three classes: first, a very few, holding 
Texan bonds and scrip, who favored annexation under any circum- 
stances, and made a great deal of noise; secondly, a small number 
thoroughly opposed to the measure ; and thirdly, the mass of the 
people, who wished the acquisition to be effected in case this could 
be done honorably and economically. Obviously the third class was 
often in the position of silent partner to the first. Calhoun had 
many adherents in the town, though Felix Connolly, who built the 
mint, described them as nearly all holders of Texan lands or bonds 
or else engaged in business as brokers or note-shavers ; and a popular 
meeting went so far in May as to threaten that Louisiana would 
resume possession of Texas, if the treaty should not be ratified; yet 
the Democrats won the State by a majority of only 700, and that 
margin seems to have been largely if not wholly due to fraudulent 
or at least irregular balloting.^* 

Polk was elected ; but in the popular vote, with which a study 
of public sentiment is concerned, he ran only some 38,000 ahead of 
his competitor. This is quite surprising. A Democratic victory 
seemed probable before the Texas issue came up. The Whig suc- 
cess of 1840 appeared to have been merely a temporary break, 
largely due to the recent financial panic and its consequences ; and 
with the exceptions of that year and 1824 the people had been 
Democratic for nearly half a century. The national House of Rep- 
resentatives that met in 1843 ^^'^•'' o^ the same complexion by a large 
majority; and from 1800 to 1876 the party able to choose a Speaker 
in the even-numbered Congresses elected its President in the next 
campaign. At the beginning of May, 1844, George Bancroft pre- 
dicted that Clay's majority in Massachusetts would be " vastly " 
smaller than Harrison's of 1840. The promising indications in Penn- 
sylvania have already been mentioned ; and other favorable omens 
were observed. The results, however, did not correspond. The 
abolition vote of 1844, substantially all of which must be counted 
as against annexation, ran up to 62,300. That of Michigan was 
larger than Polk's plurality in the State; and that of New York 
was three times as great as his plurality there. Had the party 

'^ Nat. InfelL. July 24, 1844. N. Orl. Courier, Dec, 21, 1844. Com. Adv.: 
London Times, June 10, 1844. Connolly to Van B., May 10, 1844: Van B. Pap. 
(Meeting) Mex. Consul, N. Orl., No. 32, May 11, 1844. In January, 1845, the 
Louisiana House of Representatives declared by a vote of 36 to 16 that a majority 
of the citizens favored immediate annexation, and later the Senate concurred 
{Nat. IntelL, Jan. 28, 1845). 



3i6 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



broken up in the latter commonwealth and even three-fourths of 
its members joined the Whigs, Clay would have carried New York. 
The losses of the Whigs in the four northern States of New Eng- 
land, in comparison with the returns of 1840, almost equalled Polk's 
national margin, and apparently these missing voters merely stayed 
at home, for the Democratic strength also declined. On the other 
hand some allowance is to be made for Clay's personal popularity, 
but it could hardly offset these figures. So in spite of the antecedent 
probability Polk did not have the voters with him, and annexation 
" at the earliest practicable period " was really defeated.^^ 

When we look beyond the returns these facts are emphasized. 
The effect of tariff misrepresentations on the vote of Pennsylvania 
has already been suggested. In the State of New York, said the 
Tribune, 10,000 illegal ballots were cast against Clay and not 2,000 
for him. The New York Express alleged that during the last fort- 
night of the campaign not less than 2,500 voters were naturalized 
by the Democrats. The Poughkeepsie Journal asserted that within 
three or four months upwards of 10,000 Irishmen were put at work 
on the canals under the pretence of making repairs ; that more than 
2,000 of them had been naturalized within a recent period ; and 
that perjuries by the thousand had been committed to make them 
citizens. According to the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser the result 
in the State was due to the naturalization of aliens in that city and 
New York during the preceding two years. The New York Courier 
and Enquirer declared that thousands of voters had been manufac- 
tured expressly to cast their ballots for Polk, and that more than 
2,500 foreigners, who had previously stood for the other party, were 
persuaded that a Whig victory would deprive them of their 
rights. In all, so Greeley estimated, more than 100,000 foreign-born 
Whigs were driven over to the Den)ocrats by the threatening ap- 
pearance of Nativism, and it was pointed out that the Liberty men, 
besides coming mainly from the same side, made thousands of others 
believe that Clay was really an annexationist.-" 

Webster attributed the defeat of his party to the fraudulent 
voting of foreigners in New York and Pennsylvania. Thurlow 

" Had South Carolina chosen her Presidential Electors by a popular vote, 
Polk's plurality would have been larger. Of course the remarks of the text are 
based upon the vote actually cast. Lalor, Cyclopaedia, i., 777. Stanwood, Presi- 
dency, 222. Bancroft to Van B.. May 2, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 ser., ii,, 
425. 

-" N. Y. Tribune: Nat. IntcU.. Nov. 12, 1844. Express. Journal. Com. Adv.: 
ib., Nov. 13, 1844. Courier and Enq.: ib., Nov. 19, 1844. Greeley, Amer. Con- 
flict, i., 168. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIxVL CAMPAIGN 3I7 

Weed, no mean judge in such matters, believed that until Clay wrote 
the letters modifying his attitude on the annexation question, he was 
"certain" to become President. Frelinghuysen gave the credit to 
the abolitionists and the foreign-born voters ; and Fillmore, the Whig 
candidate for the Governorship of New York, to the abolitionists 
and foreign-born Catholics. Colton, Clay's biographer, held that 
the most powerful argument against the Whigs was the popular 
name of the other party ; but he figured out in detail that New York, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia and Louisiana were carried by the Democrats 
fraudulently, and pointed to Nativism, the patronage of the national 
government, the faulty organization of the Whigs and their ineffec- 
tive campaign methods as important factors ; while the unsuccessful 
candidate himself explained the wreck of his cause as due to " a 
most extraordinary combination of adverse circumstances." " If 
there had been no Native party," he wrote, "or if all its members 
had been truer to its own principles; or if the recent foreigners had 
not been all united against us ; or if the foreign Catholics had not 
been arrayed on the other side; or if the Abolitionists had been 
true to their avowed principles; or if there had been no frauds, we 
should have triumphed." Of course the defeated party is always 
inclined to protest that it was beaten unfairly ; but a review of all 
the charges preferred on both sides confirms the impression made 
by the face of the returns that Polk had no real popular majority 
and that his annexation policy did not win the day.'^^ 

Very significant also were the opinions expressed, after the 
smoke had rolled away, as to the issues actually involved in the 
contest. The American of Portland said that in this campaign 
the battle was plainly between the principles of Adams and Hamilton 
and those of Jefferson, and that the victory meant there would be 
no National Bank, no new distribution of public lands money, no 
high tariff' and no coalition with Federalism. The Alexandria 
Gazette of \'irginia, a Whig sheet, thought the election had turned 
mainly upon abolitionism at the North, protection in Pennsylvania, 
free trade in Alabama, religious prejudices in Maine, Mormonism 
in Illinois, foreigners everywhere, and most of all upon an appeal 
to the poor against the rich. In the eyes of the Charleston Mercury 
the election had overthrown Clay and Adams, rebuked encroach- 

" Webster. Speech, Nov. 8, 1844: Nat. IntclL. Nov. 13, 1844. Weed, Auto- 
li'og., 572. (Ful., Fill., Colton) Clay, Works (Colton), v., 495, 497: ii., 428-443. 
Clay to J. M. Clayton, Dec. 2, 1844: Clayton Pap. One suspects that it was 
chagrin over his own blundering that caused Clay to ignore annexation in this 
summary. 



31 8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

ments on the constitution, forbidden a National Bank, prohibited an 
alHance between the national treasury and the stock-jobbers, and 
prevented the assumption of State debts, the imposition of unneces- 
sary taxes, the passage of a bankrupt law, the promotion of the 
anti-slavery crusade by means of a tariff that would enrich the 
North at the expense of the South, and the surrender of Texas to 
Mexican barbarity and British domination. The New York Herald 
maintained that Polk was carried into power by the cry " Texas 
and Oregon " ; while in the opinion of Anson Jones, recently chosen 
to succeed Houston, the anti-foreign feeling was decisive. Schenck, 
a Whig Congressman from Ohio, expressed the belief that Clay 
was beaten on the simple issue of " democracy " ; Brinkerhoff, a col- 
league of the opposite party, said that Polk triumphed there be- 
cause he opposed a National Bank, a protective tariff and a dis- 
tribution of the proceeds from the sales of the public lands; and 
McClernand, a Representative from Illinois, stated that the people 
of the West believed the question of reducing the price of these 
lands had been an issue in the campaign. Such are fair specimens 
of opinions given out by well qualified observers.-^ 

It is true, to be sure, that by many the result of the election was 
hailed as a victory of the Texas cause. The New York Evening 
Journal, for instance, put the case in this way : The Baltimore con- 
vention chose Polk because he was for immediate annexation ; it pre- 
sented that matter as a great party issue, and the Whigs were every- 
where against it; "if then, any question can be said to have been 
settled by the recent election, it is that of Texas." This view of the 
matter was natural. In reality the situation was very complicated ; 
mental training and a mental effort were necessary to explain or 
understand it ; mental training was not universal, and a mental effort 
required labor. The subject had been conspicuous, and it is in- 
stinctive with Americans to " star " the most prominent " feature " 
of any affair. The mass of men will not, and many of them cannot, 
discriminate. In the popular conception, the patriot never works 
for his own advantage, and the "scheming politician" never lifts 
his finger for the common welfare ; the good man is perfect, and 
the bad man is a wretch. Besides all of which, a large section of the 
public was eager to convince the world that annexation had carried 
the day. But all such bold assertions may be brushed aside. Leav- 

^ Amer., Nov. 13, 18, 1844. Gazette: Not. Intel!.. Nov. 16, 1844. Mercury: 
ib., Nov. 23, 1844. Herald, April 26, 1845. Jones, Memor., 79. Coiig. Globe, 
28 Cong., 2 sess., 56, 131, 72. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3I9 

ing out of account altogether our analysis of the result, we can see 
at a glance how carelessly they were made. The major premise of 
the Evening Journal was unsound. It would have surprised Benton 
a good deal to be told that his voting for the party's candidate 
showed that he favored its annexation policy, and probably a num- 
ber of Democrats larger than Polk's plurality agreed with him on 
this issue: for instance those, led by the New York Evening Post, 
who openly rejected the Texas plank while declaring for the man 
who stood upon it. Maine went strongly against the Whigs ; yet 
the State Senate, which contained only three of them, condemned 
certain pro-Texas resolutions by twenty-four votes to seven.'^® 

It is not even possible to trace any line of cleavage on this ques- 
tion. How the anti-annexation Democrats of New York were 
assisted to support Polk we have seen, and with equal skill multi- 
tudes of Southern Whigs wdio wanted Texas were held in the Clay 
ranks. In Georgia their convention spiked the enemy's gun with 
this deliverance: "Resolved, that we are in favor of the annexation 
of Texas to the United States at the earliest practicable period con- 
sistent with the honor and good faith of the nation " ; and the Demo- 
crats were challenged to reject the qualification if they dared. The 
Memphis Eagle argued that the efforts of the opposite party to use 
the question for their own political advantage would merely delay 
a consummation which the Whigs intended — in the proper way and 
at the proper time — to bring about. In reality, contended the Balti- 
more American, Clay was a better man for the annexationists than 
his competitor, for Mexico would treat with him more readily and 
more liberally than with a President representing the spoilers' cry of 
" Immediate Annexation " ; and it was often urged that he had re- 
peatedly shown a patriotic willingness to accept the will of the people 
in lieu of his personal desires. By such methods what difference 
between the two parties on this issue really existed was to a very 
large extent obscured.^** 

No doubt annexation sentiment helped the Democrats more or 
less, but the same could be said of many other factors. " Who 
elected James K. Polk?" asked the New York Express, and then 
it proceeded to give the answers : " ' I,' says the free trade man of 
South Carolina, ' I did it ; hurrah for free trade ! ' ' No,' says the 

'"Eve. Jouni.: Nat. Intell., Nov. 27, 1844. (Me.) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 
2 sess., 141 (Severance). 

^^ (Ga.) Charleston Courier, July 9, 1844. Eagle, May 18, 21 ; June 19, 1844. 
Amer., July 17, 1844. 



320 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Annexationist of Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, ' It was I that 
did it ; I went for the enlargement of the territory of slavery.' ' Not 
so fast,' respond the Annexationists of the North, ' It was we who 
did it — we who went for getting rid of slavery by taking Texas 
and thus enlarging the bounds of freedom.' ' No, no ' ; declare the 
tariff men of Pennsylvania, ' we did it, and did it by shouting for 
the tariff of 1842 ' . . . ' Don't boast too much,' say the Tyler men, 
' we did it ; the post-office and custom house did it ; we did it by 
giving you public offices and public money ' ; and these are not 
all who say they did it. The friends of Silas Wright and Mr. 
Van Buren in New York declare that it was their work. The 
Irish say they did it — the Germans that they did it; and the Aboli- 
tionists of the locofoco creed exult by proclaiming, 'We did it.'" 
Even this catalogue was not complete, however. The Bank, the 
tariff, slavery, Texas, Oregon, Clay's personal character, the sus- 
picion that if elected he would promote annexation, the sentiment 
against foreign interference, the military argument, Nativism, Cath- 
olic influence, public land matters, patronage, fraud, Silas Wright, 
Jackson, — every one of these drew voters to Polk. " The Ques- 
tion of annexation," remarked the Globe, ''was doubtless blended 
with a variety of other issues in the late canvass^ which it would 
puzzle a Washington editor to disentangle." The struggle was thus 
made complex by a rather large number of circumstances, among 
which figured Texas ; but after all it was essentially a party contest 
on the established lines of principle, prejudice and habit that divided 
the mass of the nation into Democrats and Whigs. There was there- 
fore no clear-cut issue between annexation and anti-annexation, and 
still less was there a " tidal wave " for immediately crossing the 
Sabine. ^^ 

It is clear, however, that a pronounced if not startling drift of 
sentiment toward annexation could be seen. Ingersoll estimated 
that out of 2,700,000 voters, at least 2,000,000 favored that idea. 
This was a guess, of course, and a guess colored by the prejudices 
and purposes of the speaker ; yet it seems plain enough that a large 
majority of the people, could every other issue have been swept 
away, would have recorded a preference in favor of accepting Texas 
at an early date. The most powerful consideration that led this 
way was probably a spontaneous desire to regain a valuable piece 
of property that had been surrendered imprudently and could now 

^'Express: Nat. InlclL, Nov. 27, 1844. Wash. Globe. Dec. 5, 1844. 



IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 321 

be had at a bargain. This was not exactly the impulse of expansion ; 
it was rather a natural spirit of thrift plus an equally natural dis- 
position to correct a disastrous blunder. The second, perhaps the 
first, motive was a determination to prevent foreign interference in 
American affairs, and especially an interference liable to cripple the 
South and injure the whole Union. Third in general effect, though 
with many persons first or second, stood the wish to protect the de- 
clining political influence of the slave section. With these prime 
factors co-operated a variety of now familiar considerations, partly 
sectional and partly national. The resulting tide of annexation sen- 
timent, largely non-partisan, and not the mere success of the Demo- 
crats, is the significant fact about the campaign so far as the present 
subject is concerned.^- 

While, however, the result of the struggle was not specially the 
consequence, it was most really the cause, of annexation feeling. 
For this a number of good reasons can be pointed out. Perceiving 
the drift of sentiment, which in the public mind was represented by 
Polk's victory, both politicians and people, desiring to be found on 
the triumphant side, marched the same way. However it had come 
about, a President strongly in favor of annexation had been elected, 
and this event, rendering the success of the measure highly prob- 
able, reinforced that natural tendency. All who desired Executive 
favors, direct or indirect, were especially affected, and many en- 
deavored now to make themselves conspicuous by propagandism in 
the official cause. The ease of explaining the recent election by 
supposing this one issue had decided it brought still others over; 
and finally the mental economy of settling the very difficult annexa- 
tion aft'air itself, with all its puzzling questions of constitutionality, 
justice and expediency, by crying J'ox Popiili, vox Dei was a power- 
ful inducement for multitudes of men. 

■''- The opinion that a strong drift in favor of annexation existed rests mainly 
on the following bases: i, the arguments and sentiments in favor of that measure 
were so strong that they were sure to affect the people when fully brought to 
bear upon them; 2, Competent on-lookers (one of them Ingersoll) reported si:ch 
a drift ; 3. editorials, articles and speeches, particularly the Congressional debates 
of January and February, 1845, and certain public acts (e. g., at New York and 
Augusta) indicate as much; 4, the prompt and general acquiescence of the country 
when annexation had been voted shows that public sentiment was ready for it ; 
5, such opposition as survived was to a large extent forced and for the sake of 
appearances. (Ingersoll) Boston Post, Jan. 15. 1845. It is important to dis- 
tinguish between the expansive impulse which was mainly responsible for the 
settlement of Texas and the causes which led us to annex that country. 



XVI 

Annexation is Offered to Texas 

At first, after the rejection of the treaty, Calhoun felt very 
despondent and advised that the Texas problem be laid aside for 
Polk; but he soon rallied and took the matter up again. The plan 
of calling an extra session of Congress was relinquished, because 
Tyler felt it might injure the Presidential chances of the Democrats. 
No course was left then except to wait until December ; but at that 
time the President was ready to act. His annual Message referred 
to the subject of annexation with vigor and at length, presenting 
once more the national view of it and not the sectional view adopted 
by Calhoun ; and again he marshalled arguments in favor of his 
cherished project. One of the principal objections urged against 
the treaty, he then proceeded to say, having been the fact that the 
question had riot been submitted to the nation, I laid it before Con- 
gress as the people's representatives. In the Presidential campaign 
the issue came before the public, and a decision has been made in 
favor of annexing Texas " promptly and immediately." The will 
of the country should of course be executed, and in so doing all 
collateral issues ought to be avoided. The United States and Texas 
desire to unite ; Mexico will accept that action amicably ; and no 
serious complaint will come from any quarter. The passage of a 
joint resolution embodying the terms agreed upon by the two gov- 
ernments is therefore recommended.^ 

On the eighteenth of December Tyler sent another Message. 
This covered the bitter correspondence which had recently passed 
between our minister to Mexico and the administration of that 
country in reference to the war with Texas, the merciless manner 
in which it was proposed by Santa Anna to conduct it, and the expos- 
tulation of the American government against the threatened bar- 
barities. Mexico, said the President with a good deal of truth, has 
violated her agreements with us, and now besides insulting us 

' See General Note, p. i. (Calhoun) Tyler, Tyler, ii,, 331. (Extra session) 
Raymond to Jones, Aug. 29, 1844: Jones, Memor., 379. Richardson. Messages, 
iv.. 340. Tyler said that annexation was presented " nakedly " to the people. 
But this appears to mean, not that it was the only issue before the public, but 
that no questions as to the terms, etc., of annexation obscured the main issue. 

322 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 323 

endeavors to set one part of our people against the other by foment- 
ing our differences of opinion regarding slavery and the incorporation 
of Texas. He then went on to argue anew that annexation was not 
a sectional issue at all, and urged that as a reply to the outrages and 
misrepresentations of our truculent neighbor the best course would 
be to act promptly in that very business.- 

By this time public opinion was setting more and more strongly 
in favor of his wishes. How the prospect that success was to 
attend that measure affected the people, two illustrations will sug- 
gest. A little later, at a meeting held in New York City, Mike 
Walsh stated that only a few months before, when he had asked 
Silas Wright publicly why he did not vote for the acquisition of 
Texas, the question had been denounced as impertinent and treason- 
able, but since the people had been seen to favor the project, Wright 
had been hissed at Tammany Hall for recreancy in that very cause. 
In Augusta, Alaine, the county court-house had been large enough 
to accommodate all the friends of Texas; but no sooner did the 
absorption of that country become highly probable than crowds 
overflowed the capitol, eager to show themselves on the popular side. 
Prompt annexation was decidedly " in the air " ; and the fact that 
coolness toward the measure was no longer required of any one by 
party loyalty, the election being over, helped in many cases to bring 
forward recruits. In the Ohio legislature, which was decidedly 
Whig, a prominent member of that party moved that the delegation 
in Congress be instructed to oppose the project, but his motion was 
laid on the table. The New York Courier and Enquirer showed the 
set of the wind by going over to the administration side. The 
Pcnnsylvanian remarked: "We are just beginning to awake to the 
vitality of the Texas question," — that is to say, the loss of a market 
for Northern manufactures which the possession or control of that 
country by England would entail. At the same time, many still un- 
friendly to the measure, perceiving that it was almost certain to be 
carried through, allowed themselves to be borne along passively by 
the rising tide.^ 

"Richardson, Messages, iv., 353. (Shannon-Rejon Correspondence) Ho. Ex. 
Doc. 19, 28 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 8-31. Rejon lauded the North, and denounced the 
South as shamelessly dishonorable. The language of Shannon, the America*! 
minister, was tactless and rasping yet in line with Calhoun's instructions to him ; 
and it was suspected that Calhoun's purpose was to draw from Mexico something 
that would assist the annexationists by exciting the public. 

^Nat. IntclL, Feb. 25; March 18, 1845. (Ohio) Pratt to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844: 
Polk Pap. Melville to Id., Dec. 17, 1844: ib. Penn.: Wash. Globe, Dec. 12, 
1844. 



324 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



This does not mean, however, that all opposition ceased. The 
Boston Atlas for example exclaimed : " Massachusetts cannot — she 
must not — she will not submit to the annexation of Texas." The 
National Intelligencer ridiculed the arguments put forward in its 
favor. According to the Richmond Enquirer most of the " Whig 
scribblers" at Washington sat in the seats of the scornful, and 
undeniably the New York Evening Post could be found there. 
" ' Now or never ' was the cry last winter," it sneered ; " ' Now 
or never ' will be the cry this winter ; and, if the matter be postponed, 
* Now or never ' will be the cry next winter " ; and it reminded its 
readers how Dr. Wallcott soothed his impatient country cousins by 
remarking, " Don't be afraid ; St. Paul's can't run away." Finally 
in January, 1845, the anti-annexation sentiment in Massachusetts 
rose to the pitch of a convention, and a strong address was issued, 
the first part of which came from Webster's pen.'* 

Meanwhile the Democrats themselves, though confident of pop- 
ular support in the Texas movement, felt by no means sure of carry- 
ing it through at once. Calhoun thought the prospect " pretty fair " 
in the House, and could hardly believe that should the measure pass 
there, it would be thrown out by the Senate. Apparently, so the 
Newark Advertiser's Washington correspondent wrote, it was 
planned that the Southern Democrats should relax their opposition 
to the tariff, and the Northern wing relax theirs to the absorption of 
Texas ; but the friends of Van Buren had neither forgotten nor for- 
given the Baltimore convention, the lack of cordiality between the 
two branches of the party often seemed too great to be bridged, and 
Calhoun's urging the measure in the interest of slavery threatened to 
prevent Northern men from supporting it so long as he remained in 
power. Near the close of December a conference was held, and it 
then appeared that many differences of opinion as to the method of 
effecting annexation existed ; while Giddings assured John Quincy 
Adams that forty Democrats in the House would vote against every 
proposition, and that he did not believe the measure could pass. On 
the latter point Crittenden held the same opinion. Raymond of 
Texas wrote to his government that the action of the Congress now 
in session was entirely uncertain so far as this issue was con- 
cerned ; and Almonte, watching afifairs closely in the interest of 

* Atlas, Dec. 26, 1844. Nat. Intel!.. Dec. 21, 1844. Eiiq., Jan. 7, 1845. 
Ere. Post, Jan. 13, 1845. Webster, Writings, xii., 192. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 325 

Mexico, believed a little before Congress met tbat nothing would be 
done in the matter until after the inauguration of Polk.''^ 

Foreign utterances continued to exert an influence, and it counted 
on the side of annexation. The .Ulas of London printed an editorial 
on the military aspect of the affair, saying that were Texas under 
the guaranty of a power able to cope with the United States at sea, 
we should be permanently checked in that direction as we were 
already in the north, and that in case of war her separate existence 
would place our Southern cities " with their inflammable population 
within the reach of an enemy, and, in fact, open up an easy march 
to the heart of the Republic." The London Times declared that it 
could "find no expressions too strong" to convey its opinion of 
" the enormous misstatements, the excessive bad faith, and the de- 
plorable impolicy " of the annexationists. It described Polk's elec- 
tion as " the triumph of everything that was worst " in American 
life; and it intimated that England, "in common" with the other 
states of Europe, was "prepared to resist" the extension of the 
United States in the Southwest as an act of rapine, calculated to 
deprive her of a useful ally, to perpetuate slavery, and to create a 
rival maritime power in the Gulf of Alexico. The London Morning 
Post characterized the designs of this country upon Texas as 
" merely a development of the savage instinct of the strong to tyran- 
nize over the weak," and announced that " some day the republican 
monster must be checked."" 

To make such talk appear the more insulting, because the more 
groundless, the Atlas confessed that "it would be madness to con- 
tend that England, in concert with other European powers, had a 
right to interfere and mediatise Texas " ; and predicted that the 
Americans would " never submit to a principle, to which, if once 
introduced, no limitation could be assigned," since unless all the 
countries of the western hemisphere were entitled to manage their 
own political affairs, none were, and the United States themselves 
had not that right. Nor was this the only admission. "If Amer- 
ica," asked the .Itlas, " i)roclaimed her right to mediatise Ireland, 
to help her to set up for herself, or to unite to France instead of 

"Calhoun to Clemson, Dec. 27, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 634. Newark 
Adv., Dec. 9, 1844. (Van B. men) N. Y. Herald, Jan. 18, 1845. Lewis to Jackson, 
Dec. 21, 1844: Jackson Pap,, Knoxville Coll. (Conference) Newark Adz:,' Dec. 
31, 1844. Adams, Memoirs, xii., 133. Crit. to Barnley, Dec. 28. 1844: Crit. 
Pap. Raymond, No. 135, Dec. 4, 1844. Almonte, No. 135, Nov.- 9, 1844. 

"London Atlas, Oct. 26, 1844. Times, Oct, 23; Nov. 15, 29, 1844. Morning 
Post, Jan. I, 1845. 



326 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to England, how long would England endure the insolent assump- 
tion?" At the same time King, our minister to France, was urging 
his government not to disgrace themselves in the eyes of Europe 
by faltering in the Texan business from a dread of British opposi- 
tion. France, he felt sure, had no wish to engage in hostilities 
against the United States; while England herself, he believed, would 
never fight in this cause, and — even if disposed to do so — could not 
secure the co-operation of France. " Upon the whole," he said at 
the end of December, 1844, " I apprehend nothing from European 
influence upon American questions, if we have the firmness to de- 
spise the brutum fulmen of mere diplomatic remonstrance." Such 
stimuli tended to inflame still further the sentiment already hot in 
this country. The issue is, exclaimed the chairman of the House 
committee on foreign affairs, " Shall Great Britain advance another 
step in political power on this continent ? " The New Hampshire 
legislature passed a series of resolutions by a large majority, de- 
claring that if necessary as against foreign nations, Texas ought to 
be occupied with an armed force. Even William Cullen Bryant's 
paper took the ground that whatever might be the claims of Mexico 
upon that country, she certainly had none that should prevent the 
United States from annexing it in case of a threat from England." 

It was naturally, then, amid a strife of currents and counter- 
currents that the subject of annexation came into the House in 
December, 1844. Some positively asserted, and others as posi- 
tively denied, that the election had settled the question. It was 
urged that the representatives of the people should make haste and 
do their bidding; and it was also urged that the legislators of the 
nation should ponder and deliberate. Many petitions and resolu- 
tions from States, organizations, meetings, and groups of individu- 
als, mostly against incorporating Texas but sometimes in the oppo- 
site sense, were presented. Tyler's later Message fanned the flame. 
Shannon's obvious blundering made one anxious to ignore his pro- 
ceedings, but the language addressed to our representative by the 
Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations was so exasperating and 
insulting that it could not possibly be forgotten at once.^ 

'London Atlas, Dec. 3, 1844. King, No. 4, Oct. 6; No. 6. Nov. 15; No. 9, 
Dec. 31, 1844. King's despatches were not published but his opinions were prob- 
ably made known in Congress. Id. to Calhoun, private, Dec. 28, 1844: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr., 1013. (Ingersoll) Boston Post, Jan. 15, 1845. (N. H.) Wash. 
Globe, Jan. 4, 1845. Eve. Post (semi-weekly), Jan. 22, 1845. 

* Cotig. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 25, 61, 78, 89, 92, 98, 100, 120, 127, etc. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 327 

In about a week after the session began, IngersoU moved a joint 
resolution embodying the substance of the treaty. This proposition 
had one great advantage, since it was known officially that Texas 
would accept the terms, but it suffered from a counterbalancing 
weakness, for the treaty had been despised and repudiated. Besides, 
the terms themselves did not meet all the difficulties that rose up 
in the minds of the legislators. These were mainly of four kinds. 
The first concerned the boundaries of Texas. It was known by all 
that a part of the territory claimed by her certainly belonged to 
Alexico still, and that another portion of her asserted frontier was 
overshadowed with grave doubt ; and there was a fear that so im- 
mense a State, should it remain intact, would eventually have a 
dangerous number of Representatives in Congress. The second 
difficulty had reference to slavery. It was felt by not a few that 
something definite ought to be determined about that in order to 
forestall another Missouri agitation, and yet many shrank from the 
subject. In the third place the question of assuming the Texan 
debt provoked great differences of opinion, for while many advo- 
cated that course, others denied its constitutionality and the wisdom 
of establishing such a precedent. Finally, there was disagreement 
on the question whether Texas ought to be received as a State or as 
a Territory. Consequently IngersoU's measure, though it repre- 
sented the Executive and the committee on foreign affairs and had 
been mediated upon for some time by Calhoun, failed to satisfy, 
and other propositions were brought forward." 

The first of these came from Weller, a Democratic Representa- 
tive from Ohio, on the nineteenth of December. His plan provided 
that Texas should become a Territory, that her public lands should 
be used to pay her debt and that a commission should determine the 
boundary ; and the scheme met with considerable favor, one reason 
for which was its avoidance of the dreaded slavery issue. Four 
days later Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois offered a joint resolution. 
This was similar in substance, though it rested frankly upon the 
alleged obligation of the United States, under the treaty of 1803, 
to receive the inhabitants of Texas ; and many on the Democratic 
side of the House found it satisfactory. Tibbatts, a Kentucky 
Democrat, followed with a resolution based on the same treaty, 
which contemplated the admission of Texas as a State no larger 

^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 26. Calhoun to Howard, Sept. 12, 1844: 
State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. 



328 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

than the largest member of the Union, her debt (with the exception 
of a specified small amount) to be paid with the proceeds of the 
sales of her public lands, and her territory to be " free " north of the 
]\Iissouri Compromise line. Numerous other plans were proposed, 
ringing the changes on the points of dispute ; but the only one of 
these requiring our attention was the concise and simple proposition 
introduced by Milton Brown, a Tennessee Whig, which provided 
that the territory rightfully belonging to the republic of Texas might 
become a State, referred the adjustment of her boundary to the 
government of the Union, assumed neither her debt nor her public 
lands, left the question of slavery south of the Missouri Compro- 
mise line optional with the people, and prohibited involuntary servi- 
tide in the insignificant northern portion.^" 

Before the end of December was reached, the advocates of an- 
nexation felt manifestly impatient. " Let not procrastination be the 
thief of Texas " ; let no time be given to foreign nations for intrigues 
and machinations, was Ingersoll's exhortation. Two caucuses were 
held by the Democrats, and finally they decided that the best method 
would be to try the chances of debate, letting every plan have its 
opportunity on the floor and adopting the one that should prove 
most likely to satisfy a majority of the House. Accordingly, on the 
third day of January, 1845, the matter was placed before the Rep- 
resentatives by moving to take up the joint resolution of the com- 
mittee on foreign affairs; and a flood of argument ensued." 

"•Raymond, No. 136, Dec, 30, 1844. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 49, 65. 
A. V. Brown to Polk, Jan. i, 1843 [1845] : Polk Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 
sess., 76, 84, 97, 107, 129, 165, 173, 192. Brown's resolution was drawn after 
consultation with Alex. H. Stephens (Am. Hist. Rev., viii., 93). It was pre- 
sented Jan. 13, 1845. 

^^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 68, 84, 87. (Caucuses) Nat. Intell., Jan. 6, 
1845. Very little was now said about the danger of enlarging the area of the 
United States. Severance of Maine took the position that if Texas was really 
independent, annexation was needless, and if not, it was wrong. Reference was 
made to the argument that annexation would be an act of bad faith and produce 
war ; but Ingersoll declared that he was authorized to pronounce hostilities with 
Mexico improbable, whatever this country should do, and the prevalent opinion 
appeared to be that as Santa Anna had been overthrown by a revolution and 
succeeded by a government too feeble to hold Texas even had she been restored 
to them, there was no longer any occasion to consider that country in the matter ; 
and some insisted still on the view that she had nothing to do with it anyhow, 
since Texas had always been free sovereign and independent. Even J. Q. Adams 
felt (Mem., xii„ 171) that the recent Mexican revolution had destroyed the only 
insurmountable objection against annexation. The military argument came up of 
course. Some asserted that Texas was of more strategic value to the United 
States while independent than she would be if annexed ; and a Western man de- 
clared that New Orleans would be defended by the people of the Mississippi 
valley without help. The authority of Jackson was urged in reply. The other 
side retorted by pronouncing him a brave soldier but no strategist ; and they 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 329 

More and more clearly it came to be seen, as the days passed, 
that a substantial majority desired the annexation of Texas, yet 
that differences of opinion, sectional disagreements, the rivalries of 
leading politicians, and the hostilities of cliques threatened failure. 

were then assured that at all events the country would prefer his opinion to 
theirs. It was argued strongly that the acquisition of Texas would give the 
United States a monopoly of cotton ; but it was answered with equal positive- 
ness that a monopoly of cotton was impossible, since it would grow anywhere 
under certain climatic conditions. Annexation was described as a sectional 
measure for the benefit of the South, In reply some demanded why that was 
objectionable, pointing out that the Northeastern boundary was a Maine issue 
yet the country had stood together upon it. Any acquisition of territory, it was 
urged, must necessarily be more or less sectional, and as for the officials of the 
government, it was natural and proper enough that Southern sympathies should 
be exhibited by Southerners. Others declared that annexation was more a Western 
than a Southern issue. Douglas asserted this, maintaining that Texas must 
be secured in order to have control of the navigation of the Mississippi and the 
Gulf. The enormous value of Texas was dwelt upon by the annexationists and 
ridiculed by their opponents. J. R. Ingersoll was reported as declaring that it 
consisted of nothing but marshes, hummocks, tadpoles and terrapins. Such was 
not Lord Brougham's opinion, retorted Hammett of Mississippi. The standard 
argument of the Texas '" markets " appeared more than once, and it was answered 
that all the purchasers would be people from the North, who would need more 
goods if they remained in the colder climate and would have more money with 
which to purchase. The aim of the measure was to increase the anti-tariff 
forces, it was suggested ; and Stone of Ohio asserted that here lay the source 
of the opposition against annexation. But an answer was ready : If Texas is 
not incorporated she will adopt free trade ; and the smuggling will injure the 
New England manufacturers. It was also argued that the South would be driven 
from the business of raising cotton by Texas competition, and would have to 
sow grain instead ; and that the West, suffering from this invasion of its field, 
would have to take up manufacturing, and so New England would be injured 
again. Annexation, it was said, will develop the coast tratie and create a 
school for the navy. This argument was not answered ; but the House was 
assured that the United States, whatver the law might be, could not avoid lia- 
bility for the Texas debt, and that no one on earth could tell the amount of it. 
The advocates of annexation aim at disunion, it was again charged. That can- 
not be, was the ready answer, for Jackson favors the measure. One argument 
even J. Q. Adams confessed could not be refuted, — the argument that nature 
meant the region for us and therefore we must have it ! and in one sentiment all 
appeared to concur, — that foreign interference must not be tolerated. Once — 
once only perhaps and then but faintly — the note of expansion was heard, 
Brinkerhoff of Ohio suggesting among other things that Texas would be needed 
as a home for later generations. 

The question of slavery continued to make great trouble. C. J. Ingersoll 
maintained that except for unfounded fears lest the acquisition of Texas should 
extend that institution, the American people were more united on this measure 
than upon any other question ; but all recognized this exception as a very serious 
one. Over and over again Northern men charged that annexation was a scheme 
to extend and perpetuate the system of human bondage. The replies to the 
charge were various. Some declared that slavery was guaranteed to the South by 
the constitution, and the government were bound to protect it. No, retorted 
anti-slavery men indignantly, slavery is merely tolerated by the constitution and 
is not a national affair. Others declared that the annexation of Texas, instead 
of promoting slavery, would prove a serious Ijlow to it; and some, like Alexander 
H. Stephens, protested vigorously that no national interference in behalf of that 
institution was desired or desirable. It was also pointed out that were Texas to 
remain independent, the whole of that vast area would be slave territory, and 
slavery might be carried some day into Mexico and Central America. Walker's 



330 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

To blaze a trail, Rhett suggested that a vote be taken on the first 
part of Douglas's resolution, which was the abstract proposition 
that Texas be admitted to the Union ; but this idea was not received 
with much favor. It seemed necessary to eliminate in some way 

theory came out that she would draw slaves from the middle States ; but this 
was met with the question, Why then have not Louisiana and Arkansas done so ? 
It was urged that the acquisition of Texas was necessary to provide the freed- 
men with a passage out of United States territory into Mexico, or, even should 
slavery continue to exist in this country, to prevent the rapid increase of the 
blacks in our southern States from leading to a war of extermination there. 
Why should not Texas be acquired for the express purpose of extending slavery, 
demanded some ; the North is growing towards the West and the abolitionists 
are becoming dangerous. But they were met with the reply, No responsible 
person thinks of interfering with slavery where it is ; it needs no defence ; and 
the attempt to extend it will help the abolitionists. Of course, too, all the strong 
objections to the institution bore upon the same point. The negroes of Texas 
would be better off under American laws, it was also urged. Amid all this 
variety of opinions one feeling appeared to gain steadily in strength : the neces- 
sity of doing something deiinite on the subject in the act of receiving Texas. 
Some upheld the view that unless such a provision were made, the South would 
claim the whole territory later. Stephens said it would be better to forego the 
acquisition than bring into the Union a subject of discord. Hale of New Hamp- 
shire proposed that any bill for annexation should contain a proviso dividing 
Texas into two parts, one slave and one free. This showed the Northern desire, 
but was evidently more than the South could be expected to concede. 

A kindred difficulty was the charge that in urging annexation the Southerners 
aimed to increase the power of their section in the national government. Some 
replied to this assertion that the South had a right to her share of the control, 
but was not trying to dictate, for, said Rhett, the North is evidently destined 
to dominate the nation, and it would be useless for the South to struggle against 
fate. Others went farther, retorting that it was the North which was determined 
to rule, and that the purpose of its domination was to oppress the South with a 
protective tariff and an anti-slavery crusade. 

The question of constitutionality also came up. Winthrop of Massachusetts 
paid particular attention to this ph^se of the subject. To admit a foreign nation 
as a State would be to admit a new partner into the Union ; this would require 
a new compact ; and a new compact could be drawn by the people alone, it was 
argued. The power given Congress to admit new States had sole reference, the 
speakers often urged, to the territory already belonging to the United States, — 
particularly to Colonies that might not at once accept the constitution ; the terri- 
tory of Texas must therefore first be acquired ; it can be acquired only by 
agreement; any agreement with a foreign state is a treaty; the business of 
making treaties belongs to the President and Senate ; and so those who favor the 
annexation of Texas by an act of Congress would destroy the constitution by too 
broad a construction of it. In reply it was maintained that the old time Federa- 
lists were making themselves ridiculous by insisting now upon an absurdly nar- 
row view of the organic law ; that in fact the language of the constitution was 
perfectly clear and precise: "New States may be admitted by the Congress into 
this Union." Jefferson thought otherwise, it was retorted ; but even this did not 
check the march of the annexationists. Not all agreements with foreign nations 
are treaties, it was pointed out. The name of Marshall was cited in behalf of 
this view ; and the power to admit new States, expressly given to Congress, was 
pointed to as full and adequate authority to accept a new partner. Vermont and 
North Carolina were foreign nations when admitted to the Union, it was even 
insisted ; but attention was called in reply to the fact that both had fought in 
our Revolutionary war, and both were included in the territory over which the 
treaty of 1783 gave the United States jurisdiction. The proceedings of the con- 
vention of 1787, one side maintained, proved that it was the intention to admit 
States arising from foreign territory, and one aim of the constitution was said 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 33 1 

all but the most popular of the plans, and so force an agreement 
upon that. Kennedy of Maryland, to do something in this way, 
declared that Ingersoll's was a scheme to confirm a treaty rejected 
by the Senate; Weller's a scheme to extend the jurisdiction of the 
United States over a foreign nation ; and Douglas's a scheme to 
revive a dead treaty by strangling three live ones. Dromgoole of 
Virginia, who was regarded as in some respects the Democratic 
leader in the House, rose on the twenty-fourth of January and spoke 
as follows : It is time to be practical and definite ; Texas is inde- 
pendent, and we need not go behind that fact ; propositions based 
upon the treaty of 1803 are not becoming, for we have recognized 
her as a sovereign nation ; the plan of the committee on foreign 
afifairs is the expiring effort of Tylerism, the recrudescence of a 
hastily drawn treaty already rejected by the Senate, and I will not 
vote for it ; propositions to receive Texas as a Territory are unsuit- 
able, for the bare acquisition of foreign soil would require a treaty, 
and it is too late now to open negotiations, besides which, if she 
come to us in that guise, we must necessarily assume her debt ; 

to have been the prevention of adjacent confederacies ; but these assertions were 
denied. On one point the opponents of the measure were rather neatly caught. 
Texas, it was reasonably argued, can certainly be acquired somehow by the 
American government ; the enemies of the treaty said last winter that such an 
acquisition could not be effected by the treaty-making power ; hence Congress must 
possess the necessary authority. In reply, some admitted that they had been in 
error ; some took the ground that the power belonged solely to the people ; and 
some retorted that the great number of annexation plans proved that the friends 
of that scheme understood very well the constitution would have to be circum- 
vented in one way or another. The purpose of the constitution, others argued, 
was to defend the weak parts of the Union ; the South, endangered by English 
designs, was now the weak part ; therefore the intent of the constitution would 
be fullfilled by protecting her. One speaker took still bolder ground, declaring 
that since it was the will of the people to acquire certain territory, the method 
of doing so was a point of no great importance ; but it was easy to meet him by 
emphasizing the duty of Congress to obey the organic law. 

Then there were certain minor constitutional points. The Texas Senators 
and Representatives, it was objected, would not have lived in the United States 
the required number of years. This difficulty it was proposed to meet by in- 
serting a permissive clause in the annexation law, by holding that Texas had been 
a part of the United States ever since 1803, or by inferring from her absolute 
equality with the other States after her admission that her Representatives 
would necessarily enjoy a full right in the national legislature. It was also 
argued that the incorporation of that territory would be in effect an importation 
of slaves, which had been illegal since 1808 ; but this was regarded as a far- 
fetched objection, and those who made it were reminded that Adams and Van 
Buren had not been deterred by this consideration from endeavoring to purchase 
the territory in question. Complaint was made that in entering the American 
Union Texas would have to surrender her sovereignty, which only the people 
had the power to do ; but this was answered on the one hand by replying that she 
would surrender her sovereignty no more than did the thirteen colonies in form- 
ing this Union, and on the other by proposing that the people of Texas, in con- 
vention assembled, should consent to the absorption of their country. 



332 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

both the history and the wording of the constitution prove that 
Congress has power to admit her at once as a State ; the only real 
difficulty is slavery; and in my opinion the proper course as to that 
is to apply the Missouri Compromise line.^- 

The plan which had seemed most likely to succeed was the one 
offered by Boyd of Kentucky. The Democratic caucus preferred it, 
and Douglas finally accepted it in lieu of his own. But this was 
substantially the same as Brown's ; and so, as it was desirable to 
have the votes of a group to which the Tennesseean belonged, the 
party decided to adopt the latter proposition. In the evening of 
January 23 a caucus was held. It was now believed that 105 Demo- 
crats and 8 Whigs — a safe majority — could be counted upon ; and 
on the twenty-fifth discussion ended at two o'clock in the afternoon. 
After several propositions had been brushed aside, Brown's came 
before the House. At the request of Douglas, the mover added an 
explicit declaration that — as the language already implied — slavery 
should not exist north of the Compromise line ; and at length, after 
various parliamentary formalities had been complied with, the reso- 
lution passed by a vote of 120 to 98.^^ 

"Wash. Glohe, Jan. 6, 1845. Herald, Jan. 15, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 
2 sess., (Rhett) 89, (Kennedy) 124, (Dromgoole) 186. (Leader) N. Y, Tribune, 
Jan. 25, 1845. 

"^^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 171. Wash. Globe. Feb. 14; March 22, 
1845. A. V. Brown to Polk (Polk Pap., Chicago) : " The Tennessee Whigs 
voted with us but we had to take it on Milton Brown's resolutions." Cong. 
Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 171, (Collamer) 181. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 25, 1845. 
Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 190-194. The anti-slavery men were particularly 
angered by the " derisive " provision about States formed north of 36° 30', for 
they did not believe Texas owned any land above that line. 

The resolution was as follows (in the form finally adopted by Congress the 
words here italicized were dropped, and the words bracketed were added: Sen. 
Doc. I, 29 Cong., I sess.): "Joint Resolution. Declaring the Terms on which 
Congress will admit Texas into the Union as a State. Be it resolved by the 
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That Congress doth consent that the territory properly included within, 
and rightfully belonging to the republic of Texas, may be erected into a new 
State, to be called the State of Texas, with a republican form of government, to 
be adopted by the people of said republic, by deputies in con^#lon assembled 
with the consent of the existing government, in order that We. same may be 
admitted as one of the States of this Union. Section 2. And be it further 
resolved, That the foregoing consent of Congress is given upon the following 
conditions, and with the following guaranties, to wit : First. Said State to be 
formed, subject to the adjustment by this government of all questions of bound- 
ary that may arise with other governments ; and the constitution thereof, with the 
proper evidence of its adoption by the people of said republic of Texas, shall 
be transmitted to the President of the United States, to be laid before Congress 
for its final action, on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight 
hundred and forty six. Second. Said State, when admitted into the Union, after 
ceding to the United States all mines, minerals, salt lakes, and springs; and also 
all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy yards, 
docks, magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 333 

Eight Whigs supported it, four of whom came from Tennessee, 
two from Georgia, one from Alabama, and one from Virginia. 
Fifty-three Democrats from free States and fifty-nine from 
the South did the same, while Gidding's forty irreconcilables 
proved to be only twenty-eight. Out of 133 men classed as North- 
erners eighty stood for the negative. According to the Washington 
Globe, some twenty-seven went against the resolution merely be- 
cause the compromise line was not what they had given their con- 
stituents reason to expect ; and ten New York Democrats placed 
themselves on the same side to conciliate the abolitionists in their 
districts. Four of that party from Maine explained their negative 
votes afterwards by saying that Texas should have been divided 
into equal or nearly equal free and slave sections ; and Raymond 
informed his government that as a rule the adverse Northern Demo- 
crats expressed themselves as friendly to annexation provided fur- 
ther restrictions touching slavery could be imposed. From this it 
would appear that the sentiment in favor of the measure was much 
stronger than the verdict. On the other hand, the National Intelli- 
gencer maintained that had both parties represented strictly the 

to the public defence belonging to said republic of Texas, shall retain all the 
public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind, which may belong to or be 
due or owing said republic : and shall also retain all the vacant and unappro- 
priated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts 
and liabilities of said republic of Texas ; and the residue of said lands, after dis- 
charging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may direct ; 
but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the govern- 
ment of the United States. Third. New States, of convenient size, [not exceed- 
ing four in number, in addition to said State of Texas,] and having sufficient 
population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the 
territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of 
the federal constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that portion 
of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, 
commonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the 
Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may 
desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory, north 
of said Missouri compromise line, slavery, or involuntary servitude, (except for 
crime,) shall be prohibited (Wash. Globe, Feb. 28, 1845)." 

At first s^Hl^it appears impossible that the advocates of annexation should 
cordially have a^fepted a bill which did not provide for the assumption of the, 
Texan debt. The New York correspondent of the London Times (in the Times of 
April 15, 1845) was astonished that the holders of Texas bonds were willing 
to accept the resolutions : and he said that intelligent, well-informed people did 
not believe that for fifty years the sales of lands would much more than pay the 
interest on the debt, yet the Louisville Journal (Mat. Iiitell., Aug. 6. 1845) as- 
serted that the holders of scrip were not only willing but anxious that the public 
lands and the debt should not be transferred to the United States. The New 
York Moniiug News, an annexation journal, provided an exjilanation of the 
mystery, saying (Nat. IntelL. Aug. 6, 1845): "Texas will no doubt drive a hard 
bargain with us for her lands. To allow them to lie outside of our general land 
system, under-selling all the rest of the West, will never do." 



334 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



popular feeling of their States, there would have been an adverse 
majority of twenty; and the Springfield Republican asserted later 
that out of sixteen Northern men — by whom it seems to have meant 
Representatives from New England, New York and New Jersey — 
who voted for the resolution, thirteen were appointed to offices 
within a few months.^* 

While these events were occurring in the House, the Senate was 
neither unmindful nor inactive. This body, according to the London 
Times, was the only American institution commanding respect 
abroad ; and here at least the cause of right, whatever that might be, 
was expected to triumph. A torrent of petitions and resolutions 
against annexation poured in like that which inundated the House, 
together with a smaller number in favor of the measure ; and also 
a slender stream of propositions to annex Canada made its appear- 
ance, obviously intended to suggest the career of aggression and 
foreign difficulties in which the friends of Texas might involve the 
nation, and so operate as a flank movement against them.^^ 

Only a week after the session began ]\IcDuffie re-introduced his 
joint resolution. This embodied the treaty, as Ingersoll's plan had 
done; and it was recognized as the administration measure. Evi- 
dently, however, the proposition had no chance of success. Clay 
suggested that it be amended by asking the consent of Mexico, 
refusing to assume the Texan debt, excluding slavery, and the like, 
which showed that unless the leopard would change his spots, the 
Whigs were not likely to receive him; while Blair of the Globe did 
what he could to rouse the Northern annexationists against the 
proposition by insisting that the object of presenting the treaty in 
this new form to the very men who had rejected it originally, was 
to defeat the project once more. At the same time many understood 
that the resolution was in reality a thrust aimed at Benton and 
Wright. Cave Johnson said they would be forced to accept the 
treaty or appear before the country as hostile to Texas. Calhoun, 
he explained, thought he had the advantage of his enemy on this 
issue, and intended to " drive him home upon it." Calhoun's friends 
therefore, inferred Johnson, would accept nothing else; and the 

"Boston Atlas, Jan. 28, 1845. (133) Tyler, Tyler, ii.. 360. Wash. Globe, 
Feb. 7, 1845. Portland Amer., Jan. 29, 1845. (N. Y.) C. Johnson to Polk, Feb. 
3, 1844 [1845]: Polk Pap., Chicago. Raymond, No. 140, Jan. 27, 1845. Nat. 
IittclL, March 25, 1845. Springfield Repub., Aug. 2, 1845. 

^'' Times, Jan. 10, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 73, 75, 92, 98, 113, 
128, 154, 171, 232, 237, 266, 295, etc. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 335 

friends of Wright and Benton would certainly not accept that. 
Consequently the chance of passing ]\IcDuffie's resolution, or in 
fact any annexation measure, appeared extremely small. ^^ 

The Missouri Senator, greatly excited by this renewal of what 
Johnson termed " the great battle " between him and the Secretary, 
stalked about in a rage ; but he did not shrink from the contest. 
At heart he was in a much softer mood regarding the immediate 
acceptance of Texas than previously he had been, and about the 
middle of September Blair had felt sure that he would go " the 
wdiole length " with the Sage of the Hermitage to effect annexation, 
even at the cost of a war with England, France and Mexico. But 
the Senator would not be driven by Calhoun even in the direction 
of Nashville. Accordingly, the next day after McDuffie's resolu- 
tion was offered, he introduced his former bill, plus an amendment 
intended to partition the territory, as equally as possible, into a 
free half and a slave half. His real purpose, the ^Mexican consul 
at New Orleans was assured by a Washington correspondent, was 
to divide the Senate so that no action could be taken during that 
session, and John Slidell, a Louisiana Representative, expressed the 
opinion that his bill would have such an effect. " Annexation at 
present is dead," wrote Cave Johnson three days after this move 
was made, unless the situation should change in some improbable 
fashion. Sternly, point to point, the two champions faced each 
other. Benton asserted that his rival's aim was to involve the 
country in a war with Alexico, so that the North — refusing to sup- 
port it — would give the South an excuse for dissolving the Union ; 
and McDuffie retorted that Benton, after assuring Mexico that it 
would be an outrage to annex Texas without her consent, now pro- 
posed to do exactly that.^'^ 

About the middle of January Senator Archer of Virginia an- 
nounced for the committee on foreign relations that owing to the 
number of plans already submitted, the action of the House of Rep- 
resentatives would be awaited. When the passage of Brown's reso- 
lution by that body was officially made known to the Senate on the 
twenty-seventh and its concurrence invited, the resolution was re- 

"CoMg. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 16. C. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844: 
Polk Pap. Clay to Crit., Dec. 16, 1844: Crit. Pap. Blair to Jackson, Jan. 3, 
1845: Jackson Pap. Johnson to Polk. Dec. 18, 1844: Polk Pap. 

"Johnson to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844: Polk Pap. Blair to Jackson, Sept. 9, 1844: 
Jackson Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 19. Arrangoiz. No. 142 (res.), 
Dec. 21, 1844, Slidell to Jackson, Dec. 15, 1844: Jackson Pap. Johnson to 
Polk, Dec. 14, 1844: Polk Pap. (McDuffie) Tyler, Tyler, ii., zzz- 



336 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



ferred in due order to Archer's committee, and silence then resumed 
her sway. Two days later a Senator observed that it was hoped 
Lazarus would come forth some time the following week, and at 
length on the fourth of February the stone was rolled away. At 
that time a report was presented ; and this was found to recommend 
the rejection of the House resolution, and to propose laying on the 
table everything now before the committee that had reference to the 
subject of annexation. January 9 Clay had written to Crittenden 
endorsing the determination of the Whig Senators to leave the sub- 
ject to the next administration; and this report was evidently de- 
signed to carry out the scheme. The document itself, whether 
purposely or not, had a tendency in the same direction, for it was 
extremely long, abstract, circumlocutory and involved. According to 
the Globe it required some ten days to make out what was meant. 
" We have read this document through and through," proudly an- 
nounced the editor of the New York Morning Ncivs; " Yes, we are 
the person who has read it through." The ostensible objects of 
the committee were to prove that the passage of the House reso- 
lution would be unconstitutional, and also that its terms were open 
to serious criticism. In these aims they did not appear to succeed, 
but they indicated plainly enough that a strong Whig element in 
the Senate could be reckoned upon still as opposed to immediate 
annexation. ^^ 

Meanwhile sentiment was changing somewhat on the Democratic 
side. Under Benton's turbulent will and bitter animosities, observed 
Catron, lay a " conservative and conciliatory spirit," and softening 
influences were at work upon him. He did not wish to prevent the 
acquisition of Texas, and he did wish to please Jackson and to 
regain good standing in the party, as Jackson urged him to do. 
Donelson wrote to him that he was injuring his friends and his 
country by pursuing such a course, and indicated frankly the objec- 
tionable features of his bill ; and this candid expostulation doubtless 
had weight. By the first of January he reached the point of say- 
ing that he would obey cheerfully at the session of Congress then 

'"Wash, Globe, Jan. 14, 1845. N. Y. Joiirn. Com., Jan. 16, 1845. Cong. 
Globe, 28 Cong. 2 sess., 194. Wash. Globe, Jan. 29, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 
Cong., 2 sess., 240. Report : Sen. Doc. 79, 28 Cong., 2 sess. Clay to Crit., Jan. 
9, 1845: Coleman, Crit., i., 226. Wash. Globe, Feb. 13, 1845. Nezcs: ib. Nat. 
In tell., Feb. 10, 1845. The report argued that a foreign nation, in order to be 
admitted to the Union, must first be resolved somehow " into its component ele- 
ments of population and territory," and then " pass through the ordeal sieve of 
the treaty-making power." 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 337 

proceeding; and before the month was out, in response to a mes- 
sage from Jackson that " brightened " his face, he rcpHed that he 
intended to accomphsh something for the cause of Texas. The 
IMissouri legislature had now declared that annexation was demanded 
"at the earliest practicable period" by a majority of the people of 
the State, and requested their representatives in Congress to exert 
themselves in that direction, expressing at the same time a prefer- 
ence that the territory should not be divided into slave and free. 
This resolution was not intended in a sense unfriendly to the Sena- 
tor ; liut it indicated a state of feeling that might easily become 
antagonistic if stubbornly resisted.^" 

]Moved by these influences, Benton decided to modify his belli- 
cose attitude, and on the fifth of February he introduced a new 
bill. In this nothing was said about obtaining the consent of Mexico, 
and no precise terms of annexation were specified ; but it was pro- 
vided that a State, " to be formed out of the present republic of 
Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries," should be admitted to 
the Union " as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission, 
and the cession of the remaining Texan territory to the United 
States " should be agreed upon by the two governments ; and 
$100,000 were to be appropriated for the expenses of negotiating. 
This proposal, Blair stated, was designed to meet as nearly as pos- 
sible Jackson's views; and he added that Raymond was perfectly 
satisfied with the plan ; that Polk's brother-in-law considered it the 
best yet offered, and that all except the Calhounites preferred it to 
the House resolution. Certainly much could be said in its favor.-" 

Benton's biographer has expressed the opinion that the purpose 
of the bill was probably to head off the rising opposition in Mis- 
souri ; but it did not prevent opposition elsewhere. Again the moun- 
tain has brought forth a mouse, exclaimed the Madisoniaii, — the same 
mouse, only minus its tail ; and it proceeded to pour vitriol upon 
" this amputated vermin, this spawn of a conglomeration of defec- 
tion and treachery," as expressly designed to preclude the immediate 

"Catron to Polk, Feb. 5, 1845: Polk Pap., Chicago. Jackson to Blair, Sept. 
19, 1844: Jackson Pap. Blair to Jackson, Dec. 25, 1844: Jackson Pap. Don. to 
Calhoun, private, Dec. 26, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., loii. Id. to Jackson, 
Dec. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Brown to Polk, Jan. i, 1843 [1845]: Polk Pap. 
Blair to Jackson, Jan. 30, 1845: Jackson Pap. Nat. Intcll., Jan. 3, 1845. J. C. 
Edwards "to Polk, Dec. 6, 1844; Polk Pap. 

^' Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 244. Blair to Jackson, Feb. 9, 1845: Jack- 
son Pap. Benton explained that terms were not specified because it was difficult 
to agree upon them, and because it was more natural, practicable and respectful 
to Texas to settle them by negotiating. 

23 



338 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



acquisition of Texas, and intended ultimately to " ignite a political 
volcano " that would place Polk's administration at the mercy of its 
author. The bill, said Calhoun later, would have killed annexation, 
for the result must have been a treaty, should Texas have been 
willing to make one, and that would certainly have been defeated 
in the Senate. The Secretary was now confined to his rooms with 
a dangerous congestive fever that left him hectic and emaciated, 
with a glazed eye, a hacking cough and a feeble walk ; but he took, 
as he said, " a most decided stand " against the measure ; while 
Texas protested in the National Register that the bill was designed 
merely to keep the annexation issue aUve for Benton's political 
profit, that such a plan settled nothing but unsettled everything, and 
that it would be " better at once to extinguish the nation than to 
doom it to a state of wasting, lingering decay." " We can neither 
beg, give, sell nor purchase ourselves into the Union. The boon of 
independence seems forced upon us even against our will," exclaimed 
the Register with genuine or well simulated bitterness.-^ 

McDufifie and Benton, however, did not monopolize the creative 
power of the Senate. Niles of Connecticut proposed that Texas be ad- 
mitted as a State not larger than the largest already in the Union, and 
that the rest of her area — excluding all over which Mexico had actual 
jurisdiction — should be ceded to the United States as a Territory; 
and Ashley of Arkansas offered a resolution which provided for 
reducing her extent by authorizing its partition into not more than 
five parts, each to become a State. The only plan requiring notice, 
however, besides Benton's was that of Foster, a Whig from Tennessee, 
which was a duplicate of Brown's. Foster's motive was seriously 

-'Meigs, Benton, 351. Meigs adds that Benton hoped this bill would prevent 
action before March 4. Madis., Feb. 6, 1845. Calhoun to Don., May 2Z, 1845: 
Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 658. Wharton, Feb. 18, 1845 : ib., 644. Texas National 
Register, March i, 1845. Another circumstance perhaps assisted in causing Ben- 
ton to offer his second bill. A proposition embodying Jackson's views, and there- 
fore supported by his influence, had been introduced on Jan. 14 by Haywood of 
North Carolina {Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 134; App., 155. Wash. Globe, 
March 26, 1845). This plan was drawn up at the request of Blair and directly 
in consequence of suggestions coming from the Hermitage, and it met with not a 
little favor (Blair to Jackson. Jan. 3, 1845: Jackson Pap.) In presenting the bill 
its author said that he desired to separate the principle of annexation from the 
method of acquiring the territory; to dispose of the slavery difficulty, which 
alone prevented annexation from being the most popular question ever sub- 
mitted to the nation and made it impossible to secure a majority for the measure 
in the Senate, and to reach in a manly way, if that were possible, an agreement 
regarding the terms upon which Texas would be accepted. Until the resolutions 
of Brown were passed by the House, the chances for Haywood's bill seemed quite 
favorable ; but, having to avoid so many difficulties, it was a long, tedious and 
exceedingly involved piece of legal composition. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 339 

called in question. The Nashville Union stated positively that he 
said he did not expect the Democrats to accept his resolution, but 
thought it would take from them their " sweetest bone " ; and Blair, 
explaining that the bone was Texas, charged him with aiming to 
cause division in the ranks in order to prevent annexation.-- 

Alany friends of that cause felt disturbed to see time passing and 
nothing accomplished, but the Madiso)iiaii was more philosophical. 
Now that the House has adopted the resolution it is safe, remarked 
the editor ; no Senator " will dare attempt to murder it in any of the 
gloomy Gothic cells of the Capitol," and the period of delay will give 
time for the sentiment of certain States to reach their representa- 
tives. Even the patience of the Madisoniaii, however, had been 
thoroughly tried when, on the thirteenth of February, the recom- 
mendations of the committee on foreign relations were brought up 
for action, and Archer formally moved the indefinite postponement 
of the House resolution ; and its patience was then still further exer- 
cised, for a long debate began. Ten days before, Senator Bagby had 
protested that the time for discussion was past, but evidently noth- 
ing could prevent the flow of oratory.-^ 

Probably a few of the members followed the speeches with 
attention, but the real character of the greater part of the debate 
was perhaps indicated by the fact that eighteen were eager to speak 
when only twelve would consent to listen. Men talked largely for 
effect upon their own political fortunes. Certain Senators, however, 
were listened to with intense interest, for their course was uncertain. 
Alerrick, a Whig from Alaryland, was one of these. The New York 
Tribune asserted that he was purchased; but he himself attributed 
his action to " the sublime light of reason." The South needs more 

^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 99, 278, 127. Union, etc.: Wash. Globe, 
April 8, 1845. 

^ Madis.. Jan. 31, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 278, 247. In this 
debate many of the old points were simply repeated ; but the fear of a Mexican 
war seemed, in view of the distracted condition of that country, too absurd to 
press ; the need of Mexican consent, now that — for the same reason — Texas 
appeared to be safe from attack, was thought equally so ; the desirability of 
possessing that territory seemed to have been placed by public opinion beyond the 
pale of discussion ; and the existence of British designs looked, in consequence 
of the lack of proof and the assurances and apparent inactivity of that power, 
much less certain that it had previously been supposed by many to be. The 
questions of slavery and Southern domination, though not lessened of late in 
importance, seemed to have been pretty well threshed out. The bearings of 
annexation upon the great question of the tariff were too well understood to 
require much comment, though Upham of Vermont took occasion to state frankly 
that phase of the matter as his constituents viewed it. The danger of extending 
the national area had well nigh ceased to alarm, though Webster clung to that 
objection firmly still. 



340 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



protection for its rights and institutions against the North, he 
argued before the Senate, and by giving it we shall fulfill the intent 
of the constitution, while the welfare of the Union will be promoted. 
His course was harshly criticised in his own State and elsewhere ; 
but he replied that although he had voted against the treaty, he was 
justified in supporting the resolution, since in many respects the 

With a certain novelty of form some of the old arguments were restated ; 
and a few new points of minor value came out. The creditors of Texas, it was 
asserted, had a right to demand that she preserve her sovereignty in order to 
ensure the payment of her debts ; power to acquire territory belonged clearly to 
the treaty-making power, and precisely the same authority would not have been 
given to Congress also ; the very fact that Texas was a nation and not m.ere 
territory made an act of Congress — as distinguished from action by the treaty- 
making power — essential ; to admit the principle of legislating for a section would 
destroy the constitution. If Texas remain independent, urged Henderson of 
Mississippi, our discontented will go there from all quarters, and in twenty 
years that country will have a population of half a million brave, excitable people, 
producing half a million bales of cotton, who — in alliance with England or France 
— could do us very great harm. Besides Great Britain must not have two com- 
peting sources of cotton. Texas competition is bound to come, argued Colquitt 
of Georgia, and the only question is whether we or a foreign nation shall have 
the benefit of those vast resources. Barrow of Louisiana declared that the great 
reasons — neither of them good' — for annexation sentiment in the South were a 
desire to gain more political power and a fear that England wished to get pos- 
session of Texas, The best way to protect New Orleans, he urged, was to com- 
plete Fort Livingston, as he had vainly urged more than once already. The New 
England enemies of annexation are injuring the business interests of their own 
section to benefit Great Britain, said Allen of Ohio ; two-thirds of the American 
commerce passes through the Gulf of Mexico and there the rivalry of England 
and the United States must be settled. Upham took the ground that Brown's 
resolution was the result of Tyler's appeal from the Senate to the House of 
Representatives, evidently thinking that his colleagues would not care to endorse 
that appeal. What if this measure be chiefly for the benefit of the South ? 
demanded Woodbury of New Hampshire ; the purchase of Louisiana gave eighteen 
degrees of latitude to the North and only five to the other section. It is mon- 
strous, protested Senator Barrow, to hold that the people decided for annexation 
in the recent campaign and therefore this body must abdicate its duty to de- 
liberate and decide. We have no right, argued another, to concern ourselves with 
slavery or republicanism outside of our own country ; and England will not try 
to get possession of Texas at the risk of forfeiting our trade, having a war with 
us, and so losing Canada. When it was suggested that the Senate had committed 
itself already by rejecting the treaty, a friend of Texas replied that no precedent 
had thus been made, for the treaty had proposed to take that country as mere 
territory. England is laughing at us, exclaimed McDuffie ; while she is exerting 
herself to prevent our annexing Texas, she sees us trying to find reasons for not 
accepting it. 

The vital issue in the Senate, however, was on the question of constitution- 
ality. On the one hand it was urged : It has been clearly settled that the 
authority of Congress is exclusively domestic ; it would be absurd to hold that 
while the concurrence of the President and two-thirds of the Senate is necessary 
merely to purchase a bit of foreign territory, a simple majority of Congress can 
admit a foreign nation to the Union as one of our equal States : such a doctrine 
is dangerous, for a margin of one member in each branch could introduce any 
number of alien countries and thus totally change the character of the Union ; 
it is an unwarrantable stretch of the constitution to attribute such a power to 
Congress, for it evidently belongs to the people alone. The other side, however, 
was maintained with no less vigor, particularly by Woodbury. The power of 
Congress is not exclusively domestic, it was urged, since it has authority to deal 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 34! 

circumstances and the terms of the proposition had now changed.-* 
Bagby, an Alabama Democrat, was a no less interesting figure. 
For some reason he appears to have entertained a personal hostility 
against the idea of receiving Texas, and his " bar-room tirades " at 
Washington during the summer of 1844 were ranked with Benton's 
oratory as injurious to the cause. As a party man and a Southerner 
he was none the less expected to stand with the Democrats, though 
the other side also had strong hopes of him. In an evening session, 
when the crisis had become fearfully acute, he took the floor. 
Around him crowded the Whigs as if to give support, while his 

with foreign nations by declaring war, taking action with reference to loans, and 
regulating commerce ; the treaty-making power was given to the President and 
Senate merely for convenience in doing that work; a two-thirds majority of the 
Senate meant originally only a margin of four votes, and certainly that was 
no safer than a clear majority of both Houses; foreign nations would not be 
admitted to the Union, for an acceptance of the United States constitution would 
be necessary and only a similar people, like the Texans, would consent to that ; 
no stretch of the constitution is contemplated, for its language is perfectly 
clear, precise and unlimited. Both sides appealed with more or less effect to the 
proceedings of the constitutional convention and the opinions of the Fathers ; 
and in reality each side could make an argument that appeared unanswerable. 

Naturally a good deal of fire was concentrated upon the House resolution. 
Benton pronounced it a mere proposal, limited as to terms and as to time ; and 
he pointed out that should the other party reject it, everything would have to 
be begun anew. It admitted Texas, he objected too, with no provision for reduc- 
ing her dangerous preponderance of size without her own consent, and therefore 
the difficult and expensive adjustments that had been made with Virginia, Con- 
necticut and Georgia would have to be paralleled at a still greater disadvantage. 
Indeed Texas would not accept the House resolution '' except for the purpose of 
prescribing her own terms " for reducing her limits, and all kinds of confusion, 
quarrels and even hostilities might result, at her option, in the process. The 
House resolution, too, he objected, should have provided for the naturalization 
of the aliens residing in Texas. In short, his own plan was more proper, more 
respectful, more flexible, more certain to bring about annexation within a short 
period of time ; and it left the execution of the measure to a President " just 
elected by the people with a view to this subject." 

By the House resokition, protested Colquitt, we admit Texas to the Union 
but do not acquire her territory. Dayton pronounced the arrangement regarding 
slavery delusive, since all the States made from Texas would be sure to retain 
that institution. The resolution is dishonorable to that country, argued Berrien, 
for it proposes to force her upon us by a bare majority vote, and it is highly 
undesirable to place this affront upon a sister State. Archer held that the 
United States had no right to require of Texas that she should do so and so, 
this and that. Most if not all of the Whig Senators, Barrow announced, op- 
posed the House resolution on constitutional grounds. 

The resistance in the Senate was reinforced by support outside. The Massa- 
chusetts legislature, for example, voted at this time that, as the constitution gave 
no authority to admit foreign territory or a foreign state by a legislative act, 
such a proceeding " would have no binding force whatever on the people of 
Massachusetts" (Nat. Intel!., Feb. 17, 1845). But even the most violent expres- 
sions counted little against the now patent fact that the country desired Texas 
and the still more evident one that the divergent views of the friends of annexa- 
tion in the House had at last been combined in a simple and sensible plan. 

-* Cong. Globe. 28 Cong. 2 sess., 315, 320, 321. N. Y. Tribune, March i, 1845. 
Lib., March 7, 1845. Wash. Globe, March 19, 1845. 



342 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



party associates fixed their eyes upon him with every look of 
anxious concern from pleading to covert menace. The news that 
he was up flew to the other House, and in a few moments the Senate 
chamber was thronged with tense faces. Then amid the excitement 
he passionately defined his position, and plainly declared that on 
constitutional grounds he could not accept Brown's resolution, at 
this time the one hope of the annexationists. "A mine sprung!" 
exclaimed The Madisonian; if he had scruples, why did he not say 
so a month ago ; " Why did he glide along like a hidden snake ? '" 
The name of Bagby became at once a hissing and a reproach, but 
none the less his attitude had to be reckoned with ; and it was claimed 
in his behalf that by awakening the friends of annexation from 
their dreams, he compelled the adoption of a policy fitted to 
succeed.^^ 

February 24 Archer withdrew his motion of indefinite postpone- 
ment in order that the issue might come squarely before the Senate 
and amendments to the House resolution be offered. Though the 
friends of Texas now hoped and aspired, it was difficult still for 
them to figure. In reality the Senate was badly split. On the 
thirteenth of February Webster had thought nothing would be done 
except to provide for negotiations. Five days later Senator Dix 
of New York had written that the issue was doubtful ; that a few 
Calhounites would not only refuse to vote for Benton's plan, but 
would insist upon the Missouri Compromise line, which some of the 
Northerners would certainly not accept ; and that he believed certain 
pretended friends of annexation were determined to defeat the 
measure in order to keep up the agitation. On the twenty-fourth 
H. D, Gilpin said that he had never witnessed more anxiety in 
Washington than over the Texas question, and that most reckless 
and desperate attempts were making to fix upon those who would 
not accept Calhoun's view of the matter the odium of a defeat which 
some desired for that very purpose. Bagby's vote was found to be 
indispensable, and he like some nine other Senators " felt a decisive 
preference " for Benton's bill. This, however, could not be sub- 
stituted for the House resolution, since the Calhounites, besides 
detesting its author, believed that his plan of opening negotiations 
might produce a fatal delay. On the other hand Benton was now 

"(Tirades) Williams to Armstrong, Nov, 26, 1844: Polk Pap. Boston Post, 
March 6, 1844. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 351. Wash. Globe, Feb. 26, 
1845. Bagby spoke Feb, 26. Madis., Feb, 27, 1845. Mobile Com. Reg., March 
II, 1845, 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 



343 



undoubtedly anxious to conciliate. Dix described him as very dis- 
creet and cool, and said he had already made many concessions ; and 
it was understood that letters from Silas Wright and Van Buren 
in favor of immediate annexation had been received. It seemed 
therefore, on all accounts, a time for compromise.-'' 

And the way to compromise was near at hand. Senator Walker 
had been well disposed toward his Missouri colleague in this affair. 
It had been his hope that Benton's first proposition could be modi- 
fied so as to pass ; and when the bill of February 5 was brought in, 
he said that he would support it, should the House resolution fail. 
For an active mind like his it was therefore no hard task to con- 
struct the idea of combining the two plans as alternatives, and about 
the eighth of February he drafted an amendment providing for this. 
On the twentieth Horace Greeley wrote from Washington that Ben- 
ton's bill, he heard, was to be piled upon Brown's resolution in order 
to give that Senator "an excuse for retreat," and make a "juggle" 
with the New Yorkers; while, as the same journalist asserted years 
afterward, Bagby was induced to favor compromise by intimations 
that he could not safely return to Alabama or even remain at Wash- 
ington, should his vote prevent annexation. All this n^vs was hear- 
say, probably; but from Blair and Walker we learn something au- 
thentic. First, Walker proposed to Allen to combine the two propo- 
sitions, Benton's plan to become operative should Texas refuse to 
accept the House method; and Allen obtained a pledge of Benton's 
concurrence. Dix, Haywood, Bagby and others refused, however, 
to give a foreign country this control over the matter. Haywood 
then proposed that in order to gain the support of Benton and his 
friends the discretionary power should be vested in the President of 
the United States ; and to this Walker not only gave his own assent, 
but obtained that of all the annexationists opposed to Benton's bill. 
Accordingly, during the session of February 2^, this bill was ofifered 
as an alternative to the House resolution. Calhoun scented danger, 
and tried hard to prevent the adoption of the plan. Foster also 
denounced it. Perhaps he saw that his purpose of blocking annexa- 
tion was liable to fail; but his contention was that the slavery 
issue involved in this affair must be settled at once in order to 

"^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 333. Webster to Harvey, Feb. 13, 1845: 

Van Tyne, Letters, 295. Dix to Van B., Feb. 18, 1845: Van B. Pap. Gilpin to 

Id., Feb. 24, 1845: ib. Wash. Globe, March 26, 1845. (Letters) Raymond, No. 
143, Feb. 21, 1845. 



344 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



safeguard the interests of the South, and that Walker's amendment 
sacrificed his own section for the sake of Northern votes. As for 
the Whigs, taken by surprise they demanded time to consider this 
new aspect of the case, and some even threatened to prevent action 
by talking out the session.^^ 

Just here lay a real peril evidently. As the Congress would 
necessarily end in a few days, the temptation to conquer by obstruc- 
tion was great, and there had appeared to be signs that it would 
not be resisted. The course of Archer and the committee on for- 
eign relations, which had postponed the consideration of the subject 
until the middle of February, had suggested as much. Barrow had 
appealed for a delay until the next Congress, in order that the rep- 
resentatives of the people chosen since the measure was broached 
might have a voice upon it. Huntington of Connecticut had urged 
that more time for consideration was needed. Crittenden had re- 
fused flatly to agree upon the twenty-sixth of February for the 
deciding vote. " The annexation of Texas is ordained,'' pleaded 
Archer, and there is a constitutional method of bringing this about, 
as my report indicated ; why not then wait a little and adopt it ? 
A disposition to waste time by employing dilatory tactics had shown 
itself of late, and the friends of the measure felt no little anxiety. 
But the will of the nation was understood, and Archer now took the 
magnanimous ground that no good could be done by stubborn oppo- 
sition.-* 

="Wash. Globe, March 26, 1845. Walker to Polk, Nov. 6, 1848: Polk Pap., 
Chicago. N. Y. Tribune. Feb. 22, 1845. Greeley, Amer. Conflict, i., 174. (Foster, 
etc.) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 359. Calhoun to Don., May 2z, 1845: 
Jameson, Calhoun, Corr., 658. Rich. Enq., Aug. 29, 1845. Nash. Union, March 
II, 1845. (Whigs) C. Johnson to Polk, Oct. 6, 1848: Polk Pap., Chicago. Polk 
appointed Bagby minister to Russia in 1848. The wording of the amendment 
was as follows: "Section 3. And be it further resolved, That if the President of 
the United States shall, in his judgment and discretion, deem it most advisable, 
instead of proceeding to submit the foregoing resolution to the republic of 
Texas, as an overture on the part of the United States for admission, to nego- 
tiate with that republic — then, Be it resolved. That a State, to be formed out of 
the present republic of Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two 
representatives in Congress until the next apportionment of representation, shall 
be admitted into the Union by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the 
existing States, as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission, and the 
cession of the remaining Texan territory to the United States, shall be agreed 
upon by the governments of Texas and the United States ; and that the sum of 
$100,000 be, and the same is hereby, appropriated to defray the expenses of mis- 
sions and negotiations, to agree upon the terms of said admission and cession, 
either by treaty to be submitted to the Senate, or by articles to be submitted to 
the two Houses of Congress, as the President may direct " (Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., 
I sess.). 

'■* Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 328, 330, 353, 359, 362 ; App., 390. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 345 

After pausing for a recess in the afternoon of February 27, the 
Senate convened again in the evening. The galleries overflowed 
vi^ith eager spectators, and the lobbies were thronged with Con- 
gressmen still more deeply interested. All the learned and the beau- 
tiful seemed to be present; every lamp was ablaze; and a subdued 
bustle and murmur kept the air in a quiver. In spite of the pro- 
found excitement, however, perfect order and dignity prevailed. 
The spectacle, said A. Y. Brown, was sublime, and the issue to be 
decided was felt to be vast and momentous. Archer offered a substi- 
tute bill proposing to open negotiations for the transfer of the terri- 
tory of Texas, with the assent of the people thereof, to the United 
States. On this question Foster of Tennessee and Johnson of Lou- 
isiana voted affirmatively, and the result was a tie. Johnson how- 
ever, though a Whig, then went over to the Democrats, and Walker's 
amendment was adopted in Committee of the Whole by a vote of 27 
to 25. In due order the Committee reported the amended resolution 
to the Senate, and at length after other attempts to defeat it had failed, 
jMiller of New Jersey proposed Benton's original bill as a substitute. 
But that gentleman was to be caught in no such trap. After in- 
dulging to the full his animosity against Calhoun, Tyler and the 
rest of A^an Buren's triumphant enemies, he had found a way to 
regain the party column, please Jackson and satisfy his constituents, 
and to do this with a high head instead of the prodigal's bended 
neck; and the opportunity was by no means to be thrown away. 
" The Senator from Missouri will vote against it," he was heard to 
say. I hope, observed his New Jersey colleague, that the gentleman 
will not destroy his own child. " I'll kill it stone dead," was the 
reply, and Miller's proposition failed. Amid a deep silence the reso- 
lutions were now read — by title — a third time. It seemed unneces- 
sary to call for the Yeas and Nays, since every man's position had 
evidently been taken ; and at about nine o'clock, by a vote of 2y to 25, 
the business was finished. The Senate then adjourned, and soon 
the guns on Capitol Hill were booming a salute.-" 

The affirmative vote consisted of the Democratic Senators and 
three* Whigs, — J\Ierrick, Johnson and Henderson. Thirteen of these 
men came from free and fourteen from slave States, while in the 
negative there were fifteen and ten respectively. Of fourteen free 
States, five voted " Yea," six " Nay," and three stood half-and-half. 

^ (Brown) Nash. Union, April 12, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 359. 
Nat. Intel!., Feb. 28, 1845. 



346 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Of twelve slave States, five voted " Yea " and three " Nay," while 
IMaryland, North Carolina, Georgia and Louisiana were divided. 
Attempts were made to show that the affirmative represented a 
decided majority of the whole people; but it was figured out in 
reply that had all in the Senate been true to the popular feeling 
of their States, a tie would have been the consequence, while the 
Washington Globe maintained that if the members from Virginia, 
Tennessee, North Carolina, Louisiana, Kentucky, Indiana, Maine 
and Alichigan had acted in accordance with the wishes of those com- 
monwealths, the result would have been forty to twelve in favor of 
the measure. It was surprising to find among the majority Senator 
Tappan, whose fierce opposition to the treaty had led him to give 
that document out in violation of his duty. He also, the New 
York Tribune alleged, had received a price; but the fact was that the 
Ohio delegation had been instructed by their legislature to vote for 
annexation. Even in spite of that he caused great anxiety ; but as 
Senator Mangum said, two Presidents and the whole party were 
upon him, and such a combination of forces could not be withstood. 
According to the Mexican consul at New Orleans the result was due 
to treachery on the part of Johnson, Merrick and others, for whom 
he said the offer of a ministry, a consulate, or a custom-house had 
great attractions. Some of the Southern Senators, wrote Webster, 
found it necessary to sacrifice their own preferences to the wish of 
their States. " It passed by chance," was the comment of the 
National Intelligencer.^^ 

" That chance can hardly again occur," added the Intelligencer; 
but the friends of annexation in the House intended to exclude all 
contingencies. Many believed that the Representatives, with half the 
business of the session still untouched, would hardly be able to 
resume the subject, or if they should, could not find time to dispose 
of the amended resolution; but when the matter came back to that 

*° N. Orl. Picayune: Rich. Enq., March 21, 1845. N. Y. Morning Nezvs: 
Nat. Intel!., March 25, 1845. Wash. Globe, Feb. 27, 1845. Conn.. Me., and Ind. 
were divided. Tribune, March i, 1845. (Ohio) Nat. IntelL, May 17, 1845. 
Mangum to Graham, Feb. 21, 1845: Mangum Pap. It is doubtful, however, 
tvhether Corwin — who had now been chosen Senator but had not taken his seat 
— -would have obeyed such instructions ; and without his vote, had he been acting, 
the measure would have failed. Arrangoiz, No. 47 (res.), March 8, 1845. 
Webster, Writings, xviii., 201. Nat. IntclL, Feb. 28, 1845. According to a state- 
ment made many years later by Hannibal Hamlin, at this time a Representative 
from Maine, Hannegan of Indiana, who cast a ballot in the affirmative, owed his 
election to the deciding vote of a member of the legislature named Kelso, and 
Kelso owed his own election to the vote of a young man whose acquittal on the 
charge of murder — which a quarrel over a girl had caused him to commit — was 
secured by Kelso (Curtis, in Wash. Star, Feb, 21, 1909). 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 347 

body, the Speaker ruled out all dilatory points of order and refused 
to entertain appeals ; efforts to bring up appropriation bills were 
unsuccessful; debate in the Committee of the Whole was limited to 
five minutes ; and repeated attempts to amend the resolution failed. 
When the Committee had reported, the previous question was moved, 
the Senate amendment adopted, and a motion to reconsider the action 
of the House defeated. The sun was then just going down; but a 
national salute fired on Capitol Hill illumined the sky, and the glad 
faces of the Democrats lighted up the chamber. A different view 
could, hov/ever, be taken of the circumstances, and it was. " The 
deed was done in darkness, as was meet," exclaimed the New York 
Tribuiie.^^ 

The endorsement of the measure in the House was more em- 
phatic this time than before; for the vote stood 132 against 76. 
Every Wliig was firm for the negative except Dellet of Alabama, 
and every Democrat for the affirmative except Hale of New Hamp- 
shire and Davis of New York. Like Foster in the Senate, Milton 
Brown turned against his own resolution. The opponents of the 
measure were stubborn enough to make a long fight, no doubt ; but 
with so strong and so determined a majority on the other side they 
could accomplish nothing. In due order the acceptance of the 
amendment by the House was now reported to the Senate. There 
too the spirit of opposition still survived; and when the formal 
announcement had been made, Bates of Alassachusetts called out, 
" Woe, woe, woe !" But protest was again futile, and the resolu- 
tion passed on to the Executive. " Diabolism Triumphant : Over- 
throw of the government and Dissolution of the Union ... a deed 
of perfidy, black as that Egyptian darkness which could be felt," 
cried Garrison's paper ; but it cried in vain.^- 

In bringing this result about the President elect undoubtedly had 
an important share. During the previous November a politician 
in Philadelphia had written to him that as the admission of Texas 
would anger the anti-slavery Democrats, the matter should be dis- 
posed of before the fourth of INIarch. The next month Cave John- 
son assured Calhoun that Polk and his friends desired to have this 
done. Crittenden believed that if the incoming President should 

^'^ Nat. Intell., Feb. 28, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 372. Harris 
to Jackson, Feb. 28, 1845: Jackson Pap. Boston Post, March 6, 1845. Tribune, 
March i, 1845. 

'^ Seven Democrats and six Whigs were absent. Mobile Com. Reg., March 
10, 1845. Wash, Globe, Feb. 28, 1845, Boston Post, March 6, 1845. Lib., March 
7, 1845- 



248 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

really adopt the annexation measure as his own, he could carry it, 
and the announcement to Calhoun showed that such was his purpose. 
The Richmond Enquirer also stated quite plainly that he desired to 
have the question settled before assuming the responsibilities of 
office, and that none who did not contribute to that end could expect 
anything from him ; and this was a warning specially applicable to 
the many Locofocos who had opposed the programme of immediate 
annexation, yet realized the importance of standing well with the 
new administration.^^ 

February 21, 1845, the Madisoiiian announced that the President- 
elect, "calm and affable-as a balmy morning in June," was then in 
Washington, " receiving and reciprocating the smiles and congratu- 
lations of his confiding countrymen." Donelson, at this time the 
American charge in Texas, had expressed the opinion to President 
Jones not long before that the new Executive would be able to 
remove all the difficulties in the way of agreement upon a plan of 
annexation, and apparently his personal influence was now exerted. 
Before Polk arrived, said the Washington correspondent of the New- 
York Commercial Advertiser, Texas had no chance; but he, by 
holding out offices as inducements to the northern Democrats, was 
able to make terms. The Tribune — a prejudiced witness to be sure 
— asserted that the President-elect obtained at least four votes for 
the measure by " nothing better than flagrant bribery " ; and Greeley 
was observing things in Washington at the time. In particular, 
it was charged that he agreed to drop Calhoun from the cabinet in 
order to win over the New York delegation, wliich, remarked the 
National Intelligencer, explained the " hitherto impenetrable mys- 
tery " of the Senate's favorable action. All such charges, however, 
are to be taken with due allowance. Mangum, a prominent Whig 
from North Carolina, writing to a friend about the matter, only 
represented Polk as constantly urging that any Democrat who should 
stand out would incur a fearful responsibility.^* 

'•''Horn to Polk, Nov. 23, 1844: Polk Pap. Johnson to Id.. Dec. 9, 1844: 
ib. Crit. to Burnley, Dec. 28. 1844: Crit. Pap. Nat. Intel!., Jan. 29, 1845. 
Tyler, Tyler, ii., 361. 

^* Madis., Feb. 21, 1845. Don. to Jones, Jan. 23, 1845: Jones, Memor., 418. 
Boston Atlas, March 15, 1845. N. Y. Tribune: Lib., March 7, 1845. (Dropping 
Calhoun) N, Y. Jourii. Com., Jan. 6, 1845 ; Memphis Eagle, March 21. 1845 (from 
Charleston Mercury). Nat. Intel!., March 10, 1845. Mangum to Graham, Feb. 21, 
1845: Mangum Pap. 

It was charged a few years afterwards that Polk actually tricked certain. 
Senators. Tappan asserted in 1848 that Haywood brought him word from Polk 
to the effect that should the amended resolution be passed, he would submit the 
amendment (Benton's bill) to Texas as the sole proposition, — a declaration sup- 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 349 

Another influence that had an effect on Congress was the interest 
in Oregon. The natural eft'ect of Hnking the two issues together 
in the Democratic platform was no doubt considerable, for it tended 

plemented by McDuffie's assurance that Tyler would not have the " audacity " 
to take the matter away from Polk by acting upon it himself (N. Y. Evening 
Post (weekly). Aug. 3. 1848). Tappan's statement was reinforced by one from 
Blair to the effect that Polk gave him an equivalent assurance, and that Dix and 
Haywood were similarly favored. In short, said Benton (View, ii., 636). at least 
five Senators would have voted Nay, had they not believed that Polk would be 
the one to act and would choose his bill. 

Polk emphatically denied this charge (Diary, iv., 38-47, 49, 51, 52). Writ- 
ing to George Bancroft with reference to the letters of Blair and Tappan (Sept. 
9. 1848: Bancroft Pap.), he said he had not the "slightest recollection of ever 
having held a conversation " with either of them on the subject ; that he was 
anxious Congress should settle the matter at its then session ; that he expressed 
his opinions on the subject fully and publicly at the hotel where he was stopping, 
but that he did not even examine the form of the different propositions pending 
in Congress. In confirmation of his assertions he called attention to the fact 
that no complaint of a violated pledge was made at the time by Senators or 
others: that in August, 1846, Blair stated that all of Polk's principal measures had 
his approval (Polk. Diary, ii., 84) : and that when the matter came before his 
cabinet on the tenth of March, 1845, he was not aware and gave his advisers no 
reason to suppose that he had committed himself in any way. Polk then asked 
Bancroft, as he did the other members of his cabinet, to express his views 
privately on the subject. Bancroft (Oct. 13, 1848: Bancroft Pap.) wrote in reply 
that he had lodged at the same place with Polk and was very often with him 
during the interval in question, but never heard him discuss the two forms of 
procedure, did not know which he preferred, and never had heard of his express- 
ing a preference. Marcy (Nov. 20, 1848: Polk Pap.) wrote that he recalled no 
conversation with Polk on the subject, and that Polk submitted the matter to 
the cabinet without indicating any preference, adding that until the two letters 
appeared he had never heard it suggested that the President had given reason to 
expect that he would select the third section. The other Secretaries also ex- 
pressed entire disbelief in the charge brought against Polk (Mason to Polk. Nov. 
12, 1848: Polk Pap.. Chicago; Buchanan to Id., Nov. 9, 1848: ib. (see Polk, 
Diary, iv.. 185-187): Johnson to Polk. Oct. 6. 1848: ib. : Walker to Id., Nov, 
6, 1848: ib.). The following suggestions may be deemed pertinent: 

I. It is improbable that Polk would inaugurate his administration by a gross 
breach of faith on a matter of prime importance. 2. It is improbaljle that he 
would promise to pursue a course that most of his friends opposed. 3. It is 
peculiarly improbable that he would do so without consulting any one of the 
competent advisers selected by him for his cabinet. 4. It is improbable that 
those aware of such a breach of trust would have remained silent about it for 
years. Bagby did, it is true, state in the Mobile Register in the fall of 1845 that 
he voted as he did because he was informed that Polk had promised to adopt the 
amendment (Cave Johnson to Polk, Aug. 27, 1848 : Polk Pap., Chicago) ; but 
this is vague and at second hand, and the question remains, why was nothing 
said at \\'ashington and by those who could have spoken of personal knowledge, 
if a deception had been practised? 5. It is particularly improbable that Blair 
would have remained silent had he known of such an affair, since Polk proceeded 
to put him out of business. 6. It is not likely Haywood, represented by Tappan 
as having given pledges in Polk's name that Polk did not keep, would have said 
nothing on finding himself thus compromised and would have been on confidential 
terms with Polk later, as we see from Polk's papers that he was. 7. It is highly 
improbable that Tappan would have written, as he did on May 11. 1847, that he 
regarded Polk as an honest man and supported him for precisely that reason 
(Polk Pap.. Chicago). 8. It would have been very improper for Senators to 
bargain with the President and arrange secretly with him to cheat their colleagues 
into thinking there was an alternative where no alternative really existed. 9. It 
is not probable that Polk would have made a confidant of Blair in so delicate a 



350 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to make the friends of each proposition favor the other; and ob- 
viously there was a fine opportunity as well as a strong inducement 
for "log-rolling." In June, 1843, the Cincinnati Morning Herald, 
an abolitionist paper, said: "The Southern delegation which has 
hitherto opposed any measure looking to the possession of Oregon 
will [at the next session of Congress] withdraw opposition if the 
supporters of the Oregon proposition will aid them in the annexa- 
tion of Texas." This may, however, have been one of those easy 
conjectures which the partisan press is always ready to throw out 
as facts. The Charleston Mercury printed during the following 
autumn a letter dated " Maine, October 12, 1843," which said that 
Texas would be conceded to the South in return for assistance in 
the other matter. Van Zandt, as we recall, informed his govern- 
ment at this time, that it was believed the two questions could 
be combined, so as to gain for Oregon the Southern and South- 
eastern vote and for annexation the support of the West and to 
some extent that of the North. Two months later Duff Green wrote 
to Cralle : " We can secure the co-operation of the North West. . . . 
The Texas, the Oregon and the Tariff are all questions cementing the 
South & North West." In January, 1844, the Houston Telegraph 
remarked that Atchison's bill to encourage the settlement of Oregon 
could not pass without votes from the slave section, and that a com- 
bination of the Southern and Western members of Congress would 
be able to carry both of the measures. Not long afterwards the 
Detroit Advertiser called attention to the fact that the ^Michigan 
Senate had requested the Congressmen of that State to vote for the 
immediate occupation of Oregon, and had refused, though com- 
posed entirely of Locofocos, to say a word against annexation. 
In March D. L. Child wrote from Washington to the Liberator 
that there had been " a constant billing and cooing between Southern 

matter, for Blair had made a public onslaught upon him before the Baltimore 
Convention met and Polk was about to discard him as the mouthpiece of the 
administration. lo. After Polk's choice was known, Blair was eager to be the 
champion of the administration, and that he could not honorably have been had 
he known that Polk had broken a pledge (Cave Johnson to Polk, Oct. 6, 1848: 
Polk Pap., Chicago.) 

As a hint of the possible incorrectness of late statements it may be noted 
that, according to Benton (View, ii., 636) Tappan talked with Polk, whereas 
Tappan himself did not pretend to have done so ; and as an illustration of the 
way in which the President could be misunderstood it is interesting to note 
instances in his diary (iii., 121 ; iv., 343). Probably, in the excitement and 
hurry of the time and his eagerness to have the annexation matter disposed of, 
he intentionally or unintentionally used ambiguous language intended to smooth 
the road, but it is not likely that he gave a pledge of the kind described later by 
Tappan, Blair and Benton. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 35 1 

and Western members [of Congress], on the principle of mutual 
support in taking possession of the two territories and breaking 
down the tariff," and that after the defeat of a resolution looking 
toward an armed occupation of Oregon, Hannegan had said he 
would be damned if he would vote for annexation ; but Child, like 
some other persons, was not always critical in making statements. 
At about the same time, as will be remembered. Black of Georgia 
offered in the House, as an amendment to a motion for occupying 
Oregon, a resolution for the re-annexation of Texas, and his amend- 
ment was accepted by the original mover /''^ 

In January, 1845, ^s a sequel to the adoption of Brown's resolu- 
tion by the lower branch of Congress, Black announced that after 
this glorious event he would go cheerfully for the occupation of 
Oregon, and that he hoped every member wdio had voted for annexa- 
tion would follow his example. Wentworth of Illinois spoke soon 
afterwards, and had much to oft'er with reference to Texas in con- 
nection with the far Northwest ; but it was noticeable that he made 
no intimation of a bargain between the two interests. In January, 
1846, Hunter of Virginia said that the South appeared to be regarded 
as ungrateful, because it did not support Western views regarding 
Oregon ; and this language implied a certain basis for expecting 
assistance. About the same time McDowell of Ohio, on a motion to 
terminate the joint occupancy of the territory in dispute, reminded 
the southern Representatives very pointedly that his section had 
stood by them in their struggle for extension ; and Wentworth of 
Illinois complained that the South, after having " used the West to 
get Texas," was thought unreliable regarding the other aft'air. Upon 
this, Yancey of Alabama demanded squarely whether a bargain 
between the sections had existed, and Wentworth replied that he had 
made no such charge. Houston of Alabama denied that any one 
had been authorized to say what the South would do on the Oregon 
question, and Chapman of the same State said he had " never heard " 
of " an understanding or bargain " in reference to the matter. In 
the Senate Hannegan, a rough sort of a man, was very outspoken 
and bitter. He intimated clearly that when the Texas issue was up, 
reasons had been given him " why he should not distrust the South 
on the question of Oregon " ; but even he, and he raging, did not 
assert that an agreement had existed. William Lloyd Garrison, 

^'^ Morning Herald, June 21, 1843. Mercury. Oct. 28, 1843: ib. Van Z., No. 
109, Oct. 16, 1843. Green to Cralle, Dec. 30, 1843: South. Hist. Ass. Pub., vii., 
419. Telegraph, Jan. 24, 1844. Adv., March 13, 1844. Lib., March 27, 1845. 



352 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



in reviewing the progress of the Texas movement through its various 
stages and tracing out the causes of its triumph, made no reference 
to Oregon ; and though he and his friends were not wanting in alert- 
ness or keenness of vision, an examination of nearly one hundred 
and forty articles, original or contributed, that dealt with the annexa- 
tion affair in his paper between November, 1843, ^^^d October, 1845, 
discovers no charge of " log-rolling " on these issues. It seems 
probable enough, therefore, that sympathies and a more or less 
explicit understanding existed but no bargain.^** 

As Tyler admitted afterwards, it was "by inadvertence on the 
part of those who controlled the action of the Senate," that he was 
given an opportunity to execute the annexation resolution, though 
JMcDuffie — it was said — expressed the opinion that the President 
would not have the " audacity " to act in the matter. Very possibly, 
too, had the outgoing Executive been left to himself, he would have 
been guided by the evident expectation of Congress that the new 
administration would be the one to carry its decision into effect. 
But Calhoun, as he proudly declared later in the Senate and as 
Tyler admitted, assured the President that he had a constitutional 
right to act, and advised him to do so at once ; and the cabinet, which 
met the next day after the resolution became a law, agreed that the 
Executive ought to exert himself effectually to ensure the success of 
a great measure which had originated with his administration. That 
the House plan was the one to adopt, the President and the Secretary 
agreed perfectly. Both of them believed also that Walker's amend- 
ment did not express the real sense of Congress, and had been 
adopted chiefly to prevent Benton and a few others from greatly em- 
barrassing, if not preventing, the passage of Brown's resolution. 
Probably, too, it was understood that should Tyler choose the third 
section — Benton's bill — and nominate commissioners, they would not 
be confirmed ; and finally, of course, detestation of the ^lissouri 
Senator counted for something.^' 

The President felt, however, a certain delicacy as regarded Polk. 
To be sure he did not think this ought to weigh overmuch, since he 
believed that his successor's preference would be like his own. and 
thought it evident that Texas, discouraged by the defeat of the 
former treaty and the small majority that had carried the resolution 

^'^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong.. 2 sess., 199; 29 Cong., i sess., 206, 460; App., 92, 
74. Lib., March 7, 1845, etc. 

"Tyler, Tyler, ii., 396. (Calhoun") Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess.. 498. Tyler 
to Wilkins, Nov. 29, 1848: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 364. Calhoun to Don., May 23, 
1845: Jameson. Calhoun Corn, 658. (Commrs.) Wash. Globe. March 4, 1845. 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 353 

in the Senate, might prefer to obtain recognition from Alexico 
through Enghsh and French influence, rather than to negotiate fur- 
ther with the United States; yet he hesitated to take the final step. 
Calhoun felt sure that the necessity for immediate action was such 
as to override the point of delicacy, and all the rest of the cabinet 
concurred in that view ; but finally Tyler requested the Secretary of 
State to call upon the President-elect and make known the situation. 
This was done, but Polk declined to express an opinion ; and accord- 
ingly instructions were sent off to Donelson in the night of 
March 3.^^ 

These explained that sections one and two of the resolution had 
been adopted by the Executive as embodying the simpler plan, and 
more especially because Benton's method contemplated not only ex- 
pensive and difficult negotiations but a treaty, wdiich in view of the 
recent vote one could hardly expect to see ratified by two-thirds of 
the Senate. The President, Calhoun went on, desires the terms of 
the United States to be accepted precisely as they stand, so that all 
the dangers incident to delay may be avoided. Should that prove 
to be impossible, then let Texas frame propositions — not amend- 
ments — expressing her views. Finally, should this plan also be 
unsatisfactory, let her draw up formal amendments, to be binding 
on both governments if adopted, — even this being a better method 
than to negotiate through agents. Foreign powers, he added, would 
spare no exertions to bring about the defeat of the resolution, and 
therefore the American charge should proceed to the Texan capital 
and urge prompt action.^^ 

Polk's course after his inauguration was peculiar. On the 
seventh of March he wrote privately to Donelson, advising him 
not to act on Calhoun's orders until further instructed, and thus 
he called a halt in what he himself regarded as a most important 
matter ; and no official action was taken until the tenth. On that 
date his cabinet assembled. Buchanan read aloud Calhoun's 
despatch of March 3, and every one present — though Polk did not 
endorse all of the late Secretary's reasoning — concurred without 
hesitation in preferring the House resolution. The President then 

^* Tyler to Wilkins, Nov. 29, 1848: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 364. (Calhoun) Cong. 
Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 498. Tyler to Calhoun, Oct. 7, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun 
Com, 1058. Madis., March 6, 3, 1845. It is interesting to note that Terrell, 
then a Texan representative in Europe, anticipated that Houston would reject 
sections one and two, and, should the United States propose to negotiate accord- 
ing to section three, would give England and France time to act by letting the 
matter go over to the next session of the Texan Congress (No. 7, May 9. 1845). 

'"To Don., No. 4, March 3, 184s: Sen. Ex. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., z^- 

24 



354 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

said he thought instructions ought to be sent immediately to the 
American charge confirming Tyler's choice. Buchanan withdrew 
to prepare them; that evening his draft was accepted by Polk; 
and the instructions were then entrusted to Governor Yell of 
Arkansas for delivery. The reasons why the cabinet approved of 
Tyler's action, as stated by Bancroft, who had just been confirmed 
as Secretary of the Navy and now entered the room, were as fol- 
lows: I, a choice had been made, and any change might produce 
confusion; 2, Donelson was regarded as remarkably prudent and 
quite capable of conducting the affair, under the direction of Buch- 
anan, quietly, amicably, and successfully; 3, sections one and two 
were looked upon as more favorable to the preservation of peace 
with Mexico than section three, since they expressly gave the 
government of the United States authority to adjust the boundary 
with her; 4, as Almonte had demanded his passports, immediate 
action seemed necessary; 5, the tedious method of a commission 
would give the Mexican government time to inflame the public 
mind; 6, the delay would be almost an invitation to England and 
France to interpose with the hope of preventing annexation; and, 
finally, the appointment of commissioners would tempt the Texans 
to make exorbitant demands, which the administration — being 
pledged to bring about the incorporation of their country — would 
find it peculiarly difficult to resist.^" 

The President, said Buchanan in his despatch of Alarch 10, 
does not believe that an agreement under section 3 would necessarily 
be a treaty, as Calhoun understood the matter ; but he is aware that 
many friends of Texas hold such a view, and that members of 
Congress favorable to annexation might be unable to vote for mere 
Articles of Union. Sections one and two follow as far as the 
present circumstances permit, the usual course for the admission of 

*'Don. to Polk, March 19, 1845: Polk Pap., Chicago (see also Tyler to Cal- 
houn. Jan. 2, 1849: Jameson, Calhoun ^orr., 1187). Polk's letter of March 7 may 
have been due simply to his disapproval of some of Calhoun's reasoning. Bu- 
chanan to Polk, Nov. 9, 1848: ib. feancroft to Polk, Oct. 13, 1848: Bancroft 
Pap. Polk to Haywood, conf., Aug. 9. 1845: Polk Pap. Blair wrote to Van 
B., Feb. 29, 1848, that it was fear of making Benton a dangerous rival (by 
adopting his plan for annexing Texas) that led Polk to choose the other alterna- 
tive (Van B. Pap.) ; but this appears fanciful. Polk's course suggests that some- 
thing lay out of sight, and partly for this reason the text intimates' above that, even 
if he had not given the pledge described by Tappan, he had perhaps used language 
implying something of the sort. According to Blair's letter, Polk gave Dix to 
understand that he intended to revoke Tyler's instructions to Donelson. In the 
executive session of the Senate on March 10, Berrien endeavored to have that 
body advise Polk to elect section 3 (Benton's bill) of the Resolution; but his 
motion was laid on the table by a vote of 23 to 20 (Madis., March 20, 1845). 



ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 355 

new States; and if Texas accept them, Congress will be bound to 
receive her. Indeed, nothing can prevent this from coming to pass 
early in the next session except some action on her own part affect- 
ing the conditions. Should any of the terms appear to be unreason- 
able, she may confidently rely " upon the well-known justice and 
liberality of her sister States to change or modify them after she 
shall have been restored to the bosom of our republican family. 
The great object now to be accomplished — that which far transcends 
all other objects in importance — is her prompt admission into the 
Union." Should she refuse her assent or insist upon proposing new 
conditions, " we are then again at sea." Negotiations would be 
necessary ; long and angry debates might arise ; the advocates of 
admission might become divided in sentiment, " and thus the great 
work of union might be almost indefinitely postponed." As it is 
desirable that our land system and " indispensable"' that our Indian 
policy be extended to Texas, let her propose to cede her lands and 
Indian jurisdiction to the United States for a sum to be determined 
by future agreement. The President v/ill " strongly " recommend 
this plan to Congress ; and, as a distinct proposition not directly 
connected with admission, he has no doubt that Congress would 
approve of it. Were it thus associated, however, it might be 
opposed by some for the very purpose of defeating annexation.*^ 

■"To Don., No. 5, March 10, 1845 '■ Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 35. The sop 
for the holders of the Texas debt, already alluded to, appears in the concluding 
sentences of this paragraph. 



XVII 

The Attitude of Rejected Texas 

Houston had many reasons to feel anxious about the resuU of 
his negotiations with the United States. His official dignity and 
personal interests, the relations of his country to Mexico, England 
and France, and the welfare of her citizens during a long future, 
all seemed to be involved in the fate of the treaty. But his feeling 
was by no means that of a shipwrecked mariner clinging to a plank. 
It was in May, 1844, that he put on paper his great ideas about the 
possible career of an independent Texas. At about the same date 
Murphy, immediately after conferring with him, reported that the 
government had treated with the United States reluctantly and 
would be glad to have the negotiations come to naught. Two weeks 
before the President knew the treaty had been signed, he informed 
Jones that he had instructed the envoys at Washington, D. C, to 
call upon the English and French ministers — in case no annexation 
measure should be adopted by Congress before adjourning and the 
American government should decline to make the proposed alliance 
— and ascertain whether a guaranty against being molested by 
Mexico could be obtained from those powers. Two days later he 
repeated these instructions, and while so doing he not only expressed 
the opinion that England and France would be responsible for the 
security of Texas, if she would bind herself never to join the 
United States, but indicated a distinct preference for that arrange- 
ment. Despite the appreciation expressed by him on receiving the 
treaty, he so evidently had little faith in its ratification that Murphy 
thought it necessary to stay constantly by his side. Van Zandt's 
unfavorable report concerning the chances no doubt strengthened 
his expectation of its failure; and when his confidential agent. Miller, 
confirmed that report, he probably looked upon the matter as vir- 
tually out of the way. We must consider ourselves " a nation to 
remain forever separate," he assured the envoys on the twenty- 
seventh of May with noticeable cheerfulness. Henderson was re- 
called and Van Zandt was soon permitted to resign; and if Houston, 
instead of refusing to consider the subject of annexation longer, 

356 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 357 

merely said that any further negotiations would have to be con- 
ducted in his own country, one infers that his object was only to 
remain on fairly good terms with the American Union, and in par- 
ticular to preserve a certain claim upon it for protection. As the 
question of joining the United States was taken up by Texas at their 
request, he sent word to Tyler, they were bound to protect her 
against all the consequences ; and he could see that such a demand 
would have tenfold efifect if he allowed it to be supposed that a 
chance of annexation still remained. In short, as Murphy had an- 
ticipated, he seized the earliest opportunity to move away from a 
negotiation that popular clamor had forced him to open and the 
disobedience of his envoys had brought successfully to a conclusion, 
and he resumed his old policy of guarding the independence of 
Texas and ensuring her safety by playing America and Europe 
against each other, and getting all he could from both.^ 

The people also felt deeply interested in the negotiations ; and 
when it became known that a treaty had been concluded, their 
anxiety was described by the American charge as " extremely pain- 
ful." The predominant wish was doubtless in some way to obtain 
peace and the consequent prosperity, and the saying, " Any port in 
a storm," if we prefix the word " almost," represented the funda- 
mental sentiment. On this point Anson Jones and Ashbel Smith 
agree emphatically with each other and with the natural proba- 
bility ; and Houston said, " Nine-tenths of those who converse with 
me are in favor of the measure [annexation], on the ground that 
it zi'ill give its peace." Afifection for kindred and the old home drew 
the hearts of many towards the United States, but a former French 
colonist wrote to the Revue de Paris that the Texans among whom 
he had lived had forgotten their origin, and were too self-reliant to 
desire annexation. There was doubtless a determined and aggres- 
sive American element ; but so far as the masses were concerned, 
the zeal for absorption in the Union sprang mainly from a longing 
to escape the perils, hardships and uncertainties of a precarious 

'See General Note, p. i. (Ideas) Houston to Murphy, May 6, 1844: Crane, 
Houston. 366. Murphy, No. 23, May 8, 1844. Houston to Jones, April 14, 1844: 
Jones, Memor., 340. Id. to Hend. and Van Z., April 16, 1844: Tex. State Dept.. 
Record Book 44, p. 206. Hend. and Van Z., April 12, 1844. Miller to Jones, 
April 28, 1844: Jones, Memor., 345. Houston to Hend. and Van Z.. May 17, 
1844: Tex. Dipl, Corr., ii., 281. To Van Z., July 13, 1844. Jones (Memor., 590) 
said in 1857 that when the failure of the treaty appeared pretty certain. Houston 
determined on a new policy. The novelty seems to have been the idea of promis- 
ing that- Texas would never join the U. S. 



258 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

national position, though partly, according to Elliot, from " a belief 
that the agitation of such a project would dispose the Government 
of Mexico to acknowledge their Independence." Behind it throbbed 
a real Texan patriotism. Young though it was, the nation had 
fascinating traditions ; and men loved the flag for which their blood 
had been shed. There was also and had been from the first, as we 
have seen, a haunting belief that it would be for the advantage of 
the citizens to maintain their national existence. The Houston 
Democrat said that most of the people would prefer that policy, if 
recognition could be secured without unreasonable delay. The Gal- 
veston Gazette agreed that a majority entertained this view; and 
the British charge informed his government confidently as late as 
May, 1844, that under such a condition " Texas would reject annexa- 
tion." Early in the same month the New Orleans Picayune, though 
a supporter of Tyler's project, felt obliged to print a letter from 
the city of Houston, which said, " What Texas desires most is a 
permanent peace and independence. . . . The people are determined 
to have peace at all hazards." Here in all probability the real senti- 
ment of the intelligent and thoughtful is correctly indicated: nation- 
ality if attainable, but at any rate safety. One special factor, it 
should be remembered, too, worked with particular force against 
the United States. Many of the citizens were not American in blood 
or in feeling. Nearly all the best of these, reported the British 
consul at Galveston, felt strongly opposed to the surrender of inde- 
pendence ; and as probably more than an average share of wealth 
and knowledge of the world belonged to them, they doubtless pos- 
sessed an influence out of proportion to their numbers. Murphy 
evidently found them troublesome, for he described the British 
party at Galveston as " Proud, overbearing, impudent and fero- 
cious." Such a body of men could effect a great deal; and if given 
a leverage, they were evidently capable of doing no little mischief 
to the cause of annexation.- 

It was under these circumstances that news of the failure of the 
treaty arrived. The first response of the high-spirited Texans was 

''Murphy, No. 23, May 8, 1844. Jones, Memor.. 42. Smith, Remin., 63. 
Houston to Elliot, Jan. 24, 1843: F. O.. Texas, vi. Letter in Revue de Paris, 
March 18, 1845. Elliot, No. 11, May 10. 1844. Democrat: Nat. Intell., March 
4, 1844. Gazette: Rich. Enq., July 2, 1844. N. Orl. Picayune, May 3, 1844. 
Consul Kennedy to Elliot, May 6, 1844: F. O., Texas, x. Donelson wrote (Nov. 
II, 1844) that the trade was "passing rapidly into European channels" and that 
the merchants not uncommonly opposed annexation. Murphy. No. 26, May 24, 
1844. For Texan sentiment see also pp. 68, 69, 74, 96, 99. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 359 

probably a sense of rebuff, of rejection. Next they realized that a 
long contemplated hope of finding shelter had been disappointed ; 
and then they reflected that their standing in the world had suf- 
fered. How can Texas be compensated, asked Senator Haywood of 
\'an Buren, for being induced to forfeit her position with other 
countries by discussing annexation with the United States? A dis- 
appointment with reference to the treaty, predicted INIurphy, would 
cause a revulsion of feeling; and now the revulsion came. "There 
were few men in the Republic," says Yoakum, who did not at the 
moment resolve to " banish forever all affection " for the land of 
their birth, " and seek among strangers and foreign nations a more 
congenial friendship and protection." In about a month the bonds 
of Texas were quoted at twelve cents on the dollar, and her treasury 
notes at seven and a half; and the blow to credit and prosperity 
implied by these figures deepened the resentment. The Chnlian of 
Galveston said that in the judgment of the annexationists themselves 
at that place the question had been closed forever; and the Gazette 
declared it was glad the treaty had failed, since independence was 
the better policy. Of still greater significance was a decisive edi- 
torial, commonly attributed to Anson Jones, that appeared in what 
was regarded as the principal administration organ, the National 
J 'indicator. Texas has "no alternative" now, said the writer, "but 
boldly to resolve on her own course of policy, and perseveringly 
prosecute the determination." " From the United States as a nation 
we have nothing to expect." The British fleets and arms, however, 
are to be found everywhere ; her administration is prompt and de- 
cided; and her influence with Mexico "is almost, if not entirely, 
unbounded." Let us then offer her a reduction of our tariff in 
exchange for Mexican recognition or an armistice. A proposition 
of that sort coming from us would be favorably received, for it 
would enable the British merchants to undersell all competitors 
here, and would make it possible for England to bind Texas to 
herself in a short while so firmly " by the strong ties of interest, 
that fearful indeed must be that shock which could disturb or 
sever them " ; and in accordance with this recommendation Jones 
instructed Ashbel Smith, the national representative at London and 
Paris, to ascertain what propositions those governments would make 
on the basis of lasting Texan independence.^ 

'Haywood to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Murphy, No. 23, May 8, 
1844. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 432. (Bonds) Petersburg Repiib.: Nat. Intell., July 



36o 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



In view of the situation, Donelson expressed the fear that Hous- 
ton, even if in favor of joining the United States, " might not De 
able to stand up before his own people if the guarantee promised 
by England & France were accompanied by terms otherwise very 
favorable to Texas." While Jones's despatch to the European 
charge was travelling towards its destination, two letters from 
Smith were coming the other way. Both told of England's anxiety 
to prevent annexation, and both expressed the opinion that commer- 
cial advantages could now be obtained in return for a pledge of 
permanent independence. Evidently, therefore, the temptation 
dreaded by Donelson was soon to be offered, with Houston less 
disposed than any one else to resist it; and before long an English- 
man occupying a seat in the Texan House of Representatives in- 
formed the London Times that no danger of absorption remained, 
unless a Mexican attack should absolutely compel Texas to enter 
the American Union for the sake of safety.* 

Some influences, however, tended to mollify the nation. When 
Van Zandt resigned and took his leave of Tyler, the President 
assured him of his fondly cherished hope that annexation had been 
defeated " only for a time " ; and Jackson wrote to Houston that 
he saw " every reason now to believe that discussion and reflection " 
were strengthening the views of the public men who favored the 
project, and was anxious that the Texan Executive should adopt 
no course " which might create new embarrassment in the negotia- 
tion or legislation which would be necessary to carry into effect the 
measure of annexation." But bland assurances and pressing exhor- 
tations were now an old story, and month after month passed at 
the Hermitage without seeing a reply from Houston arrive. Less 
conspicuous but probably far more effective, letters from friends 
and relatives in the United States doubtless crossed the line by 
hundreds. A great number of the people had connections in this 
country, and the opinion must have been expressed a thousand 
times that the rejection of the treaty was not the final word on 
the subject. ° 

IS, 1844. (Civilian) Kennedy, private, July 8, 1844. Gazette: Nat. Intell.. July 
20, 1844. Vindicator: N. Orl. Com. Bull., Aug. 19, 1844. To Smith, July 14, 
1844. 

* Don. to Calhoun, July 29, 1844: Jameson, Calh. Corr., 964. Smith to Jones, 
July I, 1844: Jones, Memor., 369. Smith, No. 58, July 31, 1844. London Times, 
Jan. 17, 1845. 

^ Madis., Sept. 13, 1844. Jackson to Houston, July 19, 1844: Yoakum, Texas, 
ii., 432. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 36I 

Something helpful was done by the American government in 
changing their representative. Alurphy, who was described as a 
" silly old man," had been acting for nine months by the President's 
appointment; but now, coming before the Senate for confirmation, 
he was rejected. "The tail goes with the hide," he remarked of 
this event when reporting the failure of the treaty to the Texan 
government, and so pleasant a turn induces one to forgive him for 
sometimes permitting a "whirlwind of emotion" to invade his 
" bosom " ; but really the time had come for an abler and cooler man. 
Tilghman A. Howard was immediately appointed and confirmed in 
his place. The new charge was not only a friend of Jackson's, but 
had formerly served upon the staff of the Governor of Tennessee 
when Houston bore that title, and evidently he was selected with 
these facts in view.*^ 

His instructions were promptly given him. "The recent rejec- 
tion of the Treaty of Annexation by the Senate," wrote Calhoun, 
"has placed these relations [between the United States and Texas] 
in a very delicate and hazardous state ; — and the great object of your 
mission is to prevent, by every exertion in your power, the dangerous 
consequences to which it may lead." As your initial step, satisfy 
the Texan government that " the loss of the Treaty does not neces- 
sarily involve the failure of the great object which it contemplated. 
It is now admitted that what was sought to be effected by the Treaty 
submitted to the Senate, may be secured by a joint resolution of the 
two houses of Congress incorporating all its provisions " ; and this 
will require only a majority in each. McDuffie's resolution was 
laid on the table by a vote of 27 to 19, many being absent, on the 
ground that there was not sufficient time to act upon it. As three 
of the absentees and three who voted in the affirmative support 
annexation, only two more votes are needed. The indications in 
the House are still more gratifying. On a motion to lay the Presi- 
dent's Message and documents, which accompanied the treaty, on 
the table, the vote was 66 to ii8; and on a motion to suspend the 
rules with a view to printing 15,000 extra copies of these papers, 
the vote was 108 to 79. In other words the majority are favorable. 
The sentiment of the people is even more satisfactory and is con- 
stantly growing better ; and it is believed that after meeting their 

"(Silly) Power to Jones, Feb. 12, 1844: Jones, Memor., 309. Nat. Intell., 
May 28, 1844. To Murphy, No. 20, June 12, 1844. Murphy to Houston, July 3, 
1844: Yoakum, Texas, ii., 432. Tyler, Tyler ii., 335, 430. Houston to Jones, 
July 8, 1844: Jones, Memor., 371. 



362 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



constituents — particularly in the South and West — a sufficient num- 
ber of Congressmen will come over to our side. 

We cannot suppose, continued the Secretary, that the govern- 
ment and people of Texas will abandon the idea of annexation " so 
long as there is any reasonable hope of its success," for that " would 
imply that they were not only insensible to the feelings and sym- 
pathies which belong to a common origin, but blind to their own 
safety and prosperity. The danger is that the revulsion of disap- 
pointed hopes highly excited, may be seized upon by an interested and 
wily diplomacy, and made the means of seducing them " into form- 
ing an alliance with England, which would eventually be disastrous 
to the United States, Texas and the American continent. Great 
Britain is purely selfish in desiring a close connection with that 
republic. " Whatever motive may be held out, the result, in the end, 
must be abject submission and degradation on the part of Texas," 
for it is always so with alliances between small and great nations. 
" Their interests would be opposite in many and important par- 
ticulars " ; and the East India possessions of England would be 
her principal care, should their welfare conflict with that of America. 
Houston has won too much fame to hazard it now by taking a step 
which his fellow-citizens would long deplore, while by carrying out 
the plan " with which he is so intimately identified, he would fill the 
measure of his country's glory and his own." The defeat of the 
treaty was due to " temporary causes," concluded the Secretary, 
and in reality the policy of annexation has " taken so deep and 
general a hold on the public mind that it must ultimately triumph, 
should it not be abandoned by the Government and People of 
Texas " ; in evidence of which Howard received a copy of the 
pledge, signed by Congressmen from eighteen States, to urge the 
cause actively at their homes, a sanguine letter from Tyler, and 
a pencil memorandum from Calhoun predicting that the new Senate 
committee on foreign relations would be favorable.'^ 

On arriving at his post, the charge found himself in a difficult 
situation. Not only had Texas been rejected again, not only had 
her relations with other countries been compromised, and not only 
were her people indignant, but she seemed at this time to be in im- 
minent peril as the direct consequence of Tyler's course. The Mexi- 

' To Howard, No. i, June 18, 1844. Calhoun's purpose in representing Hous- 
ton as committed to annexation is obvious. (Pledge) State Dept., Arch. Tex. 
Leg. Tyler to Howard, June 18, 1844: ih. Calhoun, Memo.: ib. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 363 

can Congress had voted an even greater increase of the army than 
Santa Anna demanded. Under date of June 20, 1844, one day after 
giving notice to Houston of the resumption of hostihties, General 
Woll had ordered all communications with Texas to cease, and 
announced a programme suggesting the most vindictive warfare. 
In August it was reported from Mexico that an army of 15,000 
men was expected to reach Matamoros in November ; and Santa 
Anna did in fact propose to launch an attack in the autumn both 
by sea and by land. What made the situation appear the more 
alarming was the idea entertained by many that Great Britain stood 
behind the threatened invasion, preferring that Texas be Mexican 
rather than American. The consul of the anxious republic at New 
York, for example, felt little doubt of this ; and the American charge 
at ^Mexico reported that the British legation there, complaining that 
England had gained nothing from the independence of Texas, now 
desired that Santa Anna should 'subjugate that country.^ 

On the other hand it seemed as if the struggling nation, were 
she to abandon all thought of joining the United States, had a 
splendid opportunity just before her. In spite of her difficulties, 
immigration was pouring across her frontier from the north and 
east at an unprecedented rate. Not less than 5,000 persons were 
said to have passed through the single border town of Van Buren, 
Arkansas, during the summer and fall of 1844. The influx of Ger- 
mans during the summer was described by the Mississippian as 
" immense," and a new German colony of from 6,000 to 10,000 
farmers was on foot in July. Bourgeois d'Orvanne was reported to 
be actually on the ground with the intention of planting a large 
French settlement there; and a stream of thrifty immigrants from 
the Low Countries had now been flowing in for some time. Hock- 
ley and Williams asserted that Mexico would acknowledge the 
independence of the Texans if they would merely agree to remain 
a nation and pay a suitable share of her debt. Ashbel Smith had 
an interview with her consul at New Orleans, who stood almost in 
the position of a minister, and felt " satisfied " that recognition was 
within reach. Texas, the London Mercantile Journal pointed out 
to her, would lose greatly by joining the United States, since by 
pursuing a national policy she could enjoy the advantage of supply- 

* (Army) Bank., No. 43, June 29, 1844. Woll to Houston, June 19. 1844: Ho. 
Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 27. Woll, Orders, June 20, 1844: ib., 34. Nat. lutclL, 
Aug. 13. 1844, (Propose) Bank., No. 54, July 31, 1844. Brower to Raymond, 
Aug. 16, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 307. Green, private, June 17, 1844. 



364 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

ing all Europe with cotton, sugar and cattle. Behind and beyond 
all this lay the possibilities of expansion on which, as the American 
charge testified, Houston dwelt so fondly. Should Texas remain 
free to act, remarked the weighty Journal des Dchats a little later, 
she had a good chance to extend south and get possession of the 
silver mines ; and Jackson feared that a prospect of the absorption 
of Mexico, with an English guaranty of independence meanwhile 
and large British loans based on a treaty admitting British manu- 
factures free, was gaining a party in that country.'' 

In fact, England seemed ready now to aid her, and Love as- 
serted as a positive fact that such was the case. According to the 
postmaster at Houston, it was at length "certain" that she could 
form a commercial treaty with that country ensuring immediate 
recognition ; and Houston informed Henderson and Van Zandt that 
without compromising her national position, she could secure safety 
through the aid of European powers. It seems likely that much 
passed in conversation between the representatives of Texas and 
England which escaped the record, and it is by no means sure that 
everything put on paper is now where an investigator can examine 
it ; but certainly Pakenham said to the Texan secretary of legation 
at Washington that Great Britain, understanding the causes that 
had brought the annexation treaty into existence, would not allow 
it — should it be rejected — to affect her friendly attitude, and that 
during its pendency he believed the republic could make favorable 
terms with Mexico. The London Times gave a hint sufficiently 
broad regarding English sentiment. "If Texas wisely and reso- 
lutely proclaims the policy of free trade," it said, " she secures to 
her productions a natural preference in all markets ; she buys from 
all markets on equal terms; and, above all, she gives to all foreign 
countries an equal interest in maintaining her independence." From 
this point of view, it looked as if the coldness exhibited by certain 
British representatives in regard to Texas did not spring from a 
desire to see her conquered, but from a hope that Santa Anna's 
threats might induce her to accept the terms offered by England and 
by him at England's request. That was substantially Jackson's 

"Ark. Intel!.: Nat. IntelL, Dec. 5, 1844. Mississippian: Lib., Nov. 29, 1844. 
N. Orl. Cow. Bull., July 15, 1844. Nat. Intel!.. March 28; Nov. 29, 1844. 
(Hockley) A. M. Green to Upshur, No. 31, April 7, 1844: State Dept., Cons. 
Letters, Galveston, ii. Smith, Remin., 65. London Mercantile Journal, April 15, 

1844. (Dwelt) Don. to Jackson, Dec. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Dcbats, April 29, 

1845. Jackson to Blair, Jan. i, 1845: Jackson Pap. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 365 

belief; and if one compare the unfriendly attitude of the British 
legation at Mexico, Pakenham's kindly hints, and Houston's remark 
to his envoys that independence could now be secured through 
European aid, one discovers a rational basis for his opinion.^'' 

Tyler and Calhoun, having preached and apparently having en- 
tirely believed the doctrine of " Now or never " with reference to 
annexation, were fully alive to the danger that Texas would swing 
quite away, and the President intimated to her envoys that as he 
wished to do all in his power for the security of their country, 
no important change would be made in the military and naval ar- 
rangements already ordered. This assurance, however, was not 
accepted by their government as satisfactory; and early in August 
Jones demanded aid, basing his request upon the assurances given 
by ]\Iurphy and by Calhoun, the first of which had been disavowed, 
while the second had contemplated only the pendency of the treaty. 
Now it appears surprising that the Texan Secretary of State should 
have adopted this course. If he was appealing seriously to the 
friendliness of the United States, it would have been better not to 
remind them that they had refused to extend their protection beyond 
a limit which had now been passed ; and therefore Jones's action, 
like his asking at an earlier stage for a pledge of assistance that 
he knew could not legally be given, suggests a wish to excite his 
fellow-citizens against the American Union, and incline them 
towards an acceptance of British protection. ^^ 

"All that Howard could do in response was to remind the Sec- 
retary that the term during which his government had offered pro- 
tection had expired, and to promise that he would lay the matter 
before them. Calhoun, however, saw a way to aid Texas without 
going beyond the constitutional powers of the Executive; and he 
wrote to Shannon, the recently appointed minister to Mexico, a 
rather surprising despatch, the substance of which was as follows : 

^^ Love to Nicholas, Feb. :, 1844: Crit. Pap. Norton to Calhoun, April 29, 
1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 949. Houston to Hend. and Van Z., April 29, 
1844: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 274. Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones, 
Memor., 343. Times, Aug. 15, 1844. Jackson to Blair, Aug. 15, 1844: Jackson 
Pap. 

"Van Z. and Hend., No. 124, June 15, 1844. Jones to Howard, Aug. 6, 1844: 
Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 25. Calhoun to Van Z. and Hend., April 11, 
1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 11. When Howard first presented him- 
self to Houston, the latter satisfied him, in the course of a long conversation, 
that the Texan government would make no move to embarrass the annexation 
question (Howard, Memo., Aug. 2: Arch, Tex. Leg., State Dept.) ; but this 
appears to have been based upon no definite engagement on Houston's part and 
from such a diplomatist signified very little. 



366 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Evidently Mexico intends to wage a serious and barbarous war 
against her lost province, the real aim of which is to defeat the 
project of annexation. As she is aware, that measure has only been 
deferred. Congress adjourned without finally disposing of it, and 
the plan will almost certainly be accepted by our country. Mexico 
therefore designs either to subjugate Texas or more probably to 
drive her by a ferocious attack into some foreign connection that 
would be prejudicial both to her and to us. Now the policy of 
acquiring this territory has long been pursued by the United States ; 
and are we at this late stage to let it be defeated, and see our neigh- 
bor — because she accepted the American overture — either laid waste 
or forced into an alliance that would produce hostilities between 
her and us ? " The President has fully and deliberately examined 
the subject," and has answered this question in the negative. Dur- 
ing the recess of Congress he will use all his constitutional powers 
to ward off such results ; and he would regard the invasion of Texas, 
" while the question of annexation is pending, as highly offensive 
to the United States." If Mexico has taken umbrage, we are the 
ones to attack, for the invitation to treat regarding annexation was 
given by us; and as for standing aloof and permitting another to 
" suffer in our place," we cannot. Humanity also, as well as honor 
and interest, calls upon us to intervene, for all nations desire the 
civilized usages of war to be respected, and we, being nearest the 
field of operations, have a duty to see that this is done in the present 
instance. For the same reason, too, our sympathies would have 
most to suffer, should those usages be violated. Mexico pretends 
that the Texans were intruders and usurpers ; but they were invited 
to settle in that region for the sake of Spain and herself, — to protect 
it against the Indians, cultivate the wilderness, and " make that 
valuable which was before worthless," and this they did. She pre- 
tends that they are to-day a lawless gang of adventurers; but they 
have established wise and free institutions, have obeyed the laws, 
have improved their beautiful country, and have maintained peace 
for years. They have prospered, too ; and there is no excuse for 
treating them as outcasts. Present these points to the Mexican 
government ; protest both against a renewal of the war while the 
subject of annexation is pending, and against the manner in which 
it is proposed to conduct the hostilities ; repeat that the measure of 
annexation was adopted in no spirit of hostility to that power, and 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 367 

renew our assurances that if it be carried through, the United States 
will be ready to settle most liberally all resulting difficulties. ^- 

This was a very clever despatch. For pendency of the treaty 
Calhoun deftly substituted pendency of the question. On the one 
hand he again ofifered the olive branch to Mexico, and on the other 
he appeared to threaten a war which in reality the Executive had 
no power to declare. The tone of his letter and its general meaning 
were equally well calculated to please the Texans, and to either 
teach Mexico prudence or irritate that country into an explosion that 
would excite the people of the United States to the pitch of war. 
Yet after all it was fair and right in principle, for it would not have 
been just that a neighbor should suffer alone for a negotiation di- 
rectly chargeable to us, or be driven by our course to purchase for- 
eign protection. 

At the same time Calhoun authorized the charge in Texas to 
have American troops despatched to the frontier, or — should the 
government of that country so desire — placed on her soil, in order 
to prevent our Indians from making incursions there, as there was 
reason to believe that emissaries from beyond the Rio Grande were 
inciting them to do. This appeared to be a very reasonable and even 
obligatory step, since we were bound by a treaty with Mexico to 
hold our savages in leash ; but it is obvious that such a movement 
of troops would look to her like preparation on the part of our 
government to carry out the implied threat of war. Further, al- 
though Calhoun recognized that the charge's construction of his 
pledge of protection was correct, he directed Howard to notify the 
Texan authorities that the President felt under obligation to defend 
their country, so long as the question of annexation should be 
pending, against all attacks from Mexico caused by the American 
proposal to open negotiations; that his feelings on the subject had 
been expressed to that nation ; and that he would advise Congress 
on its re-assembling to provide effectual aid. Of course a transcript 
of the despatch to Shannon was forwarded to Howard, and he was 
instructed to furnish the Texan Executive with a copy of it ; and 
moreover the minister of that country at Washington was given 
reason to inform his government that he believed Tyler felt dis- 
posed to go even farther in her defence than he wished to make 

'* Howard to Jones, Aug. 6, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 28. 
Calhoun to Shannon, Sept. 10, 1844: ib., 29. 



368 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

known. All this was sure to have a marked effect, so far as the 
facts were understood, upon the sentiment of Texas/^ 

About the middle of August Howard died of yellow fever, — the 
fourth out of five United States representatives to perish at his post 
during the short period since Texas had been recognized. At such 
a crisis this was decidedly unfortunate. The results, however, were 
not so serious as might have been anticipated, for neither Elliot nor 
Saligny saw fit to remain within reach of the scourge, and conse- 
quently our interests were as well represented there as were any. 
Indeed, it would appear that at this time Elliot was not even corre- 
sponding with the Texan authorities, for the American consul at 
Galveston reported that no one knew where he could be found, and 
Jones himself understood that he had resigned or been recalled. 
Probably, learning in the United States of the rejection of the treaty 
and well aware how that news would be likely to aft'ect Houston, 
the British representative deemed any interference on his part super- 
fluous, and so left the field open for his American rival." 

News of Howard's death was received by Tyler a month after 
it occurred, and the next day he informed Jackson that he had 
appointed Major Donelson to the vacant post. The President wrote 
that he would not consider even the possibility of a declination ; and 
the appointee's intimacy with both Jackson and Houston, as well 
as his personal qualifications for the difficult position off'ered him, 
did in fact make acceptance almost obligatory. The next morning 
a special messenger set out from Washington for Donelson's resi- 
dence. Within a month from the date of his appointment the new 
charge wound up his affairs and left home to catch a Galveston 
boat at New Orleans; and on the sixth of November, in high 
spirits over the Democratic victory in Louisiana and convinced that 
the question of annexation had been settled so far as the United 
States were concerned, he sailed for Texas without even waiting 
for his official papers. ^^ 

''To Don., No. ii, Sept. 17, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 36. To 
Howard, Sept. 10, 1844: ib., 50. Orders to Taylor and Arbuckle, Sept. 17, 1844: 
Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 37, 38. Raymond, Sept. 13, 1844: Jones, Memor.. 
382. 

"Kennedy, private, Aug. 24, 1844. Elliot (No. 12, May 20; No. 14, June 22, 
1844) left the country in May and went as far north as Virginia. A. M. Green. 
No, 3, July 20, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. 

"Accounts differ here by a day. Tyler to Jackson, Sept. 17, 1844: Jackson 
Pap. (Intimacy) Yell to Polk, May 5, 1845: Polk Pap. Raymond, No. 132, 
Sept. 19, 1844. Jackson to Blair, Oct. 17, 1844: Jackson Pap. Easland to Polk, 
Nov. 5, 1844: Polk Pap. Kennedy, private, Nov. 12, 1844. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 369 

Only four days before, Secretary Jones had written to the Brit- 
ish coni,ul at Galveston, " I am truly sorry your Government have 
not an accredited ^Minister here, at this time"; and JOnes had better 
reasons for this lament than he knew. He was now to deal, unsup- 
ported by Elliot for a time, with a man who had had much experi- 
ence among the strongest and most acute politicians of the United 
States, and under a "plain, unpretending" appearance possessed 
keen insight, uncommon shrewdness and unflinching courage, all 
dominated by cool good sense. Jackson's nephew, wrote V^an Buren, 
was "fit for anything in this Govnt.," and only his modesty had 
prevented him from occupying a seat in the cabinet. Combining 
in himself, too, the Tyler-Calhoun influence, wdiich Elliot had sus- 
pected of antagonizing somewhat the Jackson influence in Texas, 
with a most confidential intimacy at the Hermitage and perhaps as 
direct an access to Houston's heart as any man possessed, the new 
charge was probably the very best person for the task that could 
have been selected ; and the fact that he was reputed to be a par- 
ticular friend of Polk gave him additional strength. ^"^ 

On arriving, Donelson thought the signs unfavorable. Terrell, 
an avowed opponent of annexation, had been chosen minister to 
England and France ; all in the confidence of the administration 
expressed doubts as to the wisdom of joining the Union; and the 
officials in charge of the records, when questioned as to the future 
relations of Texas to England, France and the United States, mani- 
fested a signal reserve. There seemed to be an absence of excite- 
ment regarding the threatened invasion, which suggested to the charge 
a sense of confidence in European protection. Every day appeared 
to increase the strength of the British party, and the purposes of 
Great Britain could not well be opposed for they could not be 
made out.^' 

Donelson had an interview soon with Houston. The latter 
explained very blandly that he had wished to encourage England 
and ^lexico with a prospect of defeating the United States while 
at the same time alarming the latter country regarding British 
intrigues, and thus hold the afifair of annexation in such a way as 
to bring it about whenever he could, but that his hand had been 
forced and his policy defeated by over-ardent supporters of the 

'"Kennedy, private, Nov. 12, 1844. (Appearance) Terrell to Jones, Nov. 12, 
1844: Jones, Memor., 398. Van B. to Bancroft, Feb. 15, 1845: Mass. Hist. Soc. 
Proc, 3 ser., ii., 437. Elliot, secret, Dec. 29, 1844. Kennedy, Dec. 5, 1844. 

" Don., No. 2, Nov. 23, 1844. 



370 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



cause; and he said squarely that Henderson and Van Zandt ought 
not to have signed the treaty without receiving fuller pledges from 
the United States to defend Texas. Donelson replied that Tyler 
was disposed to give the desired protection but found himself limited 
by the constitution ; that the co-operation of Congress was essential 
to effect annexation; and that, had the President exceeded his 
authority, there would have been a disagreement between him. and 
the legislative branch, which would have proved an obstacle. The 
remedy, said the charge, was an appeal to the nation, and Polk's 
election would be a national endorsement of Tyler's project. To 
this Donelson added that he hoped nothing had been done to com- 
mit Texas to a policy inconsistent with that of the treaty, but from 
Terrell's language and the remarks of minor officials he feared such 
might have been the case. Houston answered that he was not in 
the habit of committing himself; and then, as the other callers retired 
from the room, he went on to remark that since the charge was 
familiar with his trials and sufferings and came from Jackson, noth- 
ing could be concealed from him.^^ 

To this Donelson responded with no little address. The ex-Pres- 
ident was most anxious, he said, to have his friend Houston prove 
that he comprehended the effects which annexation would have upon 
the fate of free institutions, yet feared that he might be influenced 
by the plausibility which could be given to the " tempting " prospect 
of " making Texas a nucleus for the formation of new states, ex- 
tending to the Pacific, affording a refuge for the oppressed of all 
nations, and rivalling the United States." "No — no — no!" was the 
reply ; Jackson might feel sure that his counsels were highly valued, 
that his words were prized as treasures ; the opposition of certain 
officials did not indicate the policy of the government; and as for 
Terrell, he had been sent abroad "to see what bids they would 
make," but with no power to commit the Executive. Houston 
then professed that he should be proud to have the union of the 
two countries brought about during the charge's connection with 
the government, and showed every appearance of being determined 
to support the measure in question so long as there was a hope 
of effecting it on terms honorable and fair to Texas. The idea of 
prominence in the United States, however, which Donelson sug- 
gested would be gained by pursuing this course, was repelled, 

"Don., No. 3, Nov. 24, 1844. It is noticeable that although Houston ex- 
claimed, " No-no-no ! " he did not disavow the ideas regarding the future of 
Texas that were attributed to him. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 37 1 

and the President said that his purpose was to spend the remainder 
of his Hfe on his plantation. The charge's comment on the inter- 
view was interesting. He remarked that Houston must be able to 
see that annexation would greatly increase the value of his lands, 
and that consequently his plan to depend upon them for his future 
occupation and support was perhaps as important an indication of 
his policy as all his assurances of devotion to Jackson and the 
cause. In other words, these protestations failed to convince.^^ 

Donelson showed the President and the Secretary of State what 
Calhoun had written to Shannon and also a despatch from the 
same source to the American minister in Paris, which — taking 
advanced ground in favor of annexation — endeavored to prove 
that France, unlike England, had no reason to oppose this measure, 
but on the other hand a very strong motive for desiring to prevent 
Great Britain from obtainmg a monopoly of the production and 
distribution of tropical commodities. With these documents Hous- 
ton and Jones expressed themselves as satisfied ; but far more signifi- 
cant in their minds, no doubt, was the news of the election. If 
Polk wins, Texas can join the Union, Van Zandt had predicted 
when he announced the defeat of the treaty; and his government 
could readily perceive that such a forecast was very reasonable. ^^ 

No less interested in the outcome of the American Presidential 
campaign were the people of that country. It revived their hopes 
of securing protection and prosperity, and Donelson reported that 
their love for the United States appeared to re-awake, while the 
bitterness caused by the rejection of the treaty seemed to abate 
in a like degree. The sharp correspondence between Shannon and 
the Alexican minister which had followed the delivery of Calhoun's 
message would prove still further, he believed, the friendship and 
fidelity of the American government ; and he soon reached the con- 
clusion that in a brief time, should nothing unfavorable occur in the 
north, annexation sentiment in Texas would be as strong as ever, 
" so strong indeed that no leading men in the Republic would hazard 
an opposition to it." Yet he still considered the situation critical. 
After talking with prominent citizens, he became satisfied that with- 
out having to give up slavery Texas could obtain recognition from 
Mexico through British mediation whenever she would accept it ; 
and he felt that should unrestricted trade with England and France 
be ofifered in addition to the boon of acknowledgment, and should 

"To King, No. 14, Aug. 12, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 38. 
Van Z., [No. 122], June 10, 1844. 



372 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



the American Congress fail to act promptly and favorably, a satis- 
factory result could hardly be expected. His aim, therefore, was 
to hold the Texan government in a state of willingness until an 
invitation could be offered by the United States in a practical form.-'' 

At this time Houston's term as President expired, and a review 
of his course regarding annexation appears to be in order. Fortu- 
nately, after what has been said, this can be made very brief. Ashbel 
Smith, second only to him in ability among the statesmen of the 
republic and not his inferior in moral and intellectual straightfor- 
wardness, has stated that in 1836 Houston was for joining the 
United States because he did not think Texas capable of main- 
taining a national existence, but that his views changed, and his 
judgment favored the policy of independence ; and Smith has ex- 
pressed the opinion that judgment, not sentiment, was Houston's 
guide. The President himself wrote to Henderson and Van Zandt 
that his judgment had "never fully ratified" the popular desire 
for annexation ; and we know that he shrewdly figured out the debit 
and credit sides of that question in a way to leave a huge balance 
in favor of nationality. His personal preference appears to have 
leaned very decidedly the same way. To appear in history as the 
founder of a new state was precisely the ambition that could appeal 
with overwhelming force to him ; and in a private letter to Elliot, 
written in May, 1843, after pouring sarcasm, ridicule and invective 
upon the United States for their failure to appreciate his country 
as he felt she deserved, and after showing that her permanent 
independence would count against them and for the advantage of 
England, he continued : " It is not selfishness in me to say that I 
desire to see Texas occupy an independent position among the 
nations of the earth, to which she is justly entitled by her enter- 
prise, daring, sufferings and privations. The blood of her martyrs 
has been sufficient to give cement to the foundation of a great nation, 
and if her independence be speedily recognized by Mexico, heaven 
will direct and carry out her destiny to a glorious consummation." 
Elliot felt convinced that such was his preference; and Murphy 
wrote solemnly to our government as follows : " I desire to say to 
you, and to impress you with a belief of the fact, that President 
Houston and his cabinet, as well, as all his leading confidential 
friends are secretly oi)posed to annexation That He & they have 
apparently entered into the measure heartily, in consequence of the 

^ Don., No. 4, Dec. 5, 1844. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 373 

undivided & overwhelming sentiment of the People in its favor." 
Finally, the antecedent probability, various private expressions of 
Houston's that appear to have been sincere, and the opinions of 
those best qualified to judge in the matter, are confirmed by his 
adoption of a course that can fully be explained on no other hypo- 
thesis.-^ 

The President's valedictory address was a further indication of 
his real sentiments. " The attitude of Texas nov^, in my apprehen- 
sion," he said, " is one of peculiar interest. The United States 
have spurned her twice already. Let her, therefore, maintain her 
position firmly, as it is, and work out her own political salvation. 
... If Texas goes begging again for admission into the United 
States, she will only degrade herself. They will spurn her again 
from their threshold, and other nations will look upon her with 
unmingled pity. ... If the United States shall open the door and 
ask her to come into her great family of States, you will then have 
other conductors, better than myself, to lead you into a union with 
the beloved land from which we have sprung — the land of the broad 
stripes and the bright stars." On the other hand, if we remain 
independent, the Pacific will be our boundary, and we can become " a 
nation distinguished for its wealth and power." Nor was his reply 
to the July letter from the Hermitage, which he sent four days 
later, much more promising, for he merely said that his country 
stood wholly untrammelled ; that he trusted her future course would 
be marked by a proper regard for her true interests; that his own 
decided opinion was, that she should maintain her present position 
and " act aside from every consideration but that of her own 
nationality " ; yet should the United States open the door wide, it 
" might be well " for her to accept the invitation. The gist of 
all this language appears to be that he desired Texas to remain inde- 
pendent, yet did not wish to lose the good-will of the Union or the 
leverage of the annexation project.-- 

On the ninth of December, 1844, Anson Jones was inaugurated 
as President. This gentleman, born at Great Barrington in 1798, 

-•Smith, Remin., 80, 69. Houston to Hend. and Van Z., May 17, 1844: 
Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 281. (A huge balance) Houston to Murphy, May 6, 1844: 
Crane, Houston, 366. Houston to Elliot, private. May 13, 1843: F. O., Texas, 
vi. Elliot, secret. Feb. 5, 1843, Murphy to Tyler, March 16, 1844, conf. : State 
Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Of course the theory that the two govern- 
ments conspired to bring slave territory into the Union falls to the ground if we 
accept this interpretation of Houston's policy. The reader will know how to make 
a proper discount from Murphy's enthusiastic views of popular sentiment. 

'^ Tex. Nat. Reg., Dec. 14, 1844. Houston to Jackson, Dec. 13, 1844: Yoakum, 
Texas, ii., 433. 



374 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



had been a country doctor in western Massachusetts. He was a 
person of medium height, medium weight and medium intellect ; a 
well meaning, good-hearted individual of much common sense, and 
a bearing that corresponded with his character. Elliot described 
him as worthy, friendly, plain in speech, simple in manner, sound 
in judgment, " remarkably cautious and reserved," and endowed 
with " a moderate degree q^ the skill and firmness of his predeces- 
sor " ; and this portrait was done by a good critic of men, somewhat 
prejudiced in favor of Jones's anti-annexation judgment. To Don- 
elson he appeared at the first interview " frank and cordial," and 
seemed to possess "in a high degree" the qualities needed by the 
chief magistrate of Texas. A careful study of his record shows 
that he was neither very able nor very straightforward; but one 
can see that his genial, open and sensible appearance, combined with 
his great caution and reserve, enabled him to make a decidedly 
favorable impression.-^ 

The relations between the outgoing and the incoming Executives 
were somewhat peculiar. Donelson spoke of Jones as ''the partic- 
ular friend " of Houston, and the British consul at Galveston stated 
that he owed his election almost entirely to the support of his pre- 
decessor; but Jones's book, written after the two had become open 
enemies, exhibits a very dififerent view. The opinion is there ex- 
pressed that Houston desired to have Burleson succeed him, and 
this desire is attributed to a hope that Burleson, like Lamar, would 
fail, and thus make Houston seem the more brilliant and indispen- 
sable. Jones further represents that his predecessor was intensely 
selfish and extremely cunning; that he had taken the credit of every- 
thing done by his Secretary of State, and wished to pursue the 
same policy regarding Jones's conduct as President ; and that only by 
making concessions to his vanity and letting him have the coveted 
glory could persecution be avoided ; but that after all Houston had 
" no agency " in the succeeding administration.^* 

In some of these remarks, however biased, there would seem to 
be a large element of truth. Houston was no doubt far stronger, 
deeper and shrewder than the other man. He found in Jones a use- 
ful clerk, — simple, steady, orderly, laborious, sensible and naturally 
sincere, — in a word, everything that he himself was not. Such a 

** Jones, Memor., frontispiece. Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844. Don., No. 4, 
Dec. 5. 1844. 

"Don., No. 4, Dec. 5, 1844. Kennedy, Dec. s, 1844. Jones, Memor., 41, 
26, 69. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 375 

lieutenant was greatly needed by such a leader, and probably did 
not seem likely to become a dangerous rival. Jones, on the other 
hand, aware that he could do many things better than his chief and 
not fully conscious of his own limitations, aspired to be a sun instead 
of a moon ; yet he was too familiar with Houston's art and power 
and too well aware of his influence in the country to desire any- 
thing like an open rupture, and, as they believed in the same policy, 
it was easy enough to avoid a break. To take his Memoranda 
at face value, one would conclude that the annexation of Texas to 
the United States was due to his longing for that arrangement. 
But the book seems to have been written to clear him from the 
odium of having attempted to defeat the measure ; it was composed 
in a spirit of desperation which appears to have been the cause not 
long afterwards of his suicide ; on a close scrutiny it is found to 
contain inconsistencies and admissions which impair the author's 
credit as a witness ; and it cannot survive a comparison with 
Elliot's despatches, which w^ere written at the time and with every 
motive to be accurate in reporting events, conversations and impres- 
sions. Ashbel Smith said in his Reminiscences that he clearly be- 
lieved Jones preferred independence; and Le National of Paris 
suspected quite naturally, as did many others, that he felt no in- 
clination to exchange the headship of a nation for the Governorship 
of a State, — an exchange that must have seemed peculiarly hard, 
since the more exalted position was a bird in the hand and the other 
only a bird in the bush.-'' 

In his inaugural address the subject of annexation was not men- 
tioned ; but Elliot supplied the omission, so far as the British For- 
eign Office was concerned, by reporting soon after its delivery that 
no trouble about maintaining the nationality of Texas would exist, 
if the matter " depended in any considerable degree upon the dis- 
positions " of her government, and Donelson helped his uncle un- 
derstand Jones's silence by admitting before long that British influ- 
ence was beginning to tell. The Message to Congress was equally 
dumb on the subject; but in a few days the President sent in a 
recommendation that a free trade arrangement be made with such 
countries as would abolish their tolls on the chief products of Texas, 
— a definite advance towards England.-" 

Soon after his inauguration Jones made an evening call upon 

''Smith, Remin., 8i. Le Nat., Feb. 21, 1845. 

"Elliot, No, IS, Dec. 10, 1844. (Don.) Jackson to Lewis. Jan. i, 1845: 
Ford Coll. Madis., Jan. 10, 1845. 



376 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Elliot and announced his policy at length. After expressing the 
opinion that a majority of his intelligent fellow-citizens were aware 
that the best course would be to maintain a national position, pro- 
vided Mexico would recognize it, he said he did not doubt that if he 
could offer the people a prospect of securing this recognition on 
fair terms, " He and his friends would have strength enough to turn 
them aside from any further thought of annexation ;" and he desired 
that the British and French representatives be fully empowered to 
act on Texan questions, so that at any propitious moment these 
could be " irrevocably " settled before the United States could 
interfere. He then explained that the most determined support of 
the annexation measure proceeded from the sugar interest, and sug- 
gested a scheme to wean the planters from it by making the British 
tariff more favorable to them. This conversation, added to other 
indications of many kinds, appears to place the question of the Pres- 
ident's attitude entirely at rest.^'^ 

Ebenezer Allen, the acting Secretary of State, who had been for 
a time Houston's Attorney General, was described by Ashbel Smith 
as a man of extraordinary legal acumen, always firmly opposed to 
the surrender of nationality, and more relied upon than any one 
else by Jones ; while Elliot said he had " the best dispositions " on 
the question of joining the Union. Some two months before, he 
had gone so far as to assure the British consul that if he could 
defeat the annexation scheme, it would be " the proudest moment " 
of his life. Donelson, however, did not hesitate, and without delay 
he addressed the hostile Secretary. While the United States are 
exposing themselves to Mexican hostilities by their faithfulness to 
Texas, he wrote, they infer and expect that she will at least refrain 
from looking upon the plan of joining them as lost. The election 
of Polk has strengthened the hope of carrying that measure through ; 
the temporary causes which led to the defeat of the treaty have 
been removed ; and further study of the subject by the American 
public is rendering the idea more attractive. For these reasons, its 
early realization may be expected. No doubt the development of 
Texas has been retarded by the delay, but she can console herself 
by reflecting on the benefits annexation will eventually bring; and 
her magnanimity in rising above the resentment that was natural in 
view of the apparent insensibility of her kindred in the north, 
will give her a special claim to the gratitude of future millions. To 

''Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844 (confirmed, c. g., by his No. 17, Dec, 21, 
1844) ; No. 10, March 6, 1845. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 377 

defend the policy of joining the American Union against those who 
describe it as exckisively beneficial to that nation, would be a reflec- 
tion upon the judgment of the people of Texas, who have so long 
preferred it. It is really a question of "mutual, equal, and vital, 
benefit and safety to both Republics." Texas has seen this more 
quickly than the United States, but that is merely because she has 
had better opportunities to judge.-* 

To this Allen replied that the relations of the two countries in 
regard to this matter would not be changed by any unfavorable 
action on the part of the Texan Executive, but they might depend 
upon causes over which he could exert little or no control ; the 
ardor of the people for annexation had no doubt been diminished 
by the apparent defeat of the measure, yet the President hoped 
that they would not become inflexibly opposed to it before its con- 
summation could be brought about. This was a little cool, and in 
reporting it Donelson felt able to be a good deal more optimistic than 
Allen regarding the attitude of the Texans. Without question the 
necessary suspension of commercial treaties, changes in the revenue 
laws and the like during the period of waiting was very inconvenient, 
and another disappointment might be fatal ; but should annexation 
be ofifered within a reasonable period, he believed it would be 
ratified in Texas " with great unanimity."-^ 

At this juncture Dufif Green arrived and began to develop his 
lofty plans. The result was a sharp clash with the Executive, in- 
tensified probably by the fact that a long-standing feud existed 
between him and Houston ; Jones recalled Green's cxcquator by 
proclamation ; and the representatives of England and France were 
said to be jubilant, declaring that annexation had become impossible 
for at least three years. Finally, however, Green disclaimed any 
intention to wound the feelings of the President or interfere with 
the independent discharge of his official duties ; the disclaimer was 
accepted by Jones ; and so, as Donelson reported, " this unpleasant 
afifair . . . passed away, producing no injury to the friendly rela- 
tions existing between the two countries."^'' 

^ Smith, Remin., 81. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Kennedy, private, Sept. 
9, 1844. Don. to Allen, Dec. 10, 1844: Sen. Journ., 9th Tex. Cong., 191. 

^ Allen to Don., Dec. 13, 1844: Sen. Journ.. gth Tex. Cong., 195. Don.. No. 
8, Dec. 17, 1844. Donelson accepted Allen's pledge as satisfactory, but no doubt 
this was largely because he counted on the rising annexation tide among the 
people. 

** (Plans) Chapter x. Jones to Don., Jan. 4, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from 
Mins., Texas, ii. Elliot, secret, Dec. 29, 31, 1844. (Jubilant, etc.) N. Orl. 
Picayune, Jan. 11, 1845. Don., No. 10, Jan. 25, 1845. 



378 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

About the middle of January, 1845, the committee on foreign 
relations of the Texan Senate made a report. This admitted that 
the time for acting upon the subject of entering the American Union 
had not yet arrived, but added that it was proper to make an expres- 
sion of sentiment. Annexation, said the committee, was " already 
emphatically willed by the people of both countries " ; and now, 
when the citizens of the United States had shaken off the politicians 
who defeated the measure and the long cherished desire seemed to 
be at the point of realization, " would it not evince the greatest in- 
gratitude to our friends who espoused our cause, and staked their 
political hopes on the issue," to change? Moreover annexation is 
for the best interests of Texas, continued the report. The object 
of government, according to our constitution, is "to .establish just- 
ice, insure domestic tranquility, [and] provide for the common 
defence and general welfare." Beside these benefits " the imaginary 
glory" of independence fades into nothingness; and all of these ends 
would be better gained by joining the United States than by under- 
taking " the tardy, uncertain, and hazardous experiment of build- 
ing up a new government, burdened with a heavy debt, and possessed 
of peculiar domestic institutions which invite the improper inter- 
ference and misplaced philanthropy of the world ? " We need pro- 
tection against the predatory warfare of Mexico; we need to be 
defended against the Indians ; and we need a naval strength, with- 
out which we cannot send out merchant ships. With annexation 
would come peace, security, American capital and population, com- 
merce, manufacturing, increase of values, and the permanence of 
distinctively republican influences. Most of the Texans are from 
the United States and have relatives there ; and the two peoples 
are the same in language, customs and religion. Were a Euro- 
pean immigration, promoted by monarchical governments, to fill our 
territory, the republican character of our institutions would change, 
and irritation between us and our powerful neighbor would follow. 
The American Union itself might perish, and " the enemies of con- 
stitutional liberty triumph. "^^ 

This address indicates clearly the existence of a serious tendency 
in the contrary direction, and nine days later the committee on the 
state of the Republic reported in the House of Representatives as 
follows: "Resolved, That if the present Congress of the United 
States shall finally adjourn without the adoption of such measures 

" (Report) F. O., Texas, xiii. Wash. Globe, Feb. 22, 1845. 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 379 

as shall leave our restoration to the Union beyond all reasonable 
doubt, it will be the duty of the Executive to enter into such negotia- 
tions for treaties with other powers, as will relieve our staple prod- 
ucts from duties in foreign Ports," and secure to those powers a 
similar advantage here. The resolution was defeated by a substan- 
tial majority; but this, Elliot understood, was because it seemed 
to put constraint upon the United States; and the fact that it was 
oflfered had considerable significance. On the other hand Ashbel 
Smith, now the Secretary of State, wrote to the Texan charge at 
Washington that the President wished him to use his " most strenuous 
exertions in every proper manner to accomplish the annexation of 
Texas to the American Union — a measure earnestly desired by " his 
government. But this injunction signified nothing regarding the 
intentions of the Executive, since Raymond could now wield no ap- 
preciable influence in the matter; and its apparent meaning is offset 
by Jones's distinct intimation to Elliot that no move towards the 
United States would be made by him. No doubt, like certain pre- 
vious instructions that have been mentioned, it was given for merely 
strategical reasons. ^- 

Very soon arrived the joint resolution passed by the American 
House of Representatives, but it received no cordial welcome. The 
British minister described the terms as " hard conditions," much 
less favorable than the friends of annexation had expected and a 
source of encouragement to the opposition. It was urged, he re- 
ported, that the proposition was entirely one-sided ; that a State 
government would cost as much as the existing regime ; that under 
the American fiscal system living would be dearer and trade less 
advantageous ; that the United States ought at least to have guaran- 
teed the possession of all the territory claimed by Texas, especially 
as they, having no responsibility for her debts, could afford to be 
liberal with Mexico about the boundary, and might negotiate away 
the land needed to pay those obligations with ; that under the con- 
stitution the sense of the people could not fairly be taken in time to 
have a new organic law ready for presentation to the American 
Congress by the first of January, 1846 ; and that no conditions regard- 
ing slavery ought to have been made. Besides, there was no assur- 
ance that even these terms would be adopted by the United States 

'^Resolution) Elliot, No. s, Feb. 8, 1845. To Raymond, Feb. 11, 1845. 
Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844. Don. (to Calhoun. Jan. 30, 1845: Jameson, Cal- 
houn Corr., 1023) said Elliot and Saligny, though not in Texas, were exerting 
themselves actively against annexation. 



380 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Senate; and Elliot wrote, "I certainly have no belief" that such 
will be the case. The Galveston Civilian, a pro-British and pro- 
Houston sheet, exclaimed: Texas is to give everything, receiving 
" nothing in return but the name of being a state in the American 
Union," and her labor system will be menaced by the growing anti- 
slavery sentiment of the North. The National Register, edited by a 
confidential friend of Houston's, after describing Brown's plan in 
lurid terms of indignation and contempt, which probably only the 
ex-President's vivid imagination was capable of supplying, declared 
that its picture was but " a dim and totally inadequate view of the 
actual pit and grave of insignificance and infamy " into which the 
American House of Representatives desired to plunge Texas, 
there to lie in " national abeyance and limbo " " in a state of imbecile 
and hopeless dependence " upon the United States, and never to be 
annexed until no more political capital could be manufactured from 
the issue. This was perhaps the angriest explosion, but the general 
attitude of the Texan editors on the subject was described by the 
New Orleans Picayune as both " unpleasant " and " unexpected." 
" K the tone of earnest indignation in which they speak is not sin- 
cere," admitted the New York Coniniercial Advertiser, "it is at 
least exceedingly well counterfeited." Another revulsion of feeling 
appeared to have set in. The New York Tribune pronounced the 
House resolution a failure ; and the Morning News of that city, like 
the Enquirer of Richmond, called upon Polk to begin afresh by 
sending a plenipotentiary to the offended republic. ^^ 

Meanwhile hints were appearing that an alternative would soon 
be placed before the anxious Texans. In December, 1844, the 
Civilian announced that the country would have an opportunity 
before long to choose between recognition by Alexico on the basis 
of permanent independence and a longer period of suspense on the 
mere chance of being accepted by the United States. Early in Feb- 
ruary, 1845, the National Register published another editorial that 
sounded like Houston, representing that England and France clearly 
perceived the great interest they had in the permanent nationality 
of Texas, were willing to place commercial intercourse with her 
on " the most liberal footing," would ask no concessions or equiva- 

^'To Raymond, Jan. 27, 1845. Elliot, No. 7, Feb, 15, 1845. Galv. Civilian, 
Feb. 12, 1845. (Bias of Civilian) N. Orl. Courier, Nov. 27, 1845. Nat. Reg., 
Feb. 22, 1845. (Friend) Don., No. 21, April 29, 1845. N. Orl. Picayune: Wash. 
Globe. March 22, 1845. N. Y. Com. Adv.: London Times, April 14, 1845. N. Y. 
Tribune, March 25, 1845 (also News and Enq.). 



THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 38 1 

lents except resolute independence, and, should this condition be 
offered, would compel Mexico forthwith to lay aside her airs of 
hostility; and later that month the same journal printed a letter 
from " a gentleman of high position in Europe," which it described 
as giving an official assurance that should annexation to the United 
States be prevented, there remained " the certainty of peace and an 
immediate recognition " upon the " simple ground " of evincing due 
willingness to remain a nation.^'* 

Elliot about the same time had several talks with the Secretary 
of State, who by his own admission preferred that course, and he 
reported Smith and Jones as agreeing that the temper of the people 
was changing again, and that — should terms based on permanent 
independence be offered now by Mexico — they would be very gen- 
erally acceptable and would be steadfastly maintained. Recognition, 
it had no doubt been feared, would facilitate the absorption of Texas 
by the United States ; but Elliot pointed out to his government 
that a state of peace would bring in a population not at all inclined 
to join the American Union, — a prospect well calculated to reassure 
Great Britain and France and to soothe the pride of Mexico. The 
signs pointed then towards close commercial relations with England 
and through her assistance an early conclusion of the nominal war ; 
and in March the Mexican consul at New Orleans wrote home that 
according to the general opinion Texas would refuse to be annexed. ^^ 

=* Elliot, No. 7, Feb, 15, 1845. Galv. Civilian, Dec. 14, 1844. Nat. Reg., 
Feb. 8, 15, 1845. 

'-'Smith, Remin., 81, 82. Elliot, No. 10, March 6, 1845. Arrangoiz, No. 
54 (res.), March 18, 1845. 



XVIII 

The Policy of England and France in Reference to the An- 
nexation OF Texas 

As early as April. 1830, ]\Iexico drew England's attention to 
Texas, and mentioned in particular the desire of the United States 
to obtain it. Gorostiza, her minister at London, had a formal inter- 
view with Aberdeen, declared that his country " would never volun- 
tarily consent " to the cession of the province, and expressed a wish 
to know the feeling of Great Britain on the subject. His Lordship, 
indeed, had already said that " the severing of a part of the Mexican 
territory would be of general significance, and could not suit the 
interests of England," but Mexico now desired something more ex- 
plicit. To this Aberdeen replied that Great Britain felt deeply con- 
cerned about the matter. He did not believe the United States, 
however anxious to possess this important region, entertained hostile 
intentions against the owners of it; but he asked Gorostiza to call 
at any hour when he should have cause to suspect the existence of 
such designs.^ 

As it has already been suggested, there were ample reasons why 
Great Britain should oppose our acquiring Texas. The area, wealth 
and population of the United States would be increased ; the danger 
of our absorbing also the Mexican republic, where England had 
large interests, would become more imminent ; and our hold upon 
the Gulf of Mexico would be strengthened. At the same time Great 
Britain would lose the priceless advantage of possessing a source of 
cotton supply outside of the United States and the profitable oppor- 
tunity to land merchandise at Galveston, under a low rate of duties, 
not only for the Texas market but for illicit introduction into the 
adjacent portions of two high tarifif countries. There was also 
another ground of objection probably. Besides extending American 
slavery, annexation would reinforce it; and both of these results 
were contrary to British policy.^ 

'See General Note, p. i. Gorostiza to Relac., No. lo (res.), Aoril 22, 1830: 
Sria. Relac. 

''According to the best English opinion, the annexation of Texas to the United 
States was quite liable to be followed by the annexation of Mexico. Pakenham, 
long minister to Mexico, wrote to the British Foreign Office (No. 22, April 14, 

382 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FR.\NCE 383 

In October, 1843, Elliot was shown the despatch from Van Zandt 
which announced that the American government had informally but 
earnestly suggested union to Texas ; and in December Fox, the quiet 
but watchful British minister at Washington, called the attention of 
the Foreign Office to portions of Tyler's annual Message which he 
thought pointed in that direction. Lord Aberdeen, believing that 
Houston desired the maintenance of nationality seems to have been 
confident that no favor would be shown to such a proposal by 
his administration, and therefore had seen little danger; but the 
President's Message and the report from Elliot aroused him consid- 
erably, it is probable, for on the ninth of January, 1844, he addressed 
a note on the subject to Pakenham, who had now been transferred 
from Alexico to Washington. At about this time Ashbel Smith, the 
Texan charge, was in Paris. There he discussed with Guizot the 
interests of his nation ; and then, going to London, he conferred with 
Aberdeen. As a result of these interviews — if Guizot w^as right in 
what he stated to the Chamber of Deputies — His Lordship addressed 
a letter on the twelfth of January to the British ambassador at Paris. 
In this he said that it appeared "sufficiently evident [from Tyler's 
remarks] that the future annexation of Texas" to the United States 
was " contemplated by the President " ; that the government of Louis 
Philippe had recognized the new republic, and " the Interests of the 
two Countries [England and France] in that part of America were, 
in all respects, the same " ; and that consequently he presumed that 
France, like England, " would not . . . look with indifiference upon 
any measure, by which Texas should cease to exist as a, separate 
and independent State." He therefore instructed Cowley to ascer- 
tain whether the cabinet of His Majesty shared these views, and in 
that case to " propose that the Representatives of the two Govern- 
ments at Washington and in Texas, should be instructed to hold the 
same Language ; deprecating all interference on the part of the 
United States in the afifairs of Texas, or the adoption of any measure 
tending to the destruction of the separate existence of that State ; 
at the same time, warning the Texian Government not to furnish the 
United States with any just cause of Complaint, and encouraging 
them to look to the preservation of their independence, as the best 
security for their ultimate prosperity, both political and commercial."^ 

1844: F. O., America, cdiv.) : "it may be feared that if the present project [the 
annexation of Texas] should unfortunately take effect, the Independence of 
Mexico will cease to be worth many years purchase." 

* Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Fox, Dec. 13, 1843. (Believinp) Smith, No. 55, 
June 2, 1844. To Pak., No. i, Jan. 9, 1844. (Guizot) Le Nat,, Feb. 2, 1846 



384 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Three days later Cowley replied that on a recent visit at the 
Tuileries, before these instructions had reached him, the King him- 
self had broached the subject, remarking that it appeared from the 
President's Message as if the United States- intended to bring about 
annexation, a point of no slight importance; that the scheme ought 
to be opposed ; and that Guizot had been desired to open negotiations 
on the matter with Her Majesty's government. It was therefore 
not surprising that when the despatch of January 12 was made 
known to Guizot, he entirely concurred in its views, replied that 
Sainte Aulaire, the French ambassador at London, would be in- 
structed at once to confer with Aberdeen, and Pageot, the minister 
at Washington, to act in strict concert with Pakenham, and re- 
marked further that he personally thought it of importance to 
oppose the designs of the United States in this matter. On the 
twenty-ninth of the month the instructions to Saint Aulaire were 
actually issued, and in them Guizot went so far as to say, " It would 
not suit us under any consideration to accept without protest such 
a change " as the absorption of Texas. The instructions to Pageot 
were dated February 10, and he was told to inform the government 
of the United States clearly that even should the people of that 
republic wish to be annexed, France " could not view such an event 
(fait) with indifference." Thus the concert of the two powers on 
the subject was inaugurated.* 

To understand why Louis Philippe embarked upon this course, 
it is necessary to study the matter somewhat carefully. In July, 
1836, Cuevas, the Mexican minister at Paris, reporting that a war 
between Mexico and the American Union was generally believed 
there to have begun, said he did not doubt " for a moment " that his 
country would receive from France and England " all the support 
which their commerce with Mexico, their ardent desire to check 
the aggressive (iinxisora) policy of the United States and the justice 
of the Mexican cause demanded " ; and from this it may be inferred 
what ideas he was endeavoring to inculcate. Two months later the 
Mexican department of foreign relations instructed him " to secure 
by all possible means the rectification of public opinion " in France, 
which it was feared that accounts of the atrocities perpetrated in 
Texas would affect. Cuevas had anticipated this order. In July 

(This trip to London does not appear in Smith's reports). To Cowley, Ko. 16, 
Jan. 12, 1844. A copy of this despatch was sent to Elliot, Jan. 31, 1844. 

'Cowley, Jan. 15, 1844. To Ste. Aulaire, Jan. 29, 1844: Le Const., Jan. 12, 
1846. To Pageot, Feb. 10, 1844: ib. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 385 

La Prcsse of Paris had contained an article, the basis of which had 
been furnished by him, declaring that the United States had " inher- 
ited the ancient Punic faith of England," and that in the eyes of the 
great American republic " all means were good." Cuevas had 
already enlisted the Journal dcs Dcbats also in his campaign, and in 
July that paper had printed an article on the United States especially 
designed to bring odium upon this country for tolerating slavery. 
After receiving his orders to influence public opinion it may be 
assumed that the minister did not relax his efforts ; and his successor 
brought out and distributed the following year large numbers of the 
pamphlet prepared by Gorostiza, which attributed to the United 
States an improper and encroaching policy in the Texas affair. 
Diplomats, journalists and government officials were the persons he 
endeavored to instruct in this way, and he believed that his exertions 
were not without success." 

By these methods very likely the French government were some- 
what stimulated to regard the aims of the United States as ambitious 
and aggressive ; and, in addition to such promptings, Louis Philippe 
had ample reasons for desiring to prevent the annexation of Texas. As 
a monarch, he could not look with favor upon the development of a 
powerful republic. Royalty was his trade. The time had gone by 
when he had thought it for his interest to flatter democrats, and 
now he feared and detested them. He was " every inch a King," 
said our representative at his court in suggesting this explanation of 
his conduct. Moreover, as a sovereign by the right of revolution he 
found himself isolated in Europe, his government, said the Amer- 
ican minister, having " never been viewed with a favorable eye by the 
great continental monarchies." It was England that had taken the 
lead in acknowledging him, and England, he felt, was still his " main 
stay." Threatened every moment, not only by this legitimist ill- 
will but by the strong revolutionary tendencies of France and Europe, 
it was upon British support that he counted to maintain that peace 
among the nations and the peoples which he deemed essential to the 
security of his dynasty and the prosperity of France; and, besides 
wishing to oblige his almost indispensable neighbor, he could see 
that the two countries, having somewhat similar interests in the 
Texas affair, would naturally be drawn together by joint action 

* Cuevas to Relac, No. 67, July 13, 1836: Sria. Relac. Relac. to Cuevas, No. 
102, Sept. 12, 1836. La Presse, July 5, 1836. Dcbats, July 12, 1836. Mangino 
to Relac, No. 28, July 13, 1837: Sria. Relac. 

26 



386 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



regarding it. Moreover he desired in particular to earn the assent 
of England to the marriage of Montpensier and the Infanta.^ 

As a Latin, too, the King could not rejoice in the upbuilding of 
a great " Anglo-Saxon " power in America. As a Bourbon he was 
peculiarly tenacious of the family compact idea, and he well under- 
stood that in case of the failure of the direct line the French branch 
would inherit a claim to Spain and all Spanish America. As a mem- 
ber of the Orleans house, if Lc National of Paris was right, he had 
inherited the policy of favoring England. As a believer in the bal- 
ance of power, he felt opposed to the existence of any greatly pre- 
ponderant nation in the western hemisphere ; and in particular he 
was keenly alive to the danger that our neighbor on the south might 
suffer from American encroachments. Indeed, he told the Mexican 
minister explicitly in July, 1844, that the ambition of the United 
States would not be satisfied with Texas, but " would follow its 
aggressive system at the expense of Mexico unless a strong barrier 
were immediately established between the two countries " ; and he 
dwelt on the same point in his conversation with Cowley." 

Moreover, France had recognized Texas in the expectation of 
securing commercial benefits ; and while as yet almost nothing had 
been accomplished — two vessels carrying all the trade in 1845 — there 
were still opportunities and hopes, especially as a former French 
colonist in Texas felt able to say that the French-speaking element 
there was the strongest except the American, and that the tastes and 
habits of the people made them like French goods. It was, besides, 
a point of pride to save a power which His Majesty had acknowl- 
edged as independent from being swallowed up by another nation. 
In fact, after recognizing Texas the King had logically desired from 
the first that her nationality become real, and as early as May, 1841, 
the following curious dialogue had occurred between him and the 
Mexican representative at his court. 

" Have you news from Mexico?" inquired His Majesty. 

"I have recently received quite satisfactory news," replied Garro. 

"The country is at peace? You believe, Monsieur Garro, that 
there will be no war? " 

" That is my hope, Sire." 

" I am glad, for you know that I do not like war, which is a 
great evil." 

"King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844: No. 21, Jan. i, 1846. Martin, No. 17, Aug. 15, 
1845. Bancroft to Polk, Nov. 3, 1846: Bancroft Pap. 

'(Claim) London Atlas. Aug. 16, 1845. Le Nat.. Jan. 27, 1845. Garro, No. 
IS (res.), July 4, 1844. Cowley, Jan. 15, 1844. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 387 

" Certainly, Sire." 

" So there will be no war ? That is best. Still, you have not 
made a treaty of peace yet." 

" Sire, I misunderstood Your Majesty and thought you spoke 
of civil war. Our war with Texas the Republic is resolved to 
continue." 

" The Spanish pronounce the name Tccas and not Tccsas, do 
they not?" 

'■ Certainly."* 

Guizot shared most of these ideas more or less strongly, no 
doubt. The new republic, he said later in the Chamber of Deputies, 
had been recognized in order to obtain raw materials on better terms 
than the United States would give, to secure lower duties than the 
American rates, to acquire valuable markets, and to avoid the annoy- 
ance of sending French merchandise to Galveston by way of New 
York. Still more strongly he dwelt upon the idea of a balance of 
power in America, and his letter to Pageot urged the value of Texas 
as a barrier against us. In the same despatch he insisted that it was 
due to the dignity of France that the national standing of that coun- 
try be respected ; and for commercial as well as political interests he 
considered it an important principle that independent states remain 
separate.^ 

There were also other reasons. Naturally he was under an 
obligation to comply with His Majesty's wishes. He felt, said 
Edward Everett, that " without the good will of the present British 
Government his own would sink." In particular there was no little 
dissatisfaction in France on account of the right of search that had 
been conceded to English cruisers with a view to the suppression of 
the slave trade ; the minister desired to have the great credit of secur- 
ing a modification of the agreement, as he actually did in 1845 ^ and 
Everett, like many French politicians, believed that he was disposed 
to gratify his neighbor in the Texas matter in order to secure this 
favor in return. Indeed, Thiers asserted flatly in the Chamber of 
Deputies that France adopted the English policy in this business in 
order to buy back the right of visit. ^"^ 

It is very likely, too, that Guizot thought the matter a small one. 

'King. No. I, July 13, 1844. (Vessels) Billault in Chamber of Deputies: 
Le Nat., Jan. 22, 1846. Revue dc Paris, March 18, 1845. Garro, No. 7 (res.), 
May 10, 1845. 

* Everett, No. 331, June 17, 1845. Dcbats. Jan. 23, 1846. To Pageot, Feb. 
10, 1844: Le Const.. Jan. 12, 1846. 

'"Everett, private, Feb. 26, 1845. London Journ. Com., June 7, 1845. Revue 
de Paris, Feb. 15, 1845. (Thiers) Dcbats, Jan. 21. 1846. 



388 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

Pageot had written about it in at least three despatches during 1843, 
asserted Berryer, without rousing any particular interest in the 
French foreign office. Probably the chief minister did not imagine 
that anything more than diplomatic operations would be called 
for. His expectation was, our representative thought, that Clay 
would be elected President in 1844, and the question of annexation 
be dropped. The reports of his agents that the Texan people did not 
wish to be absorbed, drew him in the same direction ; and in his 
despatch to Pageot he stated that the opposition against the annexa- 
tion of that country was based primarily upon the supposed unwil- 
lingness of her citizens to join the United States. In short, for all 
these reasons he believed that no harm could result from meddling, 
that he could thus accumulate merit with England, that he could 
please his master, and that he could strengthen both his own admin- 
istration and the national interests. Accordingly, though the French 
government cared intrinsically much less about the matter than did 
the English, it was determined to protest formally against the 
absorption of Texas, and after some delay instructions to that effect 
were received by Pageot.^^ 

They arrived at about the time Calhoun signed the annexation 
treaty, and the ministers of England and France, who had already 
conferred on the subject, again took counsel together. Pakenham, 
though not authorized to go as far as his colleague, had already 
remonstrated against the project in plain terms, and he would have 
felt justified now in uniting with Pageot in a formal protest, had he 
thought such a step would have " the effect of arresting the progress 
of the mischief " ; but, he reported, " I agreed with M. Pageot in 
the opinion that a simple protest on our part, unsupported by an 
intimation of more decisive measures of resistance — and this intima- 
tion neither of us were authorized to make — would have been quite 
insufficient to arrest the evil intentions of this Government." On 
the other hand, by arousing a popular outcry it might weaken the 
anti-annexation strength in the Senate, and would certainly — should 
the measure be consummated — render the position of England and 
France as passive witnesses the more " unpleasant." Consequently 
it was agreed by the two diplomats that no protest should be made.^- 

" (Pageot) Berryer: Debafs, Jan. 31, 1846. King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. 
To Pageot: Note 9. King, No, 25, Jan. 30, 1846. Smith, No. 55. June 2, 1844. 
(Cared less) Id., July i, 1844: Jones, Memor., 369. (Instructions) Pak., No. 
22, April 14, 1844. The truth about the protest was studiously concealed, and all 
kinds of assertions and conjectures in reference to it are to be met with. 

"Pak.. No. 22, April 14, 1844, 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 389 

At the end of March Pakenham had reported from Washington 
that he beHeved an annexation treaty was to be concluded " as soon 
as a certain General Henderson supposed to be now on his way from 
Texas " should arrive ; and about the middle of the following month 
he sent word that he was " assured " the treaty had been signed. 
It then occurred to the British government that perhaps these pro- 
ceedings could be checked by an appeal to international law, and on 
May 13 the opinion of Her Majesty's Advocate General was re- 
quested. With startling promptness Mr. Dodson replied only two 
days later. A state recognized as independent has the right, he 
said, to " divest Itself " of sovereignty by a treaty of annexation 
although it has made treaties with other nations, unless it has engaged 
not to do so, and even in that case is at liberty to take such a step if 
constrained by " an over ruling necessity." Little comfort could be 
derived from this opinion. In diplomacy therefore appeared to lie 
the best hope; and three days afterwards Pakenham was informed 
that immediate and anxious attention would be given to the subject.^^ 

This bore fruit within a fortnight in an interview with Murphy, 
the Mexican representative at London, and in a Memorandum of 
the conversation drawn up by him in French and modified by Aber- 
deen in English, the essential part of which ran as follows, — italics 
representing the modifications : 

" Lord Aberdeen expressed a wish to see Mexico acknowledge the 
independence of Texas. 'If Mexico,' he said, 'will concede this point, 
England (and I have reason to believe that France will join with her in 
this determination) will oppose the annexation of Texas and moreover 
he would endeavour that France and England will unite in guaranteeing 
not only the independence of Texas, but also the boundary of Mexico. 
On the other hand should Mexico persist in declining to recognize 
Texas, the intentions of England to prevent the annexation of that 
country to the United States might not be put in execution.' Upon my 
remarking that it was not at all probable the American Government 
would be willing to drop the annexation affair, even should the Amer- 
ican Senate reject the Treaty for the present. Lord Aberdeen replied 
that provided that England and Franee zvere perfectly agreed, ' it would 
matter little to England whether the American, Government should be 
willing to drop this question or not, and that, should it be necessary, she 
would go to the last extremity [jusqu' aux dernieres cxtremites] in 
support of her opposition to the annexation ; but that for this purpose it 
was essential that Mexico be disposed to acknowledge the independence 

" Pak., No. 16, March 28; No. 22, April 14, 1844. Dodson to Aberdeen, 
May 15, 1844: F. O., Texas, xi. To Pak., No. 21, May 18, 1844. 



390 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



of Texas,'" because otherwise an agreement in policy between her and 
England would be impossible. 

Such was the fully attested report of this interview. It indicated 
clearly that war with United States was contemplated, and Murphy 
was not only authorized but expected to place it before Santa Anna.^* 

A few days later a despatch was addressed to the British repre- 
sentative at Paris, and this was followed very shortly by one to 
Bankhead, accompanied by copies of the Murphy Memorandum 
and the despatch to Cowley. " You will therein see," wrote Aber- 
deen to his agent at Mexico, " that we have submitted a proposition 
to the French Government for a joint operation on the part of Great 
Britain and France in order to induce Mexico to acknowledge the 
independence of Texas, on a guarantee being jointly given by us 
that that independence shall be respected by other Nations, and that 
the Mexico-Texian boundary shall be secured from future encroach- 
ment. Should France assent to this proposal, we propose to send 
out forthwith a fit person to Texas, in the unavoidable absence of 
Captain Elliot," to ascertain whether on such a basis the people of 
that country would prefer independence to annexation, as it is be- 
lieved they would. In case our impression on this point is found 
to be correct, " we shall then take measures forthwith for operating 
directly and officially upon the Mexican Government," which we 
hope to find "amenable to our views. . . . Should they, however, 
refuse their assent, or still demur to the acknowledgment of Texas, 
it will be for England and France to take such further measures for 
attaining the desired object as they may deem expedient," — in other 
words, one may fairly understand His Lordship to mean, the purpose 
would not be abandoned.^^ 

Aberdeen learned from Pakenham, soon after the annexation 
treaty was presented to the Senate, that " the whole strength of Mr. 
Clay's party " would be thrown against it, and no doubt he perceived 
that its rejection was thus ensured ; but he felt surprised that Houston, 
after professing so earnestly to desire the maintenance of a national 
position, had suddenly taken up that project, and for this or some 

" Memo. : F. O., Mexico, clxxx. The interview was on May 28 or 29. To 
Bank., No. 16, conf., June 3, 1844. It should be noted that the Memo, zvithout the 
italicized words represents Aberdeen's ideas as Murphy understood them, and 
these words perhaps indicate merely the prudent reserve with which Aberdeen 
would naturally desire to speak to Mexico regarding the action of France. 

"To Cowley, May 31. 1844. To Bank., No. 16, conf., June 3, 1844. Aber- 
deen intimated to Smith (Smith, No. 55. June 2, 1844) that England and France 
were prepared to use force upon Mexico. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 39I 

other reason he showed considerable reserve in talking with Ashbel 
Smith, saying little for a time alx)ut his intentions or the moves 
of the powers, whereas Louis Phili])pe informed the Texan envoy 
plainly that France desired a joint and authoritative interposition 
of the two nations. On the first of June, however, Smith explained 
to him that public feeling had been too strong for the President, and 
said it was his own opinion that if Mexico would recognize his 
country and Spain would enable her to trade with Cuba by making 
a commercial treaty, her people might not care to join the United 
States. Partially reassured, Aberdeen intimated that perhaps the 
recognition could be brought about, but he still felt much anxiety 
regarding the attitude of Texas. ^"^ 

Three weeks later, however, he laid aside his reserve, and an- 
nounced that when the annexation treaty should have been rejected, 
England and France would be willing to unite with Texas, the United 
States and Mexico in a Diplomatic Act. This Act was to be equiva- 
lent to a perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition and peace, 
but preventing her from ever acquiring territory beyond the Rio 
Grande or joining the American Union. Mexico, he said, would be 
forced into acquiescence in case she should be unwilling to join, and 
it was not expected that the United States would take part. Later 
Ashbel Smith said of this plan: " The terms, effect and possible con- 
sequences to the several parties to it [including, of course, a possible 
war], were maturely considered, fully discussed and clearly under- 
stood between Lord Aberdeen and the minister of Texas." Both 
Louis Philippe and Guizot stated that France would join in the 
Act ; and President Houston, on learning of the proposition, not 
only directed Jones verbally several times to accept it, but finally 
wrote to him with his own hand this order : " Let our representatives 
be instructed to complete the proposed arrangement for the settle- 
ment of our Mexican difficulties, as soon as possible — giving the 
necessary pledges [that Texas would never consent to join the United 
States, explains Jones in a note], as suggested in the late dispatch 
of Dr. Smith on this subject."^" 

" Pak., No. 36, April 28, 1844. Smith, No. 55, June 2, 1844. 

" England and France dared make no move toward settling the Texan affair 
while the treaty was pending, lest it should become known and cause an in- 
flamed public sentiment in the United States to insist upon the ratification of 
the treaty Qones to Miller, May 3, 1844: Miller Pap.). Smith, Nos. 55, 57, 
June 2, 24, 1844. Id., Remin., 61, 62. The Act contemplated war not only with 
Mexico but with the United States, for a demand to bring Texas by force into 
the Union would certainly have arisen here, and it would have been incumbent 
upon England and France to protect her independence against us if force were 



392 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Now it is quite certain that Great Britain desired to be on friendly 
terms with this country. As far back as 1828 her minister in :\Iexico 
had been expressly notified of this wish, and ordered to " entirely 
abstain from professing or inculcating a hostile feeling " toward us. 
In 1836, while Mexico was extremely angry with her neighbor on 
the north, care was taken by the British minister at that post, under 
instructions from his government, to avoid encouraging the idea that 
any aid against us could be expected from England, or that she **' might 
be induced from a feeling of good will towards Mexico to take any 
step of a nature to give umbrage to the Government of the United 
States"; and in June, 1842, referring to rumors that Great Britain 
was encouraging Mexico, Pakenham wrote that " So far from acting 
in a sense so little likely to be approved by Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment," he had urged the Mexican authorities to satisfy our just 
demands.^* 

In fact, England could not afford to fight this country, and she 
knew it. The amount of her capital engaged in commerce with 
*the United States was described by Aberdeen himself as "vast." 
The value of British exports to the American market can be seen 
from the fact that three years later, according to Lord Bentinck, 
twenty out of the twenty-eight million dollars of the United States 
customs revenue were derived from British goods; while an article 
in the Xew York Journal of Commerce showed that England pur- 
chased $16,000,000 worth of our products more than we received 
from her. Moreover, said the London Mercantile Journal in 1844, 
the only American import that England could do without was to- 
used. Note what Pakenham and Pageot said (paragraph 23) about the action 
that would be taken by the United States in case England and France should 
undertake to ensure the independence of Texas. (Verbally) Jones, Memor., 43. 
Houston to Jones. Sept. 23, 1844: Niles., Ixxiv., 413. Jones (Memor., 59) says 
that under the Diplomatic Act France would have been willing to fight in order 
to prevent annexation. By July 19, Calhoun received information, in which he 
placed the most implicit confidence, that England, aided (it was said) by France, 
intended to force Mexico to recognize Texas on the condition that Texas would 
remain independent (Lewis to Jackson, July 19, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville 
Coll.). How Houston reconciled his order with his hopes of Texan expansion 
is a mystery. Possibly, feeling that he had better make sure of the essential, 
he decided to sacrifice those hopes ; but more probably he had some scheme in 
mind. It is noticeable that whereas England and France intended to prevent 
Texas from either joining the .U. S. or crossing the Rio Grande, his order con- 
templated (according to Jones) only the first of these limitations. The order 
as printed mentions Smith and Daingerfield as the Texas representatives, but 
the names may have been inserted by Jones as explanatory. 

'"To Pak., April 21, 1828. E. g.. Pak., Xo. 42, May 27, 1836; No. 49, June 
2, 1842. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 393 

bacco, and the others amounted to ahnost $65,000,000. According 
to that authority, the United States took about '?4,ooo,ooo in cotton 
manufactures alone, and nearly $6,000,000 in woolens. The London 
Economist well described the two countries as commercial comple- 
ments. Now not only would England lose her trade with us during 
the period of conflict but, as Le Correspondant of Paris remarked, 
we should be stimulated meanwhile to set up manufacturing estab- 
lishments of our own, and British mill-owners and merchants, ruined 
by the suspension of their trade, would be likely to cross the sea and 
conduct their business here. Early in 1844 the Liverpool Mercury 
declared that a war with the Ignited States, even if successful, 
" would be a calamity of a most fatal description." In March, 1845, 
when the danger of trouble over the Oregon question seemed real, 
the unsentimental Economist drew a most vivid and startling picture 
of the harm that would result ; and all of these considerations were 
equally forcible a little earlier. ^Moreover, an income tax to meet the 
deficit in revenue was already necessary. ^^ 

England was hampered also by the complications of her foreign 
policy in India, China, Africa and Oceanica, and she was even more, 
embarrassed by the condition of Ireland. In May, 1845, the London 
Examiner said, "The popular press [of that country] teems with 
the worst sort of treason ; . . . a treason ready to league with any 
foreign foe." The same month Peel himself intimated in Parlia- 
ment that in case of a conflict with the United States the Irish might 
cause serious difficulties; and the London Atlas remarked that some 
of their journals contemplated, " with a sort of savage satisfaction, 
not only the prospect of a war, but the probability of Ireland's 
uniting with the enemies " of Great Britain. Trouble was scented 
from another source also. The Atlas admitted that "the republi- 
cans of Canada " plainly indicated " an intention of throwing over- 
board their allegiance whenever an army of 50,000 repealers [of the 
union between Ireland and England] should choose to cross the 
Canadian borders." Moreover the continent was at this time a 
smouldering volcano preparing for the eruptions of 1848; and the 
L'nited States consul at Bremen wrote to Calhoun that the Roths- 
childs would not permit any European power to go to war in 

'"To Elliot, No. 10, July 3, 1845. (Bentinck) London Times, Nov. 25, 1847. 
N. Y. Jourti. Com.: Britannia, Oct. 19, 1844. Mercantile Journ., Aug. 26, 1844. 
Economist, Sept. 13, 1845. -^^ Correspondant , Jan. i, 1846. Mercury: Nat. Intell., 
May 9, 1844. Economist, March 28, 1845. 



394 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



America, since the consequence would be a series of revolutions 
near home.-*' 

Still further, it would have been absurd to fight the United States 
on the Texas question, when England was pursuing a course of high- 
handed aggression abroad. In April, 1844, the Atlas protested 
against the policy of the government as follows : 

'■ It is somewhat far-fetched to ground our operations [against 
Gwalior] upon an old treaty for the maintenance of a prince, because 
his regent was obnoxious to us, when that very prince, and his whole 
army and people, not only declined the assistance of their soi-disant 
allies, but opposed them with their whole force. It is, in fact, the his- 
tory of all our Indian aggressions. We first enter into a treaty for the 
support of some particular family or dynasty, in the full certainty that, 
amidst the intrigues and revolutions which occur in oriental despotisms, 
we shall be called upon to interfere, and then we claim the whole 
heritage for ourselves." 

What looked yet worse, England had recently laid herself open to 
the charge of forcing opium upon the Chinese at the point of her 
sword. For a power conducting such operations to proclaim that 
the United States could not absorb a small independent nation quite 
willing to join us would have been laughable, — if not, as Lc Consti- 
tiitioinicl termed it, mad. Yet it is perfectly clear that Great Britain 
was so anxious to prevent annexation that she stood ready, if sup- 
ported as her minister indicated, to undertake a war in order to 
establish at the Sabine a perpetual barrier against us. That such 
was the meaning of the Murphy Memorandum and also of the 
Diplomatic Act is already evident enough, and the close concert 
between the two powers makes the French government a full acces- 
sory in this design ; but, as if to place the matter beyond question, 
the British representative in Mexico was instructed in December, 
1844, to inform Santa Anna's cabinet that its course would " paralyse 
the exertions by which Great Britain and France were prepared to 
uphold the Independence of Texas against the encroachments of the 
United States, even at the risk of a collision with that Power."-^ 

The Diplomatic Act, however, although the French ambassador 
had full authority to sign it and everything could have been com- 
pleted at one sitting, never was passed. When Anson Jones received 

'^Examiner. May 17, 1845. (Peel) London Times, May 5, 1845. Atlas, 
Sept. 2, 1844; Jan. 4, 1845. Mann to Calhoun, Oct. 31, 1844: Jameson. Calhoun 
Corr., 982. 

^^ Atlas. April 6, 1844. Le Const.. July 25, 1845. To Bank., No. 49, Dec. 
31, 1844. For meaning of the Act see note 17. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 395 

written instructions to conclude it, he was already President-elect 
of the republic ; and instead of obeying he sent the representative of 
Texas in France and England leave of absence to return home. 
Smith, who was quite friendly to Jones, fully believed that he did 
this because he thought the project of annexation had been killed 
or indefinitely postponed, and wished to reserve for his own admin- 
istration the glory of making peace ; and when Smith reached home 
Jones complacently said to him, " The negotiation shall take place 
here, and you as Secretary of State shall conduct it for Texas." 
Before anything was accomplished, however, the time for this meas- 
ure had entirely passed.-- 

No better fared the rest of the programme. The same docu- 
ments were sent to Pakenham as to Bankhead, and that minister 
promptly conferred again with Pageot. Little discussion was nec- 
essary, and on the twenty-seventh of June Pakenham replied to 
Aberdeen substantially as follows : The rejection of the late treaty 
does not settle the question of annexation, and the Presidential elec- 
tion will turn upon it. Should Clay be successful, the project would 
not be abandoned ; but " there would at least be a prospect of its 
being discussed with the calmness and dignity required by its impor- 
tance, and by the interest which other Powers are justly entitled to 
take in it." For this reason England and France should avoid doing 
anything that would injure Clay's chances, and the plan in view 
" should not be known in this Country until after the Election." He 
urged further that any arrangement adopted for such a purpose 
should allow the United States to be really a party to it; and he 

"Smith, Remin., 62-65. Jones's explanation was somewhat different (Memor., 
43, 57, 44, 55, 56). He said that, by an understanding with the President, he 
had been already vested with " the actual discharge of the Executive functions " 
(the accuracy of which assertion is directly disproved by the fact that Houston 
gave him this order) and that obedience would have meant war. But as he 
stated that annexation itself would have meant war, had France lived up to her 
agreements, and asserted that he was the architect of annexation, his action does 
not seem to have been due to fear of a conflict between England and the United 
States. In another passage of his Memoranda he intimated that obedience to 
the order might have defeated or delayed annexation and he would have suffered 
blame in consequence ; but in view of his course, as it will appear in the next 
chapter, to say nothing of other aspects of it, this explanation appears entirely 
unsatisfactory. In still another place in his book he says, " I felt at liberty to 
suspend the execution of the order." This corresponds quite well with Ashbel 
Smith's very credible explanation, and is doubtless the truth. Jones's inaction 
per se, however, would probably not have prevented England and France from 
pursuing their policy. He himself has said that all they wanted was a pretext 
for interference, and that they would not have cared whether the people of 
Texas approved of the Diplomatic Act or not ; and if England was ready to 
coerce Mexico, whose good-will it was highly important to retain, it does not 
seem likely that the Texas Secretary of State could have barred the way. 



7q6 the annexation of TEXAS 

warned his government that if their plan were executed, " that is to 
say, if England and France should unite in determining to secure 
the independence of Texas without the consent and concurrence of 
this Country previously obtained," that determination would probably 
be met by the immediate annexation and occupation of Texas, 
''leaving it to the guaranteeing Powers to carry out the objects of 
the agreement as best they might " ; while should either England or 
France undertake to put the scheme through alone, " the announce- 
ment of such an intention would be met here by measures of the 
most extreme resistance." In the same sense wrote Pageot to the 
government of France.-^ 

England for her part felt the strength of this plea for delay; 
and on the eighteenth of July Aberdeen informed Cowley that 
Pakenham's despatch furnished " much ground for serious reflec- 
tion," and that in view of it England was disposed " to defer, at all 
events until a more fitting season," the execution of the projected 
measure. This in all probability, however, did not mean that it 
had at once been decided, upon hearing from Washington, to aban- 
don a plan so carefully weighed and repeatedly announced. No sub- 
stantial evidence of such a decision has been found ; there was no 
occasion to determine at this time upon anything more than post- 
ponement ; and it is practically impossible to believe that the British 
government, after deliberately adopting a policy that manifestly 
contemplated the chance of war and after officially stating that it 
mattered little what the United States might do so long as French 
support could be reckoned upon, would turn tail at the very first 
intimation of trouble with this country, and decide to leave the field 
before knowing what their ally would choose to do. Such ministers 
could neither demand respect nor respect themselves. " Reflection " 
was proper in such a case; postponement until after the American 
election was evidently expedient ; and naturally England wished in 
particular to see how fir she would be able to rely upon her asso- 
ciate after that power should have considered fully the advices from 
Washington.-* 

Nior can any evidence be discovered that France resolved at once 
to retire. For her also there was really no occasion as yet to make 
such a decision. A pause was suggested by the circumstances and 

^To Pak., No. 24. June 3, 1844. Pak., No, 76, June 2T, 1844. 

"To Cowley, No. 202, July 18, 1844. From Aberdeen's language it would 
seem likely that the idea of a longer postponement occurred to him but was laid 
aside ; but his phraseology may have been used merely to avoid all appearance of 
applying pressure to France. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 397 

recommended by her ally. She therefore replied that she too thought 
it would be well to make no move until after the close of our Presi- 
dential campaign, and then her charge in Texas was directed to 
employ all suitable arguments against the sacrifice of nationality. 
It is likely enough, however, that Guizot now began to think more 
seriously than before of the policy proposed by England.^^ 

\\'hen the course of the French cabinet in this matter finally came 
into public view, the outcry against it was furious. In the Chamber 
of Deputies its action was denounced by the eloquent Berryer as an 
undignified intrigue. Bad faith towards the United States was 
charged. How can America trust us? demanded Le Constitntionnel. 
It was entirely wrong, said many, to turn against an ancient comrade 
and valuable customer without the strongest of reasons. Not only 
was the American Union an ally and friend, but the mere existence 
of that republic, said Thiers, had prevented the nations of Europe 
from pointing to France as the only representative of the principles 
of the revolution ; and the development of the United States, causing 
England anxiety, had compelled her to treat France with more con- 
sideration than formerly. It was pronounced a fatal policy to 
alienate or weaken a people whose aid might any day be needed 
against Great Britain. " The United States are perhaps the only 
nation in the v^^orld besides France for which I desire greatness," 
exclaimed Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies with this last point 
in view.-'^ 

Above all, the government were attacked on the ground that 
Guizot, '' the man of England," was not only sacrificing the true 
interests of his country but promoting those of her ancient enemy. 
Texas must be either American or English, it was argued. The pre- 
ponderance that France has to fear is a preponderance on the ocean, 
not on the continent of America, said Billault in the Chamber. Bal- 
ance of power indeed! exclaimed La Revue Independante ; England 
already has half the world, and must we help her to maintain that 
sort of equilibrium? It is better for us, argued Thiers, that the 
small states b' long to the American Union, for if they remain inde- 
pendent, fear of England will turn them against us. Our trade with 
Texas, it was suggested, never can be large so long as her growth is 
checked by Mexican raids; but that country, if incorporated in the 
United States, would develop as Louisiana has done, and France 

"Cowley, July 22, 1844. To Saligny, Aug. i, 1844: Le Const., Jan. 12, 1846. 
"(Borryer, Thiers, Billault): Dcbats, Jan. 21-23, 3i. 1846. Le Const., Jan. 
31, 1846. Jollivet, Nouveaux Docs. Amer., 9. 



398 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



would have her share of the business. " Touching self-abnegation ! " 
sneered the sarcastic; we ofifend a traditional ally and labor for a 
traditional foe. Besides, answered the cautious, England is in such 
a situation at present that she could not fight ; and if we allow her 
to get us into trouble, we may get out of it as best we can." 

Guizot has well been described as largely a man of the closet. 
He was not very near to the people ; but he and his associates were 
far too shrewd not to foresee all these complaints and charges, when 
it was found that England and France could not carry the affair 
through high-handedly without serious opposition. Moreover these 
ideas, soon to be trumpeted in the newspapers and the tribune, were 
no doubt already circulating, in the summer of 1844, among the 
keen and well-informed public men of the country, and probably 
whisperings had begun to reach him. In fact some expressions of 
opinion had already been published. During May a writer in Le 
Constitiitionncl declared, " the Americans could not without madness 
allow Texas to become an independent and rival state." At about 
the same time Le National maintained that the struggle in that coun- 
try was one between Great Britain and the United States. England, 
though she endeavors to put " a moral sign on the shop door " by 
raising the slavery question, is trying to injure the United States and 
increase her own power in the Gulf of Mexico, said Le Correspon- 
dant. We are told that Guizot has protested against the annexation 
of Texas, remarked Le Constitiitionnel, and this does not surprise 
us : " It is much more in line with the policy of England than with 
that of France." It is unfortunate for us to be tied to the English 
cabinet, protested Le National about the middle of ]\Iay. Even the 
Journal dcs Debats, commonly regarded as an administration paper, 
felt compelled to say about the first of June : " We believe that 
France has no occasion to occupy herself with the annexation of 
Texas to the North American confederation." According to Wilmer 
and Smith's European Times, the agitation over the affair had 
now created a marked sensation at Paris, and had revived the 
talk of making common cause with the United States against Eng- 
land in order to throw off the insulting yoke of British supremacy.-® 

Louis Philippe and Guizot must have begun to understand that 

"^ Le Not., May 27, 1844. Le Const., June 13, 1845. Debats, Jan. 21-23, 
1846. Revue hidependante, Jan. 25, 1846. Lettre d'un Citoyen de New York, 
20-21. Le Const., June 13. 1845. Le Correspondant, Jan. i, 1846. 

^King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. 1-e Const., May 26, 1844. Le Nat., May 20, 
16, 1844. Le Correspondant, June, 1844. Debats: N. Orl. Courier, June 28, 
1844. European Times, June 4, 1844. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 399 

the consent of Parliament and the country to an Anglo-French war 
against the United States could not easily be obtained. " Every 
attempt to enlist France in a diplomatic — still more in an armed — 
resistance to the views of North America would meet death before 
the invincible repugnance of the country and the Chamber," de- 
clared La Revue de Paris a few months later, and this was already 
becoming probable if not certain. Guizot will blunder if he dare to 
transform his diplomatic hostility against the United States into real 
hostility, for the country would not follow him, was a warning from 
La Rci'ite Indcpcndaiitc that could easily be foreseen. Public opin- 
ion renders Guizot's position weak on account of his English pro- 
clivities, reported the American minister at Paris in December, 1844; 
and to a large extent the head of the cabinet must have understood 
this much earlier. Besides, the feeling of the nation towards Mexico 
was by no means cordial. Neither the causes, the events nor the 
unsatisfactory ending of the recent war had yet been forgotten. A 
little later Thiers remarked that France owed less deference to that 
republic than to any other American state. In June, 1844, Le Siecle 
of Paris said, " We wish Texas to be independent ... as a counter- 
poise or curb for Mexico." " The annexation of Texas presents the 
double advantage of augmenting the power of the United States, our 
natural allies beyond the Atlantic," observed La Rcvuc do Paris, 
" and of dealing a hard blow at that sad government of Mexico, 
against which we have so many grounds of complaint."-^ 

Meantime King, the American representative, had not been idle. 
Early in July he dined with Louis Philippe; and after dinner, bring- 
ing up the subject of Texas in a familiar conversation, His Majesty 
asked why the annexation treaty had been rejected. This afforded 
an opening, and the minister made all he could of it. He expressed 
his firm belief that a decided majority of the Americans favored the 
measure ; that although temporarily defeated on account of " polit- 
ical considerations of a domestic nature," it " would certainly be con- 
summated at no distant period " ; and that the interests of France, 
being purely commercial and quite distinct from those of England, 
would actually be promoted by such an arrangement ; upon which 
the King, while frankly admitting his desire to see the young republic 
remain independent, assured his guest that France " would not pro- 
ceed to the extent of acts hostile or unfriendly to the United States 
in reference to the Texas question." Probably, however, the assur- 

'^ Revue de Paris, Feb. 15, 1845. Revue htdependante, Jan. 25, 1846. King, 
No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. (Thiers) Dcbats, Jan. 21, 1846, Le Sidcle, June 14, 1844. 



400 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



ance thus reported by the American minister was couched in diplo- 
matic as well as gracious terms, and was expressed in a language 
which he cannot have used much, if at all, for nearly thirty years ; 
and in view of the concert with England it must be supposed that he 
was unduly impressed by its apparent cordiality. In real truth it 
can have indicated nothing more than a politic desire to avoid as far 
as possible offending the United States. The minister's representa- 
tions, on the other hand, seem to have been full and explicit. They 
were probably the earliest information the French government 
obtained with reference to the depth of feeling on the subject that 
prevailed in some parts, at least, of this country; and when rein- 
forced soon after by Pageot's and Pakenham's expostulations, they 
must have appeared well worthy of attention.^'' 

King then proceeded to discuss the matter with Guizot, telling him 
that intimations of a contemplated joint protest against the annexa- 
tion of Texas had been received from a source that could not wholly 
be disregarded. Guizot replied "with considerable animation if not 
some impatience " that no such step had been taken ; that France had 
acted in this matter for herself ; that her interests, being purely com- 
mercial, differed from those of England ; and that the rejection of 
the treaty had now banished the subject. King replied that he was 
gratified by Guizot's assurances ; that a movement such as that erro- 
neously imputed to France would have impaired seriously the 
friendly, indeed almost affectionate, feelings entertained for her by 
the American people ; that the United States would view with great 
distrust any proceeding calculated to place their weak neighbor under 
foreign and particularly under British influence ; that Texas must be 
absorbed in order to guard against the danger of England's controlling 
her ; that a conviction of this necessity, though more general in the 
Democratic party, pervaded a large majority of the American peo- 
ple; and that consequently the project of annexation was by no 
means dead. Just how much effect these representations had, it is 
of course impossible to say; but Ashbel Smith, who was well quali- 
fied and well situated to form an opinion, believed that King satisfied 
Guizot as to the umbrage that his proposed course would give in the 
United States.^^ 

Calhoun also endeavored to influence the French government. 

*° King, No. I, July 13, 1844. In early life King was secretary of legation 
at St. Petersburg. 

"King, No. 2, July 31, 1844. The interview took place on July 20, Smith 
to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4OI 

About the first of September King received a despatch in which, 
after straining Louis PhiHppe's cordial assurances to the greatest 
possible extent and there nailing them with pointed marks of appre- 
ciation, the Secretary went on, in what the London Times called a 
magazine article, to argue substantially as follows : It is not for the real 
interests of France, England or even Mexico to oppose annexation 
if peace, the extension of commerce, and security "are objects of 
primarx' policy with them." The United States and Texas are 
destined at some day to become one nation, and it is for the general 
good that this union take place by common consent. Opposition 
would " not improbably " lead to a war between the United States 
and ^Mexico ; or, should another power temporarily prevent annexa- 
tion and an outbreak of hostilities, our people would feel deep resent- 
ment, and " be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to 
effect " the design " by force." Meanwhile the general peace would 
be insecure, and Texas, uncertain what to do or expect, would lan- 
guish. France as well as England desires that country to be inde- 
pendent for commercial reasons ; but England hopes also that slavery 
ma}' be abolished there and, as a consequence, in the United States, 
and to this scheme the interests of the continental European powers 
are opposed. The experiment of emancipation has proved enor- 
mously costly and disastrous to Great Britain, while the nations that 
have avoided her example have increased in wealth and power. 
Therefore she wishes to recover her lost position by destroying or 
crippling the productivity of her rivals, and now seeks to reach her 
end b}' uprooting slavery in America. This would give her a mo- 
nopoly of tropical commodities, for not only would the output of the 
United States, Cuba and Brazil decrease like that of Jamaica, but 
there would be a race war as in San Domingo, — a war that would 
involve the Indian as well as the negro, " and make the whole one 
scene of blood and devastation." Is it not better for the continent 
of Europe, then, to obtain tropical productions at a low price from 
the American nations, than to be dependent for them upon " one 
great monopolizing Power" and pay a high price? And is it not 
for their interest to develop new regions that will become profitable 
markets for their goods, rather than to buy from old and distant 
countries, whose population has reached its limit? Here again it is 
impossible to calculate how much effect was produced. But there 
must have been some, for the ideas were forcible; and even if the 
administration rejected their logic, it could easily be seen that their 
27 



402 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



influence on public sentiment, should they be urged by the opposition, 
was likely to be considerable.^^ 

Louis Philippe's general preference was to avoid war. He was 
a " prudent " monarch, as our minister observed, " and ever solicitous 
to maintain peace and good will, both for his own sake, and that of 
France." His avowed policy was described by King as " peace, and 
non-intervention as the best means of securing peace." Early in 
November he dwelt upon these, his favorite themes, in an interview 
with the American minister, expressing opinions and sentiments, 
*' which though not uttered with reference to the United States, 
Mexico and Texas, were strikingly applicable to the existing rela- 
tions of the three republics." Recent difficulties between the govern- 
ment of Mexico and the French representative in that country prob- 
ably had some effect in the same direction, and both domestic uncer- 
tainties and the embarrassments growing out of the Algiers and 
Morocco questions assisted. There were thus a number of deter- 
rent influences at work upon the French cabinet ; and accordingly it 
showed signs of backwardness during the autumn in the matter of 
co-operating decisively with England.^^ 

The British administration could not fail to be influenced by this 
lukewarm disposition, since its policy leaned avowedly on the atti- 
tude of France. The New York correspondent of the London Times 
reported that the Locofocos actually desired a war with England, 
which naturally added to the gravity of the situation ; and then Santa 
Anna adopted a course that had no little effect. In order to score 
a point against the Mexican Congress he talked openly about 
Murphy's conversation with Lord Aberdeen, and instead of favor- 
ing the recognition of Texas he represented His Lordship's remarks 
as evidence that England would assist him to reconquer that country. 
Rankhead regarded this conduct as showing a " total want of good 
faith," and protested against the President's announced purpose of 
laying Murphy's Memorandum before the Congress ; and his course 
in so doing was approved by his government. On the twenty-third 
of October, therefore, Aberdeen instructed him to inform Mexico 
that since she would not consent to recognize Texas, the proposed 
concert between England and France " as set forth in the ]\Iemo- 
randum " fell to the ground. Great Britain still urged that the 

'"Times: Revue de Paris, Jan. 9, 1845. To King, No. 14. Aug. 12, 1844: 
Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39. 

^■' King, No. I, July 13; No. 4, Oct. 6; No. 6. Nov. 15, 1844. (Backward- 
ness) Smith to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Meinor., 411. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 403 

annexation of Texas to the United States would be "an evil of the 
greatest magnitude " to the mothei-country, and that it could only be 
avoided by immediately recognizing the young republic ; but the 
despatch was a formal notice that England no longer held herself 
under any obligation to Mexico to help avert the evil at the risk of 
a collision with the United States. This did not signify by any 
means, however, that her own interests or her engagements elsewhere 
might not cause her to pursue much the same course as that outlined 
in the Memorandum, and there is no evidence that she had yet aban- 
doned this policy ; but the exasperating conduct of Mexico, the failure 
of Texas thus far to accept the proposed Diplomatic Act, and still 
more the lukewarmness exhibited on the other side of the Channel 
doubtless undermined her resolution, and caused her to show, as 
Ashbel Smith reported, a certain backwardness herself.-'''* 

^ Smith to Jones, Dec, 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. London Times, Oct. 
17, 1844. Bank., No. 66, Aug. 29, 1844. To Bank., No. 34, Oct. 23. 1844. The 
despatch of Oct. 23 has been cited as " definite proof of English withdrawal from 
the project of joint action before the English government had any direct refusal 
from France to go on with that action " ; but the two powers did in fact main- 
tain their joint action in this matter so long as any hope of preventing annexa- 
tion remained (see Chapter xxi.). Probably, however, what the author of this 
passage had in mind was the project of acting jointly in the particular manner 
contemplated in June, 1844; but even this view does not seem correct, i. Eng- 
land could not fairly and honorably withdraw from a plan of joint action with 
France by sending a note to Mexico, and at this time she was peculiarly anxious 
to have the confidence and good-will of France. 2. Had England decided upon a 
new policy, notice of it would almost certainly have been given to Pakenham and 
Elliot as in other instances. 3. The proposition of the Diplomatic Act. which 
involved joint action with France on a basis really as positive as did the Murphy 
Memorandum, was not now cancelled by England as according to this theory it 
should have been. 4. In his No. i, May 17, 1845, Smith reported to his govern- 
ment from London that Aberdeen had informed Terrell (who had arrived in that 
city on Jan. 12, 1845, and was still there) that the British government were even 
then " willing on their part to enter into a Diplomatic Act embracing the stipu- 
lations and guarantees as set forth in the accounts of my interviews with Ld 
Aberdeen last year, particularly that of" the 24th June (I believe), but that the 
French Government were unwilling to enter into such obligations or to employ 
any other than moral means towards Mexico" (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1196). This 
appears virtually to prove that the despatch of Oct. 23, 1844, did not indicate 
an intention or even a desire to withdraw from the action in concert with 
France that had been proposed in June. 5. After France declined to incur the 
risk of war with United States, the British government took four weeks to formu- 
late a new and pacific programme, whereas on the theory discussed they would 
have been ready and eager to announce such a policy at once. 6. The despatch of 
Oct. 23 can be explained satisfactorily without encountering these difficulties : 
(o) England had a plan (Murphy Memorandum) for joint action with France 
in co-operation with Mexico, and also a plan (Diplomatic Act) for joint action 
with France and (if necessary) the coercion of Mexico. The former was the only 
one of which Mexico knew, and therefore the despatch of Oct. 22, intended for 
Mexico, should be understood as referring to it. Indeed that despatch said that 
■' the proposition set forth in the Memorandum . . . was based entirely on the 
assumed recognition by Mexico of the independence of Texas," and also that 



404 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



November 25 the result of the American election was announced 
by the London newspapers, and the time for England and France to 
'prosecute or to abandon their plan had arrived. About a week later, 
at an interview with Aberdeen. Smith found the minister counting 
on Guizot for no decisive action against the United States and, as 
was inevitable in that situation, unwilling to give a just ground of 
offence to this country. That very day His Lordship's misgivings 
were fully justified. In a talk with Cowley the minister of Louis 
Philippe remarked, as Calhoun and King had urged, that the annexa- 
tion affair concerned Great Britain more than it did France. 

" As both Governments have recognised Texas," answered the 
British ambassador, " you would no doubt join with England in 
negotiations to secure recognition from Mexico." 

" Cndoubtedly " answered Guizot, " we will use our best efforts 
for that purpose, and will even refuse to recognise the annexation 
of Texas to the United States; but, as a Question of Peace or War, 
I am not prepared to say that its junction with the American States 
is of sufficient importance to us to justify us in having recourse to 
arms in order to prevent it." This was obviously a diplomatic but 
distinct negative. ^^ 

The British government then pondered anew on the subject, and 
at length after four weeks of deliberation they informed Elliot what 
was now their policy. " It is," wrote Aberdeen, " to urge Mexico by 
every available argument, and in every practicable manner, to recog- 
nise without delay the Independence of Texas, as the only rational 
course to be taken for securing the real Interests of Mexico, to which 
Country the annexation of Texas to the United States would be 
ruinous." At the same time a strong desire was manifested by His 
Lordship to avoid exciting public sentiment in this country. A pas- 
sive course, " or rather a course of observation," was therefore dic- 
tated as under the existing circumstances the most prudent policy ; 

it was the proposed concert between Great Britain and France " as set forth in 
the Memorandum " which fell to the ground. Evidently an announcement of 
the failure of the first plan did not abolish the second, and it should be re- 
called that the Memorandum itself, instead of saying that in case Mexico would 
not consent to recognize Texas the plans of England to oppose annexation would 
not be carried out, only said " might not." (b) Aberdeen may very reasonably 
have believed that such an announcement as that of Oct. 2Z was the best way to 
bring Santa Anna to the point of recognizing Texas, and it may have been made 
for that purpose, (c) It seemed quite clear that Santa Anna was trying to play 
fast and loose with England, and the despatch of Oct. 23 was a proper move to 
stop his game, (d) Under the wording of the Memorandum, self-respect de- 
manded of England such a move. See also Terrell: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 11 72. 
"Smith, Dec. 24: note 34, Cowley, No. 568, Dec. 2, 1844. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4O5 

and Elliot was directly forbidden to involve his government in any 
active campaign.^" 

Near the close of the year 1844, among the papers accompanying 
Tyler's annual Message, was published Calhoun's despatch to King 
which has already been cited, and in due course the document ap- 
peared in Europe. There it made a sensation, — " quite a sensation," 
reported the minister, — for Calhoun said that our Executive particu- 
larly appreciated " the declaration of the King, that, in no event 
would any steps be taken b}- his Government in the slightest degree 
hostile, or which would give to the United States just cause of com- 
plaint." This, as we have learned, was a liberal exaggeration of 
Louis Philippe's friendliness, yet — as Calhoun doubtless foresaw — 
the language imputed to him could not be disavowed. Not only was 
public sentiment in France very warm towards the United States 
and far from cordial towards Great Britain, but the election of 
officers in the Chamber of Deputies had lately revealed a serious 
break in the administration's forces; its majorities there were small 
and fluctuating ; its fate was uncertain ; and nearly all of the charges 
brought against it amounted to the one heinous offence of subser- 
viency to England. ^^ 

The London Times, though it demanded with the utmost emphasis 
to be informed " categorically " whether France had been giving such 
assurances to the United States while "affecting" to join with Eng- 
land, was therefore unable to extort a reply. Terrell, now the repre- 
sentative of Texas, concluded that France was entirely indifferent 
to the fate of his country ; and although the French ambassador soon 
made known to Aberdeen a despatch from Guizot which described 
Calhoun's remarks as misleading and expressed a willingness to 
unite with England, as had been proposed, in securing the recogni- 
tion of Texas and guaranteeing her against molestation on the side 
of Mexico, it was not easy to feel perfectly satisfied as to the atti- 
tude of His Majesty's government. In short, while Calhoun's clever 
— even sharp — course did not destroy the concert of the powers, 
it evidently had some effect in rendering that concert less harmonious 
and less reliable. At the same time the publication of the despatch 
revealed very clearly to Aberdeen, as he admitted, the jealousy of 
the American annexationists against all foreign interference, and the 

*'To Elliot, No. 13, Dec. 31. 1844. To Bank., No. 49, Dec. 31, 1844. 
Pakenham and Bankhead also were instructed. Naturally Aberdeen tried to make 
it appear that no change in British policy had occurred. 

^^ To King, No. 14, Aug. 12, 1844: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39. King, 
No. 10, Jan, 29, 1845. 



406 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

danger that any occurrence justifying that state of mind would pre- 
cipitate the United States into "active measures." In particular, 
he concluded, a war with Mexico almost necessarily involving the 
destruction of Texan independence might very easily be kindled; 
and the importance of extreme caution was brought forcibly home 
to his mind.^^ 

Up to this time, owing to the peculiar situation already explained", 
neither an acceptance nor a rejection of the Diplomatic Act had been 
received from Texas ; and that idea, to be embodied in some plan 
consistent with the now pacific attitude of the two powers, had con- 
tinued to be entertained by them. Quite soon, however, after assur- 
ing England that she was still ready for joint action, France found 
an opportunity to eliminate that project also. This was in conse- 
quence of something which occurred in Mexico. All through the 
summer and early autumn Santa Anna had continued to talk of war 
against the Texans ; but, soon after November came in, a revolution 
in the great State of Jalisco produced a change in his language. 
General Wavell, an Englishman in the Mexican service, had believed 
all along that he desired to get rid of the Texas difficulty ; for some 
time fear of the designs of the United States had made him uneasy ; 
and now, in the revolutionary conflict forced upon him, he was nat- 
urally anxious to have the political support of Great Britain and the 
financial assistance of the British capitalists doing business in the 
country. Accordingly his minister, Rejon, stated that Mexico would 
listen to any propositions coming from England and France with 
reference to the recognition of Texas ; and finally at the end of 
November Santa Anna definitely proposed to acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of that nation on the basis of an indemnity, a boundary at 
the Colorado, and a guaranty of the northern frontier of Mexico 
from England and France. Apparently a step had now been taken 
toward a solution of the problem, and France made haste to pro- 
nounce the Diplomatic Act no longer necessary.^'' 

"^ Times, Jan. 2, 10, 1845. Terrell, Nos. i. 2, Jan. 21, 27, 1845. To Elliot, No. 
I, Jan. 23, 1845. Apparently Aberdeen took some step to soothe the United 
States, for about a month later Everett reported (private, Feb. 26, 1845) that, 
although the subject was not one on which it " could be expected " that he 
" should receive any official information," he had " good grounds for saying, 
that the annexation of Texas would not cause a breach of the existing relations 
between the United States and Great Britain." From the effect of Calhoun's 
despatch upon Aberdeen one can reasonably infer that it had had considerable 
influence at Paris. 

"After Jones became President, he expressed to the British government 
through Elliot a desire to have the proposition of the Diplomatic Act put in 
his hands. " duly prepare<J for execution," to be submitted to the people at a 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 407 

January 23, 1845, then, Aberdeen prepared new instructions for 
Elliot. On the one hand he pointed out the gravely delicate state of 
American public sentiment, and on the other he exhibited the propo- 
sition of Santa Anna. No doubt the Mexican terms are unaccept- 
able in their present form, he admitted ; but as a " first step " they 
are " of great importance and value," and of course Texas will avail 
herself of the good offices of England and France " with a view to 
the modification " of them. Despite Calhoun the concert of the two 
powers continues, in proof of which I hand you a copy of the new 
instructions, very similar to yours, forwarded to Saligny ; and " under 
certain circumstances those Powers would not refuse to take part 
in an arrangement by which Texas and Mexico should be bound 
each to respect the Territory of the other " ; though, after all, this is 
mainly an affair which concerns these two particular nations. To 
such modest terms was the opposition of England at length reduced. 
The effect of the concert had become a mere contingency, and in 
reference to the United States defensive instead of aggressive 
strategy was now in order, with care even " to avoid all unnecessary 
mention " of our government. The keenest anxiety to prevent the 
annexation of Texas, however, was still exhibited.**^ 

In the afternoon of March i6 the steamer Neiv York left New 
Orleans for Texas, carrying word that the American Congress had 
voted for annexation, and on the twentieth Galveston had the news. 
Four days later a British vessel of war brought Elliot the instruc- 
tions that have just been described. He read them with the deepest 
interest and of course with the most earnest desire to carry out the 
washes of his government. There was, however, a serious difficulty, 
for it seemed to him impossible even to mention what Santa Anna 
had proposed and Aberdeen recommended as a basis of negotiation. 
" Nothing," he replied to the Foreign Office," that is so much mixed 
with securities and guarantees upon the part of the European Powers, 
Great Britain in particular, can be offered to this people with the 
least hope of success, and the knowledge of these proposals of 
Mexico at the present moment would be decisive against the possi- 
bility of maintaining the Independence of the Country. They would 
light up a flame from one end of the North American Confederacy 

propitious moment (Elliot, No. 17, Dec. 21, 1844) ; but before this request reached 
London France had retired from that proposition. Bank., No. 65, Aug. 29 ; No. 
94, Nov. 12, 1844. Wavell, Memoir on Texas, Nov., 1844: F. O.. Texas, xi. (Un- 
easy) Bank., No. 52, July 31, 1844. Id., No. 93, Oct. 30; No. 102, Nov. 29, 1844. 
Terrell, No. 2, Jan. 27, 1845. 

"To Elliot, No. I, Jan. 23, 1845. 



408 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to the other." None the less, if Mexico would but acknowledge 
Texas on the sole condition of maintaining her nationality, Elliot 
still saw " little reason to doubt that this question might be speedily 
and securely adjusted."*^ 

Saligny, as we have observed, spent most of his time at New 
Orleans, but he probably had received there somewhat earlier an 
urgent despatch from Guizot. While directing that as little as pos- 
sible be said about the United States, the French government now 
ordered the charge to exert himself with both the administration and 
the people of Texas against the project of annexation, as a measure 
unworthy of an independent nation. The representations of Calhoun 
regarding the attitude of France made it particularly necessary, he 
was instructed, to pursue an active policy, and the inclination of 
Santa Anna to consider the question of recognizing Texas was 
described as " a decisive reason " why that country should cling to 
her sovereignty. In concert with Elliot, Saligny was therefore 
directed to recommend this view, and to urge that " every thought 
of annexation " be renounced.*- 

On receiving these orders the charge naturally sought his post, 
and he was now at Galveston. Elliot, whose policy it was to counter- 
act the suspicion of British designs by associating closely with his 
French colleague in this business, soon took him into his counsels ; 
and the next morning they set out for the Texan seat of government, 
where they were extremely anxious to arrive in advance of authori- 
tative news from the United States. Donelson was liable to appear 
at any hour, and a copy of the official report of the passage of the 
anne?cation resolution was said to be on the way via Red River ; but 

■" Arrangoiz, No. 52 (res.), March 17, 1845. Elliot, No. 14, March 22, 1845. 
The steamer should have reached Galveston on the 18th, and the Picayune of 
March 29 represented that she did ; but Elliot and the Houston Star of March 23 
give the date as March 20. As the Star says she brought New Orleans information 
of the 1 8th, she would seem to have been delayed near the city. Yell to Polk, 
March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Jones (Memor., 66) 
said that the ministers of England and France, in feeling that the people (if 
Texas were recognized by Mexico) would decide for independence, were deceived 
by " their own over-sanguine hopes." Two points ought, however, to be noted. 
Jones and Allen, the highest officials of the nation, assured them and appeared 
to be convinced that such would be the case {e. g., Elliot, No, 17, Dec. 21, 1844: 
Dec. 28,' 1844, secret) ; and it was not very unreasonable to believe that — assisted 
by recognition, by an opportunity to obtain favorable commercial arrangements 
with England, by the efforts to bring the people over to the side of nationality 
which the government were ready to make (Elliot, No. 17, Dec. 21, 1S44), and 
by the unsatisfactory terms offered by the United States — the strong though 
cautious minority might convert enough lukewarm annexationists to become the 
dominant party. 

"(At New Orleans) Joum. Com.: Newark Adi:, April 30, 1845. To Saligny, 
Ian. 17, 1845: F. O., Texas, xxi. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4O9 

the two envoys reached the capital first. They agreed that if Brown's 
plan had been adopted by the American Executive, the chief imme- 
diate danger lay in elTorts to have Jones convene the Congress, espe- 
cially since Elliot regarded the existing body as the least reliable he 
had yet seen in the country and already " deeply committed " for 
annexation; while they felt that if Benton's method had been chosen, 
the commission it contemplated, sitting in Texas with $100,000 at its 
command, " would at once overwhelm the whole power and influence 
of the Constituted Authorities of the land." They decided, therefore, 
that " every eliort consistent with the spirit " of their instructions 
ought to be exerted to prevent the government of Texas from assem- 
bling the Congress or entering upon any negotiations with a view 
to annexation, until England and France could have time to obtain 
recognition from Mexico or, failing in that aim, " provide for the 
emergency in an equally effectual manner " in Europe.*^ 

Jones was away from home in the evening of the envoys' arrival, 
but they had a " full and frank " conversation with Ashbel Smith, 
now the Secretary of State, and the next morning, after reading 
their instructions to him and the President, they urged " every argu- 
ment that presented itself " to them, " whether founded upon the 
honour and advantage of the Country, or upon the ruinous conse- 
quences of annexation, and the ambiguity and doubtful nature of the 
[American] resolutions." Elliot was regarded by Donelson, a per- 
son well able to gauge politicians and diplomats, as " a shrewd and 
cunning man," while Saligny was described as Napoleonic in appear- 
ance and " astute " in intellect ; and it is evident from Elliot's report 
of the proceedings that both men were now very much in earnest. 
On the other side, Jones was in favor of independence and probably 
felt convinced, as he afterwards wrote in his book, that it would 
benefit the Texans to maintain a separate political existence. In 
February he had received word by a man just from Mexico that 
Herrera, the new President, was very favorably disposed toward 
peace. Furthermore, by taking the ground that the administration 
desired to continue the national career and tliat the people would do 
the same should the independence of the country be promptly 
acknowledged by Mexico, he had committed himself in a manner 
that Elliot and Saligny were fully able to take advantage of. As for 
Smith, he not only preferred independence but was regarded by the 
American charge as a greater enemy to annexation than even the 

^'Elliot, No. 10, March 6; secret, April 2, 1845. 



410 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



outspoken Terrell. He was a man of no little ability, as we have 
noted ; and according to the Mexican consul at New Orleans he had 
a dominating influence over the Executive. The consul believed also 
that his ambition equalled his talents, and that he not only wished 
to be President, but felt that in the case of annexation his role would 
be comparatively undistinguished. Under such circumstances, even 
had Jones desired to stand up for that measure, it would have been 
extremely difficult to do so. He made no sign of such a preference, 
however. When the envoys argued for nationality he and Smith 
replied, " that so far as they were personally concerned it was 
unnecessary to insist upon these views," and the President declared 
that he was " sincerely desirous of maintaining the independence of 
the Country." At the same time he stimulated the envoys by 
remarking that he saw in himself only the agent of the people, and 
thought that unless Texas could speedily know she would be recog- 
nized on the condition of remaining a nation, " He should feel that it 
was in vain to resist the tide." As for a course of action he agreed 
perfectly with his visitors, desiring neither to assemble the Congress 
nor to have a United States commission sit in the country.** 

Elliot and Saligny now formally invited the government to accept 
the good offices of England and France with a view to an early and 
honorable settlement with Mexico upon the basis of independence. 
Jones thereupon instructed the Secretary of State with correspond- 
ing formality to accept this intervention, and the following " Condi- 
tions preliminary to a treaty of peace " between the two countries 
were then drawn up: " i, Mexico consents to acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of Texas ; 2, Texas engages that she will stipulate in the 
treaty not to annex herself or become subject to any country what- 
ever ; 3, Limits and other conditions to be matters of arrangement in 
the final treaty ; 4, Texas to be willing to remit disputed points 
respecting territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires." 
It was then proposed, evidently by the charges, that the following 
agreement be made; i. The signature and seal of a duly authorized 
Mexican minister are to be attached to the preliminary conditions of 

"Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Don. to Calhoun, Jan. 30, 1845: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr., 1023. (Saligny) Smith, Remin., 22; Foote, Remin., 50. Smith, 
Remin., 81, 82. Jones, Memor., 66. Jones, Letter: Miles.. Jan. 15, 1848, p. 308. 
Jones's best defence of his course is to be found in this letter ; but it is too 
ingenious to be convincing, and there are too many facts against it. Don., No. 
21, April 29, 1845. Arrangoiz, No. 55 (res.), March 24, 1845. Early in March 
Smith had proposed to Elliot that England guarantee to Mexico the abandon- 
ment by Texas of all annexation projects, which implied that he believed Texas 
7voiild bind herself to that policy (Elliot. No. 10, March 6, 1845). 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4II 

peace, and the government of Texas pledge themselves to issue 
forthwith, after this acceptance of them shall have been placed in 
the hands of the President, a proclamation announcing the conclu- 
sion of the preliminaries of peace with the republic of Mexico. 2, 
For a period of ninety days from the date of this Memorandum 
Texas " agrees not to accept any proposals, nor to enter into any 
negotiations to annex Herself to any other Country."*'"' 

At this, however, the President hesitated, for he perceived what 
Elliot described as " the serious responsibility " that he was desired 
to incur. During the twenty-eighth he consulted the cabinet twice, 
and once had the charges present their views before it ; but he was 
only a second-rate man with everything against him, and it was in 
vain to struggle. From conviction or policy he had represented that 
the people would choose independence if recognition could soon be 
obtained from the mother-country ; and he could not logically, as 
their avowed agent, refuse to adopt the one possible course which 
might place this boon within their reach. At the pressing request of 
Jones and Saligny, Elliot very reluctantly consented to make a secret 
journey to Mexico with the utmost despatch, and explain to the 
British and French ministers there " the extreme difficulty of the 
President's situation, and the urgency of immediate promptitude, 
and exact conformity to the preliminary arrangement" submitted; 
and finally, on his promising this and on the personal assurance of 
the charges that the Memorandum of the Conference would be made 
known only to the British and French representatives in Mexico and 
the United States and to their home governments, Jones accepted 
the plan on March 29.**' 

Three alternatives were kept in view, it would appear, in these 
negotiations. The first was to satisfy the people of Texas, by 
obtaining the assent of Mexico to the preliminary conditions, that 
peace with independence could be had. The second was to have the 
affair settled by the European governments with a representative of 
Texas beyond the Atlantic ; and the third was to obtain such a formal 
declaration on the part of England and France to sustain Texan 
independence " and prevent further disturbance and complication 
from Mexico," as would " enable the friends of independence to 

*^ Memo, of Conference : Conditions : F. O.. Texas, xiii. 

** Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 386. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. It was dis- 
tinctly understood at the conference that, should the Texans decide in favor of 
annexation, their government would be at liberty to execute their will (Jones, 
Memor., 475). Elliot was informed by Smith that none of the cabinet felt "any 
good will to the [American] resolutions." 



412 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



defeat their opponents at the next election." What provision was 
made for the first and most desired of these aUernatives has now 
been explained. The second and third of them required the presence 
in Europe of a Texan envoy fully competent and fully authorized for 
the business. Accordingly Elliot and Saligny urged that Ashbel 
Smith go there immediately with *' full powers to conclude any 
arrangement which might seem to the Governments and himself to 
be necessary for the safety of the Country," and Jones cordially con- 
sented. Allen was therefore made Secretary of State, and Smith 
prepared to set oflf at once for his former post.*^ 

Elliot intended to give out that he would sail in the Electro to 
meet his wife at Charleston, South Carolina, but really be landed at 
Vera Cruz and have the Electro reported there by another name; 
and in returning he proposed to disembark at a point in the United 
States where he would not be recognized, and gain New Orleans " in 
some unobserved manner." On reaching Galveston, however, he 
found that a British war vessel, the Eurydice, commanded by his 

*' Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Smith's appointment was asked "as a striking 
proof of the good dispositions " of the Texan government. All these facts, de- 
rived from Elliot's report, are a sufficiently clear indication of the character of 
Smith's mission ; but that gentleman himself had something to say at the time 
about it. According to the editor of the principal newspaper of Houston, a 
place through which he doubtless passed on his way to Galveston, he was going 
to England " with the avowed object of conducting negotiations for the acknowl- 
edgment of our independence through British intervention." All the way on his 
journey from Washington to the coast, after the interviews with Elliot and 
Saligny, he loudly denounced the annexation resolution of the American Congress 
at the taverns on the road, it was said, and several of the most respectable men 
of the county were ready to declare, the editor stated, that his conversation re- 
vealed an uncompromising opposition to that resolution (Houston Telegraph, 
April 23, 1845). After he reached the port. Smith wrote to Jones representing 
the sentiment among the people as intensely strong in favor of annexation, and 
added that he did not suppose his going abroad would be desired '' if likely to 
produce no beneficial results," which implies clearly that he had been sent to 
accomplish something against that project (Jones, Memor., 446). Later, attempts 
were very naturally made to explain all this away. In an open letter dated 
August 7, 1845, Smith pronounced it "utterly false" that he went to Europe to 
concert measures with foreign governments to prevent annexation (F. O. Texas, 
xiv.) ; but this letter was intended to make the public believe he was not opposed 
to that measure, which was certainly not correct. In other words the letter can- 
not be regarded as wholly ingenuous. In his Reminiscences he says that Jones 
sent him to Europe to close the Texas legations there in a becoming manner ; but in 
that case why did the state of public opinion in Texas make him doubtful whether 
his mission could prove beneficial ? Jones, commenting in his book on Smith's 
letter from Galveston, explained that Smith did not understand his errand; but 
this is absurd. Smith seems to have had the clearest head in Texas ; he was 
accustomed to deal with the foremost statesmen of Europe and had won their 
respect ; Aberdeen described him as " a man of excellent capacity " ; as Secretary 
of State he was in conference with Elliot and Saligny on three successive days ; 
and he had opportunities to confer with Saligny at will, it is probable, all the 
way to Galveston, since the two men sailed together for New Orleans (Memphis 
Eagle, April 23, 1845). Jones's explanation is manifestly a pretence. 



THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4I3 

cousin, George Elliot, had arrived at that port. Writing to Jones 
that a despatch from Bankhead represented the Mexican govern- 
ment as still ready to negotiate, he went aboard the Electro, was 
transferred to the Eurydicc out of sight of land, and then sailed 
away for \'era Cruz. Saligny, meanwhile, after writing from Gal- 
veston to the President, " Be cheerful and firm at Washington, and 
my word for it, everything will soon come out right," sped away for 
New York City in such haste that when the steamer stopped for 
w'ood a few miles below New Orleans, he sprang ashore, it was 
reported, obtained a horse, and rode on. It was surmised that his 
purpose was to communicate with Paris in the quickest possible 
manner, and this appears to be the rational explanation of his course. 
Ashbel Smith — reluctantly in view of the exhibitions of Texan 
public opinion observed on his way to the coast — proceeded on his 
mission ; and Jones and Allen remained at the capital to hold the 
gate.*^ 

In short, then, it appears that Great Britain was so anxious to 
prevent the annexation of Texas that she stood ready, if supported 
by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States ; that the 
French government were at first no less willing than England to 
agree upon decisive measures ; that the determination of the Ameri- 
can people to resent vigorously such dictation — a course sure to 
arouse the many Frenchmen who were against the British, against 
the King or against Guizot — caused that power to fall back ; that in 
consequence England wavered and then withdrew ; and that all this 
grand effort at international concert resulted only in a sort of con- 
spiracy to divert the people of Texas from the destiny actually 
preferred by the majority. And it is interesting to note, first, that 
probably the decisive element in the affair was the readiness of a 
large number of Americans to plunge into a war for which the 
nation was wholly unprepared; and, secondly, that after these 
diplomatic events had been taking place for months, it was loudly 
asserted by opponents of Tyler's administration, not only that Eng- 
land had no schemes afoot with reference to Texas, but that every 
idea of a European concert against annexation was transparent 
moonshine.'*'' 

^'Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Id. to Jones, April 3, 5. 1845: Jones, Menior., 
441, 443. Saligny to Jones, April 3. 1845: ib., 443. (Saligny) N. Orl. Picayune: 
Memphis Eagle. April 23, 1845; Wash. Constitution: Charleston Courier, April 
29, 1845. Smith to Jones. April 9. 1845: Jones. Meiiior.. 446. 

*" E. g., Nat. Intel!.. Feb. 20, 1845. No doubt many who talked of war be- 
lieved England would not fight, but even these would not have shrunk from it. 



XIX 

The Annexation Question before Mexico 

It hardly need be said that from 1836 to 1845, even amid all the 
inconsistencies that surrounded it, Mexican feeling in reference to 
Texas and the Texan question was consistently bitter. In opening 
Congress January first, 1838, President Bustamante said: "With 
regard to the Texas campaign, I will only observe that its prosecu- 
tion is the first duty of the Government and of all Mexicans ;" and 
this was the refrain perpetually. The province had revolted ; by the 
fortune of war Mexico's army had been vanquished there ; a Mexican 
President had been taken prisoner. The national honor had there- 
fore to be vindicated, the national interests to be protected ; and 
the smallest crumb of victory against the " rebels " was hailed with 
unbounded exultation. Even as far from the capital as Tabasco, 
La Aurora, on hearing of a successful raid, exclaimed, " What ^Nlexi- 
can does not feel in his breast an insuppressible joy on seeing the 
arms of his nation triumphant ever against a horde of infamous 
bandits?" "Urgent necessity of the Texas war," became a stock 
phrase with journalists and pamphleteers, and the trumpet was 
sounded in every key.^ 

In addition to this fundamental sentiment, there were certain 
related ideas that increased its power. Foreign nations are watch- 
ing our conduct in this matter, .argued the writers, hoping to make 
our country the plaything of their whims and purposes. The Ameri- 
can Union in particular was represented as covetous of its neighbor's 
territory and even as plotting to extinguish her independence. The 
United States, " in their delirious ambition, aspire to plant their 
unclean flag, the emblem of treason, ingratitude and injustice, in 
beautiful and opulent Mexico," cried a pamphleteer in 1842; and 
this idea became almost as familiar and almost as unquestioned as 
the doctrine of the Trinity. ]\Ioreover the influence of the Texas 
afi^air was artificially increased by certain politicians who found it 

' See General Note, p. i. This chapter, as published in the Amer. Hist. 
Rev.. Oct.. 191 o, contains a number of additional illustrative quotations worth 
the attention, perhaps, of those interested in this phase of the subject. On the 
other hand some new material is presented here. Bustamante : F. O., Mexico, 
cxiii. La Aurora, Oct. 27, 1842, 

414 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 415 

useful, and particularly by Santa Anna, that prince of schemers. 
He, on opening Congress in 1842, spoke thus with reference to the 
war: " If we wish to preserve an honorable name among civilized 
nations, it is essential that we employ all our energies and resources 
in combating without cessation, at any sacrifice and at all hazards, 
until our arms and our pretensions finally triumph ;" and in time this 
matter became an integral part of Mexican life and consciousness, 
overpowering the imagination and sapping the strength of the nation 
like a cancer.- 

Intelligent men saw quite early, however, as was pointed out in a 
previous chapter, that Texas could not be recovered, and some dared 
speak of peace. Canedo, we recall, favored a settlement when ^linis- 
ter of Foreign Relations in 1839, and in January, 1844, that states- 
man expressed a similar view, supporting it with strong arguments, 
in the Rcvista Economica y Comcrcial de la RcpnhUca Mexicana. 
This disposition on the part of a few to recognize the facts was 
reinforced by France and still more by England. Early and late, as 
we have seen, England recommended and urged in the strongest 
terms, as a most desirable and indeed a most necessary step, that 
]\Iexico acknowledge the independence of Texas ; and at first one is 
amazed to find that even at a time when she had great influence in 
the country, no regard was paid to her wishes and apparently no 
consideration given to the weighty reasons that she put forward. 
Yet in reality the inaction of Mexico was not due merely to blindness, 
indolence or obstinacy. She, as well as Great Britain, had reasons, 
and there were not a few of them.^ 

In the first place every nation is unwilling to acknowledge itself 
defeated by rebels, and this was peculiarly true in a case where so 
vast a disparity of numbers and wealth existed. Racial pride not 
only emphasized this reluctance, but led Mexico to scorn the Texan 
colonists as beggars because they had asked for lands, and as 
ingrates because they had revolted. Thirdly, she gloried not a little 
in having abolished slavery, and it was felt by many that in efYect a 
recognition of the lost province would be an endorsement of an 
odious institution against which the nation had committed itself; and 

*£. g., Urgente Necesidad de la Guerra de Tejas, dated Dec. 10, 1842. S. 
Anna: Nat. Intell., July 22. 1842. 

^ La Revista, etc., Jan. 15, 1844. Some of the statements made below in 
support of the last sentence of this paragraph are based upon a rather extensive 
examination of contemporary Mexican periodicals found in many places, and it 
would be useless to fill a large space with references to inaccessible sources. 



41 6 THE ANNEXATIOX OF TEXAS 

fourthly, as Canedo's article suggested, it was feared that an 
acknowledgment of Texan independence would encourage other dis- 
satisfied sections, particularly California, to secede. The Mexicans 
tried to believe also, and most of them were successful, that the 
United States had instigated the rebellion; they knew that our 
country had long desired the region ; and they could not forget that 
many American volunteers had aided the people of Texas to defeat 
their troops. Official documents and the popular clamor agreed per- 
fectly in charging us with impudent and criminal breaches of inter- 
national law and treaty rights. For such and for other reasons 
Mexico was unfriendly toward us; and not only did this nation wish 
Texas recognized, it was believed, but it seemed very possible that an 
acknowledgment of her independence would assist us to obtain the 
coveted territory, and so would bring us into a dangerous contact 
with several disaffected Departments. Resentment and self-interest 
co-operated, therefore, in urging that recognition be withheld. 

In another way no less, the unpleasant feeling against the Ameri- 
can Union worked in this direction. The Mexicans were keenly 
alive to the fact that great differences of opinion between North 
and South existed here, and that Texas was a bone of contention 
among us. From both sections they heard the words " disunion " 
and " dissolution," and naturally, arguing from their own methods, 
they looked for a breaking up of the nation. " Perhaps the day is 
not far distant," wrote the Mexican minister to this country in 
August, 1844, " when we shall see two republics in place of these 
now United States," and he thought the anticipated election of Clay 
to the Presidency in the autumn of that year might precipitate the 
crash. It was therefore a definite aim of Mexican policy to stimu- 
late our differences. Over and over again the Minister of Foreign 
Relations, in a letter addressed to Shannon, the American represen- 
tative, but really intended for the public, made a striking distinction 
between the two sections of our country. Now he dwelt upon 
" the artifices by which the government and the southern people " of 
the Union had created the Texan situation ; now he lamented the 
evils brought upon his nation by " the faithless [poco leal] conduct 
of the government and the people of the southern States"; and 
finally he referred to the North as " that portion on whose honor 
Mexico relies, doing to it the justice which it merits, and which its 
own government endeavor to take from it, by representing it as an 
accomplice in a policy to which the nobleness of its generous senti- 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 4I7 

ments is repugnant." From this point of view it was plainly for 
the interest of ^Mexico to render the Texas controversy as permanent 
and bitter as possible, in order to paralyze or at least weaken a 
neighbor whom she dreaded, and thus not only protect herself but 
gain the revenge for which she longed.* 

England, though not hated, was regarded with suspicion. In 
1825. when the draft of a treaty with that country, which the 
Mexican government had been eager to conclude, was laid before 
Congress, Great Britain was held up there " as an Object of Jealousy 
and Suspicion," and great pains were taken " to excite Doubts, and 
Fears, with respect to her future conduct." The following year, 
when the author of a violent pamphlet against the English was 
banished by President Victoria, Congress annulled almost unanim- 
ously the " extraordinary powers " which had enabled hiiu to intlict 
this merited punishment. In 1833 a letter was published in the 
official newspaper, charging England with a design to interfere in 
the internal political affairs of Mexico. On general principles the 
wealth and might of that nation excited envy and fear, and the 
heavy debt to London bondholders was felt to be a sort of usurpa- 
tion of power. The British recognition of Texas caused very deep 
resentment. Tlie English held great properties in the country, and 
their government were continually making claims and uttering pro- 
tests in behalf of the owners. It was thought by many intelligent 
Mexicans that the foreigners with whom they had relations did all 
they could to hinder the commercial and industrial development of 
the nation in order to have the advantage of supplying its wants, 
and this feeling applied with special force to the English, who 
enjoyed the major part of that business. British capitalists were 
believed to have co-operated with Santa Anna in looting the public 
treasury ; and a secret correspondence was commonly said to have 
been discovered after his fall, in which he had agreed to surrender 
Yucatan and California to England. A little later the Mexican 
correspondent of the London Ti}iics reported that the " grasping 
policy of Great Britain " and in particular her supposed designs upon 
California were " a constant theme of declamation and complaint." 
There was a fear that by following her advice a still greater hold 
upon the country as a whole or at least upon some portion of it 

'Almonte, No. 99, Aug. i8, 1844. Rejon to Shannon, Oct. 31, 1844: Ho. 
Ex. Doc. 19, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 8. 

28 



^l8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

might be given her, and therefore it seemed best upon general prin- 
ciples to hold off in this matter.^ 

More particularly still, it was suspected that England herself had 
an eye upon Texas. In 1842 a New Orleans newspaper suggested 
that she wanted to get that country into her power so as to control a 
cotton-growing region, and was using Mexico as a cat's-paw ; and the 
Mexican consul brought this article to the attention of his govern- 
ment. In 1836, it is true, the administration had been disposed to 
hand over its rebellious aliens in the north to Great Britain; but 
the later feeling was very different. " There is no power on Earth," 
wrote the American minister at that capital in February, 1844, 
" with which Mexico would not rather see Texas connected than 
with England, either as a colony, or upon any other footing of 
dependency or union, political or commercial ;" and it will be recalled 
that in a conversation with Upshur at about the same time, Almonte 
agreed with him that it would be " infinitely better " for the mother- 
country that Texas form a part of the American Union than that 
she become a commercial dependency of London. In this he was no 
doubt sincere, and he assured his government that what England 
and France aimed at in recommending peace was to establish a 
home for their surplus population between the Rio Grande and the 
Sabine, and create a new market there from which to " inundate " 
Mexico with smuggled goods. Finally, there was a lack of faith in 
Great Britain's intention to carry the matter through. In December, 
1844, the same minister said, when instructed to ascertain her real 
policy regarding the annexation of Texas, that he positively knew 
she was not disposed to have war with the United States on account 
of this affair." 

Against France deep feeling existed. Not only had there re- 
cently been a war with that nation, but certain incidents of the con- 
flict had left a peculiar enmity behind. Later, it will be remembered, 

" Morier and Ward to F. O., No. 6, April 30, 1825: F. O., Mexico, xii. 
Ward to Id., No. 16. March 10, 1826: ib., xx. (Letter) Pak„ No. 77, Dec. 23, 
1833. (Hinder) Bustamante, Gobierno de S. An., ii8. (Looting) Green, 
private, June 17, 1844. Green said: "The English merchants here are all in 
favor of his [S. Anna's] Govt., because under his administration, ncgocios, 
(which in English may be rendered transactions effected by bribery) are most 
freiiuent and most profitable. They are his best customers ; they pay most liber- 
ally for exclusive licenses to import, etc., etc. — They put money in their pockets ; 
he amasses golden ounces. They serve each other, and the interest of G. B. is 
on his side." Bank., No. iii, Dec. 31, 1844. Times, April 11, 1846. See also 
Otero, Cuestion Social y Politica, 95. 

'^Crescent City, June 20, 1842: Sria. Relac. Pak., No. 48. July i, 1836. 
Thompson, No. 40, Feb. 2, 1844. (Conversation) State Dept., Mex. Notes, Feb. 
16, 1844. Almonte, No. 28 (res.) ; No. 161 (priv.), Dec. 14, 1844. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 4I9 

a quarrel had occurred with its minister, a haughty, domineering 
individual, whose doings had keenly and justly offended Mexican 
pride ; and this difficulty had not yet been settled. The French king 
himself had urged the recognition of Texas in an imperative and 
almost insulting manner. One interview of his with the Mexican 
representative has already been mentioned. In July, 1844, a second 
took place. At that time Louis Philippe inquired whether it was 
the intention to acknowledge the independence of Texas, and when 
Garro replied w^ithout hesitation in the negative, His IMajesty re- 
torted, " Then I must tell you with all frankness that my intelligence 
is not able to understand your policy " ; and he would not permit the 
envoy to explain. Such insistence on the part of France appeared, 
like England's urgency, too suggestive of self-interest.'^ 

Behind all these particular causes of distrust there lay, also, a 
deep-seated suspicion of foreigners in general. This highly charac- 
teristic attitude of mind was largely a heritage from the colonial 
period, when aliens had been rigidly excluded ; but the people were 
confirmed in it by all sorts of misrepresentations. When the cholera 
morbus was making terrible ravages in 1833, many believed that the 
cause of the scourge was the poisoning of fountains by men from 
abroad. This one illustration will suffice, but the number that could 
be given is almost without limit. Finally, Mexican administrations 
had so insecure a tenure of existence that officials lived only for the 
day ; political opponents were so cunning and unscrupulous and the 
public so wanting in confidence and intelligence that no avoidable 
responsibility was willingly incurred ; the ministers themselves were 
in most cases unequal to their tasks, and all of them had more work 
than could be done; and the eternal doctrine of Mauaiia (tomorrow) 
always provided a convenient way of escape. In short, the recogni- 
tion of Texas presented itself to the Mexican mind as a great sacri- 
fice of honor and interest recommended by one country that was 
considered a perfidious, arrogant and over-prosperous rival, eager to 
acquire the territory ; by another that was regarded as hateful in 
war and hateful in peace ; by a third, known to be a creditor and 
believed to be a schemer; and by a fourth, looked upon as a handful 
of insolent, ungrateful beggars, at once the scum and the dregs of 
Christendom; while all the complications of Mexican politics and all 
the peculiarities of Mexican character tended to reinforce the argu- 
ments for inaction.* 

'(Feeling) Ashburnham to F. O., No. iii, Dec. 31, 1838: F. O., Mexico, 
cxvi. Garro, No. 15 (res.), July 4, 1844. 

* (Fountains) Pak., No. 55, Oct. 5, 1833. 



420 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



By the middle of February, 1844, Bankhead, the British minister 
in Mexico, received official information by the way of Van Zandt, 
Elliot and the Foreign Office that the United States had informally 
proposed annexation to the Texan envoy, and one can hardly doubt 
that he communicated to the government near him a piece of news 
not only so important in itself but so well calculated to justify the 
course recommended by England. All the steps made known by the 
American newspapers were more or less closely followed from that 
time on, and many editorials against the project, which appeared in 
the anti-administration journals of the United States and accused 
our government of bad faith, of greed and of duplicity, were repro- 
duced in the official Diario and in other Mexican papers. To sug- 
gest what their effect upon the public must have been, it is enough 
to mention that an article from the Anti-Slavery Standard of New 
York was presented as an impartial account of Tyler's proceedings. 
The popular Democratic view that the Presidential election had set- 
tled the question of annexation did not escape notice ; and the Execu- 
tive Messages of December, 1844, were carefully scanned. More- 
over, the Mexican consul at New Orleans insisted continually in his 
reports that annexation was now only a question of time.^ 

On February 14, 1845, the passage of Brown's resolution by the 
House of Representatives was known at Mexico, and this news 
created " great consternation " in the government circle, reported 
Bankhead. Cuevas, Herrera's Minister of Foreign Relations, im- 
mediately asked the opinion of that sensible diplomat, who chanced 
to be with him when the information arrived, and was earnestly 
counselled to be moderate and cautious. Soon afterwards Bank- 
head followed up this advice by entreating him to delay no longer 
the acknowledgment of Texan independence. Cuevas replied that a 
proposition to recognize the ingrates would be rejected at once by 
Congress unless backed and aided by England and France, but with 
an assurance of that support would certainly pass. The British 
minister declined, however, to entangle himself. " I reminded his 
Excellency," he reported, "that any assistance from England must 
be a moral one, for that whatever disposition may at one time have 
existed to go beyond that line, had now been withdrawn " ; and this 
unsatisfactory answer was all that could be obtained. ^° 

•Dec. 26. 1843, F. O. sent to Bank, a copy of Elliot's despatch of Oct. 31, 
which reported the interview with Houston at which Elliot learned of Van Z.'s 
despatch of Sept. i8: F. O., Mexico, clx. Diario, June 15. 1844, and passim. 
ArranKoiz. No. 58 (res.), June 17. 1844; No. 60 (res.), June 19, 1844; No. 26 
(res.), Feb. 4, 1845. 

^"Diario, Feb. 14, 1844. Bank., No. 19, March i, 1845. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 42I 

The following month Cuevas laid before Congress a Memoria, 
on the portion of which relating to Texas he had consulted Bank- 
head, and one may suppose had been influenced by him. In this 
paper the minister urged that under Santa Anna the foreign affairs 
of the nation had been very badly managed, and endeavored to bring 
against the hostile bearing displayed towards the Texans all the 
unpopularity of the now overthrown tyrant, — the ministry, as he 
explained, having been " blind, and wdiolly carried away by the 
impetuous genius of the man who dominated it." He then pro- 
ceeded to adduce reasons for adopting a new method in handling the 
matter. It is impossible to regain our lost province, he argued. 
The people are all aliens ; they have no sympathy with Mexico ; and 
they can neither be exterminated nor compelled to join heartily with 
us. Military success against them, if possible, would cost more 
than it would be w^orth ; and the only real chance would be to induce 
colonists from other nations to settle there and neutralize the influ- 
ence of the Americans. War, then, is not feasible. Equally grave 
is this problem of recognition. The national honor and the integrity 
of the national territory are involved in that question ; besides which 
Texas, if independent, would carry on smuggling operations, and 
would be the ally and tool of the United States. Worse yet, how- 
ever, would be the absorption of that region by its powerful neighbor, 
for while " the independence of Texas perhaps would not make nec- 
essary a war with the American republic ; from its annexation, this 
must inevitably result." It is, therefore, " not strange that the idea 
be suggested of a negotiation which, based upon our rights, should 
be worthy of the Republic and should ensure definitively the respect 
with which the United States must regard Mexico." If such a 
course be pursued, the nation in case of war " can reckon upon more 
sympathy [than could otherwise be expected] and upon the co-opera- 
tion of that just and enlightened policy which prevails in the world 
to-day."ii 

Meantime reports from .Arrangoiz, the consul at New ( )rlcans, 
made the success of the annexationists appear still more certain. 
On the eighth of March he wrote that even a prospect of hostilities 
would not stop the United States, and a week later that although 
most of the Texan newspapers condemned the terms of Brown's 
resolution, it would be acceptable to the people. The Mexican public 
became greatly excited, and the government found it necessary to 

"Bank., No. 46, April 29, 1845. Memoria. March 11, 1845. 



422 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



despatch troops northward ; but on the twentieth Bankhead informed 
Elliot that all the bravado of threatening war meant nothing, and 
that Mexico was disposed to receive overtures from Texas with a 
view to recognition. Such an assurance Cuevas had authorized him 
to give, and it was forwarded to Elliot by the Etirydice}- 

On the very next day came official information that the American 
Senate and President had acted in favor of annexation. Cuevas 
immediately sent for Bankhead, who endeavored to calm his excite- 
ment ; and later both the English and the French ministers discussed 
the situation with the Secretary, and strongly recommended modera- 
tion. Congress was officially given the news on the twenty-second, 
and that body immediately put on a warlike front. It was proposed 
in the lower House to abrogate the treaty of amity and commerce 
existing between the United States and Mexico, shut out American 
trade, and prohibit the restoration of commercial intercourse except 
on the basis of non-annexation ; and a few days later it was moved 
that " under the existing circumstances the Government should listen 
to no proposition having for its object the recognition of the inde- 
pendence of Texas, and under no circumstances to propositions look- 
ing towards the annexation of that Department to the United 
States " ; and the resolution even undertook to make it legally trea- 
sonable to " promote either of these designs by speech or writing." 
The administration, however, was not so pronounced. A letter to 
Shannon, moderated by the British and French representatives, 
broke off diplomatic relations with him ; yet, as the London Times 
noted at once, it did not reassert the claim of Mexico to the Texan 
territory, and it was plain to close observers that the government 
had not been controlled entirely by the feelings of the public nor 
even by their own.'" 

On the afternoon of April 7 a fearful earthquake shook the 
capital and filled its inhabitants with mourning and alarm. Immense 
damages were caused ; the halls of Congress were so much injured 
that sessions could no longer be held there, and shocks continued to 
work havoc the following day. Whether this visitation had any 
effect on public sentiment cannot be known ; but a spirit of serious- 

" Arrangoiz, No. 47 (res.), March 8; No. 51 (res.), March 14. 1845. Bank., 
No. 27, March 31, 1845. Id. to Elliot. March 20. 1845: F. O.. Mexico, clxxxiv. 
Elliot to Jones, April 3, 1845: Jones, Memor., 441. 

"(March 21) Bank.. No. 31, March 31, 1845. Diorio. April 11, 1845. 
La Voz del Pueblo, March 29, 1845. Shannon, No. 9, March 27 ; No. 10, April 
6, 1845. The news of the annexation was confirmed on the 28th: Mex. a traves, 
iv., 538. Cuevas to Shannon, March 28, 1845 : Diario, March 28, 1845. Times, 
May 10, 1845. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 423 

ness must have been promoted by it, and the government may have 
argued that the superstitious masses would feel doubtful whether 
heaven approved of their bellicose excitement. At all events, on the 
eighth Bankhead wrote that he believed Congress would accept " any 
fair plan " for acknowledging the independence of Texas. ^'* 

Two days later the official journal published the note that Almonte 
had addressed to the American government after the President had 
signed the annexation resolution, protesting against his action and 
announcing an intention to withdraw from the country. This docu- 
ment was of course admirably suited to stimulate public opinion at 
home, for it described the absorption of Texas as " an act of aggres- 
sion the most unjust which can be found recorded in the annals of 
modern history," and assumed an equally high tone all the way 
through. Much more noteworthy, however, was Buchanan's reply, 
published at Mexico on the same day, for it remarked suggestively 
that the admission of Texas to the American Union was now irrev- 
ocably decided upon so far as the United States were concerned, 
and added in plain words that only a refusal of the other party to 
accept the terms and conditions could frustrate the design. This 
language, though far from being so intended, was a strong argument 
in favor of the proposed negotiations with Texas, and some of the 
quick-witted Mexicans doubtless caught the hint." 

On the evening of April 11 the British frigate Enrydice came in 
at \ev2i Crviz. Without loss of time her captain landed, and as soon 
as possible he set out for Mexico City, carrying despatches — it was 
understood — for the British minister. With him went an incon- 
spicuous person in a white hat. This retiring individual, however, 
was Charles Elliot, the British charge in Texas, who had induced 
his cousin to assume the role of a bearer of despatches in order to 
divert attention from him ; and three days later, after having been 
duly robbed en route by the brigands, the travellers arrived safely at 
the capital with the Texan proposition.'" 

The outlook for their mission appeared distinctly favorable. 
President Herrera was a mild, fair, thoughtful and patriotic citizen; 

" Mexico a traves, iv., 539. Bank, to Elliot, April 8. 1845 : F. O., Texas, 
xxiii. 

^' Diario, April 10, 1844. Almonte to Calhoun, March 6, 1845: Sen. Doc. 
I, 29 Cong.. I sess., 38. Buch, to Almonte, March 10, 1845: ib.. 39. (Hint) 
Mexico a traves, iv., 539. 

'"Elliot to Jones, April 5, 1845, endorsement: Jones, Memor., 443. Dimond 
to State Dept., No. 236, April 12, 1845: State Dept., Desps. from Consuls. Vera 
Cruz, i. Elliot to George Elliot, April 5, 1845, and memorandum : F. O., Texas, 
XV. G. Elliot to Austen. May 2, 1845: ib. Bank., No. 46, April 29, 1845. 



424 



THE ANXEXATIOX OF TEXAS 



and his policy was not characterized by the animosity towards the 
United States, real or assumed, that many previous governments of 
Mexico had exhibited. The official journal had even reprinted with- 
out comment an article from an American newspaper condemning 
Rejon's bitter correspondence with Shannon. Already the Presi- 
dent had indicated a willingness to make advances toward peace like 
those suggested by Santa Anna just before his fall, and the terms 
now received from Jones were unexpectedly acceptable. Indeed 
Bankhead described the proposition that Texas would not join any 
foreign nation as " a positive and unsolicited concession " to the 
mother-country. The British minister was regarded at this time by 
the American consul as the dominant factor at Mexico. In fact the 
consul intimated that the administration was " under the tutelage of 
the British Legation " ; and all the influence of England favored, of 
course, an acceptance of the Texan overture, while the Memoria of 
Cuevas was believed to have inclined the public toward conces- 
sions. A council of the ministers was at once convened ; the propo- 
sition was laid before it; and the cabinet decided to endorse it.^' 

There existed, however, a difficulty. As the government pos- 
sessed no authority to alienate any portion of the national territory, 
it was necessary to ask Congress for the power to do so. Several 
days were therefore taken to prepare that body for the request, and 
then on the twenty-first Cuevas laid the subject before the Chamber 
of Deputies in what was termed an Iniciativa. " Circumstances have 
arisen," he said, " which render negotiations for blocking the an- 
nexation of Texas to the United States not only proper but neces- 
sary . . . [and] Texas has at last proposed a settlement." To 
refuse to treat regarding this matter would constitute " a terrible 
charge against the present administration " ; yet the President, 
" though satisfied of its importance and of the urgency of doing 
something in regard to it, is also convinced that the Executive can- 
not act in the aflfair without a previous authorization from the Cham- 
bers." Should this be granted, the proper steps will be taken. If 
an honorable arrangement can be made, the government will lay it 
before Congress ; while if not, they will be the first to declare for a 
war, " which will be the more just, the greater have been our efforts 
to prevent it." To adopt any other course than to break at once with 
the United States is a very great sacrifice for the administration ; 

"Shannon, No. 8, Jan. i6. 1845. Bank., No. no, Dec. 31, 1844: Xo. 46, 
April 29, 1845. Parrott to Buch., May 13, 1845: State Dept.. Desps. from Mins., 
Mexico, xii. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO ^2^ 

but, with a view to the welfare of the country, we suggest that "the 
Government be authorized to hear the propositions made regarding 
Texas, and proceed to negotiate such an arrangement or treaty as 
may be deemed proper and honorable for the Republic." This re- 
quest was received " most favorably," reported Bankhead; and Elliot 
wrote to Jones before the day was over that in a week the condi- 
tions of peace would be formally signed. ^^ 

But the government had not the sole authority. There was a 
public, and the public felt deeply on this matter. To see a few 
people, nearly all of them foreigners, rebel, seize a large portion of 
the nation's territory, rout its army, capture its President, establish 
a working government and gain recognition abroad had been fear- 
fully trying. To believe, not only on the authority of every Mexican 
leader but on that of many honorable and eminent Americans, that 
all this loss and chagrin were largely if not wholly due to the 
machinations of a neighbor, allied to ^Mexico by a treaty of amity 
and constantly professing friendship, was harder yet. And now to 
find those Texans, recently so eager to escape from all outside con- 
trol, preparing as if by a preconcerted understanding to join that 
seemingly perfidious and aggressive nation, carrying their invaluable 
territories with them and bringing its frontier to the very bank of 
the Rio Grande, — this was certainly enough to make any man, igno- 
rant of the steps by which it really had come about and quite unable 
to understand American ways, boil with rage. 

Public sentiment, therefore, had been observing matters with 
growing excitement. The government's proposition to the Cham- 
ber was made in secret, but more or less distorted accounts of it 
leaked out. The Federalists accused the administration fiercely of 
selling a part of the country for British gold, insisting that England's 
efforts in the matter were for selfish ends. Tornel, formerly Santa* 
Anna's crafty satellite and now the editor of a newspaper, cried 
loudly for war though personally a notorious coward. " Let us die, 
but let us die bathed in the blood of our enemies?" exclaimed El 
J'cracnicaiio. "The triumph will be ours." declared El Jaliscicnse 
more hopefully but with no less fury, " and the infamy will fall upon 
the enemies of justice." " Let us fly to Texas and recover the honor 
of the nation ! " exhorted El Obscrvador of Zacatecas. " The entire 
nation demands war. . . . What, then, is the Government about? 

'* Bank.. No. 46, April 29, 1845. Cuevas. Iniciativa. April 21, 1845: Diario, 
April 21. 1845. Elliot to Jones. April 21. 1845: Jones, Memor., 452. Mexico a 
traves, iv., 539. 



426 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



. . . Alas for the Mexican nation if it lose these moments, precious 
for overcoming its enemy ! Alas for Mexico, if she forget that her 
independence, that her liberties are to-day in danger ! " cried La Voz 
del Pueblo; and still more furiously the same popular journal ex- 
claimed, after Cuevas had presented his Iniciativa to the Chamber, 
" Extermination and death to the Sabine was the cry of our victor- 
ious legions at the Alamo, Bejar and El Salado. Extermination and 
death will be the cry of the valiant regulars and of the citizen soldiery, 
marching enthusiastically to conquer Texas." " Mexicans ! . . . 
Already you have ceased to possess a frontier or even a dividing line 
between yourselves and your perfidious neighbor. Already you have 
lost the hope of preserving your independence. Day by day from 
now on that independence will grow feebler; and at this very mo- 
ment we see our liberties, our cherished liberties, MexicanSj threat- 
ened by an enemy close at hand. You, then, Mexicans, what are 
you doing?" — thus appealed El Veracnizano Libre. "The Texas 
afifair has ceased to be a question," declared El Boletiii dc Noticias; 
" In the face of the world the most horrible of perfidies has now been 
consummated, and the peril of our country places before us the ter- 
rible problem whether to exist or to exist no more." Not only fierce 
but persevering were these and other journals ; and the editors of 
La Voz del Pueblo, not satisfied to hurl thunderbolts — or at least 
firebrands — against the United States, issued a pamphlet which, 
suggesting that England intended to establish a protectorate over 
Texas, use San Francisco as a base for her trade with Asia, and 
reduce the people of northern Mexico to a condition like that of 
the Mahrattas, denounced the " infantile confidence " with which 
the ministry had listened to proposals coming through a British 
channel as " truly wonderful." It is actually proposed to renounce 
forever, so Le Courrier Frangais summarized the language of the 
extremists, a province that is ours ; the intervention of England and 
France would cost us dear ; no sort of arrangement with rebels ought 
to be tolerated; " Dclcnda est Carthago !'"^'^ 

Such appeals as these were admirably calculated to excite the 
public they addressed, for they touched the springs of patriotism, 
l)ridc, suspicion, jealousy and conscious weakness. Five days after 
Cuevas presented his Iniciativa the American consul at Mexico re- 

'" Bank., No. 48, May 20, 1845. Vcracnizano, April 5, 1845. Jaliscicnse, 
April I, 1845. Obscrvador. April 6, 1845. Vos del Pueblo. April 16: May 3, 
1845. Veracriizano Libre, March 24, 1845. Bolet'm de Noticias. March 4, 1845. 
Federacion y Tejas. Courrier Francois: Diario. May 18, 1845. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 427 

ported, " \\'ar with the United States seems to be the desire of all 
parties rather than to see Texas annexed." At Vera Cruz and 
Puebla there were even symptoms of revolt. The cabinet felt greatly 
distressed. To the Minister of Foreign Relations every sign of 
opposition seemed invincible, and Bankhead reported in disgust: " It 
required all the argument and solicitation of Monsieur de Cyprey 
[the French minister], and myself to keep Senor Cuevas up to the 
mark, by repeating to him the absolute necessity of immediate action, 
and pointing out the crisis in which the Country is placed." Bank- 
head believed, and no doubt urged, that the absorption of Texas by 
the United States would mean the opening of a door for the conquest 
of Mexico. Yet with such a peril " staring him in the face," as the 
liritish representative said, the fear of taking a responsibility often 
caused Sehor Cuevas to present " the most puerile arguments to 
avoid giving a direct answer to the Texian propositions." In fact 
he seemed convinced by the tenth of May that the ministry would 
have to resign; but finally, stimulated by the exhortations of the 
British and French representatives not to abandon the cause of 
Mexico and encouraged by promises of support from political 
friends, the cabinet consented to remain in office.-'^ 

There were, however, other causes of embarrassment. All the 
previously mentioned considerations tending to favor inaction in the 
matter had an opportunity to present themselves anew. In particu- 
lar it was very difficult for the ministers to rid themselves of the 
familiar notion that giving up Texas might involve the loss of other 
territory and even a greater loss. In asking Congress to grant 
?3,ooo,ooo the government had said in April, " The question is not 
merely whether Texas is or is not to be independent of Mexico, but 
also whether Mexico will hereafter be an independent nation or be 
a colony " of the United States. It is possible that Cuevas hoped to 
obtain, by holding off, an English and French guaranty of the north- 
ern boundary. He knew that in June of the previous year England 
at least had been ready to stand behind the permanent independence 
of Texas, that France had pursued of late the same Texan policy as 
her neighbor, and that both were now quite as anxious to have 
]\Iexico recognize that country as they had been at any previous date. 
He understood, too, that without such a guaranty her independence 
might prove a feeble barrier, or no barrier at all, against the United 

-" Parrott to Buch., April 26, 1845: State Dept., Desps. from Mins.. Mexico, 
xii. Bank., No. 48, May 20; No. 46, April 29, 1845. Id- to Sir Ch. Adam. Apr. 
29, 1845 : Brit. Admty. Secy., " In Letters," Bundle 5,549. 



428 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

States. Considering all this and aware that Great Britain had 
strongly recommended the recognition of Texas for the very purpose 
of establishing such a barrier, he may reasonably have suspected 
that Bankhead and Cyprey were authorized to give the desired pledge 
should that step become absolutely necessary, and he may have 
adopted a policy of delay partly for efifect upon them. Another 
statesmanlike view also may have been entertained. In February 
the Mexican minister at Washington had written to Arrangoiz that 
the pending Oregon bill would certainly, if passed, cause hostilities 
between the United States and England, and this idea was forwarded 
to the capital. That bill, to be sure, did not become a law ; but 
Polk's inaugural address took so uncompromising a stand for Amer- 
ican claims in the far Northwest that a conflict seemed once more 
very possible, and Cuevas may well have paused to inquire whether 
such a war might not give his countr}- an opportunity to make good 
her claim to Texas, and whether England's present eagerness to have 
that country recognized might not be due in a greater or less measure 
to a perception of this very fact.-^ 

Procrastination, however, on the part of Mexican diplomats does 
not absolutely require so elaborate an explanation. Indolence was 
constitutional and habitual with them ; and to that cause more than 
to any other Bankhead attributed the delay in this affair. Racial 
formalism was another obstacle. Pefia y Pefia, chairman of the 
Senate committee, for example, caused the waste of several precious 
days by drawing up a labored report that went back to the Duke of 
Alva and the Low Countries. Then the business was nearly upset 
by the news that President Jones had convoked the Texan Congress 
to consider the American annexation proposition, and that — as the 
Mexican consul at New Orleans wrote — ten more United States 
war vessels were coming to Vera Cruz; but Bankhead assured the 
government that the latter report could not be correct, and Elliot 
explained that Jones's action was merely intended to silence the 
clamor and defeat the intrigues of the American party in Texas.-- 

While the diplomats discussed and meditated, the official news- 
paper endeavored to bring the people around. As for the course of 
the United States, it said, the opinion of all is the same ; but it is 
now a question of "opening negotiations for the very purpose of 
preventing" the success of their designs. If the government refuse 

=" Bank.. No. 38, April 29, 1845. To Bank., No. 16. conf.. June 3, 1844. 
Bank., No. 65, Aur. 29, 1844. Arrangoiz, No. 35 (res.), Feb. 17, 1845. 

=°Bank. to Elliot, May 20, 1845: F. O., Texas, xxiii. Bank., No. 48, May 20, 
184s. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 429 

to hear the proposals of Texas, it may hereafter be said that by so 
doing they brought upon us the greatest of evils; whereas if those 
proposals are listened to, no matter what be the outcome, it will be 
clear to the world that we resort to war only after exhausting all 
honorable measures to avoid it. Besides, the negotiations are to 
rest, as we understand, on a basis highly creditable to Mexico, and 
the result of them will be submitted to the Chambers. An opposi- 
tion paper attacks the idea of even hearing Texas, on the ground 
that while we dream of a peaceful settlement, the United States — 
" who never sleep " — will overwhelm us ; but there is no need of 
relaxing our preparations for war while we negotiate. The article 
in question betrays personal considerations all the way through. It 
is simply an attempt to discredit the ministry, and it would be better 
to await the result of the discussion, and see what kind of a treaty 
is actually drawn. Others complain because the propositions of 
Texas are not immediately published ; but it would be stupid to make 
them known, since the Americans might then baffle us, as they have 
already taken advantage of ever}- blunder on our part.-^ 

It is charged, protested the Diario further, that the ministry have 
usurped an authority not belonging to them ; but this is false, for 
they have taken no final action and will leave the decision to the 
Chambers. It is objected that they have asked for power to sign 
an agreement as well as for power to hear propositions ; but it would 
be absurd to let them listen yet refuse them all authority to do any- 
thing. It is argued that treaty-making is a sovereign act, and that 
our government — recognizing the ability of Texas to treat with us 
by asking leave to negotiate with her — practically admit the inde- 
pendence of that country ; but it is well known that in every case 
of rebellion the seceding part of a nation is for certain purposes 
regarded as if independent, and this was done by ourselves in the 
instance of Yucatan. It is further objected that the organic law 
permits the President to make treaties only with foreign nations, and 
that the ministers, by asking permission to treat with Texas, recog- 
nize it as such ; but they would have had no occasion to ask for 
special powers had they regarded Texas as a foreign nation. Another 
objection is this: The organic law gives no authority to treat with a 
revolted province, and therefore the mere proposal of the govern- 
ment is in itself a violation of law ; but at the worst, if the law did 
forbid them to treat with a revolted province, the proposal would be 

'^Diario, April 22; May i, 1845. 



430 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



only a suggestion that one of its features be annulled. The consti- 
tution does not, however, forbid such negotiations, for it is merely 
silent on the matter.-* 

At the same time the urgency of the situation was further 
emphasized by Arrangoiz. The press of Texas, he reported, had 
come over generally to the side of annexation, and the Congress 
would not dare to reject the American proposition. At Fort Jesup, 
near the Texas frontier, he added, there were sixteen companies of 
United States infantry and seven of dragoons; and other troops had 
been ordered to that point. In all there were 2,500 or 2,600 men ; 
and they would enter Texas immediately, should it be known that 
Mexican troops had crossed the border. It would therefore be in 
vain to rely upon force. Meanwhile Almonte, who believed his 
nation ought to recognize Texas at once and hurried home to pre- 
sent his views, appears to have arrived on the scene, and no doubt 
he gave additional strength to that side of the question.^^ 

Finally, after three days of debate, the Chamber of Deputies 
authorized the cabinet on May 3 to hear the propositions " offered 
by Texas," thus gratifying the national pride by pointing out 
distinctly who had tendered the olive branch. At the same time, 
instead of permitting the ministers to negotiate such an agreement 
as they should consider proper and honorable, it only gave powers to 
negotiate one that should " be " proper and honorable. For this 
ingenious device to saddle the responsibility upon the executive 
department the vote stood 41 to 13. Two weeks later the Senate 
approved of the measure by 30 voices against 6, and at last on the 
twentieth Bankhead notified Elliot and Cyprey notified Jones of the 
acceptance of the Texan articles. Cuevas had made an additional 
declaration to the effect that in case the negotiation should for any 
reason fail or Texas consent directly or indirectly to join the United 
States, the action of Mexico in agreeing to treat with her should be 
considered null and void ; but this bit of tactics did not affect the 
substance of the matter.-" 

'-* Diario, May i, 6, 1845. The arguments of the Diario reveal the superficial 
and captious but clever character of the opposition. Its efforts were seconded by 
the ablest of the Mexican journals, the Siglo XIX. {e. g.. April 24. 1845) and some 
others. 

"Arrangoiz, No. 67 (res.), April 30, 1845. To Cowley, No. 46. April 15, 
1845: F. O., Texas, xxi. Shannon, No. 10, April 6, 1845. The N. Orl. Picayune 
(April 29, 1845) stated that Almonte reached Mexico on April 18; see Mex. a 
travt's, iv., 540. 

'^Diario, May 18. 1845. Bank, to Elliot, May 20, 1845: F. O., Texas, xxiii. 
Cyprey to Jones. May 20, 1845: Tex. Arch, Mex. a traves, iv., 543. Cuevas, 
Add. Decl. : Sen. Doc. i. 29 Cong., i sess., 89. 



THE ANNEXATION QUESTION BEFORE MEXICO 43I 

During the last week of April Elliot, having done all that he 
could at the seat of government, retired to the beautiful town of 
Jalapa, not far from Vera Cruz, and there awaited the result of his 
mission. On learning what had been done, he sailed for Texas in 
the French brig of war, La Pcronsc, and May 30 he found himself 
once more at Galveston.-" 

^London Times. June 4, 1845. G. Elliot to Adm. Austen. April 30, 1845: 
Brit. Admty. Secy., " In Letters." Bundle 5,549. Dimond to State Dept., No. 
243. May 27, 1845 : State Dept., Desps. from Consuls, Vera Crux, i. Elliot, No. 
16, May 30, 1845. 



XX 

The Crisis 

DoNELSON, confiding in Allen's promise that nothing unfavorable 
to the cause of annexation would be done by the Texan Executive, 
visited the United States just before Christmas, 1844, and in the 
following Alarch he was there again, waiting now for news that 
Congress had acted. By the twenty-fourth came Waggaman and 
the impatiently expected despatch from Calhoun. In the course of 
that day Buchanan's instructions also were placed in his hand, and 
after nightfall he sailed for Texas on the Marmora. Three days 
later he found himself at Galveston. The British and French minis- 
ters had now left for the seat of government on the mission that 
proved so effectual with President Jones ; and Donelson, very soon 
discovering their movements, chartered a steamer and " put off " 
after them.^ 

No doubt he was anxious. Rumors were afloat that the British 
war vessel, which had lately arrived at that port, had brought the 
hoped-for Mexican recognition, and that a liberal commercial treaty 
was to be proposed by England. Indeed it was generally believed 
at Galveston that if recognition had not already been granted, Elliot 
and Saligny would promise to guarantee it should annexation to the 
United States be refused. Donelson had no little faith in the senti- 
ment of the Texans, but there were unpleasant facts not to be 
denied. Many of the newspapers had shown hot indignation against 
the terms offered by the United States; and some, particularly the 
chief organ of the government, were now opposing them on grounds 
that suggested hostility to the very principle of annexation. It had 
often been asserted by men of good judgment that assured indepen- 
dence with favorable commercial propositions from England would 
thankfully be accepted. The friends of annexation were poor, and 

* See General Note, p. i. Don., conf., Dec. 24, 1844. Donelson had re- 
(juested Calhoun to have any further instructions sent to him at New Orleans, 
and, on hearing that the Senate had acted, left his home in Tennessee for that 
city. For some reason, however, Waggaman was ordered to go via Nashville 
and look for him there. Consequently the instructions of March 3 and those of 
March 10 reached him on the same day. For this reason Polk's note of March 
7, received on the i8th, had no effect. Id., March 24, 28, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 
29 Cong., I sess., 45, 46. Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. 

432 



THE CRISIS 433 

in fact almost all the money in the country was under the control of 
the British element. Terrell, an avowed partisan of nationality, 
was confidently expressing the opinion in Europe that his views on 
the subject were rapidly gaining ground among his fellow-citizens, 
and there must have been a foundation to base it upon. A deep 
jealousy existed between the eastern and the western sections of the 
country ; and an ominous chance could be seen that this might pre- 
vent harmonious action, even should the general sentiment be favor- 
able. There was danger that the people, instead of boldly demanding 
what they wanted, would feel bound to follow the prominent citizens 
whom public opinion in the United States had taught them to regard 
as their leaders ; and these men had ambitions, rivalries and interests 
that could be reached by personal and political arguments. Not a 
little might depend, too, wrote Donelson, on the shape in which the 
question of accepting the American proposal should be laid before 
the public, and this must be done directly or indirectly by the Texan 
government. It was therefore highly desirable to secure the co- 
operation of the President, and from that official he anticipated on 
the other hand " serious opposition. "- 

But there were powerful influences on the other side. In spite of 
everything, even though sometimes unconscious of the fact, a major- 
ity of the Texans deeply loved the American constitution and their 
kindred, the American people; while as heirs of 1776 and 1812, as 
the objects — like all Americans at that day — of British contempt, 
and as believers in the institution of slavery, they disliked and dis- 
trusted the English. It was well understood that in the event of 
annexation lands would increase very rapidly in value and make 
their owners comfortable or perhaps rich. Hopes were encouraged 
and even promises made, it was charged, that the rivers would be 
cleared for navigation, the harbors deepened, lighthouses built and 
fortifications constructed ; and probably some exaggerated yet well 
founded anticipations of such benefits were entertained. It was pre- 
dicted that American capital would flow into the land in ocean 
streams, Ashbel Smith complained ; and this was substantially a 
reasonable forecast which, thwarted for a time by the civil war, has 
been fulfilled. When annexation came to pass, wrote one of the 
early settlers, " After all those years of trial and sore distress, being 

= Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. Don., March 28, 1845: Sen. Doc. 
I. 29 Cong., I sess., 46. Id. to Polk, March 18, 19, 1845: Polk Pap., Chicago. 
(Terrell) King. No. 11, Feb. 2t, 1845. (Jealousy) Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. 15, 
1848, p. 308. Don., No. 21, April 29; No. 30, June 19; private, July 11, 1845. 

29 



434 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



as it were a kind of football for the greater powers on both sides 
of the Atlantic, it did seem good to see the old stars and stripes 
again floating over us, giving assurance of strength and protection, 
[and] saying to the nations of the world, 'Hands off;'" and this 
profound sentiment, later one of satisfaction, was already one of 
desire. Ground down by long years of adversity, poverty and war, 
the masses were eager to be safe from the many evils they had 
experienced ; and now that the doors of the United States were seen 
to stand open, excited by this combination of strong feelings they 
" ran perfectly wild and frantic," said President Jones. British 
diplomacy being monarchical as well as abolitionist, and everything 
Mexican being in the popular view treacherous, whatever security 
was offered by those two powers in conjunction looked rather more 
than suspicious ; but admission to the Union on a par with the old 
States meant a simple, definite and well tested guaranty of protection 
and welfare. Frank ^Mexican recognition at an earlier period 
might have satisfied them ; but the present offer, apparently due to 
English management and evidently made to defeat annexation, was 
a different affair.^ 

Besides, there had been of late a powerful and increasing tide of 
American immigration. As Senator Ashley of Arkansas had stated 
only a month before, so many were passing Little Rock on the 
way to Texas that a steamboat was required to ferry them across 
the river, and corn had risen from twenty-five cents to $2.00 a 
bushel along their line of march. There was also a route crossing 
the western part of that State, a third by way of Natchez and 
Nachitoches, and a fourth by Red River ; and still other settlers 
came by water. Their total number made a flood. Nearly all of 
them had turned their faces toward the far Southwest confidently 
hoping, it may be presumed, that Texas would soon form a part of 
the Union ; it was greatly for their interest as well as their satis- 
faction that such a result should come to pass ; and it is easy to see 
that every one of them was a zealous missionary in the cause. 
Governor Yell, who had sailed for Galveston with the charge, took 
hold; Memucan Hunt, formerly minister to the United States, 
issued an address in favor of accepting the American proposition ; 
and of course Donelson himself, conspicuous wherever he went for 

'Elliot, private, Nov. 15, 1842. described the American Texans as deeply sus- 
picious of England. Smith. Remin., 77, 76. Smithwick, Evolution, 281. Jones, 
Mcmor., 42, 62. 



THE CRISIS 435 

both discretion and earnestness, was never at a loss for efifective 
arguments.* 

Public sentiment promptly declared itself. On the ninth of 
April Smith reported that he found it " very intense " everywhere, 
and was " forced to believe that an immense majority of the citizens " 
were in favor of annexation as presented in Brown's resolution. He 
felt satisfied, too, that they would "continue to be so," even if 
" recognized in the most liberal manner by Mexico." " Should it be 
suspected," he said with reference to his mission abroad, " that the 
matter was to be deferred till the European powers could in any wise 
be heard from or consulted, especially England," he was assured 
that an attempt would almost certainly be made " to plunge the 
country into a revolution." The mere idea that he was to cross 
the Atlantic excited the people. He deemed it advisable to let them 
believe that he was bound for Washington, D. C, and he felt con- 
vinced that on learning he had sailed, they would " be inflamed 
beyond c&ntrol." Such, he stated, was an inadequate expression of 
the opinions deliberately formed in the course of his journey from 
the capital to the shore of the Gulf. A few days later Judge Ochil- 
tree, a member of the cabinet, wrote from Galveston that he found 
" deep and intense feeling " there. A " universal enthusiasm " was 
exhibited, said Donelson; and Elliot himself, on coming in contact 
with the sentiment of the people, described it as " hot and apparently 
general " in favor of annexation. Those opposed to the measure 
judged it necessary to conceal their views, and many thought it 
politic to advocate the cause, not only in order to avoid unpopularity, 
but as a method of defeating/ less outspoken rivals and placing them- 
selves ahead of more conservative leaders. The tide had risen and 
was rising still ; and Donelson very soon felt satisfied that he could 
rely upon its power. ^ 

When that gentleman had arrived within twenty miles of the seat 
of government, Jones, Ashbel Smith, Elliot and Saligny were signing 
the Memorandum of their conference ; and a few hours later the 
British and French envoys met him near the capital. With an 
eagerness he could not conceal Donelson asked them whether 
Congress had been convoked, " speaking of that measure as one of 

* Ashley: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App., 287. Yell to Polk, March 
26, 1845: Polk Pap. Wash. Globe, April 16, 1845. Yell, being an intimate friend 
of Polk (Polk, Diary, ii., 451), could in some ways exert a special influence. 

° Smith to Jones, April 9, 1845: Jones, Memor., 446. Ochiltree to Jones, 
April 13, 1845: ib., 450. Don., No, 21, April 29, 1845. Elliot, No. 16, May 30, 
1845 (P. S., May 31); Jan. 8, 1846. 



436 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



course, and necessarily decisive of the whole matter ;" but the charges 
only replied suavely that they " supposed the Government were 
waiting for his tidings, and that nothing had transpired of their 
purposes." He was particvdarly anxious to learn where Houston 
could be found, and even inquired of Elliot and Saligny ; but unfor- 
tunately they " could not tell him exactly." Regarding their mission 
he was unable to ascertain anything on the way, and even at the seat 
of government no clue could be obtained. They had appeared to 
show little satisfaction with its results ; but that was all he could 
learn, and it was less than nothing." 

A similar comedy was then played by Jones, Smith and Allen. 
Donelson gave the Secretary of State the substance of the American 
proposition on the evening of his arrival ; but Smith " seemed unpre- 
pared with views or opinions as to the course the President would 
adopt, and, if an inference had been drawn from the indefiniteness 
which marked his responses, it would have been most unfavorable." 
On presenting himself to Jones, Donelson was astonished to discover 
that the Secretary had suddenly been given a leave of absence, and 
that Allen was to serve in his place. He was then still more sur- 
prised by finding that Allen also had leave of absence, and quite 
naturally he feared there was " some settled scheme of delay, or of 
manoeuvre to promote the imputed project of a treaty with France 
and England." But the President received him cordially, and 
listened to his remarks with apparent interest. He said he had 
previously leaned toward the idea of summoning the Congress to 
act upon the question of annexation, but now favored laying it before 
the people at once, and calling a convention to effect the changes 
necessary for the admission of Texas to the Union. This appeared 
ominous, for by the terms of Brown's resolution the consent of the 
" existing government " — including Congress — was requisite. What 
followed looked no more encouraging, for he added " that the 
gravity of the subject required him not to act in haste; and that, 
although he had a decided opinion, he would dwell awhile on it, until 
he was aided by the advice of his cabinet." Next Donelson found 
that Allen also had a scheme for preventing Congress from assent- 
ing to the American proposition. The matter, he argued, was extra- 
constitutional, and the executive branch could deal with it as well as 
the legislative. The charge combated this view ; and Allen, finally 
withdrawing his objection, agreed to lay before the President Donel- 

' Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Don., April i, 1845. 



THE CRISIS 437 

son's draft of a reply to the American proposal. But this indicated 
no real progress, for Jones replied that he desired more time for 
reflection." 

It was noticeable also that Allen's leave of absence was to take 
him to a place about forty miles distant, where Houston was said 
to have just arrived. Donelson had written to the ex-President from 
Galveston, but he was now informed that for some reason his letters 
had failed to reach their destination. Moreover he heard that 
Houston intended to take a stand for the third section of the Ameri- 
can resolution, — the part rejected by Tyler and Polk; and he could 
not help reflecting that it was only natural the Texan authorities 
should cling to a state of things which gave them honors and emolu- 
ments. The proposition embodied in sections one and two of the 
resolution was therefore submitted informally, although — by what 
Calhoun termed a masterly stroke of diplomacy — as an ultimatum. 
This action had no favorable effect, however. " Affairs do not wear 
the encouraging aspect I would desire," Donelson reported. There 
was evidently danger that the Texan government would decline to 
move, and by thus withholding their co-operation would defeat the 
American plan ; and much was now being said " on the streets " of 
some scheme, based on English and French guaranties, to be sub- 
mitted to the people at the same time as the offer of annexation. 
But the charge determined to hope for the best, and insisted strongly 
upon action at an early date.* 

He next visited Houston, and soon found that rumor had not 
misrepresented the ex-President's attitude. That leader was distinctly 
opposed to the American terms, objecting particularly to the cession 
of Texan public property and the uncertainty of the southwestern 
boundary. Donelson endeavored to satisfy him ; but Houston still 
insisted upon the necessity of resorting to the third section — in other 

' Don., April i, 1845. The substance of Donelson's draft was that the Presi- 
dent would call Congress at an early day. or designate a day for the people to 
choose delegates to a convention to decide upon the American proposals, and. should 
they be accepted, make the necessary changes in the government. In addition 
to the delays and other embarrassments that would have resulted from offering 
§ 3 to Texas, Jones said later that — had this been done — the arrangement with 
Mexico could have been used to extort better terms from the U. S. (Letter, Nov. 
13, 1847: Nilcs. Jan. 15, 1848, p. 308). 

'See previous note. Don. to Allen, March 31. 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., 
I sess., 48. Id. to Calhoun, April 24, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 1029. Cal- 
houn to Don., May 23, 1845: ib., 658. Jones, Memor., 103. See remarks in 
note 15. Jones to Don., Jan. 26, 1852: ib., 583. Don., April 3, i, 1845: Sen. 
Doc. I, 29 Cong., I sess., 51, 47. 



438 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

words, opening negotiations — and inquired whether any guaranty- 
existed that should his country accept the proposal and conform her 
government thereto, " she might not still be refused admission " into 
the Union. ^ 

He even went farther, and put his ideas on paper. Brown's reso- 
lution, he complained, dictates the terms and Texas is driven to sub- 
mission, whereas she ought to have something to say about the 
matter; and, being compelled to surrender her property without com- 
pensation, she really has to pay a price for American statehood. On 
the other hand should the terms be arranged by negotiation, they 
could be laid before the public at the annual election in September, 
and should the people endorse them, the Congress could then take 
the necessary action. This course the ex-President pronounced 
" indispensable " from the Texan point of view, and he expressed 
the belief that without the third section the resolution would not even 
have passed the American Congress. In his judgment, he said, 
admission to the Union " would be very doubtful," should the third 
section be ignored. He feared that should Texas accept the condi- 
tions and her new constitution prove unacceptable to the United 
States, there would be a tremendous upheaval in both countries. 
Not enough time was allowed her for a proper consideration of the 
whole subject. She was still regarded as a suppliant. She ought to 
part with nothing she might need later. There had been strong 
opposition in the United States against receiving her ; and as the 
unfriendly element might some day gain control, her retained rights 
needed to be defined. These are specimens of Houston's objections. 
As a whole they showed that he was catching at every difficulty which 
seemed likely to hinder the acceptance of the American ultimatum 
and to call for the opening of prolix and uncertain negotiations. 
Elliot himself could have done no more; and the Mexican consul at 
New Orleans informed his government that although Houston 
asserted he had not exchanged letters with the British minister for 
more than a year, it was positively true that a continuous corre- 
spondence had passed between them. In short, as Donelson reported, 
the ex-President " brought all his influence to bear against our pro- 
posals, and in favor of resorting to the negotiation contemplated by 
the Senate amendment to the House bill." He did not talk very 
much on the subject, though he seems to have dealt a hard stroke 

"Don., No. i8, April 12, 1845. 



THE CRISIS 439 

where he thought it prudent so to do ; but, remarked Ashbel Smith, 
" his silence was not equivocal. "^° 

There were, however, certain influences drawing him in the other 
direction. Donelson had brought down " a letter from the Chief," 
that he had thought would prove decisive. You have acted a noble 
part, wrote Jackson, in leading Texas home to the Union, " and 
your name is now recorded among the heroes, the patriots, and [the] 
philanthropists." Elliot said that Houston had " other friends " 
who would " endeavour to keep him in the way of his abiding 
honour and duty," but he fully recognized the power that emanated 
from the Hermitage. Ambition, too, while it held out a prospect of 
the great nation that Texas might some day become, held out also a 
nearer view of a great nation, the United States, that already was. 
The Washington Globe had suggested that in due time a chief 
magistrate might come from beyond the Sabine; and the Baltimore 
American, commenting on this remark, had pointed to Houston, and 
said that Jackson had already demonstrated his ability to make 
Presidents. Later this month Buchanan wrote to Donelson : " It is 
possible that some of the high officers of Texas, supposing that their 
importance and their emoluments might be lessened by annexation, 
may prove to be hostile to the measure ; but surely the hero of San 
Jacinto cannot fear that his brilliant star will become less bright by 
extending the sphere of its influence over all the twenty nine States 
of our Federal Union ;" and there is evidence that so obvious a per- 
sonal argument had been discovered some time before. Only a few 
days later the British consul at Galveston reported to his government 
that the Texan leader had been mentioned by the Democratic 
journals of the United States as a probable candidate for the Presi- 
dency, and that it was believed the Sage of the Hermitage would 
recommend his nomination. Elliot thought other inducements had 
less weight than personal regard for Jackson ; but Houston was 
not so constructed that he could ignore this gilded bait.^^ 

A serious embarrassment was now encountered by the ex-Presi- 
dent in the terms of annexation which he himself had suggested the 
previous December, when probably he believed that no real prospect 

^'Houston to Don., April 9, 1845: Tex. State Hist, Ass. Quarterly, Oct., 
1897. Arrangoiz, No. 77 (res.), May 26, 1845. Don. to Calhoun. April 24, 1845: 
Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 1029. Jones, Memor., 103 (Allen said that Houston 
urged Miller to oppose annexation in the paper that he edited). Smith, Remin., 69. 

"Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. Jackson to Houston. March 12, 
1845: Yoakum, Texas, ii., 441. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845; No. 7, Jan. 20, 1846. 
Globe and Amer.: Memphis Eagle, March 31, 1845. To Don., No. 6, April 28, 
1845. (Evidence) Kennedy, private, June 18, 1844; April 25, 1845. 



440 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



of joining the Union remained. These demanded that the national 
debt of his country should be assumed or else that she should retain 
her public lands for the payment of it ; and the American proposition 
offered the second alternative. On substantially all points his 
requirements had been fairly satisfied; and Donelson, referring to 
this fact in the discussion, maintained that he was virtually com- 
mitted to the House bill. There was also that " wisdom growing 
out of necessity," the power of which had already been acknowl- 
edged. This and " all the circumstances which affected the relations 
between Texas and the United States " appear to have been brought 
before his mind, and every consideration that could work upon his 
judgment or his feelings was doubtless made to play its part. Yet 
Donelson admitted that he took leave of Houston " under a full con- 
viction that if the adoption of our proposals depended upon his 
vote, it would be lost."^- 

Such a state of things was distinctly recognized by the charge as 
" unfortunate," for he looked upon the ex-President as " the only 
man in the Republic " who could " embarrass the question." From 
two distinct sources he derived the ability to make serious trouble. 
One, arising from " the sincere respect and love entertained for him " 
now, as Donelson understood, " by the great mass of the people," 
sharers with him in " the glory of the revolution," was his influence 
on public opinion ; and the other was his ascendancy over Jones, who 
could not fail to see, however unwillingly, the power that he wielded 
in the nation and the danger of ignoring it. According to Ashbel 
Smith, during this period the past and the actual heads of the nation 
were in the main on friendly and confidential terms ; and Houston 
carefully drew out his objections to the House bill for the special 
purpose of influencing his successor. In particular, he advised the 
President to insist upon annexation by treaty, because a treaty could 
be abrogated. Supported by the national hero, said Donelson, the 
Texan Executive expected to throw the American charge back for 
new instructions on the basis of negotiation ; and should this plan 
fail, it was quite possible that he might venture, with the same back- 
ing, to prevent the requisite action of the Texan government. U 
Houston wavers, wrote Yell, the President may refuse to summon 
Congress ; and now he did more than waver, — he opposed.^^ 

■'Don., conf.. Dec. 24, 1844. Id. to Calhoun. April 24, 1845: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr.. 1029. Id., No. 22, May 6; No. 18, April 12, 1845. 

'*Don., April i; private, July 11, 1845- Yell (to Polk, May 5. 1845: Polk 
Pap.) described Houston as the power behind the throne and greater than the 



THE CRHIa 441 

Alter this unsatisfactory struggle, Donelson returned to Wash- 
ington and again interviewed the Executive ; but he could not dis- 
cover even now what was going on. Jones merely intimated that 
within sixty days he expected Mexico to offer something, and he 
endeavored to convey the idea that his information on the subject 
was derived, through Arista and Navaez, from the Mexicans them- 
selves. Ignorance of the scheme then afoot did not matter very 
much, however, for the charge employed all his strength to make the 
assembling of Congress unavoidable, and in this effort now had 
powerful assistance. Even at the seat of government he found the 
excitement keen on his return there, and this high state of feeling 
had begun to be reinforced from the nation at large. Soon public 
opinion was made known to Jones in ways too plain to be misunder- 
stood, and he was forced to perceive that the only safe course for him 
was an immediate compliance with the will of the majority. It was 
proposed, for example, to issue an address, if he would not move, 
and call upon the friends of annexation to meet and insist that a 
session of Congress be held. In eastern Texas Rusk, Henderson 
and other leaders were so vigorously at work that Yell felt sure they 
would carry their section, " and no mistake ;" while in the north and 
west Burleson, Reynolds, Lipscomb, Hays and their allies were con- 
fident they could force the Executive to act. For some time now 
the people had been, said Yell, " in a perfect commotion ;" and some 
even proposed to lynch Jones, should he offer the least opposition.^* 

Under these circumstances Donelson felt ready to submit the pro- 
posal of the United States in a formal and final shape. In doing so, 
he explained the reasons, as Calhoun's instructions presented them, 
for selecting sections one and two of the resolution. All the Texan 
authorities needed to do was to express their acceptance of the propo- 
sition, he further pointed out, and summon a convention to modify 
suitably the constitution and the government. " This great question, 
then," he continued, " is in the hands of Texas. It depends upon 
herself whether she will be restored to the bosom of the republican 
family, and, taking her station with the other sisters of the con- 
federacy, will co-operate with them in advancing the cause of free 

throne. Don.. No. 18, April 12, 1845. Smith, Remin., 70, (Drew out) Don. 
to Calhoun. April 24, 1845 : Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 1029. Smith, Remin., 71. 
Yell to Polk, March 26, 184S : Polk Pap. 

"Don., No. 21, April 29, 1845. Don. to Calhoun, April 24, 1845: Jameson, 
Calhoun Corr.. 1029. (Safe) Wicklifife to Buch.. May 21, 1845: State Dept. 
(Proposed) Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. (Lynch) Arrangoiz, No. 
81 (res.), June 2, 1845. 



442 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



government; or whether, standing aloof from them, she is to run 
the hazards of a separate career, at a period in the affairs of the 
world when the friends of a different system of government are 
urged bv the most powerful motives to resist the extension of the 
republican principle." No doubt objections to the terms may be 
made ; but these are of minor consequence, and " may well be post- 
poned until the natural course of events removes them. If annexa- 
tion should now be lost, it may never be recovered. . . . Much was 
conceded " on the other side " to obtain the passage of the resolu- 
tion " ; and it was believed that for like reasons Texas also would 
" overlook minor considerations. "^° 

Jones now took the position that the United States ought to have 
been more liberal, but that he would interpose no obstacle to the 
submission of the resolution to Congress and the people ; and accord- 
ingly on April 15 a proclamation was issued, calling upon the Sena- 
tors and Representatives to meet at Washington-on-the-Brazos June 
16, "then and there to receive such communications" as might be 
made to them, " and to consult and determine on such measures as 
in their wisdom " might be deemed expedient for the welfare of 
Texas. It was not zeal for annexation, however, that prompted this 
act, but fear of the people. Jones informed Elliot later that he had 
convened the Congress merely because it was plain to him that " no 
other means were left to him of averting bad and irreparable conse- 
quences " ; and Donelson reported two weeks later that were there 
found a device by which literal compliance with any feature of the 
joint resolution could be evaded, it would be resorted to, since it was 
expected that the next Congress of the United States would be as 
ready to dispute the formal admission of Texas as the recent one 
had been ready to contest the passage of the resolution, and would 
take advantage of any such point. None the less a very great danger 
had been averted. The government had acted. ^^ 

Meantime public opinion had beat upon Houston also. By the 
twenty-third of April pro-annexation meetings had been held in 

'"Jones, Memor., 103. Don. to Allen, March 31, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 
Cong., 1 sess., 48. Donelson's letter, though dated March 31 and read or shown 
to the Texan government the next day, appears to have been retained and modi- 
fied, and then formally presented about April 13. Allen acknowledged the receipt 
of it on the 14th: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong.. 1 sess., 53. To be sure, the letter as 
we have it in its final form is dated March 31 and seems to have been enclosed 
in Donelson's of April i ; but the modified letter would naturally have borne the 
same date and would have been substituted for the earlier draft in the files of 
the State department. This matter is, however, of no particular importance. 

'•Don., No. 18, April 12, 1845. Proclamation, April 15, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 
29 Cong.. I sess., 53. Elliot to Bank., June 11, 1845: F. O., Texas, xiii. Don., 
No. 21, April 29, 1845. 



THE CRISIS 443 

many places, and no meeting of the opposite kind anywhere. The 
Galveston N'ezcs had heard at that time from nearly twenty county 
gatherings, it stated ; and all of these had not only desired admission 
to the Union on the terms proposed, but desired it immediately, 
deprecating delay as extremely hazardous. Said the Houston Tele- 
graph: " The object of the Mexican Government is to lie and deceive 
us, and thus to delay measures until the opponents of Annexation 
can gain strength to defeat the measure. They may dupe some of 
our statesmen, but they will not dupe the people of Texas. Their 
march is onward. Their attention is fixed upon but one object, and 
they are determined to consummate it in spite of every obstacle." 
" So far as the United States and Texas are concerned," reported 
Consul Kennedy to the British government on April 25, "no one 
appears to doubt that annexation is inevitable." " No one can 
doubt," admitted the National Register at the same time, " that a 
large majority of our citizens are anxious for annexation, and will 
accept and ratify the terms now proposed."^' 

Reflecting again upon " the wisdom growing out of necessity," 
Houston very likely noted how the New Orleans Commercial Bul- 
letin already held that should Texas reject our offer, the United 
States must occupy the region as Madison had occupied West Florida. 
He noted too, very probably, certain remarks in the New Orleans 
Picayune. The developments of the past few weeks, declared this 
important journal, prove " the absolute sway " of Elliot and Saligny 
over Jones ; to them the doors of the cabinet are open while closed 
to the public ; and if the people of Texas are thus to be prevented 
from having an opportunity to express their will, Polk will be justi- 
fied in using military force to end " the tyranny of foreign dictation." 
The whispers of the larger ambition seem also to have been heard; 
and furthermore it was even represented to Houston, as to Jones, 
that the only " safe " course was a compliance with the will of the 
majority. On the fourth of May he appeared at Galveston bound 
for the Hermitage, there to calculate his chances for the American 
Presidency, Elliot surmised. " His views have undergone the change 
I anticipated," reported Donelson after an interview ; " I consider 
the question settled so far as Texas is concerned." Still another 
peril had been averted.^* 

"Houston Telegraph, April 23, 1845. News, April 22, 1845. Kennedy, 
private, April 25, 1845. Texas Nat. Reg., April 24, 1845. 

^^ Com. Bull.: London Times. May 10, 1845. Picayune: Memphis Eagle, 
April 22,, 1845. (Safe) Wickliffe to Buch., May 21, 1845 : State Dept. Yell to 



AAA THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

But a convention was necessary; and such a body, if not con- 
trary to law, was clearly extra-legal, since the constitution included 
no provision for it; and this difficulty was the greater because the 
jealousies between the sections were very likely to break out over 
the ticklish matter of apportioning delegates, especially as the bit- 
terly contested question whether Austin should be the capital would 
come before the convention. It looked as if controversies might 
easily arise which would afford the President a reasonable pretext 
for interposing or for calling a halt. Donelson himself felt much 
in doubt about the affair. At one time he thought the Congress 
ought to pass a law fixing the basis of representation, while at another 
he suggested to Jones that an apportionment could be made by the 
Executive, subject to revision by the convention itself. Then he 
feared that should the President assume this authority, he might be 
thought unwilling to allow the legislative branch a voice in the mat- 
ter; and therefore he discouraged the plan. In fact, he discovered 
there was a great deal of sentiment against entrusting this power to 
Jones, and finally he recommended that the whole matter be referred 
to the Congress.^'' 

Jones, however, had ideas of his own on the subject. For one 
thing, he expected a proposition from Mexico to lay before the 
people ; and for another he could probably see, as Allen suggested to 
him, that the Congress would be composed of bitter enemies and 
indifferent, apologetic friends of the administration, but that by sum- 
moning a conventionn lie could paralyze the opposition, and place 
himself tactically at the head of the nation. Accordingly on the 
fifth of May another proclamation was issued. In this the Presi- 
dent, admitting that no department of the government had constitu- 
tional authority to take such a step, merely recommended that dele- 
gates be chosen on a certain basis of representation to meet together, 

Polk, May 5, 1845: Polk Pap. Elliot to Bank., June 11, 1845: F. O.. Texas, xiii. 
Don., No. 22, May 6, 1845. Elliot (No. 10, Jan. 26, 1846) said that Houston 
was so acted upon that during the critical period he remained " passive and 
observant." Though the danger of opposition from Houston seemed to be over, 
the friends of annexation did not relax their efforts to hold him. Donelson and 
Jackson recommended that a clerkship at Washington be given to his friend 
Miller (Jackson to Polk, March 11, 1845: Polk Pap., Chicago); and Polk, in 
reply to a letter from him dated May 26, wrote that this matter should receive 
attention, that Texas should be defended and liberally treated, that her territorial 
claims should be vigilantly protected, and that he hoped Houston would be elected 
to the U. S. Senate (June 6: ib.). 

'"Don. to Jones, private, April 29, 1845: State Dept, Desps. from Mins., 
Texas, ii. Id., No. 30, June 19, 1845: .Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 74. Jones, 
Letter: Nilcs, Jan. 15, 1848, p. 308. Don., No. 19, April 16; No. 21, April 
29, 1845. 



THE CRISIS 445 

and that they assemble at Austin on the fourth clay of July to con- 
sider the overture of the United States " and any other proposition " 
which might be made " concerning the nationality of the Republic," 
and further, should the step be deemed wise, to adopt provisionally 
a new constitution, to be submitted to the people for ratification, 
with a view to the admission of Texas into the American Union. 
On learning of this action, Donelson remarked that the President 
and cabinet were now sufficiently committed ; and thus another 
obstacle had safely been passed.-*^ 

Now arose, however, a delicate situation. The Texan Secretary 
of State represented informally to the charge that acquiescence in 
the x\merican proposition would very likely cause a Mexican attack, 
and asked that United States forces march to the western frontier 
of Texas on the acceptance of the annexation overture. Donelson 
replied that if Allen would submit his views officially in writing, the 
note would be forwarded to the American government, and he ex- 
pressed the opinion that since any invasion would " certainly be 
aimed at the interests of the United States," the desired assistance 
would be cheerfully afforded. Allen thereupon drafted a note ask- 
ing for military protection and sent it up from Galveston for Jones's 
approval. The approval was given, and the note was then formally 
presented.-^ 

■"Allen to Jones, May 4, 1845: Jones, Memor., 459. Proclamation, May 5: 
F. O., Texas, xiv. Don., No. 25, May 24, 1845 : Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 59. 

"'Don., No. 22, May 6, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 56. Allen to 
Don., May 19, 1845: ib., 61. Id. to Jones, May 3, 1845: Jones, Memor.. 458. 
Don. to Allen. May 24, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 62. Later Jones 
said (Memor., 53) that no protection was needed at this time; that the affair 
was a '■ trick " ; that Donelson inveigled Allen, when the latter was at Galveston, 
into making the demand for protection. He explains that the reason Texas was 
in no danger was, that the preliminary articles of peace had been signed by 
Mexico ; but at this time they had not been signed by her. He says that he as- 
sented to Allen's letter because at that date he was " not a free agent " : but if 
he was under compulsion it was the compulsion of the Texan people whose will 
he recognized as supreme. As Mexico was believed to have troops at Matamoros, 
a vindictive raid seemed quite possible and preparations to repel it quite proper. 
This was not all. May 11 Donelson wrote that a British fleet was believed to be 
on the way to the Gulf, and that Mexico, thus encouraged, might declare waf 
against the United States, hoping that Texas, rather than be involved, would 
accept independence guaranteed by the powers. Allen's letter was handed to 
Donelson at New Orleans (Don., June i, 1845: Jones, Memor., 465), so that the 
Secretary had had an ample opportunity to recover from any mesmeric influence 
exerted upon him by the American charge. Jones was far from that influence at 
the time, and Donelson's letter to him on the subject (Jones, Memor., 457) con- 
tains no sign of pressure. Moreover Donelson's correspondence with the depart- 
ment of State gives no evidence that he urged Allen to ask for protection. Jones's 
second excuse — that he assented because the matter had already gone so far he 
could not refuse to assent — is evidently of no account, since Allen faithfully 
submitted the proposition to the President before taking any formal action what- 
ever. 



446 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



To all this no exception could be taken ; but it was very probable 
that public sentiment in Texas and the southern States would urge 
that American troops advance beyond the Sabine in case Mexico — as 
seemed quite likely — should cross the Rio Grande before the formali- 
ties of accepting the proposition of the United States could be com- 
pleted. This danger was, however, foreseen by Donelson, and he 
wrote to Buchanan, when forwarding Allen's request, that until 
annexation should actually have been accepted, " the greatest cau- 
tion should be observed, so as to give not the slightest pretext for 
the assertion that either the government or the people of Texas were 
influenced by the presence of our armed force." Buchanan was 
equally alive to the danger, and this letter was crossed by one in 
which the Secretary of State expressed himself as follows : " I am 
instructed by the President to inform you that as soon as the existing 
government and the convention of Texas shall have accepted the 
terms proposed . . ., he will then conceive it to be both his right 
and his duty to employ the army in defending that State against 
the attacks of any foreign power " ; and a little later he added that 
the United States should avoid " even the least appearance of inter- 
ference with the free action of the people of Texas on the question 
of annexation." The dreaded contingency did not arise, but the 
policy decided upon by our government with reference to it is worthy 
to be remembered.^^ 

Akin though different was another military difficulty. As we 
have observed, a hot-headed element in Texas, mainly belonging to 
the anti-Houston party, had always longed for war with Mexico, 
believing that both revenge and territory could be gained. Now that 
annexation seemed at hand, a still more pressing motive was added. 
This was a desire to assert practically the Rio Grande boundary, so 
as to protect the country against invasion and make it easier to carry 
into the Union the district between that river and the Nueces. Ac- 
cording to Ashbel Smith there was yet another motive. It was 
understood that negotiations with Mexico were afoot ; many par- 
tisans of annexation feared some overture might come from that 
country which the people would be disposed to accept; and therefore 
it was desired by them to precipitate hostilities. For some or all of 
these reasons Jones was now urged to send a military expedition to 
the Rio Grande and perhaps beyond it, and he was thus placed in an 

=°Don. to Allen, May 24, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 6j. Id.. No. 
25. May 24, 1845: ib., 59. To Don., No. 7, May 23; No. 8, June 3, 1845: ib., 
40, 41. 



THE CRISIS 447 

exceedingly hard predicament. His negotiations with Mexico made 
it impossible to assent, yet — that affair being secret — he could not 
explain his refusal ; and as those who brought this pressure upon 
him with great energy were all or substantially all for aimexation, 
there was grave danger that he would become angry and refractory 
on that subject.-^ 

A number of circumstances made this prospect signally threat- 
ening. Duff Green was still in Texas, actively in favor of bringing 
that country into the Union and eager to extend her territory at the 
expense of Mexico, as we have seen ; and he was distinctly persona 
noil grata to Jones. Stockton, in command of an American fleet, 
was at Galveston ; and he, a man of great energy and somewhat less 
discretion, seems to have been playing a zealous part of a similar 
kind. Yell remained in Texas, exerting himself in the cause, for 
about six weeks ; Wickliffe, recently Tyler's Postmaster General, 
had been commissioned as a confidential agent to oppose the appre- 
hended eft'orts of England and France, and had begun operations 
about the first of May ; and ex-President Lamar, who had come over 
to the side of annexation, was now on the ground at work. Lamar 
belonged of course to the anti-Houston and anti-Jones party ; Wick- 
liffe, Stockton, Green and presumably Yell, falling in with that fac- 
tion, saw things through their eyes ; and this entire aggregation, in 
concert with General Sherman, the Texan commander-in-chief, ex- 
erted their utmost endeavors, it would appear, to force the wished- for 
campaign upon the President. They had strong arguments, too. 
Mexican troops were believed to be concentrating on the border, and 
Wickliffe felt satisfied they were coming to the Nueces. In fact a 
hundred men were already reported to have reached that stream, and 
about seven thousand to be under orders on the Rio Grande. Kin- 
ney, who owned a ranch near Corpus Christi, was in fear of an 
attack, and Captain Hays wrote of actually expecting a battle.^* 

At the end of May General Sherman and Dr. Wright, surgeon 

^ Smith, Remin., 66. Jones. Memor., 48. 

-* Arrangoiz. No. 40 (res.), Feb. 28, 1845. Jones, Memor., 48. Don., No. 23, 
May II, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 57. (Commissioned) State Dept., 
Special Missions, i., 213. Yell to Polk, May 5, 1845: Polk Pap. (Come over) 
Smith, Remin., 79. (Eyes) Don., private, July 11, 1845, (Exerted) Smith, 
Remin., 66; Elliot to Bank., June 11, 1845: F. O., Texas, xiii. Don. No. 25, 
May 24; No. 26, June 2, 1845: Sen. Doc. i. 29 Cong., i sess., 59, 64. Wickliffe 
to Buch., May 21, 1845: State Dept. Don.. No. 27, June 4, 1845. Wickliffe to 
Polk. June 4. 1845: Polk Pap. Id. to Buch.. June 13. 1845: State Dept. N. B. 
Wickliffe's reports may be found in a package endorsed: " C. A. Wickliffe, Con- 
fidential Agent to Texas to counteract the contemplated interference of Great 
Britain and France to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States." 



448 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



of the United States war vesselFnnc^^on and— according to Jones — 
Stockton's secretary, visited Washington-on-the-Brazos and spent 
three days in discussing this matter. Jones, fearing that Sherman's 
popularity, the general hatred of Mexico and the other inducements 
might lead to the overthrow of the government should a blunt 
refusal be made, found it necessary to temporize ; and he replied that 
as Congress would meet in a few days, he would rather wait until 
he could have its advice. This is his own account, and Donelson's 
reports give hints of the same complexion. Wickliffe indicated how 
closely the government were pressed by writing that he himself was 
going to urge Hays to drive the Mexicans from the region west of 
the Nueces; and Sherman gave a report of his interview with the 
Executive, that brought out in strong colors the embarrassment in 
which the President found himself involved.-^ 

Jones admitted that Donelson held aloof from this affair ; and in 
fact the American charge cautioned Stockton, telling him that it was 
highly important the squadron should " so act as not to alter the 
general character of the defence " which the United States intended 
to interpose for Texas, — that is to say, she was to be defended after, 
but not before, the annexation proposal should have been accepted ; 
and instead of advocating an attack upon Mexico, he took the ground 
that it would be preferable to let the hostilities be commenced by 
her. No less correct was the conduct of our Executive. Buchanan 
wrote to Donelson that the government would " studiously refrain 
from all acts of hostility" towards Mexico unless these should 
become " absolutely necessary in self-defence," and that orders to 
this effect were given Stockton. Indeed, as a general policy, the 
Secretary of State urged that until a convention of the people should 
formally accept the American terms, any invasion ought to be re- 
l)ellcd by the Texans themselves. Consequently, though Jones's 
resentment against Wickliffe and Stockton was extreme, he could 
not hold the United States responsible for their proceedings ; and 
Donelson was able to report that however little the measures of these 
gentlemen were " calculated to conciliate the support of the Govern- 
ment," no harm had actually been done. One more rock had now 
been left behind.-" 

"Jones, Memor.. 48-50. Don., private, July 11, 1845. Wickliffe to Polk, 
June 3, 4, 1845: Polk Pap. 

"• Jones, Memor., 49, 96. Don. to Stockton, June 22, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 
29 ConR., I sess.. 86. Id., No. 32, July 2, 1845: ib., 91. To Don., No. 8, June 3; 
No. 9, June 15, 1845: ib., 41, 42. Jones, Memor., 96, 50. Don,, private, July 11, 
1845- 



THE CRISIS 449 

At this juncture Elliot returned from Mexico with the acceptance 
of the Texan overture, set out for the capital on the first day of 
June, and hurried on by day and by night without pausing for rest. 
There were two ways in which disaster to the cause of annexation 
was now threatened. In the first place, the Captain gave it out 
strongly that hostilities would ensue should the American proposi- 
tion be accepted, and even announced that should such action be 
taken, Mexico would declare war against the United States as soon 
as the vessel which had brought him north should return to Vera 
Cruz. Though in extreme haste, he took time on his way to assure 
General Sherman that peace would instantly come to an end, that 
the United States would blockade the Mexican ports, that England 
would refuse to recognize the blockade, that a twenty years war 
would follow, and that he should advise his friends to leave the 
country. Right and left he talked in this manner, and it was antici- 
pated that on finding the preliminary conditions of peace unwelcome, 
he would send an express to the Mexican general, and bring his army 
across the Rio Grande before the American proposition could be 
accepted. Five days after Elliot landed at Galveston even our 
charge regarded war as inevitable. This was certainly a very grave 
matter. In such a contest, not only would the cotton of Texas have 
been unable to find a market, but her soil would most probably have 
become the arena of contending armies, and all she possessed would 
have been endangered.-'^ 

But the charge was prepared for this emergency. Elliot, before 
Hihis departure for Vera Cruz, had told him as well as others that he 
Nvas going to the United States ; and Donelson, partly to keep track 
of him and partly to learn promptly what occurred at Mexico in 
consequence of his despatches to Bankhead, had taken the steamer 
for New Orleans. At Iberville, Louisiana, on May 22 he saw it 
announced in the Picayune of the day before that the British minister 
had gone south instead of north, and very soon this astonishing news 
was confirmed. In fact the proceedings of the ]\Iexican Congress 
regarding the overture from Texas were reported in the New Orleans 
paper, and so Donelson had time to adapt his policy to the circum- 
stances.-^ 

^ Don., No. 26, June 2; No. 28, June 11 ; No. 27, June 4, 1845: Sen. Doc. 
I, 29 Cong., I sess., 64, 68, 66. Elliot, No. 16 (P. S.), May 31, 1845 ; No. 16, 
Feb. 16. 1846. Wickliffe to Buch., April [June] 3. 1845: State Dept. Id. to 
Polk. June 4, 1845: Polk Pap. 

^ Don. to Jackson, May 24, 1845: Jackson Pap. N. Orl. Picayune. May 21, 24, 
1845. Don., No. 24, May 22, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 58. 

30 



450 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



On the one hand he planned to rouse the spirit of the Texans. 
To Allen he wrote, and to many others he undoubtedly said : " If 
Texas cannot be allowed to enjoy the blessings of peace and inde- 
pendence, as one of the sovereign members of the American Union, 
without asking permission of Alexico or of the monarchies of Eu- 
rope, the fact is worth volumes of argument in explaining the duty 
of those who are struggling to maintain a system of government 
founded on the will and controlled by the authority of the people." 
After the measure of annexation has been carefully matured and is 
acceptable to practically all of her people, she is told she must aban- 
don it or take the chances of war. " Thus is it made difficult for 
Texas, even had her judgment led her to reject the overture for her 
admission into the federal Union, to accept the propositions from 
Mexico, without incurring the imputation of being awed by an armed 
force, kept avowedly upon her frontier to commence hostilities, if 
her decision should be different from that prescribed for her. Nor 
is this difficulty lessened because it has connected with it the kind 
offices of the governments of France and Great Britain. Viewed in 
its best aspect, it shows that a shackle upon the present and prospec- 
tive relations of Texas, in defiance of her sovereign will, is resolved 
upon by others, not to satisfy Mexico, because she, in recognising 
the independence of Texas, admits her inability to place this restraint 
upon it, but to satisfy other and different interests." France and 
England know that she is far better able to maintain her indepen- 
dence now than earlier, and they are aiming a blow, not only at the 
equal rights of nations, but at the very principle of self-government ; 
for if Mexico, evidently unable to coerce Texas alone, now hurls 
defiance at both Texas and the United States, it must be that she 
counts upon the aid of these great European powers. Under such 
circumstances the determination of Texas to join the United States 
is worthy of a free people. And no doubt Donelson also said, as he 
wrote to Jackson : " We have at last the fullest proof of the direct 
interference of the British Government with the annexation ques- 
tion . . . disguise was only assumed [by Aberdeen, Pakenham and 
Elliot] to give the greater force to their machinations against both 
Texas & the United States. But Texas will be true to herself — she 
will scorn British dictation."-" 

At the same time the charge endeavored to neutralize the eft'ects 
of Elliot's menaces. When Secretary of State Allen, looking to 

"Don. to Allen, June ii, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 69. Id. to 
to Jackson, May 24, 1845: Jackson Pap. 



THE CRISIS 451 

the clanger of a Mexican raid, particularly against the place where 
the convention was to assemble, asked for immediate protection, 
Donelson wrote to Taylor, conmianding the American forces in the 
Southwest, that the emergency justified him in sending dragoons to 
San Antonio and infantry to Corpus Christi. In reality Taylor did 
not enter Texas until after the convention had acted ; but the fact, 
conveyed to Allen and no doubt widely made known, that such a 
letter had been written, must have tended strongly to reassure the 
public.^" 

The other danger growing out of Elliot's action was that in view 
of the Mexican concessions, the British and French support of them, 
and the unsatisfactory terms of Brown's resolution, all the advocates 
of independence would rally, a considerable number of citizens — the 
conservative, the timid, and those who had merely pretended to favor 
annexation because they found the crowd going that way — would 
join them, and a serious division in public sentiment would be pro- 
duced. Elliot and Saligny had often reported that an important 
element of the population desired a national career, and we have 
found ample reasons to believe that such was the case. Pakenham 
had understood at the end of March that a gentleman was then sailing 
for England to lay before the British government a plan to defeat 
annexation " with the consent of parties of power and influence in 
Texas." On the eve of setting out for Mexico Elliot had written 
to his government that should recognized independence be found 
" authentically " to be within reach, the cautious friends of that 
policy would rally to it " with courage and confidence." Later he 
expressed the opinion that had the ex-President come out decisively 
against the American proposal, " supported as he would have been," 
the situation at this time might have been different ; and the reason- 
ableness of this opinion was confirmed by Donelson's anxiety on 
that very point. His cousin, associated with him in the secret jour- 
ney to Mexico, felt " no doubt " that in view of the hard terms of 
the L'nited States and the offer of Mexican recognition the next 
Texan Congress would favor independence. Yell admitted that at 
Galveston the annexationists were a minority ; we have seen evidence 
at various times that the partisans of nationality had money, argu- 
ments and influence ; and we have just observed in the Houston 

^^ Allen to Don., June 26. 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 92. Don. to 
Allen, June 30. 1845: ib., 94. Taylor to Adj. Gen., July 8, 1845: Ho. Ex. Doc. 
18, 30 Cong., I sess., p. 4. Donelson probably saw that Taylor would not be 
able, even if he should wish, to place troops in Texas before the date on which it 
was practically certain the convention would act. 



452 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Telegraph a hint of their plausible scheme. What might not this 
faction accomplish under the existing circumstances, if sufficiently 
emboldened to make a firm stand ?^^ 

But again Donelson was prepared. As soon as he heard of 
Elliot's manoeuvre he argued that the willingness of Mexico to rec- 
ognize Texas was to be considered " nothing but a ruse on the part 
of the British government," and announced his belief that the people 
would be more unanimous than ever for annexation as against Eng- 
lish interference with " a question truly American." In this he was 
supported to some extent by Houston, who said that the circum- 
stances of the recent negotiation with Mexico would expose it to 
denunciation as an unwise interposition of the British authorities. 
He then proceeded to outflank his enemy. Had no American over- 
ture been made, he suggested, the old enemy of Texas would now 
be threatening her with war and the British agent would be prepar- 
ing the way for Aberdeen's abolition scheme ; but as it is, Elliot goes 
in disguise to Mexico, and at his bidding that country sends word 
she will treat with her rebellious daughter as a sovereign nation. 
" It would be mockery," he insisted, " to say that a power so potent 
as this has suddenly been acquired, or could not, at any time, have 
terminated the contest between Texas and Mexico ; and its failure 
to do so, can only be accounted for on the supposition that it re- 
garded this contest as an element in the consummation of a policy 
essential to the interests of Great Britain, however disastrous the 
contest may have been " to the belligerents themselves. ^- 

But now a very great peril arose in exactly the opposite quarter. 
After Elliot's return Jones issued another proclamation. This re- 
cited that in March the representatives of England and France had 
made a fresh ofifer of their assistance for the settlement of the 
difficulties with the mother-country on the basis of independence ; 
that the Texan Executive had specified certain conditions prelimi- 
nary to a treaty of peace ; that the conditions had been accepted by 
Mexico; and that pending action in this matter by the people of 
Texas hostilities against that country should cease. Upon this arose 
a storm indeed. All the friends of annexation doubtless took the 
same view of Jones's action as Donelson did: that he had exerted 
himself to the utmost to create an issue on which a majority of the 

'"Pak., March 29, 1845. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845; No. 10, Jan. 26, 
1846. G. Elliot to Adm. Austen, April 30, 1845: Brit. Admty. Secy., "In Letters," 
Bundle 5,549. Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. 

" Don., No. 24, May 22 ; No. 25, May 24; No. 26, June 2, 1845 : Sen. Doc. i, 
29 Contj., I sess., 58, 59, 64. 



THE CRISIS 453 

people would unite against the American proposition. The announce- 
ment of a truce capped the climax. On the one hand, it dealt a fatal 
blow to the scheme of asserting the Rio Grande boundary; and on 
the other it cast doubt once more upon the genuineness of Texan 
nationality, since it acknowledged that the war still continued. It 
thus offended the patriotic sentiment of the people, angered all who 
desired to invade Mexico, and in particular incensed the partisans 
of annexation.^^ 

Wicklift'e's report, rather than Donelson's cautious despatch, 
reveals the effect of Jones's proclamation upon the Texans. It came 
upon them, he said, " like a peal of Thunder in a clear skie," more 
than confirming all their suspicions of " an arrangement betw'een 
him and others on the one part and the Uritish Minister on the 
other " to defeat annexation, and apparently proving that only the 
will of the people could prevent " the solemnization of the unholy 
bonds of wedlock " between their country and Great Britain ; and the 
President's course was condemned in unmeasured terms, said the 
American agent. " We are informed," stated the editors of the New 
Orleans Courier, "that the feelings of the whole population are 
roused to the highest pitch by the treacherous conduct of Jones, and 
his intention, if left to himself, to throw the republic into the arms 
of England." As for the proposed Mexican treaty, admitted Ashbel 
Smith, the people of Texas " appeared frantic " against it. Natur- 
ally the leaders of the anti-administration party saw their oppor- 
tunity, and inflamed the public as much as possible ; and the Mexican 
consul at New Orleans decided there would probably be a revolution. 
Now should the authoriticsbeoverthrown, the whole plan of annexa- 

^ Proclamation, June 4, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 81. Don., No. 
24, May 22, 1845. (Blow) Elliot to Bank., June 11, 1845: F. O.. Texas, xiii. 
Wickliffe to Buch.. June 13, 1845: State Dept. Jones's defence was, as Allen 
said, that it was the duty of the Executive to give the people a choice between 
independence and annexation (Allen to Don., July 28, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 
Cong., I sess., 112). But why a choice was necessary when the preference of the 
great majority for annexation was recognized on all hands could not be made 
clear, and therefore a desire to win them away from their preference appeared 
to be revealed. The proclamation was issued no doubt because Jones had given 
a pledge to take that step. Very likely, too, he feared to offend Elliot and 
Saligny, lest the tenor of the language used to those gentlemen should lie made 
known. Moreover, even had a choice been desired by the people, the foreign 
intervention and the secret method by which it had been secured, would have 
thrown a deep hue of suspicion ujion Jones's conduct. It fact Jones, when de- 
fending himself later on the ground that he was compelled to place the alterna- 
tives before the people in order to preserve his " plighted faith toward all parties," 
admitted that he showed or seemed to show some sympathy with England and 
France. At the same time he stated that he knew the people would prefer annex- 
ation yet that in his own judgment " it was their interest to maintain their sepa- 
rate existence" (Jones, Memor., 66). 



454 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



tion adopted by the United States with such immense difficulty might 
fall to the ground, for the " existing government " — the government 
contemplated by Brov^ai's resolution — would be unable to co-operate 
further. All the civil and military officers would lose their places, 
and would naturally feel incensed against the promoters of the trou- 
ble ; everything would be in confusion ; and finally, should the United 
States Congress then fail to agree promptly about admitting Texas, 
her position would be extremely painful, and the cause of annexation 
would probably be lost. On the other hand, were a revolution to 
be undertaken and fail, Jones w^ould be likely to exert his utmost 
power against the American proposal.^* 

In this emergency Donelson resolved that he would not " place 
the President in direct opposition to the Congress " unless the rea- 
sons for so doing should prove to be " imperative," and he informed 
Buchanan that he should " maintain such relations with the Execu- 
tive " as would " furnish it with no pretext for exerting its Consti- 
tutional power to thwart the consummation of the measure of an- 
nexation." In pursuance of this policy and in order to associate 
Jones in a sense with the United States — as well as to satisfy him 
that the American charge was placing the best construction possible 
upon his course — Donelson was ''much in the habit" of reading to 
him the despatches forwarded to Buchanan. He now went farther 
and wrote very strongly to Henderson against the project of over- 
throwing the government, clearly pointing out the dangers it in- 
volved. Even if the President has endeavored to defeat the great 
measure, continued the charge, yet he has summoned the Congress 
and the convention, and so far has kept his pledges. " Freedom of 
opinion is a vital Republican principle " ; and a chief magistrate who 
executes the will of the people, as Jones appears willing to do, is 
called " a patriot and true Republican." Instead of striking at the 
Executive, therefore, it would be better to rejoice that his action, 
while not really injurious to the cause, brings " into bolder relief the 
beauties of the Republican principle which fears not error of opinion 
when truth is free to expose it." Instead of complaining because 
other propositions are submitted at the same time as that of the 

** Wickliffe to Buch., June 13. 1845: State Dept. Courier, June 24, 1845. 
Smith, Remin., 72. Don., No. 30, June ig, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 
74. Arrangoiz, No, 74 (res.), May 21, 1845. Don. to Hend., June 30, 1845: 
State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Some would have held the revo- 
lutionary government to be the " existing government," but — as Donelson inti- 
mated to Henderson — enough might have taken the other view to prevent favor- 
able final action by the American Congress. 



THE CRISIS 455 

United States, one should be glad that all the means of forming an 
enlightened judgment are given to the people. Instead of punishing 
the few opposed to the American overture, the convention should 
bury all past differences, both personal and political, and act har- 
moniously.^^ 

Elliot for his part reasoned that the humor of the people was 
variable, and that reflection might bring them back to sounder opin- 
ions. Their present " feverish excitement in favour of annexation," 
he believed, was " provoked and kept alive by extraneous agency." 
The action of Mexico, though tardy, had bettered her position mate- 
rially, he felt ; and he was encouraged further both by Jones's assur- 
ance that great if not insuperable difficulties in the way of joining 
the United States existed still both in that country and in Texas, and 
by the President's view that like all other fevers this rage for 
annexation must run its course. An attack of illness befell him, 
however ; and on the ground that the convention ought not to be 
countenanced by the presence of a foreign representative, he decided 
to go north for the benefit of his health. His absence from the 
country removed a source of irritation, and he thus assisted Donelson 
to save the government.^^ 

At the appointed time Congress met. The capital was merely a 
rude town of five or six thousand inhabitants, living mostly in log 
cabins. The principal hotel consisted of a bar-room, a long unplas- 
tered dining-room, a kitchen, and above these apartments an unfin- 
ished garret, the general dormitory, where the constructive art of 
the period could be studied in such dim light as filtered through the 
dingy glass of one small window. The hall of the Representatives 
was an unfinished loft over a drinking-place in a small frame build- 
ing, occupied during the recesses of Congress by the Treasury de- 
partment, and at such times divided by screens of unbleached muslin 
into sections labelled with the pen of a clerk, " Treasurer's Office," 
" Auditor's Office " and the like. The Senate used a loft over a 
grocery in an old unpainted building. Its chamber was only about 
fifteen by twenty feet in size ; but, as became its greater dignity, the 
room had a rough board ceiling, coarsely white-washed. Three 
dollars a week during the session was the rent paid for this hall of 

*' Don., No. 28, June 11, 1845. (Habit) Jones. Memor., 586. Don. to Hend., 
June 30, 1845: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Id. to Allen, June 11, 
1845 : Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess.. 69. 

^Elliot, No. 16 (P. S.), May 31, 1845. Id. to Bank., June 11. 1845: F. O., 
Texas, xiii. Id., No. 17, June 2 [12?], 1845. Id. to Bank., private, June 11, 
1845: F. O., Texas, xiii. Id., No. 18, June 15, 1845. Elliot's departure from 
Texas was condemned by his government. 



456 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



State ; and as some of the members — wrapped in the blankets which 
all travellers carried — passed their hours of sleep on mattresses there, 
closely attended by fleas, the price does not seem unreasonable. The 
War department occupied a log cabin that boasted one glass window, 
and the State department a frame building merely clapboarded, 
through whose innumerable crevices the wind freely sifted. It was 
indeed an unpretending seat of government; but the circumstances 
and the men gave it dignity, and with good reason the eyes of five 
nations were now riveted upon it.^^ 

Jones submitted the matter of annexation to Congress at once, 
explaining that the legislative branch had been convoked in order that 
" the existing government " might authorize the acceptance of the 
American proposition. At the same time he stated that conditions 
preliminary to a treaty of peace with Mexico, recognizing the inde- 
pendence of Texas, had been signed and would be laid before the 
Senate, which was done two days later. As for the Executive, he 
promised in his Message that he would carry out the will of the 
nation, whatever that might be. The work of the Congress had been 
marked out clearly by Donelson, who at this time was in reality 
almost a dictator so far as the matter of annexation was concerned. 
All it needed to do, he said, was to accept the American resolution 
and sanction the calling of the convention ; and this was accomplished 
through a joint resolution adopted unanimously on the eighteenth. 
By a similar vote the projected treaty with Mexico was promptly 
rejected by the Senate.^* 

On the fourth of July assembled the convention. At this point 
several mischances were possible, the greatest of which, perhaps, was 
the danger of a conditional acceptance of the American proposition. 
The feeling that the terms offered Texas were not what they should 

"Providence Journal: Nat. InfelL, June 17, 1845. 

^ Jones to Cong., June 16: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 74. Id. to Senate, 
June 18: ib., 87. Don. to Allen. June 13, 1845: ib., 76. Joint Resolution: F. 
O., Texas, xiv. Don., No. 31, June 23, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 
83. The haste of Congress, argued Elliot (No. 19, July 3, 1845), showed that 
discussion was dreaded ; and he represented that men opposed to annexation 
joined in its action either through fear of violence or because they saw that oppo- 
sition was hopeless. Probably some basis for these opinions existed.- Discussion, 
while no doubt it would have been powerless to stay the tide, might have de- 
stroyed perfect harmony, and it can hardly be supposed that every member of 
Congress was a hearty annexationist. But the substantial unanimity of that 
body in favor of the American overture cannot be denied. On another point 
also its action was highly satisfactory. The proposition to overthrow the exist- 
ing government reappeared on the last day of the session, but it failed to command 
the necessary support (Elliot, No. 21. July 30, 1845). The American charge 
had fallen sick of the fever, but was convalescing when the convention met (To 
Buch., July 2, 1845). 



THE CRISIS 457 

have been was very strong. The United States had not taken a firm 
stand for all of the territory she claimed, and her debt had not been 
assumed. The boundary question in particular signified a vast deal 
to many of the delegates, and the popular sentiment had an avowed 
champion in Mayfield, formerly Secretary of State, a strong and 
impetuous man. It was proposed, therefore, to adopt the American 
resolution with some sort of amendment covering these points; and 
it was also suggested to divide Texas into several States at once, in 
order to make certain her political importance in the Union. The 
second proposition was not very alarming, but the other had a 
different look.^^ 

In accordance with his instructions, Donelson urged that time and 
experience would point out any needed corrections of the terms, and 
that it would be better to wait until this clearer view should be 
obtained, until prejudice and party excitement should have passed 
away, and until Texas herself should be represented in the American 
government. As for the assumption of the debt, he said, that 
" would have been setting up a dangerous precedent, not warranted 
in the judgment of a large portion of Congress, by the constitution 
of the United States." Suggestions regarding this and other matters 
could be offered by the convention ; but were the acceptance of the 
resolution to be made conditional on the adoption by the American 
Congress of any definite proposition regarding such debated subjects, 
the question of annexation might be re-opened there, and the con- 
sequence might be delay ; whereas even the opponents of the measure 
would not be illiberal, after the actual acquisition of so valuable a 
territory, in dealing with Texas.*" 

To Mayfield the charge addressed himself directly. " I feel that 
I may safely say to you as a private citizen,' he wrote, " that you 
may look with confidence to Mr. Polk as ready to maintain the 
claim to the Rio Grande ; and that no expression from Texas is nec- 
essary to stimulate his exertions." The United States will have not 
only her claim but other grounds as well, and may be depended upon 

^° Don. to Allen, June 13, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 76. Don., 
private, July 11, 1845 (accompanied by Id. to Mayfield, July 11). Elliot, Au- 
gust 12, 1845. 

^ Don. to Allen, June 13, 1845: Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess.. "jd. Don. also 
hinted that the U. S. would desire to extend their land system and Indian policy 
to Texas and would pay for the privilege of doing so. June 15. Polk wrote to 
Don. urging that the convention accept the American proposal in general terms 
on the first day of its session, announcing that he would then defend Texas as a 
part of the Union, and promising to recommend liberal treatment of her (Polk 
Pap., Chicago). This letter was sent by the hand of Gen. Besangon, but prob- 
ably it did not reach its destination by July 4. 



458 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



to make the most of them. I shall state in a public despatch that 
the Texan government and convention would have asserted the right 
and ability of their country to maintain that boundary had they not, 
relying fully on the justice and friendship of the American author- 
ities, foreborne purposely to do so, in order that there might be no 
pretext for saying that Texas was unwilling to leave the matter to 
discussion and negotiation. In particular, the convention should 
avoid every appearance of expecting the United States to take pos- 
session of the territory claimed but not yet occupied, for such a move 
would be deemed an aggression against Mexico, and would be incon- 
sistent, not only with Brown's resolution, but with the course here- 
tofore pursued by Texas. It might reopen the whole question in the 
United States, and might enable foreigners to place that country 
in the wrong. To such representations Mayfield succumbed.'*^ 

Another danger arose from the presence of false friends in the 
convention, plotting to insert something in the new constitution that 
would not be acceptable to the American Congress. As Jones him- 
self informed Elliot, a considerable number of delegates, ostensibly 
favorable to annexation, were " steadily determined " to defeat the 
measure in this way, and Allen confirmed these revelations. More- 
over, admitted the Secretary of State, " matters of local interest and 
subjects of irreconcilable discord, incentives to partisanship, intrigue 
and disorganization," were if possible to be pressed upon the con- 
vention.^^ 

But these devices, like all others to outwit Donelson and thwart 
the will of the majority, proved in vain. Care had been taken in 
almost every case to select natives of the United States as delegates. 
From a printed list of the members it appears that all but two whose 
birthplaces were set down had been born under the American consti- 
tution. Of these two, one first saw the light at San Antonio and 
the other, though an Englishman, had lived in New York ; while of 
the ten whose birthplaces were not given one had been born in Vir- 
ginia and one in Tennessee. Well aware of their danger, the friends 
of annexation were careful also to avert dissension. On the day 
before the session was to open, some two thirds of the delegates 
were in Austin; an informal meeting took place in the afternoon; 
and a committee of fifteen was appointed to draw up an ordinance 

"Don. to Mayfield, July ii, 1845: State Dept., Desps. from Mins.. Texas, 
ii. Id., private. July n, 1845. 

"Elliot to Bank., private, June 11, 1845: F. O., Texas, xiii. Allen to Kauf- 
man. July 10, 1845: F. O., Texas, xvi. 



THE CRISIS 459 

expressing the assent of the people of Texas to the joint resolution 
of the American Congress. " In the evening," said a correspondent 
of the Houston Telegraph, " the committee met at eight o'clock and 
continued in session until nearly midnight. It was truly pleasing to 
notice the harmony and forbearance that all the members displayed, 
and the assiduity with which they labored until a suitable instrument 
was drafted."*^ 

The next morning at eight o'clock the convention formally 
assembled. General Rusk was nominated for President, and — 
amazing fact — no opposition was made to his election. On taking 
the chair he said : " Our duties here, although important, are plain 
and easy of performance ... we have one grand object in view, 
and that is to enter the great American Confederacy with becoming 
dignity and self-respect. Let us, then, lay aside all minor considera- 
tions, and avoid all subjects calculated to divide us in opinion." An 
earnest prayer was offered by the Rev. Chauncey Richardson, and 
" for several minutes after he closed, the whole assembly seemed to 
be absorbed in silent devotion." Then, after the election of a 
secretary, a committee of fifteen was appointed to prepare an ordi- 
nance of assent, and "in a few minutes " these gentlemen were some- 
how able to draw, agree upon and bring in an instrument declaring 
the acceptance of the proposition of the United States by the people 
of Texas. On the question of adopting this report, Bache of 
Galveston voted in the negative ; but he stood alone on that side, 
and he like the rest signed the ordinance. Upon this, all the spec- 
tators "manifested the most enthusiastic joy"; and the delegates, 
after voting to wear crape a month in memory of Andrew Jackson, 
adjourned for the day.''* 

The convention was determined, said Donelson, to introduce 
nothing questionable or novel in the new constitution, and in this 
spirit its work proceeded. At the end of August its task was com- 
pleted, and on the second Monday of October the people voted 
whether to adopt the constitution and accept the American pro- 
posal. By this time very likely a certain ebb of feeling had set in, and 
certainly a new cause of dissatisfaction with the government of the 
United States had arisen. It had been supposed by many Texans 
that after annexation the merchandise then in the country could be 

** (List) F. O., Texas, xvi. Houston Telegraph : ib., xiv. 

** Telegraph: Note 43. Ordinance sent to Don. by Rusk, July 5, 1845: Sen. 
Doc. I, 29 Cong., I sess., 98. The ordinance may be presumed to have been 
the one drafted the previous evening. 



46o 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



sent north free of duty, and therefore dealers had arranged to 
import large quantities under the existing low tariff. In fact the 
government itself, in order to increase its revenue, had encouraged 
their policy. The American Secretary of Treasury, however, took 
a view of the case which did not favor this business, and his decision 
roused no enthusiasm among the Texans. There was complaint also 
because — in accordance with the precedent of 1836 — the voting had 
to be done viz'a voce, and in particular those who desired to count 
against annexation without appearing to do so naturally felt 
scandalized. Many doubtless refrained from voting simply because 
they considered the result certain. The consequence was a smaller 
affirmative majority than might perhaps have been expected; but 
had the advocates of independence made a strong showing, Jones 
would probably have hastened to publish the fact, and Elliot stated 
in the January following that the vote had not been made known. 
At all events it was announced on the tenth of November that the 
new constitution and the American proposal had been accepted, and 
the people were called upon to hold elections the next month for the 
choice of a State administration. So far as Texas was concerned, 
the battle had ended.*^ 

This result Governor Yell attributed to Donelson, " our worthy 
and talented charge d'Affaires," and he appears to have had sub- 
stantial reasons for his opinion. Not only did the charge stand in 
peculiar relations with Houston, but he was in touch with the mem- 
bers of the Congress and convention, understood the temper of the 
people, had full knowledge regarding the " various cliques and 
factions," and possessed all the personal qualifications demanded 
by his peculiar task. In particular, Yell gave him the credit of 
placing the Executive in the right attitude with extraordinary 
address, and also of putting others in a position from which they 
were willing to retire after the President decided to summon the 
Congress. By this the Governor appears to have meant that Donel- 

■"Don., No. 33, July 6, 1845: Sen. Doc, i, 29 Cong., i sess., 96. (Consti- 
tution) Ho, Ex. Doc. 16, 29 Cong., i sess. Jones, Proclamation, Aug. 28: F. O., 
Texas, xiv. Elliot, Aug. 12, 1845, Kennedy. No. 23. Sept. 6, 1845. Jack to 
Pres. and Cabinet of Texas, May 27, 1836: N, Orl. Com. Bull., Aug. 18. 1836. 
Elliot. No. 31, Nov. 14, 1845. Id., No. 6, Jan. 18; No. 7, Jan. 20, 1846. Procla- 
mation: F. O.. Texas, xiv. Garrison (Westward Extension, 155) says there were 
" only a few dissenting votes." while Elliot reported (Jan. 20) that at least two- 
thirds of the people refrained from voting or voted No. The N. Orl. Picayune 
of Oct, 25, 1845, stated that at Galveston the vote was 270 vs. 121, and at Hous- 
ton 241 vs. 44. That in the face of certain defeat so large a percentage stood for 
the negative is proof that the evidence regarding a national sentiment had a 
substantial basis. 



THE CRISIS 461 

son knew how to impress upon Jones the strictly representative 
nature of his office, how to marshal the friends of annexation in a 
firm and menacing array, and finally — after the desired effect had 
been produced — how to dissolve the phalanx without the occurrence 
of a disturbing event; and the charge's own despatches, though 
extremely guarded, seem to confirm this understanding of the 
matter.'**' 

^''Yell to Polk, May 5, 1845: Polk Pap. 



XXI 

Annexation is Consummated 

After sending to Elliot the instructions of January 23, 1845, 
Aberdeen continued to interest himself in the Texans. About a fort- 
night later he not only tried to make independence attractive by 
intimating that a reduction of the duty on their cotton was possible, 
but suggested on the other hand that England and France would 
not " continue their exertions [at Mexico] in behalf of people who 
refused to profit by them," and even that it might be a just cause of 
war to abrogate existing treaties by joining the United States. In 
April the alarm in Mexico and the dissatisfaction in Texas caused 
by the passage of Brown's resolution by the House of Representa- 
tives appeared to offer a new ground for hope, and the two powers 
instructed their diplomatic agents to exert themselves anew, though 
in the most pacific manner as regarded the Americans, to obtain 
recognition from the one country and ensure the independence of 
the other.^ 

News of the energetic measures adopted by Elliot and Saligny at 
the end of March caused a second flutter of cheerfulness, and Bank- 
head was then directed not only to urge in the most pressing terms 
that Texas be recognized " without a moment's delay," but to 
announce that should this advice be neglected, England and France 
would consider themselves " entirely absolved from all further 

^ See General Note, p. i. The author prepared a much fuller chapter, but 
as many of the details were not practically important and the volume is large, 
he concluded to condense it. Terrell, No. 3, Feb. 13, 1845. Id. to Jones, Feb. 
13, 1845: Jones. Memor., 422. Bank., No. 19, March i, 1845. To Cowley, No. 
46. April 15, 1845. Aberdeen proposed to stand forward "at this moment" not 
so much for British interests as for those of Mexico and Texas, and he added : 
" This position as it renders them [the British ministry] more independent of 
circumstances, will make their task more easy of accomplishment, by enabling 
them, in conjunction with France, to address the Mexican Government, in the 
tone of disinterested friendship and admonition " ; which would seem to imply 
that previously this had not been the attitude of Great Britain. Cowley, No. 184, 
April 28, 1845. To Saligny, No. 4, April 2T, 1845: F. O., Texas, xxi. To Bank., 
No. IS, May i, 1845. To Elliot, Nos. 6 and 7, May 3. 1845. At this time 
Aberdeen at first thought of undertaking to settle the differences between Mexico 
and Texas on the express condition that Texas pledge herself to reject annexation. 
Terrell, however, told him that he thought she would reject such a condition 
yet would refuse annexation if recognized (Terrell, No. 7, May 9, 1845). It 
was therefore arranged between England and France to offer mediation without 
re(|uiring a positive pledge. 

462 



ANNEXATION CONSUMMATED 463 

interference in the afifairs of Mexico with reference to the United 
States." This, however, was as far as even Great Britain would 
now go. Two days later Ashbel Smith called upon Addington, the 
Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and learned that the govern- 
ment, regarding annexation as practically inevitable, would neither 
exert themselves further to prevent it nor take exception to it after- 
wards. Accordingly the Texan envoy reported that a longer stay 
in Europe seemed unnecessary, and within a brief period he was 
recalled. At Paris Garro, the Mexican representative, made very 
determined and repeated efforts, but he could elicit no promise 
whatever of armed intervention. Guizot intimated plainly that 
" the present circumstances and the difficulties growing out of the 
Parliamentary system " stood in the way, and this explanation threw 
a strong light on the earlier feeling and policy of Louis Philippe's 
government. Thus England and France retired from the field. - 

Alexico also retired, but with a flourish of trumpets. About the 
middle of July, 1845, learning that the American proposal was 
favored by Texas, her government issued a circular proclaiming 
that the nation had complied with the requirements of civilization 
and humanity in listening to the Texan overture and must now 
defend its rights. At the same time they requested the Governors of 
States to send on their full quotas of men for the army, and 
announced that a declaration of war against the United States would 
immediately be proposed to Congress. As the month ended, word 
came from the British consul at Galveston that the convention had 
acted. Naturally the chagrin and indignation of the Mexicans were 
extreme ; but the dictates of prudence could not be wholly ignored, 
and Bankhead was constantly at work to keep the ministers within 
bounds. As the result, they contented themselves with the view 
that war had already been declared by this country in the act of 
annexing Texas. Cuevas was eager to catch the least suggestion of 
British aid, but Bankhead would give no hint of such a thing; and 
the administration, compelled to rely upon its own resources, con- 
cluded to satisfy itself by ordering to the northern frontier for the 
sake of appearances 1.8,000 more or less fictitious men.^ 

-To Bank., No. i8, May 31, 1845. These instructions indicate that the 
concert of England and France in this business still continued. Smith, No. 2, 
June 3, 1845. To Smith, June 26, 1845. Garro, No. 14 (res.). June 17; No. 15 
(res.), June 18; No. 16 (res.). June 21, 1845. 

^ Diario, July 17, 1845. Nat. Intel!., Aug. 16, 1845. Bank., No. 78, July 30, 
1845. 



464 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

In the United States, besides differences of view on the question 
of defending our new acquisition before it became legally a part of 
the Union, an inevitable diplomatic embarrassment arose. Colonel 
Kaufman was appointed Texan charge to this country, and he 
demanded to be received as such on the ground that he represented 
an independent nation. No doubt the American Executive had the 
most cordial desire to comply with his wishes, and the Secretary of 
State was in favor of doing so. Polk said, however, that as the 
convention had accepted the annexation proposal, Texas had really 
become a part of the United States, and for that reason Donelson 
had been recalled; that with few exceptions the people and press 
concurred in this view ; that upon it rested the propriety of sending 
American troops and vessels to stand on guard against Mexico ; and 
that it was highly important not to give the opposition a handle by 
acting inconsistently. In short, admitted Kaufman himself, "a. stern 
political necessity " compelled the administration to reject his claim, 
and finally Allen, the Texan Secretary of State, instructed him to 
return home.* 

Another flurry was created in the United States by the talk of 
rescinding the annexation measure. In this matter Horace Greeley 
was one of the most active. Scarcely had the resolution been passed, 
when the New York Tribune announced that nothing had not yet 
been decided. " We say. Resist the consummation of the Annexa- 
tion scheme to the last," it exclaimed; and let the free States send 
true men to the next Congress. Indeed, it went so far as to pro- 
claim that by their course in this affair the Americans had declared 
themselves " the enemies of the civilized world," and it called 
loudly upon both Mexico and England to resist by force. The 
project of somehow upsetting what had been done simmered warmly 
in certain quarters, and in the following November the chairman of 
an anti-annexation meeting said in Boston: We do not admit that 
the question is decided; we dispute the jurisdiction of Congress; 
and we deny that Congress has even completed what it undertook 
to do. Meanwhile Senator Haywood of North Carolina, thinking 
Polk over-confident, invited attention to the fact that twenty-four 
of his colleagues were committed before the public against the 

* Kaufman to Buch., Sept. 23, 1845: Tex. Arch. Kaufman being ill, Lee 
(secretary of the legation) was instructed to act for him. Allen to Lee, Aug. 2, 
1845: ib. Polk, Diary, i., 17-20. Lee to Jones, Sept. 6, 8, 1845: Jones, Memor., 
48s, 490. Kaufman to Jones, Nov. 3, 184S : ib., 503. Allen to Kaufman, Oct. 
IS. 1845: Tex. Arch. 



ANNEXATION CONSUMMATED 465 

method of annexing Texas that had been adopted by the Executive, 
and pointed out that with three new converts to their doctrine they 
would be able to prevent the final success of the measure.^ 

But the plan of resuming the struggle met with no general 
favor. Greeley himself made light of it afterwards. " There were 
the usual editorial thunderings," he said ; " perhaps a few sermons, 
and less than half-a-dozen rather thinly-attended meetings, mainly in 
]\Iassachusetts, whereat ominous whispers may have been heard, 
that, if things were to go on in this way much longer, the Union 
would, or should, be dissolved." The Cincinnati Gazette, for 
example, pro;iounced the opposition highly improper, saying that 
while its editors had opposed annexation, they now realized that the 
public faith had been pledged. Fair-minded men could hardly feel 
otherwise. Even at Boston this opinion prevailed. The Advertiser, 
for example, deprecated the movement against receiving Texas ; and 
Nathan Appleton published a letter in this sense addressed to Adams, 
Palfrey and Sumner. Van Buren assisted to bring the Locofocos 
to the same position ; Whigs began to say that after all Texas was 
likely to support their party, and therefore a continuance of the 
agitation w^ould be unwise, — an illustration of the political scheming 
which had been masquerading under loftier titles all the while ; and 
no doubt a great number of persons who had felt compelled to 
oppose Tyler's project, now thankfully saw it nearing consum- 
mation.® 

As for the merits of the question, a decent regard for consistency 
kept some in line for a while longer and conviction did the same for 
others, but the expediency and even inevitableness of annexation 
had their effect, and many soon found excuses for breaking away. 
By the middle of November the Philadelphia North American, 
which had labored strenuously against the measure, said : " It is now 
plain that the American people have, all along, desired the acquisi- 
tion of Texas. Nature seems to have included it within our borders ; 
it was believed to have been disintegrated from our territory, and 
to regain it was only to give the nation its own ; besides, the monopoly 
of an article of necessity to the world, is the most certain source of 

°7V. Y. Tribune. March 8, 13. i, 1845. Niles. April 12. 1845, p. 89. Eflforts 
in Mass. to prevent ann. : Garrison, Garrison, iii.. 135-144. Haywood, Aug. 25, 
1845 : Polk Pap.. Chicago. 

* Greeley, Amer. Conflict, i., 175. Cincin. Gazette: Nat. Intel!., July 31, 1845. 
Adv., etc.: ib., Dec. i, 1845. Appleton was not the only prominent opponent of 
annexation to take this stand. Van B. to Kellogg, Sept. 2. 1845: Van B. Pap. 
(Whigs) N. Y. Express: Rich. Enq., Nov. 11, 1845. 



466 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

national wealth, and the monopoly of cotton could only be secured 
by annexing Texas. It was peopled by our brethren, and its grave- 
stones were marked with the names of those cradled with us." 
Robert C. Winthrop of Boston, who had fought hard in the 
national House on the same side, expressed acquiescence in 
the result publicly on the Fourth of July, 1845; the Evening 
Post of New York was heard congratulating the country upon 
this valuable acquisition ; and before long Gallatin himself, who 
had presided over the great anti-annexation meeting in that city, 
admitted that the absorption of Texas was '' both expedient and 
natural, indeed ultimately unavoidable.'"^ 

In this direction foreign influences continued to be helpful. 
During September " that brazen scold,'' as the London Times was 
described by its neighbor, the Standard, professed that it saw " great 
danger " of the realization in the United States of these gloomy 
words from an old English writer: " No arts, no letters, no society, 
and, what is worst of all, continual feare and danger of violent 
death, and the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short '' ; 
and Buchanan wrote to our minister at London that " The conduct 
of Great Britain in regard to the Texas question — & the torrents 
of abuse against us . . . [coming] in one unbroken stream from the 
English journals " had " greatly incensed the people of this Country.'" 
Still more effective, perhaps, were the British and French manoeu- 
vres in Texas and especially the clandestine journey to Mexico. 
With much truth our Secretary of State assured Major Donelson 
that every American felt indignant about Elliot's course, and that 
his operations had tended to unite the public in favor of annexation ; 
while the New York Courier and Enquirer, which had opposed the 
resolution adopted by Congress, now said, " The interference of 
the Governments of England and France has not only reconciled 
nearly the whole country to annexation, but even to the manner of 
accomplishing it."** 

When Congress met in December, 1845, Polk at once announced 
that the American terms had been accepted by Texas, and trans- 
mitted her new constitution. " The public faith of both parties " 
being " solemnly pledged to the compact of their union," he said, 

^ No. Amcr., Nov. 12. 1845. (Winthrop) Lib., July 25, 1845. Post: N. Y. 
Herald, March 8, 1845. Gallatin to Calhoun. March 3, 1848: Jameson, Calhoun 
Corres., 1161. 

^ Times, Sept. 23, 1845. Standard, April 14, 1845. Buch., Sept. 13, 1845: 
Polk Pap., Chicago. To Don., June 15, 1845. Courier and Enq.: London Times. 
Aug. I, 1845. It should be remembered that Elliot was very unwilling to make 
the secret journey, and yielded only to an almost or fiuite irresistible pressure. 



ANNEXATION CONSUMMATED 467 

" nothing remains " except to pass an act admitting the new State 
on the proper basis, and for " strong reasons " this ought to be done 
without delay. A few days later he supplied official evidence that 
the new constitution had been ratified by the people of Texas, and so 
the question of annexation was now before the American authori- 
ties for their final action. '^ 

In the House of Representatives this information was referred 
to the committee on Territories, and on the tenth of December 
Stephen A. Douglas reported a joint resolution declaring Texas to 
be a member of the Union on an equal footing with the original 
States, and providing that she should have two Representatives until 
an apportionment should be made on the basis of population. 
Protests and petitions against receiving the new sister poured into 
the House, and resolutions from the legislatures of Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island and Connecticut accompanied them ; but the day for 
such efiforts had evidently passed. The joint resolution was made 
a special order for the sixteenth, and when it came up the annexa- 
tionists promptly showed both the strength and the will to force the 
measure through immediately. Hunt of New York denounced the 
stifling of debate and refused to vote ; but the only result was that 
the House excused him from doing so. Rockwell of Massachusetts, 
who succeeded — where a host of others failed — in an effort to get 
the floor, moved to recommit the matter with instructions to bring 
in an amendment prohibiting slavery in Texas, and then a long 
scene of confusion began. All opposition, however, proved vain. 
The resolution was adopted by 141 against 56. and a motion to 
reconsider the vote failed. ^° 

In the Senate a bill for the admission of the new State was intro- 
duced on the tenth, and prompt action was demanded on the plea 
that many goods intended for that market lay ready for shipment 
at New York but could not enter the country, so long as it remained 
legally out of the Union, without paying duties. Resolutions and 
petitions against annexation made their appearance, but as in the 
other chamber they had no effect. When the passage of the Douglas 
proposition by the House was announced, the judiciary committee 
recommended that it be adopted in lieu of the resolution already 
brought before the Senate. Webster, once more a Senator. 'now 

"Richardson, Messages, iv., 386, 416. 

'" The last of this information was received Dec. 9. Co>ig. Globe, 29 Cong., 
I sess., 37, 39, 41, 43. 44, 51, 52, 60. Particular objection was made to giving 
Texas the advantage of slave representation and to allowing her two Repre- 
sentatives. 



468 



THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 



Spoke against admission, basing his appeal mainly on the grounds of 
slavery and slave representation; but Berrien, a Southern Whig 
opponent of annexation, replied, " The pledge of this Government 
has been given, and it must be redeemed." No one felt able to refute 
that argument, and on the twenty-second the resolution passed by a 
vote of 31 to 14. Seven days later it was signed by the President, 
and so the long struggle ended. It remained, however, to bring 
Texas actually within the Union, and measures to this end were 
taken without unnecessary delay. The laws of the United States 
were formally extended over her territory, and a district court, 
equipped with judge, attorney, marshall and clerk was created. A 
collection district also was established ; and a bill providing for postal 
routes followed. ^^ 

Her admission to the American Union was duly made known to 
Texas, and in February, 1846, the inauguration of her State adminis- 
tration formally completed the momentous affair. " Gentlemen of 
the Senate and of the House of Representatives," said President 
Jones in his valedictory, " The great measure of annexation, so 
earnestly desired by the people of Texas, is happily consummated. 
. . . The lone star of Texas, which ten years since arose amid clouds 
over fields of carnage and obscurely shone for a while, has culmi- 
nated, and, following an inscrutable destiny, has passed on and 
become fixed forever in that glorious constellation which all free- 
men and lovers of freedom in the world must reverence and adore — 
the American Union. . . . The final act in this great drama is now 
performed. The republic of Texas is no more." Tears crept uncon- 
sciously from the eyes of many a weatherbeaten listener, who had 
toiled, suffered and bled to win freedom and establish a government, 
as the broad blue flag with its one brilliant star was reverently 
lowered by the retiring President; but when the banner of the 
Union rose in its place and caught the breeze, a deep satisfaction 
warmed his heart, and even while the tears fell, his voice broke 
forth, almost through sobs, in loud and repeated cheers. ^- 

Froni the foregoing narrative certain conclusions appear to 
follow. Nothing in the revolution of 1836, in the claims of Mexico 
or in the recognition of Texas by the United States deprived these 
two countries of the legal and moral right to take up in the latter 

" Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., i sess.. 38, 45, 54, 60, 66. 75, 76, 87, 88. 89, 93, 94, 
99. loi, 102, 107, 137, 282. Polk, Diary, i., 148. 

"Jones, Letters on the Hist, of Ann., 25. Texas Democrat. Extra, Feb. 20, 
1845- Smithwick, Evolution, 283. 



ANNEXATION CONSUMMATED 469 

part of 1843 tlie project of uniting. The continuance of our neigh- 
bor as an independent nation involved a number of serious dangers 
to us, while as one of the States she could add much to our power 
and resources. Strong tendencies opposed to annexation existed 
there, however; England, France and Mexico stood firmly against it; 
and when Tyler took hold of the matter in earnest it was for numer- 
ous reasons a delicate and pressing affair. The American President, 
though naturally he exhibited Southern prepossessions and aims, 
pursued an honorable course. In particular he engaged in no con- 
spiracy, though it is true that he was aware of much regarding the 
case which could not be published and proved. The situation of our 
government was hard. On the one hand a choice between great 
humiliation and misfortune and a great war was deliberately pre- 
pared for us abroad, and the moves of the opposition in Great Brit- 
ain, France, Mexico and Texas had to be defeated, while on the 
other certain American opinions, interests and political complica- 
tions threatened to block the project. The opponents of annexation 
in the United States, with numerous exceptions, appear to have been 
actuated by no peculiarly elevated motives, and too commonly they 
showed less patriotism and sagacity than its advocates. Among the 
leaders Tyler, the unpopular, comes out rather distinctly best, as 
so often occurs when conduct and principles are closely examined. 
Gradually the American people, though not extremely thoughtful, 
well-informed or high-minded on the subject, reached the sound con- 
clusion that it was for the national advantage to bring about annexa- 
tion with no further delay ; for various reasons, one of which was 
this growing sentiment, an administration pledged to such a course 
came into power; by clever management a majority in our Congress 
was secured for a definite proposition ; and the masses in Texas — 
perceiving that however well another destiny might suit the aims of 
certain public men, the plain people were likely to fare best under 
the Stars and Stripes — insisted upon accepting the American offer. 
By a combination of ability and good fortune all the remaining 
obstacles, by no means contemptible, were swept away; the will of 
the two nations was executed ; and before long it was generally 
recognized that their union was expedient, logical and practically 
inevitable. For a variety of reasons, however — chiefly natural preju- 
dices, an equally natural want of information and the fact that cer- 
tain gifted opponents of annexation enjoyed great prestige in quar- 
ters where much attention has been paid to historical writing — some 
inaccurate views regarding the matter have unavoidably prevailed. 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 

I. ]\Ianuscripts. 

Archives du Ministere de? Affaires Etrangeres, Paris. ^ 

Archive de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico: De- 
spatches to and from Ministers and Consuls in the United States, 
Great Britain and France. 

Bancroft Collection, New York (Lenox) Public Library. 

Bancroft Papers, Mass. Historical Society. 

Campbell Papers, Library of Congress. 

Clayton Papers, Library of Congress. 

Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress. 

Ford Collection, New York (Lenox) Public Library. 

Jackson Papers, Library of Congress. 

Jackson Papers (Knoxville Collection), Library of Congress (par- 
tially available). 

Jackson Papers. New York (Lenox) Public Library. 

Lamar Papers, Texas State Library, Austin. 

Mangum Papers belonging to A. W. Graham, Esq. 

Markoe and Maxcy Papers, Library of Congress. 

Miller Papers, Texas State Library. 

Pierce Papery, Library of Congress. 

Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 

Polk Papers, Chicago Historical Society.- 

Public Record Office, London : Foreign Office Papers ; Slave Trade 
Papers ; Admiralty Records. 

Texas (National) Archives, Austin: Diplomatic Correspondence; 
Senate Journal (secret) ; Laws of Eighth Congress. 

United States Department of State : Archives of the Texas Lega- 
tion ; Circulars issued to Diplomatic and Consular Agents ; Con- 
fidential Report Books; Domestic Letter Books; Instructions to 

' The documents bearing directly on the annexation of Texas were not. how- 
ever, seen in the French archives. This matter is explained in the General 
Note. p. I. Information from Mexico as late as 1833 was obtained. 

' These have recently been transferred to the Library of Congress, but the 
author distinguishes between the two collections as a slight acknowledgment of 
the courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. 

471 



472 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



and Despatches from Ministers, Consuls, Special Agents and 
Confidential Agents; Miscellaneous Letters and Replies; Notes 
to and from Foreign Legations. 

Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress. 

Webster Papers, Library of Congress. 

IL Contemporary Periodicals (for details consult the 
footnotes).^ 

United States : So far as they could be obtained, one newspaper of 
each party in each State for 1836, 1840-1844, and less systematic- 
ally 1845.'* In most instances the papers were found ; in some of 
the others the gaps were partially filled. Li the cases of Wash- 
ington and several other important cities use was made of an 
exceptional number of journals. Many valuable clippings from 
American papers, sent home by foreign agents, were discovered in 
the State Department. Contemporary magazines also were 
studied. 

Great Britain : The British Museum collection of newspapers and 
magazines was examined for the years 1836, 1840-1845. 

France : The newspapers and magazines in the Bibliotheque Na- 
tional were examined for the years 1836, 1840-1845. 

' The list of periodicals examined is a very long one. To print it would 
appear to some pedantic, and as the periodicals used appear in every instance in 
the footnotes, it seems unnecessary. 

* In making use of the newspapers two principal embarrassments have been 
experienced. In some cases the title of the journal included the name of the 
city or town where it was published, while in others it did not. • It would seem 
proper to follow the usage in each particular instance ; but sometimes the files 
are not themselves consistent, and a considerable number of papers have been 
found only through quotations in their contemporaries, which were not always 
accurate in this particular. To avoid confusion the name of the place is there- 
fore uniformly printed in Roman letters while the proper name of the paper is 
italicized. The other trouble arose from publication as dailies, tri-weeklies, semi- 
weeklies and weeklies. There were surprising irregularities in this regard. Cer- 
tain papers belonged now to one of these classes and now to another : some 
indicated their class in their titles, and in other cases (particularly when only 
extracts could be found) the author was unable to ascertain to which class the 
particular issues from which he quoted actually belonged. Again, to employ the 
word " Daily " in one case and not in another might lead the reader to suppose 
that the latter belonged to a different class, whereas perhaps it was merely not 
the practice in the second instance to make the adjective a part of the name; 
and still other difficulties under this head might be mentioned. It has therefore 
seemed best, since the authority of the paper and not the frequency of its issue 
is the essential point, to omit uniformly " Daily," etc., except in a few special 
cases. Most of the newspapers cited may be found in the Library of Congress, 
and nearly all of the others in the Public Libraries of Boston, Nashville and 
Memphis, or the collection in the City Hall at New Orleans. 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



473 



Mexico: The collections of newspapers in the Secretaria de Haci- 
enda, Biblioteca Nacional, and Archivo del Ayuntamiento de la 
Ciudad de Mexico, and fragmentary collections in numerous 
State and municipal archives were examined for the period 
treated. 

Texas : The author's main reliance was on the many clippings sent 
home by the representatives of foreign nations in Texas and the 
United States, quotations in American and British journals, and 
newspapers preserved in the State Library of Texas. 

III. Later Periodicals (see the footnotes). 

The historical serials of the countries named above were searched 
for documents and for articles, and the same course was followed 
with many not specially historical. Whatever useful material was 
found is referred to in the footnotes. 



IV. Books and Pamphlets. 

[To make a critical bibliography would add too much to the bulk 
and cost of this volume, and, as little use has been made of printed 
materials (aside from the history of Texas before the revolution) 
except for the documents they contain (criticised in the text if 
necessary), it seems uncalled for. This list is included (i) to pre- 
sent fuller titles than it seemed desirable to give in the footnotes, 
and (2) to indicate useful sources of information.] 



Adams, C. F., Jr. 

Charles Francis Adams. Boston. 
1900. 
Adams, E. D. 
British Interests and Activities in 
Texas. Baltimore. 1910. 
Adams, J. Q. 

Memoirs. 12 v. Phila. 1874-77. 
Alaman, L. 
Hist, de Mejico. 5 v. Mejico. 
1849-52. 
Almonte, J. N. 

Noticia Estad. sobre Tejas. 
Mexico. 1835. 
Anti-Texas Legion. Albany. 1844. 
Benton, T. H. 
Abridgment of the Debates of 
Congress. 16 v. N. Y. 185/-60. 



Thirty Years' View. 2 v. N. Y. 
1856. 
Blaine, J. G. 

Twenty Years in Congress. 2 v. 
Norwich. 1884. 
Bocanegra, J. M. 

Disertacion Apologetica del Sist. 

Fed. Mexico. 1825. 
Memorias para la Hist, de Mexico. 
2 V. Mexico. 1892. 
Brown, J. H. 

History of Texas. St. Louis. 
Buchanan, James. 
Works (J. B. Moore, Ed.). 12 v. 
Phila. 190&-11. 
Buckingham, J. S. 
The Slave States of America. 2 v. 
London. 



474 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



Bustamante, C. M. de. 

El Gabinete Mexicano, etc. 2 v. 

Mexico. 1842. 
El Gobierno del Gen. A. L. de S. 
Anna. Mexico. 1845. 
Calboun, J. C. 

Correspondence. See Jameson. 
Works (ed. by Cralle). 6 v. 
N. Y. 1854. 
Channing, W. E. 

Works. 6 V. Boston. 1869. 
Child, D. L. 
The Taking of Naboth's Vineyard. 
N. Y. 1845. 
Clay, C. M. 

Autobiog. (V. i.) Cincinnati. 1886. 
Coleman, Chapman. 
Life of Crittenden. 2 v. Phila. 
1871. 
Conninicaciones relat. a la Agreg. 

de Tejas, etc. Mexico. 1845. 
Cooper, T. V. 

Amer. Politics. Springfield. 
Crane, W. C. 

Sam Houston. Phila. 1884. 
Curtis, G. T. 

D. Webster. 2 v. N. Y. 1870. 
Dawson, H. B. (Ed.). 

The Federalist. N. Y. 1897. 
Federacion y Tejas. Mexico. 1845. 
Foote, H S. 
Reminiscences. Washington. 1874. 
Texas and the Texans. 2 v. 
Phila. 1841. 
Garrison, G. P. 
Texas. Boston. 1903. 
Texas Diplomatic Corresp. 2 v. 

Washington. 1907, 191 1. 
Westward Extension. N. Y. ujoO. 
Garrison, W. P. and F. J. 
Wm. Llovd Garrison. 4 v. N. Y. 
1885. 
G. L. H.. A Texian. 

Brief Remarks on Dr. Clianning's 
Letter to Hon. Henry Clay. 
Boston. 1837. 
Greeley, Horace. 

American Conflict. 2 v. Hart- 
fortl. 1864. 



Recollections. N. Y. 1868. 
Slavery Extension. N. Y. 1856. 
Green, Duff. 
Facts and Suggestions. N. Y. 
1866. 
Hansard, T. C. 

Parliamentary Debates. 15 v. 
London. 1832-89. 
Harden, E. J. 
George M. Troup. Savannah. 
1859. 
Harvey, Peter. 

Reminiscences of Daniel Webster. 
Boston. 1877. 
Horton, R. G. 

James Buchanan. N. Y. 1856. 
Houstoun, Mrs. M. C. 
Texas and the Gulf of Mexico. 
2 V. London. 1844. 
Hunt, Gaillard. 

John C. Calhoun. Phila. 1907. 
Jameson, J. F. 

Calhoun's Correspondence (Am. 
Hist. Assoc, Annual Report for 
1899, Vol. ii.). 
Jay, William. 

Causes and Consequences of the 
Mexican War. Boston. 1849. 
Jenkins, J. S. 
James K. Polk. Auburn. 1850. 
Silas Wright. Auburn. 1847. 
Jollivet. 

Annexion du Texas. Paris. 1844. 
Nouveaux Docs. Amer. Paris. 

1845. 
Jones, Anson. 

Letters Relating to the History of 
Annexation. 2 ed. Phila. 1852. 
Memoranda and Official Corre- 
spondence. N. Y. 1859. 
Kendall, Amos. 

Autobiography. Boston. 1872. 
Kendall, G. W. 
Texan Santa Fe Expedition. 2 v. 
N. Y. 1844. 
Kennedy, William. 

Texas. 2 ed. 2 v. London. 1841. 
La Camara de Repres. a la Nacion 
Mex. Mexico. 1845. 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



475 



Lalor, J. J. 

Cyclopaedia of Political Science, 
etc. 3 V. Chicago. iS86. 
Lamar, M. B. 

Inaugural Address. Houston. 
1838. 
[Lester, C. E.] 

Sam Houston. Phila. 1866. 
Lettre d'un Citoyen de New- York. 

Paris. 1845. 
Lodge, H. C. 

Daniel Webster. Boston. 1899. 
Ludecus, Ed. 

Reise durch . . . Tumalipas, Co- 
ahuila und Texas, etc. Leipzig. 
1837. 
Lundy, Benj. 

The War in Texas. 2 ed. Phila. 
1837. 
Mackenzie, W. L. 

Van Buren. Boston. 1846. 
McLaughlin, A. C. 

Lewis Cass. Boston. 1899. 
McMaster, J. B. 

Hist, oi the U. S. 7 v. N. Y. 
Madison, James. 
Writings (Hunt, Ed.). 8 v. N. Y. 
1908. 
Maillard, N. D. 

History of Texas. London. 1842. 
Mateos, J. A. 

Hist. Pari, de los Cong. Mex. 
10 V. Mexico. 1877-86. 
Maza, F. F. de la. 

Codigo de Colonizacion y Terrcnos 
Baldios. Mexico. 1893. 
Meigs, W. M. 

Life of T. H. Benton. Phila. 
1904. 
Memoria . . . de Relacioncs, etc. 

^Mexico. 1845. 
Mexico a traves de los Siglos. 6 v. 

Mexico. 
Morse. J. T. 

J. Q. Adams. Boston. 1899. 
Onys, L. de. 
Memoria sobre los Negoc. cntre 
Espafia y los EE. UU., etc. 
Madrid. 1820. 



O So hace la Guerra de Tejas, etc. 

Mex. 1845. 
Otero, Mariano. 
•Cuestion Social y Politica. IMex. 
1842. 
Peck, C. H. 

Jacksonian Epoch. N. Y. 1899. 
Polk, J. K. 

Diary. 4 v. Chicago. 1910. 
Pracht, Victor. 
Texas im Jahre 1848. Elberfeld. 
1849. 
Prentiss, S. S. 
Memoir [ed. by his brother]. 2 v. 
N. Y. 1886. 
Quincy, Josiah. 

J. Q. Adams. Boston, i860. 
Raines, C. W. 

Bibliography of Texas. Austin. \^^ 

1896. 
Reeves, J. S. 
Amer. Diplomacy ilnder Tyler and 
Polk. Baltimore. 1907. 
Revolutionary Officer. 

Considerations on the Propri. and 
Necess. of Annex. . . . Texas. 
N. Y. 1829. 
Richardson, J. D. 

Messages and Papers of the Presi- 
dents. 10 V. Washington. 1896. 
Roosevelt, Theodore. 

Thomas H. Benton. Boston. 1899- 
Sargent, Nathan. 

Public Men and Events. 2 v. 
Phila. 1875- 
Schouler, James. 
Hist, of the United States. 6 v. 
N. Y. 
Schurz, Carl. 

Henry Clay. 2 v. Boston. 1899. 
Sedgwick, Theodore. 

Thoughts, etc. N. Y. 1844. 
Seventy-second Anniv. of D. Web- 
ster's Birthday. 1854. 
Shepard, E. M. 

Martin Van Buren. Boston. 1899. 
Smith, Ashbel. 
Addresses. 1848 and 1875. 
Reminiscences. 1876. 



476 



ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 



Smithwick, Noah. 
The Evolution of a State. Austin. 
1901. 
Stanwood, Edward. 
Hist, of the Presidency. Boston. 
1898. 
Sumner, W. G. 

Andrew Jackson. Boston. 1899. 
Thompson, Waddy. 
Letter to National Intelligencer. 
1844. 
Tornel, J. M. 

Breve Reseiia Hist. Mexico. 1852. 
Tejas y los EE. UU., etc. Mexico. 

1837- 

Treaties in Force, Compilation of. 
Washington. 1899. 

Turner Essays in History. By 
various authors. 1910. 

Tyler, L. G. 
Letters and Times of the Tylers. 
Richmond. 3 v. 1884-96. 

United States Congressional Docu- 
ments, including the Journals of 
Senate and House and the Execu- 
tive Journal of the Senate. 

Urgente Necesidad de la Guerra de 
Tejas. Mexico. 1842. 



Visit to Texas. 2 ed. N. Y. 1836. 
Von Hoist, H. 

Const, and Polit. Hist, of the U. S. 

8 V. Chicago. 
John C. Calhoun. Boston. 1899. 
Webster, Daniel. 

Letters (Van Tyne). N. Y. 1902. 
Writings and Speeches. 18 v. 
Boston. 1903. 
Weed, Thurlow. 
Autobiography (H. A. Weed, Ed.). 
Boston. 1833. 
Winsor, Justin (Ed.). 
Narr. and Crit. Hist, of America. 
8 V. Boston. 1884-89, 
Woodbury, Levi. 

Writings. 3 v. Boston. 1852. 
Wooten, D. G. 

Hist, of Texas. 
Yoakum, H. K. 

Hist. Texas. 2 v. Redfield. 1856. 
Young, A. W. 

American Statesman. Rev. ed. 
N. Y. 1877. 
Zavala. L. de. 

Revoluciones de Mexico. 2 v. 
Mexico. 



INDEX. 



Abbreviations, 2, note. 

Aberdeen, Lord, exonerates United 
States, 25 ; his position on British 
mediation, 83, 86 ; on Texan slavery, 
88, 89-91, 123, 124, 126; his inter- 
view with Everett, regarding inter- 
ference in Texas, 150, 151, 232; 
despatch to Pakenham on same sub- 
ject, 200; veiled threat against 
U S., 304; interview with Mexican 
minister in 1830, 382 ; instructions 
to British ambassador at Paris 
(1844), 383; interview with Mexi- 
can representative (Murphy), 389; 
proposed Diplomatic Act, 391, 394 ; 
instructs representative in Mexico 
that the plan of co-operation with 
Mexico is dropped, 402, 403, note; 
perceives need of caution in matters 
affecting the United States, 406; 
prepares new instructions for 
Elliot (Jan., 1845), 407; tries to 
make independence attractive, and 
reminds Texas of the existing 
treaties, 462. See also England. 

Adams, John Quincy, view of an- 
nexation, 4; his effort to acquire 
Texas, 8, 106; three-weeks address 
in House of Representatives, 68; 
attitude of, on slavery in Texas, 
116, 117, 130; eloquent address, 
131; circular (1843), 132; on an- 
nexation, 136, 221, 280; his descrip- 
tion of Buchanan, 268. 

Addington, H. U., British Under 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, his 
attitude on Texan affairs, 86. 

Advertiser, Albany, 67. 

Advertiser, Boston, 136, 465. 

Advertiser, Detroit, 133, 254, 354. 

Advertiser, Galveston, 1841, 38, 112. 

Advertiser, Mobile, 40, 299. 

Advertiser, Newark, 66, 300, 324. 

Advocate, Charlottesville, Va., 245. 



Alabama, on annexation of Texas, 
68, 299. 

Alaman, Lucas, his action in Texas 
matters, 9, 10; his Report, 1830, 19, 
note. 

Alamo, 12, 20, 43, 49. 

Allen, Charles, 182. 

Allen, Ebenezer, his course as acting 
Secretary of State in Texas, 376, 
277; appointed Secretary, 412; his 
action regarding annexation, 436, 
445; recalls Kaufman, 464. 

Alliance of Texas with the United 
States suggested by Houston, 162 ; 
United States requested to become 
a defensive ally, 163, 164; Van 
Zandt's opinion on this proposi- 
tion, 169. 

Almonte, J. N., 42 ; his threat to re- 
sign mission if the United States 
considers annexat'on, 135, 137 ; his 
conversation with Upshur, 194, 195; 
interviews with Calhoun, 195 ; with- 
draws from Washington, 261 ; 
quoted on annexation sentiment, 
299, 324, 418; his note to the Amer- 
ican government, 423 ; hurries 
home, 430. 

American, Baltimore, 114, iiS, 132, 
133, 244, 245. 253, 319; on Houston 
as a possible President of the 
United States, 439. 

American, Portland, 298. 317. 

American, Sunbury, Pa., 314. 

American Anti-Slavery Society, op- 
poses annexation of Texas, 67. 

Andrews, S. P., works for abolition 
of slavery in Texas, 89, 112, 114. 

Annexation, Texan vote in favor of 
(1836), 20; formal proposition for 
(1837), 63; proposition of Texas 
withdrawn, 68; arguments for and 
against, 63-66; the slavery issue, 
67, 68; fluctuation of Texan feel- 



477 



478 



INDEX. 



ing, 69, 70 ; Texan government ad- 
vances and recedes, 70; possibilities 
of Texas as an independent state, 
68, 74, 75, 99; public sentiment in 
the United States, 71-74; annexa- 
tion desired by Tyler, 103-111; in- 
formally proposed by Upshur, 122 ; 
proposition made to Texas, 128; 
development of sentiment both for 
and against, 130-146; annexation 
treaty negotiated, 147-179; discus- 
sion of, in American press, 180- 
193; Texas or disunion, 204-213; 
the project how received by the 
Senate, 221-233; Presidential con- 
ventions and campaign of 1844, as 
affecting, 234-257, 297-321 ; defeat 
of treaty, 258-273; causes of this 
result, 273-279; Tyler's Message to 
House, and bills for annexation, 
presented and tabled in Senate, 
281-288; strength of anti-British 
feeling, 301-305 ; influence of the 
Liberty party, 306, 307 ; growth of 
annexation sentiment, 320, 323 ; 
public opinion more favorable, 323; 
discussion in House, and passage 
of bill for, 324-334, 347 ; discussion 
in Senate with same result, 334- 
346; instructions embodying action 
of Congress sent American charge 
in Texas, 353-355 ; Texan feeling 
regarding terms proposed, 379, 437- 
440 ; efforts of England and France 
to prevent annexation, 381-413; 
the question before Mexico, 414- 
431; Donelson labors for, 432-461; 
Texan Congress convened to con- 
sider the proposals, 442, 455, 456; 
convention called, 444, 445 ; meets 
and votes for annexation, 456-459 ; 
the people concur, 460; annexation 
effected, 466-468. See also Texas, 
United States. 
Annexation Resolution adopted by 
U. S. House, 332; text of it, 332, 
note; with amendment (Benton's 
bill) adopted by Congress, 343-345; 
text of the amendment, 344, note. 



Anti-annexation convention in Mas- 
sachusetts, 324. 

Anti-slavery Convention, London, 
1843, 89. 

Anti-slavery Standard, New York, 
420. 

Appleton, Nathan, 465. 

Archer, William, 194; on relations 
with Mexico affecting annexation, 
197, 198; his course in discussion 
of annexation, 268-270, 274, 335, 
342, 344, 345- 

Archer, Branch T., 21. 

Argus, Albany, N. Y., 312. 

Arista, Mariano, 47, 441. 

Armistice, The proposed, between 
Mexico and Texas, 43, 44 (and 
note), 172. 

Arrangoiz, J. de, reports annexation 
as almost certain, 421 ; urges 
Mexico to negotiate with Texas, 
430. 

Ashburnham, British Charge in 
Mexico, his attitude toward Texas, 

77- 

Ashburton, Lord, encourages plan 
for tripartite agreement, 109. 

Ashley, U. S. Senator, offers resolu- 
tion on annexation, 338; remark 
on Texan immigration, 434. 

Atlas, Boston, 181, 182, 183, 198, 229, 

324- 

Atlas, London, 304, 305, 325, 393, 394. 

Aurora, New York, 134, 226, 285. 

Aurora, La, Tabasco, 414. 

Austin, Moses, 7. 

Austin, Stephen F., his attitude on 
slavery in Texas, 9 ; on Texan in- 
dependence, II, 12; commissioner 
to the United States, 21 ; appeals 
for aid, 27. 

Bagby, A. P., on annexation, 341-343. 

Bancroft, George, 202, 242, 251, 315; 
on approval by cabinet of Tyler's 
action regarding terms of annexa- 
tion, 354. 

Bankhead, Charles, represents Great 
Britain in Mexico, 94, 402; will not 
promise Mexico British aid, 295; 
his influence in Texan affairs, 420- 



INDEX. 



479 



425, 427, 428, 430; instructed to 
urge that Texas be recognized at 
once, 462; counsels moderation in 
IMexico after action of Texan 
convention, 463. 

Barbadoes, colonial secretary of, 
visits Texas, 79; his report, 85, 86. 

Barker, E. C, article, 16, note. 

Barker, George P., 312. 

Barrow, Alexander, his letter on 
annexation, 163 ; appeals for delay, 

344- 

Beales claim to lands in Texas, 85, 
122, 149, 155. 

Bee, New Orleans, 46, 114, 181. 

Belgium, recognizes Texan independ- 
ence, 76. 

Belser, J. E., on annexation, 301. 

Bentinck, Lord, 392. 

Benton, Thomas H., on recognition 
of Texas, 54 ; on annexation, 64, 
108, 138; on Gilmer's letter, 132; 
on disunion movement, 210, 211, 
213 ; on annexation treaty, 225, 228, 
258, 259, 262, 264, 274; on military 
protection of Texas, 231, 232; his 
attitude in Presidential campaign 
of 1844, 235, 236, 238, 244, 253 ; his 
speech on the treaty, 264, note ; his 
argument on relations between 
Texas and Alexico, 277 ; presents 
bill in Senate for annexation of 
Texas, 284, 285; his discussion with 
McDuffie, 286, 287; does not sup- 
port McDuffie's joint resolution, 
287; attacks administration, 309; 
introduces former bill amended, 
335; introduces new bill, 336, 337; 
this bill adopted as section three of 
the annexation resolution, 343-345. 

Berrien, J. M., on annexation, 468. 

Berryer, A. P., 388, 397. 

Biddle. Nicholas, 108. 

Billault, French Deputy, 397. 

Birney, James, 306, 308. 

Black, E. J., favors annexation, 138, 
191. 351 : is willing to support occu- 
pation of Oregon, 351. 
Blair, F. P., editor of Washington 
Globe, on annexation, 188, 216; his 



attitude toward Calhoun, 213, 216; 
toward Tyler, 310; toward Mc- 
Duffie's joint resolution, 334; to- 
ward Benton's bill, t^t,"/. See also 
Globe, Washington. 

Hocanegra, J. M., 293-295. 

Holetin de Noticias, El, 426. 

Botts, J. M., 192, 205. 

Bowles, Cherokee chief, 35, 163. 

Boyd, Linn, offers plan for annexa- 
tion, 332. 

Bravo, Nicolas, 56. 

Britannia, London, 303. 

British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society, its action regarding slavery 
in Texas, 116. 

Brougham, Lord, on Texan affairs, 
123, 141, 232. 

Brown, A. V., his attitude on annex- 
ation, 108, 137, 138. 

Brown, Milton, introduces proposi- 
tion, in the House, for annexation, 

Z^^, 332, 347- 

Bryan, Joseph N., 52. 

Bryant, William Cullen, signs protest 
against Texas resolution at Balti- 
more convention, 312. 

Buchanan, James, quoted, ^2 ; his 
position on recognition of Texas, 
52, 54, 57 ; Presidential aspirant in 
1844, 236; favors annexation treaty, 
267, 268; prepares instructions for 
American charge in Texas, 354 ; 
his remarks on the terms, 354, 355 ; 
his reply to Almonte's note, 423 ; 
instructions to Donelson. 439, 446, 
448; to American minister at Lon- 
don on British attitude on Texan 
question, 466. 

Burnet, David, 20, 30, 34, 66. 

Bustamante, Anastasio, his career in 
Mexico, 2, 3, 82 ; quoted on Texan 
campaign, 414. 

Butler, Anthony, 12. 

Butler, B. F., of New York, 246, 249, 

25-- 
Calhoun, John C, on recognition of 
Texas (1836), 53; on annexation 
(1836), 64, 66; urges opposition to 
British anti-slavery designs in 



48o 



INDEX. 



Texas, 126; appointed Secretary of 
State, 174; works for annexation 
treat}^ 174-178; his interviews 
with Almonte, 195; reply to Paken- 
ham concerning Lord Aberdeen's 
despatch on the English position, 
201-204, 213, 215, 216-218, 259, 287; 
his attitude regarding secession, 
209, 211, 213-216; suggested for 
President of a Southern confeder- 
acy, 211; aspirations for Presidency 
of the United States, 217; rela- 
tions with Van Buren, 235 ; his 
opinion on prospects of the an- 
nexation treaty, 272 ; his despatch 
to charge at Mexico, 288; opposes 
Benton's bill, 338, 343 ; urges Tyler 
to act on annexation resolution, 
352 ; his instructions to Donelson, 
353 ; to Howard, 361, 362, 367 ; his 
despatch to Shannon, minister to 
Mexico, on Texan affairs, 365-367 ; 
his despatch to King, endeavoring 
to influence the French govern- 
ment, 400, 401, 405. 

California, revolt in, 48; Houston's 
belief that Texas might acquire, 99 ; 
Tyler's plan for obtaining, 109; 
England's alleged designs concern- 
ing, 155, 230, 417. 

Cameron, Simon, 314. 

Canada, propositions to annex, 334. 

Canales, Antonio, his campaign 
against Mexican Centralists, 37. 

Canedo, Juan de Dios, Mexican min- 
ister of Foreign Relations, his atti- 
tude on Texan independence, 82, 
415, 416. 

Canning, Charles John, :i2, 77- 

Cannon, N., 27. 

Carroll, William, 108. 

Cass, Lewis, 236, 250, 251. 

Catholics in Presidential campaign of 
1844, 311, 317. 

Catron, John, discourages invasion of 
Mexico, 39; references to, 156, 238; 
works for annexation, 162; for 
Polk. 250, quoted, 253, 254, 255, 336. 

Channing, William E., quoted, 4; his 



views on the Texan revolt, 14, 15, 
18, 19. 

Chapman, Reuben, 351. 

Chihuahua, plan in, for union with 
Texas, 48. 

Child, D. L., 25, 132, 350. 

Choate, Rufus, 163. 

Cholera morbus epidemic, popular 
Mexican belief as to cause of, 419. 

Cincinnati, meeting in, suggests rec- 
ognition of Texas, 52. 

Citizen, Albany, 311. 

Civilian, Galveston, 44, 96, 180, 359, 
380. 

Clay, Cassius M., 297, 308, 312. 

Clay, Henry, his efforts to acquire 
Texas, 8, 105, 140 ; report on rec- 
ognition of Texas, 54, 61 ; promotes 
bank bill, 102; nominated by Mas- 
sachusetts for Presidency, log, 157; 
his opinion on annexation, 160 ; his 
prospects for the Presidency and 
the annexation question 51s affect- 
ing each other, 174, 182, 184, 185, 
192, 217; opposes annexation, 197, 
198, 259, 272 ; his letter against it, 
240-242; unanimous choice of 
Whig party in 1844, 234, 246; his 
change of attitude on annexation, 
307-309 ; influences for and against 
in the Presidential campaign, 311- 
321 ; his explanation of defeat, 317; 
letter urging delay on annexation 
question, 336. 

Clayton, Thomas, 189. 

Clipper, Baltimore, on annexation, 
^33, i45j 226; censures Tyler, 229. 

Coahuila, discontent in, 47, 48. 

Coahuila-Texas, 7, 8, 10, 11. 

Colonial Gazette, London, 78. 

Colquitt, W. S., 206. 

Commerce between England and the 
United States, 392, 393. 

Commercial Advertiser, Buffalo, 316. 

Commercial Advertiser, New York, 
on annexation, 138, 315. 348; on 
Texan feeling, 380. 

Commercial Bulletin, New Orleans, 
quoted on prospects of Texas 
league, 47; its advice to Texas, 49; 



INDEX. 



481 



Statement regarding Texan ideas of 
extension, 51 ; quoted on English 
action, 123, 154: on possible occu- 
pation of Texas by the United 
States. 443- 

Commons, House of. See House of 
Commons. 

Compiler, Richmond, 218. 

Concert, international, against an- 
nexation, 383, 384, 390. 391, 395, 
396, 400, 403, note. 404-406, 407. 
413, 462, 463. 

Confederacy, Southern. See Seces- 
sion. 

Connecticut, 53, 260. 

Conner, David, instructions to, 227. 

Connolly, Felix, 315. 

Constituent Congress of Mexico, i, 7. 

Constitution, federal, proclaimed in 
Mexico, I ; abolished, 3. 

ConsHtutionnel, Le, 394, 397, 398. 

Convention, Texan, to consider an- 
nexation. 436, 444. 456-461. 

Corpus Christi, skirmish near, 38. 

Correspondant, Le, 393, 398. 

Corwin, Thomas, 346, note. 

Cotton industry, as affecting relations 
of England, Texas and United 
States, 85, 86, 89, 90, 94. 97, 109, 112. 

Courier, Boston, 130; on relations of 
Texas and England, 144. 

Courier, Charleston, 192. 

Courier, New Orleans. 31, 40, 47, 104. 
211, 224, 453. 

Courier and Enquirer, New York. 
70. 316, 32^, 466. 

Courrier, Franqais, Le, 426. 

Cowley, Lord, 383, 384, 386, 390, 396, 
404. 

Crawford, J. T., 24. 

Crittenden. J. J.. 197, 198: his course 
in annexation proceedings. 225, 
227, 229, 344. 

Croskey, J. R.. represents Beales 
claim to lands in Texas, 85, 86. 

Cuevas, L. G., represents Mexico in 
France, 384, 385; Mexican Minister 
of Foreign Relations, 420; his pro- 
posals regarding Texas (Mentnria 
and /uiciiitiz'(i), 421. 424; consulta- 



tions with Bankhead, 420-422, 427; 
his condition of negotiation with 
Texas, 430; eager for English aid, 

463- 
Cushing, Caleb, iii. 
Customs affairs on Texan liordcr, 10, 

71, 73- 

Cyprey, Alleye de, 427, 428, 430. 

Daingerfield, \V. H., 39. 

Dallas, G. M., 255. 

Debate on Annexation, 1845, in the 
House of Representatives, 328, 
note ; in the Senate. 339, note. 

Del Norte Company, 212. 

Democrat, Houston, 358. 

Democrat, Milwaukee, 135. 

Democratic Central Committee of 
Va., 181, 298. 

Democratic party, 234, 238; attitude 
of, on annexation, 242, 255-257, 
297; national convention of, 1844, 
248-257 ; influences for and against 
in campaign, 309-315: analysis of 
result. 315-320. 

Diario, official Mexican newspaper, 
59, 420; urges negotiation with 
Texas. 428, 429. 

Diplomatic Act, proposed by Eng- 
land, 391 (and note), 394, 403, 406. 

Diplomats, The principal, 2, note. 

Disunion. See Secession. 

Disunion convention, 208. 

Dix, John A.. 342. 343. 

Dodson, John, British Advocate 
General, 389. 

Donelson, A. J., 251, 252; expostulates 
with Benton, 336; American charge 
in Texas, 348. 368. 369 ; quoted on 
Houston's position, 360; discusses 
with Houston. 369-371 ; reports 
the situation critical. 371 ; Iiis view 
on English influence, 375 ; his letter 
to Allen, 376, :i77 ; visits the United 
States. 432 ; returns to find English 
and P'rench envoys at Texan capi- 
tal. 432, 433, 435 : discusses situa- 
tion with Jones, Smith and Allen. 
436; visits Houston, 437-440; 
formally presents proposals of the 
United States to Texan govern- 



32 



482 



INDEX. 



ment, 441 ; his skillful conduct of 
affairs, '444-446, 448-454, 456-461; 
his recall, 464. 

Douglas, Stephen A., offers joint 
resolution for annexation. 327; 
offers joint resolution declaring 
Texas a mem!)er of the Union, 
467. 

Dromgoole, G. C. speaks on annexa- 
tion, 331. 

Doyle, Percy W., 93, 94, I5S- 

Eagle, Memphis, 319. 

Earthquake in Mexico, 422. 

Economist, London, 393. 

Edinbui-gh Review, 13, 97- 

Elect ra (ship), 412. 

Elliot, Charles, English consul and 
charge to Texas, 80; his character 
and abilities, 81 ; his opinion on 
Texan independence, 83, 87 ; pre- 
sents the Beales claim, 85 ; his plan 
for abolition of slavery and adop- 
tion of free trade, 91, 92 ; discussion 
with Houston, 92 ; remarks on the 
Texan situation (1843), 93-95; his 
influence in Texas, 96, 113, 114, 155, 
160, 161, 262 ; meets Henry Clay, 
160; his interview with Houston on 
Upshur's informal proposition of 
annexation, 147-149 ; his opinion of 
Houston's request for defensive 
arrangement with United States, 
164; requests full explanation of 
Texan policy, 171 ; quoted, 358, 380; 
away from his post, 368, 369; his 
reports on temper of Texan people, 
381, 451 ; his reply to Aberdeen's 
instructions of January, 1845, 407 ; 
his labors with Texan authorities 
to prevent annexation (March, 
1845), 408-411, 462; his secret 
journey to Mexico, 411-413, 423, 
428, 431 ; his opinion of annexation 
sentiment, 435 ; hurries to Texan 
capital to work against annexation, 
449 : leaves Texas, 455 ; feeling in 
United States concerning his 
course, 466. 

Elliot. George. 413, 423. 451. 

Ellis, Powhatan. 59. 60. 



England, relations of, with Mexico, 
23, /2 ; with Texas, 60, 63, 75-79 ; 
recognizes Texan independence, 79; 
treaties with Texas concluded, 80 ; 
attitude of, on mediation between 
Texas and Mexico, 81-84; deeply 
interested in Texan slavery. 79, 84- 
94, 97, no. III, 1 13-126; fears of, 
in United States, 135-137, I43, I47, 
150-155; disclaims intention to 
interfere improperly in Texas, 150- 
153, 200; but continues to be 
regarded as a factor in the situa 
tion, 154, 158, 160, 161, 164, 165, 
167, 170, 359: her representative 
requests full explanation of Texan 
poHcy, 171 ; opposes annexation 
treaty, 188, 304; readiness to give 
Texas aid, 364; view of England's 
policy. 382, 383, 388, 389. 413 ; Aber- 
deen's interview with Mexican re- 
presentative (Murphy), 389: plans 
for joint action with France to 
prevent annexation, 390; proposed 
Diplomatic Act, 391 ; England's de- 
sire and need for friendly terms 
with the United States, 392-394; 
yet now willing to fight U. S., 394; 
action delayed, 394-396; a passive 
course dictated, 404; new instruc- 
tions to Elliot, 407; his efforts for 
treaty of peace between Texas and 
Mexico, 410, 411; England's great 
anxiety to prevent annexation, 413, 
418, 450, 453 ; her last efforts for 
Texan independence, 462, 463. See 
also Aberdeen, Elliot, Pakenham, 
Bankhead. Cowley, and Concert. 

Enquirer, Richmond, 71, 116, 145, 189, 
193. 207, 240, 285, 299, 324, 348, 380. 

European concert against annexation. 
See Concert, international. 

pAtropean Times. Wilmer and 
Smith's, 398. 

Eurydice (ship), 412, 422, 423. 

Eve, Joseph, on Texan affairs in 
T842, 40, 41. 

Evening Journal, New York, 318. 

Evening Post, New York, ptiblishes 
Sedgwick's articles opposing annex- 



INDEX. 



483 



ation, 190, and documents accom- 
panying annexation treaty, 225 ; its 
predictions on Texan matters, 288; 
course in Presidential campaign of 
1844, 299, 312, 313; later views re- 
garding annexation, 324, 326, 466. 
Everett, Edward, introduces Ashbel 
Smith, 83, 87 ; Tyler's plan to 
relieve, 109; reference to, 117; his 
instructions from Upshur, 124-126; 
interviews with Aberdeen, on Brit- 
ish intentions regarding Texas, 
150-153; despatch from, 232; 
quoted on Louis Philippe's position, 

387. 
Examiner, London, 393. 
Express, New York, 316, 319, 320. 
Federalists of northern Mexico seek 

aid from Texas, 36, 47 ; their 

schemes for independence or union 

with Texas, 47, 48. 
Field, David Dudley, 191, 312. 
Flirt (ship), 154. 
Florida, acquisition of, 5, 7. 
Foreign-born voters join Democrats, 

311. 317- 

Forsyth, John, his attitude towards 
Texas, 30; views on annexation, 
63-66, 106. 

Fort Jesup, 430. 

Foster, E. H., offers resolution on 
annexation, 338. 

France, claims of, to Louisiana, 5 ; 
acknowledges independence of 
Texas, 76 ; disapproves annexation 
treaty, 261 ; review of French 
policy regarding Texas, 383-388, 
413 ; plans for joint action with 
England to prevent annexation, 
391 ; indignation of people against 
this policy, 397-399; efforts of 
W. R. King and Calhoun to influ- 
ence course of government, 399- 
401; delay, 402; refusal of France 
to take up arms, but willingness to 
aid in obtaining recognition from 
Mexico for Texas, 404, 405 ; pro- 
nounces Diplomatic Act unneces- 
sary. 406; retires from action con- 
cerning Texas, 463. 



Free trade and tariff problems as 
affecting the Texas question, 91, 94, 
97, 136, 142, 144, 185, 230, 364, 375, 

Free Trader, Natchez, on annexation 
of Texas, 70 ; on English position, 
104. , 

Frelinghuysen, Theodore, 311, 317. 

Fremont, John C, 127. 

Fulton, William, on annexation, 171. 

Gadsden, James, 209, 309. 

Gaines, Edmund P., 27. 

Gallatin, Albert, 191, 466. 

Galveston, description of, about 1843, 
41. 

Garrison, William Lloyd, ~2„ 116; his 
attitude toward Whigs and Dem- 
ocrats, 306 ; does not refer to 
Oregon in connection with Texas 
affairs, 351, 352. See Liberator. 

Garro, Maximo, interviews with 
Louis Philippe, 386, 419; his final 
efforts for aid in Texan affairs. 

463. 
Gazette, Alexandria, Va., 317. 
Gazette, Cincinnati, on movement for 

rescinding the annexation measure, 

465- 

Gazette, Galveston, 358, 359. 

Gazette, Philadelphia, 131. 

Georgia, secession sentiment in, 206, 
208; annexation meeting at Augus- 
ta slightly attended, 299 ; resolu- 
tion of Whigs on annexation, 319. 

Georgian, 31. 

Giddings, Joshua R., 324, 2,2>Z- 

Gilmer, T. W., favors annexation, 
131, 207. 

Gilpin. H. D., 342. 

Globe, Washington, D. C, on annexa- 
tion, 140-144, 180, 182, 188, 216, 226, 
439; on asking assent of Mexico, 
199; on possible Southern confed- 
eracy, 211; on relations between 
Tyler and Van Buren, 234; its 
course in Presidential campaign of 
1844, 238, 253. 310; opinion on vote 
of House, T,2,i. 

Goliad, 19, 43, 49. 

Gorostiza. M. E. de, offends and 



484 



INDEX. 



leaves United States, 59, 82; his 
interview with Lord Aberdeen con- 
cerning Texas (1830), 383. 

Great Britain. See England. 

Greeley, Horace, on annexation, 138; 
on Clay's course, 308; on Walker's 
amendment to Benton's bill, 343 ; 
on rescinding annexation measure, 
464, 465. 

Green, Ben. E., 288, 293-295. 

Green, Duff, visits London semi-offi- 
cially, 117; report of British de- 
signs attributed to him, 117-119, 
121, 232; said to be interested in 
Texan properties, 189; American 
Consul at Galveston. 212 ; his 
explanation, 213, note ; urges deser- 
tion of old party leaders, 238; 
quoted on attitude of the North- 
west, 350; his clash with President 
Jones, 2,77, 447- 

Grundy, U. S. Dist. Atty., 24. 

Guerrero, Vicente, made President of 
Mexico, 2; proclaims abolition of 
slavery, 9, 29. 

Guizot, F. P. G., his Texan policy, 
383, 384, 387, 388; opposition to, 
among French people, 397-399; his 
interview with W. R. King, 400; 
finally refuses to join England in 
taking up arms to prevent annexa- 
tion, 404 ; his explanation of obsta- 
cles to decisive action, 463. See 
also France. 

Hamilton, James, 36, 205. 

Hammond, J. H., quoted on pros- 
pects of a Southern confederacy, 
211; his opinion on failure of 
treaty, 273, 277. 

Hannegan, E. A., on Oregon ques- 
tion, 351. 

Hays, J. C, 441, 447, 448. 

Haywood, VV. H., Jr., 343, 359, 464. 

Henderson, John, of Mississippi, 198. 

Henderson, J. Pinckney, appointed 
Texan envoy to England and 
France, 63. 76; quoted on British 
intentions, 122; appointed to co-op- 
erate with Van Zandt in matter of 
annexation treaty, 165, 166, 172; 



arrives in Washington, 174; his 
report to Jones, 175; his comments 
on terms of treaty, 223 ; " culti- 
vates " Whigs, 260; mention of, 
272, 281 ; his recall, 356; active for 
annexation, 441. 

Herald, Cincinnati, 135, 208, 306. 

Herald, New York, 30, 182, 187, 246, 
256, 298, 300, 307, 318. 

Herrera, J. J. de, President of 
Mexico, 3, 409 ; his attitude towards 
the United States, 423, 424. 

Hockley, G. W., Texan commis- 
sioner to Mexico, 44, 172, 363. 

Holland, recognizes Texan independ- 
ence, 76. 

Holmes, L E., on southern conditions, 
205. 

Horn, Henry, 314. 

House of Commons, considers Amer- 
ican relations with Texas, 77. 

House of Representatives of the 
United States, action of, on rec- 
ognition of Texas, 57, 58; bill 
passed in, for annexation, ;i24-232, 
347 ; analysis of votes, 333, 334, 347. 

Houston, G. S., 351. 

Houston, Sam, his share in causing 
the Texas revolution, 25, 26, 28 ; his 
first Presidency, 35 ; his character, 
35; re-elected President, 38; his 
general policies, 38, 39; secures a 
truce with ]\Iexico, 43, 44 : takes 
steps to obtain an armistice, 44: 
why opposed to war, 50; asks Brit- 
ish aid, 94 ; shows a leaning toward 
England, 95, 96; very influential in 
Texas, 96: his real aim, 98-100, 
164-169: his view of American 
policy regarding annexation (1843). 
106, 107: his position regarding 
slavery in Texas, 114; proclaims 
the truce, 118; declines to consider 
annexation (July, 1843), 121: his 
dealings with England misrepre- 
sented, 136; explains to Elliot his 
attitude towards the United States, 
147-149; suspected by Upshur, 153; 
visits the Flirt, 154; reply to Amer- 
ican overture, 155; contrasts Eng- 



INDEX. 



485 



land advantageously with the 
United States, 156; predicts the 
consequence of non-annexation, 
159; firm for independence, says 
Elliot, 160; fearing action of Con- 
gress sends in a secret message 
(Jan., 1844), 160-162; desires defen- 
sive arrangement with the United 
States, 162, 164, 166, 167 ; appoints 
Henderson to co-operate with Van 
Zandt, 165 ; Henderson's instruc- 
tions, 166; Houston's reasonings, 
166-168: his letter to Jackson (Feb., 
1844), 168, 169; his feeling toward 
Jackson, 168, note ; does not accept 
the proposed armistice, 172; finesse 
regarding annexation treaty, 1^2, 
173. 176-179; real feeling about the 
treaty, 179 ; anxious but not worried 
regarding its fate. 356; prefers 
guaranteed independence, 356, 357 ; 
interview with Donelson, 369-371 ; 
review of his policy regarding 
annexation, 372; further indica- 
tions of his preference, 37s ; Jones's 
charges against, 374; opposes the 
American annexation proposal, 
437-440; thinks of the American 
Presidency, 439, 443 ; yields to public 
sentiment, 442, 443. 

Howard, B. C, 58, 60. 

Howard, Tilghman A., appointed 
American charge in Texas, 361 ; 
Calhoun's instructions to, 361, 362, 
367 ; his answer to Texan demands, 
365; his death, 368. 

Hubbard, David, 206. 

Hubbard, Henry, of Xew Hampshire, 

251. 

Hughes, J. M., offers resolution con- 
cerning Oregon, 191. 

Ilunt, Memucan, presents Texan 
annexation proposal (1837), 63-66; 
works for annexation (1845), 434. 

Hunt, Washington, opposes final vote 
for annexation, 467. 

Hunter, R. M. T., 237, 351. 

Huntington, J. W., 344. 

Huskisson, William, quoted on the 



attitude of Great Britain regarding 
annexation, 77. 

Immigration, Texan, 96, 97, 363, 434. 
See also Settlers. 

Impeachment of Tyler demanded, 
229. 

Independence declared by Texas, 13; 
recognized by the United States, 
62 ; by France, Holland, and Bel- 
gium, 76: by England. 80. 

Ingersoll, Charles J., on Texas, "73; 
on annexation treaty, 278; moves 
joint resolution for annexation, 327. 

Iniciaiiva presented by Cuevas. 424. 

International concert against annexa- 
tion. See Concert, international. 

Iturbide, Augustin dc, in Mexico, i, 
50. 

Jackson, Andrew, his attempt to inir- 
chase Texas, 9, 22 ; his alleged 
complicity in the Texan revolution, 
25-28 ; discourages Texan invasion 
of Mexico, 39; attitude on recogni- 
tion of Texas, 54-56, 60-62 ; on 
annexation, 105, 108, 144; writes to 
Houston on annexation, 163; 
recommends secrecy to Tyler, 170; 
reference to, 186; urges ratification 
of treaty, 189, 230, 263 ; quoted on 
Calhoun's action, 203 ; on disunion 
sentiment in the Southwest, 207, 
208; on defending Texas, 229; on 
Van Buren's position, 246; letters 
from, on annexation, 252, 263, 304. 
307 ; quoted regarding Clay, 309 ; 
gives advice in Presidential cam- 
paign, 310; writes to Houston, 360, 
439 ; annexation convention votes 
tribute of mourning to, 459. 

Jalisciense, El, 425. 

Jalisco, revolution in, 406. 

Jarnagin, Spencer, speaks against 
disunion, 212; against annexation, 
266, 267. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 140, 186. 

Johnson, Cave, on annexation treaty, 
225, 235, 272, 278; on Presidential 
campaign of 1844. 236, 242, 245, 
253 ; urges compromise candidate, 



486 



INDEX. 



250, 251 ; on McDuffie's joint reso- 
lution, 334, 335. 

Johnson, R. M., 236, 251. 

Johnston, Alexander, 237. 

Jones, Anson, promotes Texan inde- 
pendence, 28, 30; quoted on Texan 
affairs, 36, y], 42, 44, 45, 51, 61, 70, 
96, 122; extracts from and refer- 
ences to official correspondence, 
etc.. as Secretary of State, 149, 152, 
155, 162-164, 172, 395; his attitude 
on annexation, 166, 169, 357; suc- 
ceeds Houston as President of 
Texas, 318, 373; his character and 
policy, 373-376; his negotiations 
with the English and French envoys 
(March, 1845), 409-412; interview 
with Donelson, 436; public feeling 
strong against, 441 ; forced to con- 
vene Congress, 442; issues proc- 
lamation for convention, 444 ; his 
proclamation concerning English 
and French offers of assistance 
and the Mexican attitude, 452, 
453; submits question of annexa- 
tion to Congress, 456; his valedic- 
tory, 468. 

Journal, Poughkeepsie, 316. 

Journal, Louisville, 299. 

Journal des Debats, on slavery, 87, 
385; on Texan prospects, 364; on 
French interference regarding an- 
nexation, 398. 

Journal of Commerce, New York, 
73. 97, III, 112, 175, 186, 195, 199, 
392. 

Kaufman, D. S., discussion concern- 
ing his appointment as Texan 
charge after vote for annexation, 
464. 

Kendall, Amos, 237, 245, 254. 

Kennedy. William, in Texas, 80, 
note: his opinion on relations of 
Texas and Mexico, 83: Houston's 
and Alien's remarks to, 161 ; on 
annexation, 443. 

Kennedy, John P., 189, 331. 

Kent, James, demands impeachment 
of Tyler, 229. 



Kentucky, presents memorial for 
recognition of Texas, 53. 

King, William R., discourages imme- 
diate recognition of Texas (1836), 
52 ; on European influence upon 
American questions, 326; remarks 
on Louis Philippe and" his policy, 
385 ; his interviews with Louis 
Philippe and with Guizot on an- 
nexation, 399, 400, 402. 

La Branche, Alcee, appointed repre- 
sentative of the United States in 
Texas, 62. 

Lamar, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, 

35- 

Lamar, Mirabeau Buonaparte, 
second President of Texas, 30, 
35 ; his character and administra- 
tion, 36, 37; opposed to annexa- 
tion, 69; his opinion on the aboli- 
tion movement, 114: works for 
annexation, 447. 

Land troubles in Texas, 15, 16, 60. 

La Salle, Robert de, plants colony in 
Texas, 5. 

Leclerc. Frederic, quoted, 13, 17, 47, 
51. 69. 

Ledger. Philadelphia, 175, 177, 182, 
187, 188. 242, 246, 261, 271, 281. 

Letcher. R. P., 234, 237. 

Lewis, Dixon H., 206, 215, 235. 

Liberator, 67, 70. 73, 131, 135, 226, 
347, 350. 

Liberty party, 131. 306, 307, 316. 

Liberty Standard, 306. 

Lipscomb, A. S., 441. 

Little Rock, stream of Texan immi- 
gration passing through, 434. 

Livingston, Edward, quoted on 
Texan affairs, 21, 27; favors acqui- 
sition of Texas, 106. 

Locofocos, 216, 234, 235, 251, 350, 
402. 

" Lone Star." See Texas. 

Louis Philippe, his policy and course 
regarding Texas, 383-387, 391, 398, 
399. 402, 405, 419, 463. See also 
France and Guizot. 

Louisiana, French claim to. transfer 
of, to Spain and purchase by 



INDEX. 



487 



United States, 5, 6; attitude of on 
annexation of Texas, '/2, 299; 
situation of, in Presidential cam- 
paign, 1844, 314, 315. 

Love. James, 92, 93, 204, 364. 

Lumpkin, Wilson, 206. 

Lundy, Benjamin, 29. 

McDowell, J. J., 351. 

McDuffie, George, on Texan affairs, 
30, 66; his message to Calhoun, 
174; on secession, 205, 209, 211; 
on sending forces to the South- 
west, 227; argues for annexation, 
to protect slavery, 264-266; moves 
joint resolution for annexation, 
285, 286; his view on tariff, 312; 
reintroduces joint resolution, 334, 

335- 

Mcllvaine, A. R., 255. 

IMadison, James, 140. 

Madisonian, quoted, on English atti- 
tude toward Texas, 115; on Up- 
shur's action, 127 ; on annexation, 
134, 136, 137-139, 177, 180, 184-186, 
221, 226, 339; on Mexican influ- 
ence, 184; on Mexico's treatment 
of the United States, 196 ; suggests 
secession, 207 ; attitude toward 
Locofocos, 216; on support of 
Tyler, 219; attitude towards Van 
Buren, 238, 246 ; towards Tyler, 
247; announces probable legisla- 
tive action for annexation of 
Texas, 281 ; quoted on Benton's 
bill, 2,Z1 ; on Bagby's course, 342 ; 
on Polk, 348. 

Maine, annexation sentiment in, 261, 
262, 301. 

Mangum, W. P., 348. 

Marmora (ship), 432. 

Maryland, annexation sentiment in, 
301. 

Mason, Sampson, on conditions in 
Texas, 58. 

Massachusetts, opposes annexation 
of Texas, 68, 133, 139, 260. 

Maxcy, Virgil, 174, 215, 217, 218. 

Mayfield, J. S., contends for preser- 
vation of Texan boundary, 457, 
458. 



Mayo, Robert, 25. 

Mcmoria presented by Cuevas, 421, 
424. 

Mercantile Journal, London, 86, 363, 
39-2. 

Mercury, Charleston, 205, 209, 317, 
350. 

Mercury, Liverpool, 304, 393. 

Merrick, W. D., on annexation, 339. 

Mexican consul. New Orleans : see 
Arrangoiz. 

Mexico, outline of history of, 1-3, 
8; abolition of slavery in, 9; action 
concerning American colonization 
in, 9, 10, 16-18; revolt of Texas 
from, 13-15 ; relations between the 
two states, 16-19; charges of inter- 
ference by the United States, 20- 
2,^ ; fighting in Texas and capture 
of San Antonio, 38; Judge Robin- 
son's proposals and Santa Anna's 
action, 42, 43; truce granted, 44; 
troulile with Yucatan, 42, 45 ; re- 
volts in northern provinces of 
Mexico, 46; possibilities of their 
union with Texas as an indepen- 
dent state, 46-48; recall of minis- 
ter at Washington, 59; virtual rec- 
ognition of Texan independence, 
59, 61 ; attitude toward Great Brit- 
ain regarding Texas, 60, 72 ; pro- 
tests against French recognition of 
Texan independence, 76 ; declares 
that war will go on, St, ; English 
suggestion that she recognize 
Texan independence, 94, 95 ; un- 
pleasant relations with United 
States, T07 ; circumstances of the 
truce, 95, 118, 149; continued 
claim of sovereignty, 154, 172; 
attitude after the signing of the / 
annexation treaty, 184, 260; rejects 
American overture regarding an- 
nexation and declares that it will 
be equivalent to declaration of ' 
war, 288-294 ; resumes hostile atti- 
tude toward Texas, 363 ; proposes 
terms of recognition, 406; review 
of Mexican feeling and policy re- 
garding Texas, 414-419; action of 



488 



IXDEX. 



United States stimulates Mexican 
government to seek settlement 
with Texas, 420-425 ; public feeling 
inflamed, 425-427: diiiculties, and 
reasons for procrastination, 427. 
428; cabinet authorized to hear 
Texan propositions, 430; action 
following news of Texan annexa- 
tion convention, 463. See also 
Santa Anna, Cuevas, and Boca- 
negra. 

Michigan, on annexation of Texas, 
68. 

Mier, Texan forces captured at. 39. 

Mier y Teran, Manuel de, 10. 

Miller, W. D., appointed secretary of 
Texan special legation at Wash- 
ington, 165; writes to Jackson, 174. 

Mississippi, citizens of, present re- 
quest for recognition of Texas, 
53; legislature of, passes law for 
sectional Congress, 208; strong 
secession movement in, 209 ; favors 
annexation, 262, 299. 

Mhs'issippxan, 363. 

Missouri, annexation sentiment in, 

ZZl- 

Monasterio, J. M. O., 22. 

Monroe, James, 6, 106, 140. 

Morfit, Henry M., investigates Texan 
situation, 12, 13, 30. 

Moniiiig Herald, Cincinnati, 350. 

Morning Herald, London, on British 
policy regarding Texan and Amer- 
ican slavery, 90. 

Morning Nezvs, New York, 336, 3(^0. 

Morning Post, London, 325. 

Morpeth, Lord, his speech on slavery 
in Texas, 116. 

Morris, Thomas, of Ohio, suggests 
in U. S. Senate that Texas l)e 
recognized, 52. 

Morton, Marcus, 251. 

Murphy Memorandum, T,Sr), 394, 402, 
403. 

Murphy, Tomas, as Mexican repre- 
sentative at London reports inter- 
view with Lord Aberdeen, 389 
(see also 394, 402, 403). 

Murphy. \V. S.. .American represen- 



tative in Texas, 45 ; his reports of 
Texan conditions, 74, 118; obtains 
correspondence regarding truce 
with Mexico. 136; his despatches to 
Upshur (Nov., 1843), 149; his 
judgment of Texan feeling toward 
the EngUsh, 154; urges that United 
States Congress act on annexation, 
160, 262, 263 ; pledges protection to 
Texas, 165 ; his pledges disavowed, 
175, 176; his report of British 
minister's plan for " new policy " 
in Texas, 220; description of Brit- 
ish party at Galveston, 358; his 
recall, 361 ; quoted on Houston's 
course, SJ2. 

National Le, Paris, 375, 386, 398. 

National Bank, 108, 298, 317. 

National Intelligencer, quoted on 
recognition of Texas, 54; on an- 
nexation, 67, 137, 226, 324; its atti- 
tude towards President Tyler, 102, 
115; discussion of its treatment of 
the annexation question, 180-184; 
publishes statement by Clay, 240 ; 
its opinion on Van Buren's defeat, 
253 ; on prospects of annexation 
treaty, 272, 314; on vote of House, 
333 ; on vote of Senate, 346 : on 
Polk's action, 348. 

National J 'indicator, on attitude of 
the United States on Texan affairs, 
74, 95 ; on failure of treaty, 359. 

Nativism, a disturbing factor in the 
Presidential election of 1844, 310, 
311, 316, 317. 

Nelson, John, succeeds Upshur tem- 
porarily as Secretary of State, 169. 

Neiv Era, St. Louis, 211. 

New Hampshire passes resolutions 
on Texan affairs. 326. 

New Mexico, discontent in, 48. 

New Orleans, in Texan affairs, 71. 

New York, presents memorial for 
recognition of Texas, 53 ; citizens 
of, urge ratification of commercial 
treaty with Texas, 261 : situation 
of, in Presidential campaign of 
1844, 311-313. 

Ncxi's, Galveston. 443. 



INDEX. 



489 



Newspapers. See Press, the; and 
names of individual papers. See 
also the Appendix. 

Niles, John M., on recognition of 
Texas, 54; on annexation, 338. 

Norfh American, Philadelphia, 180, 
181, 182, 189, 229,- 465. 

North Carolina, citizens of, offer 
resolutions for recognition of 
Texas, 53 ; secession sentiment in, 
20;. 

Nueces, boundary of a disputed terri- 
tory-, 19; skirmish on, 38. 

Nuevo, Leon, insurrection in, 47. 

Observador, El, Zacatecas, 425. 

Observer, Salem, on annexation of 
Texas, 72,. 

Ochiltree, W. B., 435. 

Ohio, on annexation of Texas, 68. 

" Old Hickory." Sec Jackson, 
Andrew. 

'■ Old Sam." See Houston, Sam. 

Old School Democrat, St. Louis, 134. 

Onis, Luis de, 6, note. 

Opium war in China, 394. 

Oregon, Houston's belief that Texas 
might acquire, 99 ; Tyler's plan 
concerning, 109; desire for, in the 
West, 142 ; Democratic resolution 
concerning, 255, 256 ; influence of 
interest in, in Texan matters, 
349-352, 428. 

Orvanne, Bourgeois d', 363. 

Pageot, French minister at Wash- 
ington, disapproves annexation 
treaty, 261 ; his view of anti-British 
feeling, 302; his instructions, 384, 
388; his report to his government 
(June, 1844), 396. 

Pakenham, Richard, his opinions and 
advices on Mexican and Texan 
affairs, 42, 45, 46, 77, 82, 302, 392; 
his instructions from Lord Aber- 
deen, 83 ; sent to Washington, 188, 
201, 203; his statement of English 
attitude toward Texas, 364; his 
reports from Washington, 389, 
390, 395- 

Palmerston, Lord, quoted, 23 ; his 
statements of British attitude 



toward Texas, 76-79; on relations 
of Mexico and Texas, 80. 

Parton, James, 26. 

Pedraza, Manuel Gomez, chosen 
President of Mexico, 2. 

Peel, Sir Robert, his opinion of 
Charles Elliot, 8r ; on abolition of 
slave labor, 86 ; on prospect of war 
with the United States, 393. 

Pena y Pena, Manuel de la, 428. 

" Penn, William," pseudonym, 127. 

Pennsylvania, citizens of, present 
memorial for recognition of 
Texas, 52, 53 ; situation of, in 
Presidential campaign, 1844, 3I4- 

Pcnnsylvanian, 187, 300, 314, 2>^2>- 

Peonage, in Mexico, 9, 18. 

Pcrouse, La (ship), 431. 

Philanthropist. 135. 

Picayune, New Orleans, on Arista's 
policy, 47; on plans for revolt of 
Mexican states, 48 ; on English 
influence in Texas, 113; on Texan 
desire for peace, 358; on Texan 
feeling as to terms offered by the 
United States, 380; on possible 
interference Ijy the United States 
to end English and French control, 
443- 

Pickens, F. W., 57, 58, 205. 

Pillow, Gideon J., works for Polk's 
nomination, 250, 254 ; visits Jack- 
son, 310. 

Pine Tree State. See Maine. 

Plato, 4. 

Polk, James K., 184: nominated for 
Presidency, 250-252 ; influences for 
and against in the campaign, 310- 
314; elected, 315 ; analysis of result, 
320 ; his influence in annexation 
question, 347, 348, 352 ; did he trick 
Senators?, 348, note; his course 
after inauguration, 353. 354; his 
stand for American claims in the 
Northwest, 428: his opinion on rec- 
ognition of Texan charge after 
vote for annexation, 464. 

Post, Boston. 187, 226, 303. 

Prentiss, S. S., 299. 

Presidential campaign of 1844 in hs 



490 



INDEX. 



relations to annexation, 234-257, 
297-321. 

Press, American, on annexation, 71, 
72, 130, 180-189, 302, 303, 323, 464, 
465; English, 303, 304, 325, 466; 
French, 397-399; Mexican, 425, 
426; Texan, 380. See also names 
of newspapers. 

Presse, La, Paris, 385. 

Preston, W. C, on recognition of 
Texas, 52, 53 ; on annexation, 66, 
68. 

Princeton (ship), 169. 

Raymond, C. H., acts as messenger 
between United States and Texas, 
160; his reports on conditions at 
Washington, 259, 261, 271, 324, 333, 

337- 

" Re-annexation " of Texas, 6, 248, 
300. See also Annexation. 

Recognition of Texas, memorials 
concerning, from various states, 
52, 53 ; discussion of, in United 
States Senate, 52-57; in House of 
Representatives, 57-59; Pres. Jack- 
son's attitude, 54-56, 60-62 ; press- 
ing reasons for, 59-61 ; final deci- 
sion, 62. 

Register, New Haven, 297. 

Reily, James, 70. 

Rejon, M. C, 406; his letter to Shan- 
non, 416, 424. 

Republican, New Orleans, prints 
letter from A. J. Yates, 113; quo- 
tation from, 114; discusses annexa- 
tion, 133, 134, 180. 

Republican, Savannah, 72, 219. 

Republican, Springfield, 334. 

Revista Economica y Comercial de 
la Republica Mexicana, 415. 

Revolution of 1836, 6, 19, 20; causes, 
10-13; discussed, 14-19; responsi- 
bility of the United States for, 
considered, 20-33. 

Revue de Paris, 90, 120, 229, 399. 

Revue des Deux Mondes, 13, 51. 

Revue Indepeudante, La, 29, 397, 399. 

Rhctt, R. B., 205, 207, 209, 211. 

Rhode Island, on annexation of 
Texas, 68. 



Richardson, Chauncey, 459. 

Right of search, 79, 387. 

Rio Grande, Republic of. proclaimed, 

37, 47- 

Rives, W. C, on recognition of 
Texas, 53 ; on annexation treaty, 
272. 

Robinson, Judge, his plan for Texas 
and Mexico, 42-45, 86, 93, 114. 

Rockwell, Julius, urges amendment 
prohibiting slavery in Texas, 467. 

Rusk, T. J., works for annexation, 
441 ; elected President of annexa- 
tion convention, 459. 

Sabine River, as a boundary of the 
United States, 5-7. 

Sainte Aulaive, Comte de, 384. 

St. Lawrence River, 301. 

Saligny, Comte de, representative of 
France in Texas, 76, 161, 368; in- 
structed to work against annexa- 
tion, 408; his labors with the 
Texan authorities, 408-412, 462; 
his journey to New York, 413. 

Saltillo, battle at, 37. 

San Antonio, taken by Mexico, 38; 
condition of, in 1843, 41. 

San Francisco, Tyler's plan to obtain, 
109; rumor of bargain with 
Mexico for, 199 ; probable offer 
for, through Thompson, 293. 

San Jacinto, battle of, 20, 22, 27, 52. 

San Luis Potosi, revolt in, 46. 

Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, his 
career in Mexico, 1-3; treatment of 
Texas, 10, 13-15, 18, 19; conven- 
tion with the Texans, 20, note ; 
mention of, 25 ; resolution at 
Washington condemning action of, 
31 ; Buchanan's and other remarks 
on, 32, 33 ; his negotiations with 
Judge Robinson, 42-45; action re- 
garding Yucatan, 45, 417; his 
power in Mexico, 50; his depotism, 
52 ; hope in United States for 
treaty with, 59 ; virtually recognizes 
Texas, 59; his position on Texan 
independence, 82, 83, 84, 87, 149, 
195, 415; his version of Thomp- 
son's proposition on behalf of the 



INDEX, 



491 



United States and statement of his 
reply, 289-292; his attitude toward 
American overture, 294; discusses 
Murphy's conversation with Lord 
Aberdeen, 402 ; proposes to ack- 
nowledge independence of Texas, 
406; his fall and alleged scheming 
with England, 417. 

Santa Fe expedition, ^y, 48, 72. 

Secession, movement for, 204-214, 
287; Mexican belief in probability 
of, 41^ 

Sedgwick, Theodore, on annexation, 
189-191, 312. 

Senate of the United States, action 
of, on recognition of Texas, with 
citations of individual opinions of 
many members, 52-57, 61 ; pub- 
lishes proposed annexation treaty 
and accompanying documents, 229; 
discussion and defeat of treaty, 
258-273 ; bills for annexation intro- 
duced, 284-286; continued discus- 
sion and various propositions, 334- 
344; a bill passed, 345; analysis of 
the result, 345, 346 ; annexation 
consummated, 467, 468. 

Settlers in Texas from the United 
States, grievances of, 7-19; coloni- 
zation enterprise undertaken at 
New York, 30; character of the 
Texans, 34. See also Immigration. 

Shannon, Wilson, 323, note, 326, 416; 
diplomatic relations with, broken 
off, 422. 

Sherman, General, favors military 
campaign on Mexican frontier, 
447, 448. 

Steele, Le, Paris, 399. 

Siglo XIX, El, on colonization in 
Mexico, 16; favors recognizing 
Texas (1845), 430, note. 

Slavery, as an issue in the annexa- 
tion of Texas, 3-5 ; its abolition 
proclaimed in Mexico, 9 ; but 
Texas exempted, 9, 18; proslavery 
influence in settlement of Texas 
and in revolution of 1836, consid- 
ered, 28-30; British attitude toward 
slavery in Texas, 79, 84-94, 97. no, 



III, 1 13-126, 200; British designs 
revealed by Smith, 88, 89; abolition 
movement in Texas, 111-115; 
various opinions on slavery as 
related to annexation, 132, 134-136, 
141-145, 149, 201, 202. 

Slidell, John, 335. 

Smith, Ashbel, represents Texas in 
England, 83, 84, 86, 87, 383; his 
letter to Van Zandt, 87, 88, no; 
to Texan Secretary of State, 89; 
report from, 90; statement to 
Lord Aberdeen, 91 ; remark on 
Texan attitude to England, 96; 
transmits information on anti- 
slavery feeling in England, 117, 
118, 121, 126, 224; his opinion on 
Texan desire for peace, 357 ; on 
Jones's purpose. 375 ; his instruc- 
tions, as Secretary of State, to 
Texan charge at Washington, 379; 
his conference with Guizot, 383; 
quoted on English plans, 391, 403 ; 
returns to Texas, 395 ; appointed 
Secretary of State, 409; his nego- 
tiations with the English and 
French envoys (March, 1845), 409, 
410; opposed to annexation, 409, 
410, 412, note; re-appointed repre- 
sentative to England and France, 
412, 413 ; his report of public senti- 
ment in Texas (April, 1845), 435; 
interview with Donelson, 436; final 
efforts in England and his recall, 

463. 
Smuggling, danger of, in Texas, 94, 

134, 144, 230. 290, 291, 418, 421. 
Sonora, revolt in, 46, 48. 
Sources, The, i, note; appendix. 
" South, The, in Danger," Walker's 

pamphlet, 312. 
South, the political strength of, 104; 

sentiment of, regarding annexation 

of Texas, 104, 105, 301. See also 

Secession and Annexation. 
Southard, S. L., 54. 
South Carolina, secession sentiment 

in, 205 ; favors sectional Congress, 

208. 
South Carolinian, 205. 



492 



INDEX. 



Soutlieni Press, Washington, 208. 

Southwest, secession movement in, 
207. 

Southwest Territory, 285. 

Spain. Mexican revolt against, 1-3. 

Spectator, Washington. 183, 205, 259, 
300. 

Spencer, J. C, opposes annexation, 
106. 

Standard, London, 466. 

Stephens, Alexander H., opposes 
annexation treaty, 278. 

Stevenson, F. B., 308. 

Stockton, R. F., scheming of, 447, 
448; cautioned, 448. 

Sumpter Volunteers, 210. 

Stin, New York, on annexation of 
Texas, 73. 

Tabernacle, New York, meeting in, 
opposing annexation, 191. 

Tamaulipas, State of, 11; war in. 47: 
plan to unite with Texas, 48. 

Tampico, rebellion at, 46. 

Tappan, Benjamin, publishes docu- 
ments accompanying treaty, 225 ; 
censured, 225, note. 

Tappan, Lewis, at anti-slavery con- 
vention, London, 116. 

Tariff, as a factor in the Texas ques- 
tion, 94, 97, 134, 142, 143, 144, 185, 
350; an issue in the Presidential 
campaign of 1844, 298, 314, 316. 

317- 

Taylor. Zachary, his orders for con- 
duct of troops on Mexican 
frontier. 227. 

Telegraph, Houston, 180, 260, 263. 
350. 443, 459. 

Tennessee, favors annexation of 
Texas, 72. 

Tennessee Supreme Court. Chief 
Justice of, quoted. 32, 53. 

Teran. See Mier y Teran. 

Terrell, G. W., Texan minister to 
England and France, opposes an- 
nexation, 369, 370, 405, 433. 

Texas, outline of early history of. 
3-13: declaration of independence 
from Mexico. 13-18; western 
boundary, 19; David Burnet, first 



President of, 20, 34 ; review of 
causes of the revolution, 20-33 '> 
Houston elected President, 35 ; 
Lamar elected President, 35 ; finan- 
cial conditions of Texas in 1839 
and 1840. 36; relations with north- 
ern Mexico, 36 ; with New Mexico, 
27; Houston re-elected, 38; Mexi- 
can hostilities, 38; futile attempt to 
invade Mexico, 39 ; condition of 
Texas in 1842, 39-42 ; Judge Robin- 
son's scheme, 42-45 ; truce and pro- 
posed armistice, 43, 44; possibili- 
ties of aid from the United States 
or Europe, and of union with re- 
volting provinces in northern 
Mexico, 45-51 ; recognition by the 
United States, 52-63; efforts for 
annexation, 63-66; fluctuations of 
feeling on both sides, 66-75 J Texas 
a menace to the United States, 75, 
220 ; recognition by France, Hol- 
land, and Belgium, 76; by England. 
79 ; discussion of English relations, 
76-97 ; proposition for triple inter- 
position by England, France and 
United States. 84 ; outlook and aim 
of, 98-100 ; abolition movement in, 
111-115; Houston declares subject 
of annexation dropped for time 
being, 121 ; conflict of English in- 
fluence and annexation sentiment, 
122-155; reply to overture of 
United States, 155 ; declaration of 
desire to join the Union, 161 ; 
coadjutor to Van Zandt appointed, \/ 
162 ; alliance with the United States 
suggested, 162 ; proposed armistice 
fails, 172, 173 ; apparent willingness 
to join United States, 173; annexa- 
tion treaty signed, 176; result for 
Texas of ^~~Tef3at, 279, 280; 
Texan sentiment, 338. 357-36o; 
influx of immigrants, 363 ; renewed 
Iiopes of English aid, 364 ; demands 
protection from United States, 
365 ; Jones becomes President, 373 ; 
report of Senate committee on 
Foreign Relations regarding an- 
nexation, 378; resolution offered 



INDEX. 



493 



in the House, 378, 379; joint reso- 
lution disappointing- to Texans, 
379. 380 ; sentiment inclines again 
to maintain independence, 381, 432 ; 
influences on other side, 433 ; tide 
of immigration, 434 ; intense feel- 
ing in favor of annexation, 435 ; 
lynching of Jones suggested if he 
opposes, 441 ; Congress called to 
consider proposals from the United 
States, 442 ; special convention 
called, 444 : military protection 
asked. 445 ; campaign on Mexican 
frontier proposed, 446-448; final 
contest with British and Mexican 
influence, 450-453 ; Congress meets 
and accepts American resolution, 
456; rejects proposed treaty with 
Mexico, 456; convention meets and 
v.^votes for annexation, 456-461 ; the 
vote on annexation, 460, note ; final 
action of United States Congress 
admitting Texas as a State, 466- 
468; inauguration of State admin- 
istration, 468. See also Houston, 
Annexation, Mexico, Great Brit- 
ain, and Truce. 

"Texas and Oregon," 318. 

Texas National Register, on condi- 
tions in northern Mexico, 48; on 
Texan feeling. 338 : on terms 
oft'ered by the United States. 380; 
on maintaining independence, 380, 
381 : on annexation, 443. 

"Texas or Disunion," 204-213. 

Thiers, L. A., on policy of French 
caliinet regarding Texas. 387. 397, 
399. 

Thomasson, W. P.. on aimexation, 
302. 

Thompson. G. L., special mission to 
Mexico. 184, 189. 288. 289, 292. 293, 

295- 

Thompson. Waddy, on recognition of 
Texas, 58; on annexation, 68, 301. 

Tibbatts, J. VV., offers resolution for 
annexation,. 327. 

Times, Galveston, 44. 

Times, London, slanders the Ameri- 
can cabinet, 21 ; opinions of its 



correspondent at New York, 32, 33, 
66, 302, 402; on Texas fleet, 40; 
favors a barrier against the United 
States, 78; abuses Captain Elliot, 
81; reports Morpeth's speech, 116; 
unfriendly toward United States, 
232 ; annexation issue unimportant 
in United States, 299; reviles the 
Americans, 303; abuses and 
threatens the United States, 325, 
334; advises Texas to refuse an- 
nexation, 364 ; ridicules Calhoun, 
401 ; tries to browbeat France, 405 ; 
on the attitude of Mexico, 422 ; 
insults the United States, 466. 

Times, Texas, on English anti- 
slavery influence, 114. 

Tontine. Philadelphia, Texas meet- 
ing at, ^,2. 

Tornel, J. M., 8, 9, 44, 196; cries for 
war, 425. 

Treaties : concerning purchase of 
Louisiana, 5, 7; of Floriila, 5-7; 
commercial treaty with Texas 
rejected by Senate, 71 : treaties be- 
tween England and Texas, 80, 81, 
83 : treaty of annexation between 
United States and Texas, prepara- 
tion of, 172-178; terms of, and 
documents accompanying, 223, 224; 
discussion of, 258-272; vote on, 
in Senate, 273 ; reasons for defeat 
of, 273-279 ; results for Texas and 
United States, 279, 280. 

Tribune, New York, 72, 131, 133, 135, 
144, 181, 183, 225, 229, 256, 261, 
272, 297, 304, 306, 316, 339, 346, 
347, 348, 380, 464. 

Tripartite agreement planned between 
United States, Mexico, and Eng- 
land, 109. 

Triple interposition for Texas, J\, 
84. 

Tropic. New Orleans, 96. 112. 113. 
136. 

Troup, G. M., on abolition of slavery 
in Texas, 121 ; on annexation, 206. 

Truce, lietween Mexico and Texas. 
43. 44 (and note") ; ended liy Mex- 
ico, 363. 



494 



INDEX. 



True Sun, 144. 

Tyler, John, his character, loi, 102; 
his political difficulties, 102; his 
attitude on annexation of Texas, 
103-111, 115, 117, 118, 120-123, 126- 
130, 199; receives private informa- 
tion of British designs, no, 117, 
121 ; reference to Texas in his 
Messages, 130, 137, 158; his fear 
of English interference in Texas, 
153; unfavorable to Calhoun's ap- 
pointment as Secretary of State, 
174; clamor against his plans re- 
garding annexation, 183, 192; his 
attitude towards Mexico, 198; 
change of front on annexation 
matters, 199-220; prospects for re- 
election as President, 218, 219; his 
Message to Senate, accompanying 
annexation treaty, 221-223; further 
comments, 227-229; his impeach- 
ment demanded by several news- 
papers and persons, 229; presents 
additional Messages, 230, 232; his 
hostility to Van Buren, 234; his 
re-nomination, 247, 248; general 
unwillingness to allow him credit 
for acquiring Texas, 277 ; his Mes- 
sage to House of Representatives 
urging action on annexation, 281, 
282 ; his confidence in the Demo- 
crats, 299; withdraws from cam- 
paign, 309, 310; Messages, Decem- 
ber, 1844, urging annexation, 322; 
further action, 352, 353; view of 
his course in the matter, 469. 

" Tyler and Texas," 192, 221, 248, 

259- 

Tyler Central Committee, 219, 247. 

Uncle Tom's Cabin, 4. 

Union, Nashville, 215, 246. 

United States, surrenders territory 
beyond Sabine River, 5, 6; treaties 
with France and Spain, 5, 6; 
efforts for purchase of Texas, 8, 9; 
question of responsibility of the 
United States for Texan revolu- 
tion, 20-33; recognition of inde- 
pendence of Texas, 52-62; cool- 
ness toward Texas, 63-74; reject 



annexation plan, 68; menaced by 
Texas, 75, 220; English feeling 
towards, regarding cotton indus- 
try, etc., and slavery, 85-91 ; atti- 
tude of, towards Texas, compared 
with that of England, 95, 97; 
growth of annexation sentiment 
in, during Tyler's administration, 
ior-146; overtures to Texas re- 
garding annexation, 128, 147 ; diplo- 
matic discussion with England 
concerning Texas, I5i-i53; bill 
proposing annexation before Texas 
Congress, 160; negotiations pro- 
ceed with privacy, 170; strong 
feeling on both sides, 170, 171; 
annexation treaty signed, 176; 
prospects of ratification, 176, 177; 
action of the press, 180-188; 
charges of private financial inter- 
est, 188, 189; attitude of Congress, 
191 ; feeling against British inter- 
ference, 192 ; attitude toward 
Mexico, 194-197; messenger des- 
patched to Mexico, 198, 199; dis- 
cussion of annexation as related to 
slavery, secession, etc., 202-219; 
resume of ways in which Texas 
was a menace to the United States, 
220; continued discussion of 
treaty, 221-233; annexation ques- 
tion and Presidential campaign of 
1844 as affecting each other, 234- 
257; the condition of trade with 
Texas, 261 ; defeat of treaty, 258- 
273 ; relations with Mexico contri- 
buting to this result, 273-277; des- 
patch to charge at Mexico, con- 
cerning annexation, 288, 289; 
offer of payment for just claims, 
289; relations with England, 392; 
with France, 397-402; determina- 
tion to resent foreign dictation, 
413 ; question of recognizing Texan 
charge appointed after vote for 
annexation, 464; talk of rescinding 
annexation measure, 464; but gen- 
eral acquiescence, 465, 466; action 
of Congress admitting the new 
State, 466-468; summary of the 



INDEX. 



495 



course of the United States, 468, 
469. See also House of Represen- 
tatives, Senate, and Tyler. 

United States bank, 108, 147. 

United States Gazette, publishes 
letter on prospects of treat}-, 171 ; 
on Van Buren's position, 244. 

Upshur, A. P., appointed Secretary 
of State, no; his interviews with 
Van Zandt, Texan charge, 117, 
118; his communications to Mur- 
phy regarding British plans, 119- 
124; his instructions to Everett, in 
London, 124-126; his canvass of 
the Senate on annexation, 127 ; 
notice to Van Zandt of readiness 
to consider treaty of annexation, 
128, 147; instructions to Murphy, 
150. 157-159; his decisive despatch 
in Texas, 163, 164; his death, 169; 
references to his policy and 
opinions regarding Texas, 194, 
207. 208 ; his conversation with 
Almonte, 194, 195. 

Van Buren, Martin, undertakes to 
purchase Texas. 9 ; his views on 
annexation, 63, 65. 105 : mention of, 
185, 192, 216, 217; named by many 
State conventions as Presidential 
candidate. 1844. 234 : strong oppo- 
sition to, 234-239 ; declares against 
immediate annexation. 242-244 ; 
storm of criticism aroused, 246; 
fails of nomination in national 
convention, 248 : his influence 

. against annexation, 259; his view 
on relations of Texas and Mexico, 
277; refuses to change his attitude 
on annexation. 307 ; influences 
Locofocos, 465. 
Van Zandt, Isaac, quoted. 41 ; instruc- 
tions as Texan charge at Washing- 
ton, 70; important letter to. from 
Ashbel Smith, 87, 88, no; presents 
subject of annexation, 107; de- 
sires appointment of Upshur as 
Secretary of State, no; his opin- 
ion on state* of feeling between 
United States and England, in; 
interviews with Upshur. 117, 118; 



letters to Jones on annexation, 122, 
147 ; refrains from communicating 
terms of Texan reply to American 
overture and resubmits the case, 
156, 157; possible intention to defy 
Houston, 161, note; continues san- 
guine, 169; his opinion on an alli- 
ance, 169; is directed to make an- 
nexation treaty with the United 
States, 172; his reports of its 
terms, 176, 223; of its chances, 272; 
of annexation sentiment notwith- 
standing its defeat, 279; of pros- 
pect of admission by action of 
Congress, 281 ; of combining the 
Oregon and Texas questions, 350; 
his resignation, 356, 360. 

J'eracrucaiio, EI, 425. 

Veracniaano Libre, El, 426. 

Vermont, protests against annexa- 
tion of Texas, 67, 135. 

Victoria, Guadalupe, President of 
Mexico, I, 417. 

Virginia, sentiment in, on annexa- 
tion, 207 ; on secession, 209. 

Voz del Pueblo, La, 426. 

Walker, R. J., on Texan prospects, 
52 ; his resolution on recognition, 
56. 57, 62, 63 ; suggests purchase of 
Texas, 64 ; reference to, 70 ; his 
Letter urging annexation, 140- 
144; labors for annexation, 162, 
184. 200, 207, 300; said to be inter- 
ested in Texan properties, 189 ; 
Sedgwick's reply to his arguments. 
190; works for Tyler's withdrawal. 
309; his pamphlet. "The South in 
Danger," 312; helps Polk in 
Penna., 1844, 314; has Benton's 
bill attached to Brown's annexa- 
tion resolution, 343, 345. 

Walsh, Mike, 323. 

Ward. H. G., his action in Texan 
afi'airs. 8. 22. 

Washington. George. 186. 

Wavell, General, visits Texas. 12; 
quoted, 34; his opinion of Santa 
Anna's real wish regarding Texan 
independence. 406. 

Webster, Daniel, on attitude of 



496 



INDEX. 



United States government in Texan 
revohition, 2i, 23, 25, S^, 53; on 
Texan prospects, 49; on recogni- 
tion of Texas, 52, 53, 54. 61 ; gives 
warning of European interference, 
60; quoted on Tjler, 102; resigna- 
tion from Cabinet. 109, no; his 
position on annexation, 106, 127, 
139, 181, 182, 193. ^39, 297, 298, 
324, 468; his effort to secure Cali- 
fornia referred to, 186; his view 
that annexation would not give 
Mexico a casus belli, 194 ; his opin- 
ion on result of election of 1844, 
316. 

Webster-Ashburton treatj', 107, 186. 

Weed. Thurlow, on Presidential 
election of 1844, 317. 

Weller, J. B., his proposition for an- 
nexation, s^/. 

Wentworth. John, 351. 

Wharton, Francis, 254. 

Wharton, William H., 21 ; as Texan 
agent at Washington, proposes 
annexation, 63. 

Whig, Nashville, 298. 

Whig party, 197, 234 ; national con- 
ventiorl of, 1844, 246; silence of, 
on annexation, 256 ; attitude 
toward abolitionists in Ohio, 307 ; 
influences for and against in cam- 
paign of 1844, 311-314; analj'sis of 
result, 315-320. 

Whitman, Walt, quoted, 34. 

Whittier, John G., quoted, 193. 

Wickliffe, C A., confidential agent in 
Texas to counteract the efforts of 



England and France against an- 
nexation, 447, 448, 453. 

Williams, S. AL, Texan commissioner 
to Mexico, 44, 172, 363. 

Wilmot, David, 214. 

Winthrop, Robert C, defeat of his 
resolution against annexation, 170, 
191 ; on anti-British feeling, 302 ; 
acquiesces in decision for annexa- 
fion, 466. 

Wise, Henry A., on Texan possibili- 
ties, 49; advises annexation, 103- 
105, 130, 131 ; nominated, but re- 
jected, as minister to France, iii; 
secures appointment of Calhoun as 
Secretary of State, 174. 

Woll, General, 44, 363. 

Wright, Silas, moves in Senate to 
provide for Secretary of Legation 
in Texas, 57 ; his opinion on dis- 
union movement, 210; on relations 
of Tyler and Van Buren, 235 ; on 
conditions at Washington, 245 ; on 
Van Buren's defeat, 254; named 
as possible Presidential candidate, 
254; nominated for Vice-President, 
but declines, 255 ; for Governor of 
Xew York, 312. 

Yancey, W. L.. 351. 

Yates, A. J., his letter on abolition 
movement in Texas, 113. 

Yell, Archibald, 354, 434, 440, 441, 
447, 451, 460. 

Yoakum, H. K., quoted, 359. 

Yucatan, secession of, from Mexico, 
8. 42: returns to the Union, 45. 

Zacatecas, State of, 11. 



m. 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

The Troubadours at Home 

2 vols., 8vo, fully illustrated, ^6.00 

An attempt, based upon substantially all the scholarly literature of the sub- 
ject and a study of the local environment, to represent the world in which 
the mediaeval Provencal poets lived, reconstruct their fragmentary per- 
sonalities, and translate their songs in the original metres. 

Quarterly Review, London : "If one wishes to understand 
Provence, . . . his best preparation — by a strange contrast — 
will be through the wide and erudite labors of an American en- 
thusiast. In his two beautiful volumes. The Troubadours at 
Home, Mr. Justin H. Smith has elucidated his vast subject- 
matter with a fulness, a thoroughness and a vivifying sympathy 
which render iiis labour of love a truly valuable production." 

Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec 

With maps and diagrams. 8vo, ^2.00 

A critical study based upon the original sources, many of them previously 
unpublished or inaccurately printed, and upon repeated careful examina- 
tions of the ground. With Arnold's Journal, never before printed, and 
numerous maps, part of them original. 

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science : " No one will gainsay the fidelity with which the 
author has performed his task. ... In the matter of notes and 
citations the recognized canons of scientific historical writing 
are scrupulously observed. Indeed the critical notes are models 
of their kind. . . . The author may rest assured that his work 
will never have to be performed again." 

Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony 

2 vols., 8vo, 315 illustrations, 23 maps, $6.00 

A thorough, fully documented work, based upon all discoverable MS. and 
printed sources and a close study of the ground, fully showing for the 
first time the political state of Canada, 1774— 1783, what was planned and 
done during that period to win the province, the difficulties, the causes of 
failure and the important results. The style of the writing corresponds to 
the character of the persons, events and scenes described, and makes the 
history life-like as well as correct. 

English Historical Review: "An important contribution 
to history." 

y\MERiCAN Historical Review : " We have in these two vol- 
umes a definitive account of the subject." 

Political Science Qu.^rterly : "He has shown by example, 
and that conclusively, how the War of the Revolution should 
be treated if its real character and meaning are to be broueht 
out." 

New York Sun: " An admirable narrative." 
Iowa Journal of History and Politics : "As a whole thor- 
oughly readable and at times dramatic." 

Outlook : " His work is so fresh, so original and so informing 
that it deserves the heartiest of welcomes." 

New York Times : "He has not only conducted a faithful piece 
of research ; he has written an interesting book." 



A-\J 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




I: ill l! ! 



llllllillli'EIJ 



0O03 541 660 2, 



l!H 1 



